Summative Evaluation of the Global Partnership Program

January 2013

Abbreviations, Acronyms and Symbols

Acknowledgements

The Evaluation Division (ZIE), Office of Audit, Evaluation and Inspection (ZBD/ZID), of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), would like to extend its gratitude to the staff and management of the Global Partnership Program for their cooperation and to the Evaluation Advisory Committee for its indispensable guidance and advice. Special acknowledgement is extended to all stakeholders and representatives from the Russian, US and UK government departments and related organizations who agreed to be interviewed for the purposes of this evaluation.

Executive Summary

Introduction

This evaluation of the Global Partnership Program (GPP) was conducted by the Evaluation Division (ZIE), Office of Audit, Evaluation and Inspection (ZBD/ZID), of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), in compliance with the requirements of the Treasury Board (TB) Policy on Evaluation and the Financial Accountability Act for evaluation of all Grants and Contribution (Gs&Cs) programs of the Department. The evaluation is also part of the requirements of the 2008 TB Submission granting funding authorities for Phase III of GPP (2008-2013), and stipulating that a summative evaluation of the of the Program be conducted in the fifth year. The target audience for this evaluation includes the Government of Canada (GoC), DFAIT's senior management, and the Canadian Public.

The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the relevance and performance of GPP and identify lessons learned regarding the efficiency, effectiveness and economy of its delivery.

Background

The Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (WMD) was launched in 2002 at the G8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada. This partnership was established in order to address the risk of non-state and state actors acquiring WMD and related materials left over from the Cold War era. The Kananaskis Summit resulted in the development of a new form of international cooperation in non-proliferation aimed at destroying and/or securing WMD and preventing terrorists and states of proliferation concern from acquiring such materials, primarily in Russia and the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The Partnership managed to raise over $20 billion to support cooperation and programming, with Canada contributing $1 billion over a 10-year period through GPP and its five programming portfolios, reflecting the priorities of the GP declared in Kananaskis, including: 1) Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD); 2) Nuclear-powered Submarine Dismantlement (NPSD); 3) Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS); 4) Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists (RFWS); and 5) Biological Non-proliferation (BNP).

Since 2002, GPP has evolved through a number of phases marked by separate Treasury Board (TB) submissions, amended Terms and Conditions (Ts&Cs), lessons learned from completed projects and initiatives, as well as the recommendations of a number of audits and evaluations completed after each phase.

In June 2009, GPP received policy authorities to expand its programming globally, and in February 2011, the Program pursued and received authorities for a notional allocation of up to $42 million to fund programming in Asia, the Americas, the Middle East, and Africa. These new authorities reflect the decision made by G8 leaders at the 2010 Muskoka Summit to expand GP programming outside of Russia and the FSU.

Evaluation Scope and Objectives

The overall goal of this evaluation was to provide DFAIT's senior management with an evidence-based assessment of the relevance and performance of GPP and its portfolios in accordance with the 2009 TB Policy on Evaluation. Additional emphasis was placed on the value-for-money provided by the Program over the past 10 years. Using a systematic data collection process, the evaluation reviewed the activities and projects implemented under the Program and the respective results achieved. Recommendations were made based on the evaluation findings and conclusions.

Some of the specific objectives of the Evaluation were:

• To determine whether GPP has addressed and continues to address a demonstrable need and is an appropriate and effective mechanism for implementing Canada's commitments to the GP.
• To ascertain whether the program effectively supports GoC in responding to international security concerns.
• To derive lessons learned and best practices which could be applied to future projects as the program expands its geographic scope.

While the evaluation covered the operational period of GPP from its inception (2003 to 2012), particular emphasis was placed on the programming period from 2008 to 2012, analysing the results achieved under Phase III of the Program and the authorities provided by the 2011 TB Submission for a geographic expansion.

Evaluation Approach and Methodology

Given the plurality of programming domains, each with their respective objectives, delivery mechanisms, and challenges, the evaluation tailored its approach, methodology and results reporting frameworks to the unique characteristics of the five portfolios. These included in-person and telephone interviews with 94 stakeholders in Canada, Russia, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), three field visits to Moscow, London and Washington, as well as the review of a considerable number of reports, program documentation, GP related literature, international publications and summit reports.

The evaluation revisited the existing program architecture, governance model, and delivery instruments to ascertain whether they are well suited for and responding to the unique opportunities and challenges associated with the GPP's expanded mandate.

Key Evaluation Findings

Relevance

• While Canada's GPP continues to be relevant to the threats identified by G8 Leaders at the Kananaskis Summit in 2002, there is a clear recognition that the changing nature and geographic scope of the WMD proliferation threat require an adjustment to the evolving priorities of the GP. As the GP member countries continued to implement programming in Russia, it became clear that the nature of WMD proliferation threats was evolving, moving beyond concerns of non-state and state actors' acquisition of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons to potential diversion of dual-use materials and technologies. Furthermore, as these proliferation concerns existed worldwide, GP members realised that non-proliferation programming had to become global in scope to properly address the evolving threat.

  In response to these new challenges, in 2011, GPP received authorities to broaden its geographic mandate and to focus on the new programming priorities, namely BIO, NRS, UNSCR 1540 and SEP, while winding down its commitments to CWD and NSDP in the FSU.

• The Program is relevant to the GOC's priorities in the area of international security and is aligned with Canada's evolving foreign policies, strategies and commitments. GPP is consistent with DFAIT's strategic objectives and directly serves the Department's ongoing priority to contribute to international security through reducing the WMD proliferation threat, contributing to the establishment of better Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) regimes abroad, and developing relationships with new partners The Program also contributes to the promotion of international security through supporting global institutions and partnerships that focus on results, accountability and effective burden sharing in the area of non-proliferation, and on implementing programming that addresses security challenges such transnational crime.
• Ensuring the safety and security of all Canadians and developing and implementing Canada's foreign policy are among the primary roles of the Federal Government of Canada, therefore GPP's delivery is within the responsibilities of the federal government and DFAIT's mandate. GPP has also leveraged the expertise of other government departments to help create a coordinated whole-of-government response to WMD proliferation threats.

Performance: Achievement of Expected Outcomes

As a member of the GP, Canada, through GPP, has made considerable progress toward delivering on all commitments made to Russia and the FSU in Kananaskis, along the five programming streams:

Nuclear Powered Submarine Dismantlement (NPSD) Program

• The NPSD Program achieved all of its declared outcomes, ultimately reducing a serious proliferation and environmental threat to Russia and the international community. The NPSD Program was concluded in November 2011, after having accomplished the recovery of over 8,000 spent fuel assemblies from 35 Russian naval reactors and the full dismantlement of 16 Russian decommissioned NPSs and 2 strategic boats. The fuel assemblies recovered under the NPSD Program resulted in approximately 11 tons of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium being secured, meaning that a serious proliferation threat has been contained and the environmental threat to the shores of Canada and other Artic neighbors significantly reduced.

Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD) Program

• The CWD Program has achieved its short-term objectives in supplying chemical weapons destruction equipment for two facilities in Russia. The Program made significant progress against longer-term objectives contributing to the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons and reduction of security and environmental threats. Canada's and other countries' contribution have helped Russia destroy 64% of its CW, and have contributed to Russia's capacity to meet its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS) Program

• The NRS projects in Russia and the FSU have achieved their objectives and contributed to increased nuclear and radiological security. Canada's support to the nuclear and radiological security agenda in Russia has been significant and second only to that of the U.S. among the GP members, a fact that is well recognized and appreciated by both the Government of the Russian Federation and other GP member countries. The contributions through the NRS have solidified Canada's reputation as a competent, collaborative, and trusted partner. With regard to global expansion, 21 projects dealing with nuclear and radiological security (physical protection upgrades, border security, training, technical assistance) had been proposed since 2011, involving at least 12 different countries. At the time of writing, approximately 12 of the proposed projects had obtained Ministerial approval, including projects in Colombia, Costa Rica, Brazil, Libya, and South East Asia, involving at least 10 countries, and 1 to the Inter Action Council.

Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists (RFWS)/Scientists Engagement (SEP) Program

• The RFWS Program achieved its objectives in Russia and the FSU by redirecting and/or finding employment for FWS through contributions to the two science centres - ISTC in Moscow and STCU in Kyiv, and through direct or jointly funded research undertaken by Russian institutions. Since 2003, GPP, and its RFWS stream in particular, have funded approximately 450 research initiatives and capacity building projects in Russia and the FSU, valued at nearly $100 million. More specifically, Canada sponsored projects in Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan through which 137 scientists were engaged in projects and nearly 4000 scientists received funding to redirect their work. Canada also contributed $1.5 million to the the Closed Nuclear Cities Program (CNCP).

  The status of the future of the Science Centres in Moscow and Kyiv and their slow process of restructuring, has, however, become a major challenge for Canada and in terms of justifying the relevance of the project review and approval processes, as well as the projects proposed for funding. In line with that, Canada's decision to withdraw its support for the ISTC and STCU is seen as being in line with the new GP priorities for scientist engagement beyond the FSU.

Bio Non-proliferation (BNP) Program

• Under Phase I and II, Canada's GPP implemented BNP projects on a small scale under the RFWS portfolio, using the ISTC and STCU as delivery mechanisms in Russia and the FSU, which resulted in positive outcomes for Canada, and for scientists and organizations in the FSU.
• Under GPP Phase III, the major focus of Biosecurity (BIO) programming in the area of physical biosecurity and biosafety improvements was the design and construction of a new Level III biological containment laboratory in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Unfortunately, the project collapsed just before the start of the construction stage. (Further detail provided in Section 7.5.3)
• Overall, the evaluation found evidence that some of the BNP portfolio's activities in Russia and the FSU have contributed to the achievement of results at the level of short-term and medium-term outcomes, especially those related to securing of WMD materials and facilities. The success of GPP's programming in Russia and the FSU was due, in part, to the fact that the Program was able to address multiple facets of the biological non-proliferation issues within one centralized geographic region. However, it was more difficult to determine the extent to which BIO activities have reduced "environmental and health risks stemming from WMD materials," or strengthened "international non-proliferation regimes."
• Although BIO programming on a broader geographic scale has not yet fully unfolded, with only a few projects having received Ministerial approval, a stronger trend to cover multiple activities through various delivery mechanisms rather than to focus on fewer priorities and areas became apparent during the evaluation. This may ultimately diminish the effectiveness of the BIO program and Canada's ability to make a difference in the area of bio security.

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540

• While programming in support of UNSCR 1540 implementation has only recently started, there is evidence of progress and initial results, particularly in establishing the legal framework to support compliance with UNSCR 1540 objectives.

Performance: Demonstration of Efficiency & Economy

• Over the life of the GPP, the Program was able to achieve its objectives on time and at a cost roughly 15% below budget. Further, these were achieved with an administrative overhead of around 10%, which is acceptable for a program as large and complex as the GPP.
• The management structure under GPP Phases I, II & III was supportive of the effective delivery of projects and achievement of results in Russia and the FSU. In response to the challenges of the geographic expansion, the Program has initiated revisions to this management structure; however, its effectiveness could not be assessed by this evaluation due to the absence of sufficient implementation evidence. Similarly, the development of frameworks to support programming on a global scale were still works in progress at the time of the evaluation.
• Project planning during Phases I, II and III was rigorous, which contributed to the efficiency and effectiveness of program delivery by portfolio. Programming outside Russia and the countries of the FSU will however introduce new planning challenges, including the need for a more structured project review and country selection process.
• The risk management strategies developed over time for the GPP and each specific portfolio have proven to be robust and effective for the programming activities undertaken in Russia and the FSU. Global expansion is expected to expose Canada to new risks which will have to be respectively managed, e.g., countries with which Canada has no bilateral agreements, new recipients of varying institutional capacity, untested implementing partners, and unstable or insecure implementing environments. Therefore, some of the strategies will need to be updated to respond to the different types of risks associated with global expansion.
• While information management systems developed by SPMs during the study period were determined to be adequate, global expansion will require a more integrated information management system.
• Though the return on investment in WMD non-proliferation is difficult to quantify in monetary terms, GPP contributions to avoid a catastrophic event precipitated by the use of WMD for malicious purposes were overall deemed to be good value for money.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This evaluation found sufficient evidence that during the past nine years, GPP had managed to deliver on all its commitments and has achieved its intended outcomes in Russia and the countries of the FSU within budget and schedule, thereby providing evidence of exemplary planning, risk management, and comptrollership over the resources at its disposal.

In addition to the specific WMD threat reduction achievements of its varied portfolios, GPP has made significant contributions to the long term capacity of Russia and other FSU countries to dispose of WMD material and maintain the security of sites housing such materials. Additionally, GPP has enhanced Canada's standing in the international community as a leader in WMD non-proliferation and strengthened Canada's bilateral relationship with Russia and other GP Partners, notably the US and the UK.

Despite challenges related to the new departmental project approval process, the evaluation noted progress in programming outside of Russia and the FSU in conformity with the GP vision and GPP's new expanded geographic mandate. Measures to establish the administrative infrastructure to support programming globally, however, were still works in progress.

Based on the above findings, observations and analysis, the evaluation recommended the following to help improve the relevance and performance of the Program during its global expansion mandate:

1. That GPP Management, following consultations with all relevant intra- and inter- departmental stakeholders, establish a governance framework to provide policy advice and strategic guidance to GPP programming and support the coordination among DFAIT's Security programs.
2. That GPP establish strategic frameworks for the leading and cross-cutting thematic program domains/portfolios.
3. That IGA establish a Program Risk Framework with respective Risk Mitigation Strategies which take into consideration the new risk profile related to geographic expansion.
4. That GPP accelerate efforts to develop an integrated records management system that will integrate financial and program data to facilitate reporting on performance and results at the portfolio and program level.
5. That GPP develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to guide the implementation of the program and specific projects under the new thematic and expanded mandate.

1.0 Introduction

The Evaluation Division (ZIE) at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) is mandated by Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) through its Policy on Evaluation (effective 1 April, 2009) to conduct evaluations of all direct program spending of the Department, including Grants & Contributions programs. ZIE reports to the Departmental Evaluation Committee (DEC) chaired by the Deputy Ministers and the Associate Deputy Minister of the Department.

The Evaluation of the Global Partnership Program (GPP) is part of the approved Five-Year Evaluation Plan of the Department. Consistent with the TBS Policy, the purpose of this evaluation was to assess the relevance and performance of GPP and identify lessons learned regarding the efficiency, effectiveness and economy of its delivery. The target audiences for this evaluation are the Government of Canada (GOC), DFAIT's Senior Management and the Canadian public.

1.1 Background and Context

The Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (WMD) was launched in 2002 at the G8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada. This partnership was established in order to address the risk of non-state and state actors acquiring WMD and related materials left over from the Cold War era. The Kananaskis Summit resulted in the development of a new form of international cooperation in non-proliferation aimed at destroying and/or securing WMD and preventing terrorists and states of proliferation concern from acquiring such materials. To this end, the GP raised over $20 billion to support cooperation and programming, including $10 billion from the United States (US),$2 billion from Russia, and $1 billion from Canada.^{Footnote 1} Since 2002, 17 additional countries have joined the GP, increasing the total number of members to 25.^{Footnote 2}

The initial focus of GP programming was on addressing proliferation and security risks in Russia and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). These countries were identified as major sources of WMD and related material and knowledge, the security of which had been compromised by the dissolution of the FSU and the ensuing financial crisis. More specifically, GP member states identified four priority areas for programming in Russia and the FSU: i) destruction of chemical weapons; ii) dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines; iii) disposal of fissile materials; and iv) employment of former weapons scientists (FWS).

Shortly after the GP was established, its members committed to periodically examine the progress achieved in planning and implementing cooperation projects, as well as to review priorities and ensure alignment between programming activities and international security objectives. At the 2007 G8 Summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, for example, it was remarked that the GP, while remaining committed to fulfilling its objectives in Russia, had to evolve in order to respond to new and emerging security threats worldwide posed by terrorists, other non-state actors and states of proliferation concern seeking to acquire chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.^{Footnote 3} At this Summit, G8 leaders also encouraged GP member states to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540.^{Footnote 4} At the 2008 G8 in Toyako, Japan, the GP member states agreed to include new recipient and donor states accepting the GP Principles and Guidelines on a case-by-case basis to help address WMD proliferation risks worldwide.^{Footnote 5}

In 2010 at the Muskoka Summit in Canada, G8 leaders acknowledged the progress made in achieving the objectives in Russia declared at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit, particularly in the areas of chemical weapons destruction and the dismantlement of nuclear powered submarines, and again encouraged the GP to expand its membership as a means of facilitating global programming.^{Footnote 6} More importantly, leaders acknowledged the continuing threats posed by global WMD proliferation, and recognized the importance of the Global Partnership continuing its joint efforts to address them in the years ahead. Senior experts were asked to evaluate the results of the Global Partnership to date, as a point of departure for developing options for programming and financing beyond 2012, focusing on nuclear and radiological security, bio security, scientist engagement and facilitation of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, as well as the potential participation of new countries in the initiative.^{Footnote 7} At the Deauville Summit in France in 2011, GP member states declared that the priorities identified at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit for Russia had largely been met and recommended that the mandate be extended beyond 2012 with renewed emphasis on global expansion.^{Footnote 8} Moving forward, the GP confirmed the four new priority areas identified in Muskoka:

• nuclear and radiological security;
• biological security;
• scientist engagement; and
• implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540.

1.2 Canada's Global Partnership Program

1.2.1 Program Mandate and Objectives

Following the Kananaskis summit in 2002, the GoC pledged up to $1 billion over 10 years and established the GPP within DFAIT to manage the delivery of this commitment. The overarching mandate of the GPP from its inception has been to reduce the threat posed by weapons and materials of mass destruction and related expertise to Canadians and the international community. This mandate has been pursued by implementing projects in cooperation with G8 countries and members of the GP, initially in Russia and FSU and, since 2009, in other geographic regions as decided on a case-by-case basis. Phase III of the Program (2008 to 2013) aimed to achieve the following outcomes:

Short- and medium-term outcomes:

• Destroyed WMD and related materials;
• Secured WMD materials and facilities;
• Increased sustainable employment for FWS;
• Reduced environmental and health risks; and
• Accrued industrial and scientific benefits to Canada

Expected long-term outcomes include:

• Reduced threat of WMD to Canadians and Canadian interests;
• Strengthened international non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD)regime and a more secure international environment; and
• Enhanced international image and prestige of Canada through international cooperation and coordination of activities.

1.2.2 Evolution of GPP Programming Portfolios

Over the past 10 years, GPP has implemented its mandate through a number of program portfolios that align with the thematic priorities of GP. During the course of the Program's implementation, new portfolios have been created to respond to evolving international security priorities and existing portfolios have been condensed and wound down as expected results were achieved and international commitments delivered.

Initial GPP programming was implemented under four portfolios reflecting the priorities of the GP declared in Kananaskis, including: 1) nuclear and radiological security (NRS); 2) chemical weapons destruction (CWD); 3) redirection of former weapons scientists (RFWS); and 4) nuclear-powered submarine dismantlement (NPSD). A fifth programming portfolio, Biological Non-proliferation (BNP), which was originally pursued under the RFWS portfolio, was added to the GPP suite of programming portfolios in 2007.

GPP was also charged with administering Canada's contribution to the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) and the Chornobyl Shelter Fund (CSF), both managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The NSA was established in 1992 to address nuclear safety concerns in Central and Eastern Europe and other FSU countries arising from Soviet era nuclear power plants. The CSF was established to address ongoing nuclear safety and environmental issues stemming from the 1986 explosion at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the Ukraine.

Following the Deauville Summit in 2011, GPP added support for the implementation UNSC Resolution 1540 as a sixth programming portfolio. With the winding down of its programming in support of nuclear power submarine dismantlement and chemical weapons destruction in Russia, GPP in 2012 again restructured its suite of programming portfolios, retaining NRS and BNP as discrete programming domains, with BNP being renamed to Biological Security (BIO). The RFWS was renamed and re-focused on Scientist Engagement (SEP) and Countering WMD knowledge proliferation. SEP and the UNSC Resolution 1540 were cast as "cross-cutting" programming domains that support and complement initiatives implemented under the NRS and BIO portfolios. Some residual chemical weapons destruction work continues to be implemented in Russia and Libya by the 1540 programming unit.

1.2.3 Evolution of GPP Funding Authorities

Since 2002, GPP has evolved through a number of phases marked by separate Treasury Board (TB) submissions, amended Terms and Conditions (Ts&Cs), lessons learned from completed projects and initiatives, as well as the recommendations of a number of audits and evaluations completed after each phase. Funding for the first five years of the Program (2003/04 to 2007/08) was allocated through a TB submission in 2003. Subsequent TB submissions established a special GPP Project Fund and provided authorities for the Program to undertake projects in the original four priority areas.

Following the positive findings of a 2007 Summative Evaluation, covering Phase I & II of GPP, TB approved Phase III of GPP in June 2008, including new Ts&Cs permitting contributions to be made to multilateral, intergovernmental and international institutions, and other G8 and GP governments for initiatives related to the destruction, disposal and securing of WMD and/or related material, equipment, technology and expertise.

In June 2009, the GPP received policy authorities to expand its programming globally in line with the decisions of the Toyako Summit. Approval was given for the use of up to $50 million in remaining GPP funding for threat reduction programming in countries and regions outside the FSU. Later in 2009, TB also approved the expenditure of $39 million for the construction, commissioning and certification of a bio-containment facility in the Kyrgyz Republic pursuant to the Ts&Cs of Phase III of GPP. The amount was subsequently increased to $57 million.

In February 2011, GPP pursued and received authorities for a notional allocation of up to $42 million to fund programming in Asia, the Americas, the Middle East, and Africa. These new authorities reflect the decision made by G8 leaders at the 2010 Muskoka Summit to expand GP programming outside of Russia and the FSU.

1.3 Program Resources

At the outset of GPP, Canada's $1 billion commitment over ten years was distributed between the original four programming priorities as follows:

• Nuclear-powered submarine dismantlement - $300 million
• Destruction of Chemical Weapons - $300 million
• Nuclear and Radiological Security - $160 million
• Redirection for Former Weapons Scientists - $180 million

These were notional allocations (including $60 million for Operating Costs) and, as the Program evolved, they were reviewed and adjusted on an ongoing basis to better reflect the changing needs and evolving priorities (e.g., BNP programming).

Phase III of GPP (2008 to 2013) received approved funding to the amount of $457 million over a period of 5 years based on the following sources:

• funds earmarked in the fiscal framework for GPP, including funds in the International Assistance Envelope (IAE) - $369 million;
• funds earmarked in the fiscal framework for Plutonium Disposition - $65 million; and
• funds from the existing DFAIT's reference levels for the GPP - $23 million.

Table 1 presents the notional^{Footnote 9} allocations to Vote 10 made under GPP Phase III ($million).^{Footnote 10} The amount allocated under Vote 1 - Operating Costs was $64,123,500 and $300,000 were allocated to Vote 5 - Capital budget.

Much of the funding for Phase III has been allocated to projects similar to earlier program activities, which had been well-defined under the previous phases. A degree of flexibility was, however, provided under Phase III to allow the Program to better respond to emerging opportunities and priorities as changes occur to the threat assessments or the international situation. As a result, the budget for Phase III did not provide a detailed account of future or additional projects. It was agreed that further details would be determined as part of the annual GPP priority review process and approved according to the Program's Project Approval Process.

1.4 Implementing Mechanisms and Partners

The GPP uses a variety of mechanisms to implement projects abroad, including:

• Multilateral Delivery Mechanisms
• Bilateral (third country) Delivery Mechanisms
• Bilateral Recipient Delivery Mechanisms

Examples of multilateral delivery mechanisms include the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the EBRD. Bilateral (third country) delivery mechanisms include the US, the United Kingdom (UK), and Norway. Bilateral Recipient Delivery mechanisms were used in Russia and the Kyrgyz Republic. Going forward, the geographic expansion of GPP's programming will provide further opportunities for expanding the membership and scope of the GP as well as identifying new partners.

1.5 Program Governance

The Global Partnership Program Bureau (GPX, later IGX)^{Footnote 12} was established at DFAIT in September 2002 under the authorities of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Program continues to be managed exclusively by DFAIT. In 2010, IGX was replaced by the Major Programs Division (IGD), which brought the GPP, the Capacity Building Programs Division and the International Crime and Terrorism Division under one Director General who reports to the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM), International Security Branch (IFM). In 2012, the Bureau was again renamed to become the Non-proliferation and Security Threat-Reduction Bureau (IGD), with the Global Partnership Program Division (IGA) housed within it.

Until June 2012, the Director General of Non-proliferation and Security Threat-Reduction Bureau IGD was supported by two GPP Directors and a Senior Policy Advisor responsible for corporate affairs and communications activities. One of the Directors (IGA) was responsible for the BNP portfolio, as well as Program Policy and Finance. The other GPP Director (IGB) was responsible for the CWD, RFWS, NRS, NPSD, CSF portfolios as well as Human Resources activities. One of the Director positions was cut in 2012 as a cost saving measure in response to the Departmental Contribution to Canada's Deficit ReductionAction Plan (DRAP).

Since the inception of the Program, each portfolio has been managed by a Senior Program Manager (SPM) with a small staff of Project Officers (PMs) and, where necessary, contractors with specialized expertise. Until 2012, the Program had six SPMs, however, as a result of the latest restructuring of the Program, including the transformation of the SEP and the UNSCR 1540 portfolios to crosscutting initiatives in support of BIO and NRS, as well as the completion of the NPSD Program and the winding down of CWD, the number of SPMs was reduced to three in the Summer of 2012.

Up until 2010, the GPP's policy and programming was guided by two Advisory Groups comprised of senior officials from a wide range of Other Government Departments (OGDs) and chaired by the Director General, IGX: The Global Partnership Advisory Group (GPAG) and the Science, Technology and Trade Advisory Group (STTAG). The mandate of the GPAG was to provide policy advice and ensure that relevant Canadian interests and priorities were reflected in the selection and delivery of GPP projects. The STTAG provided a forum for discussing the international science, technology and trade-related aspects of the RFWS/SEP envelope in order to ensure that projects involving former weapons scientists reflected Canadian priorities for Research and Development (R&D). These advisory groups were disbanded in 2010 because they were deemed to be inefficient and not contributing to the direction of the Program.

Program Support Services

At DFAIT headquarters in Ottawa, GPP was supported by the Programming Services Division (IXS), which was responsible for corporate planning and reporting for DFAIT's International security programs. IXS acted as a centre of programming excellence by promoting coherent and consistent management practices; providing financial and program management support; assisting in the development of performance measurement tools; and compiling best practices. Through IXS, GPP received the full-time support of senior level Counsel from the Department of Justice for all legal matters, policy issues with legal implications, negotiation support, and review services for legal documents. IXS was disbanded in 2012 as part of the Canada's Deficit ReductionAction Plan.

In addition to the support received from IXS in Ottawa, GPP maintained a small presence in Moscow with dedicated staff assigned to the Canadian Embassy, including one Canada-based staff (CBS) and four Locally-engaged staff (LES).^{Footnote 13} These officers provided assistance to GPP managers and contractors, including support in the conduct of site visits, monitoring of projects, provision of project management support, liaising with contractors, communicating with the representatives of the Russian government and business officials, and analysing and reporting on changes in Russia's policy that could affect project implementation and results. With the winding down programming in Russia, a decision was made in the summer of 2012 for the closure of the Moscow office.

2.0 Evaluation Objectives and Scope

2.1 Evaluation Objectives

The overall goal of this evaluation was to provide DFAIT's senior management with an evidence-based assessment of the relevance and performance of GPP and its portfolios in accordance with the 2009 TBS Policy on Evaluation. Additional emphasis was placed on the value-for-money provided by the Program over the past 10 years. Using a systematic data collection process, the evaluation reviewed the activities and projects implemented under the Program and the respective results achieved. Recommendations were made based on the evaluation findings and conclusions.

The specific objectives of the Evaluation were:

1. To determine whether GPP has addressed and continues to address a demonstrable need and is an appropriate and effective mechanism for implementing Canada's commitments to the GP.
2. To ascertain whether the program effectively supports GoC in responding to international security concerns.
3. To determine the extent to which the GPP is consistent with and supportive of DFAIT's priorities and objectives, as well as, where relevant, the priorities and objectives of partners and beneficiaries.
4. To determine whether GPP and its sub-programs contribute to the realisation of declared outcomes.
5. To determine whether the current systems of governance and resource allocation are optimal or whether there are more effective or economical ways to achieve the same results.
6. To derive lessons learned and best practices which could be applied to future projects as the program expands its geographic scope.

2.2 Evaluation Scope and Focus

While this evaluation covers the operational period of GPP from its inception (2003 to 2012), attention is directed to the operation period 2008 to 2012 and the contributions made and results achieved under the GPP's Phase III TB Submission and the authorities provided by the 2011 TB Submission related to geographic expansion.

3.0 Key Considerations

3.1 Geographic Expansion and Evolution of Priorities

An assessment of the relevance and success of the Program to date is particularly timely as the Program transitions to a worldwide mandate from its initial experience in Russia and some countries of the FSU. Since September 2009, GPP has been operating under amended Ts&Cs allowing programming activities that address WMD activities worldwide. With Phase III authorities expiring in March 2013, lessons learned and best practices derived from the evaluation will inform future programming activities under renewed authorities.

To account for this shift in the geographic scope of the Program, the evaluation reviewed the existing project and management frameworks and their applicability to smaller projects in countries where GPP has not had previous programming experience and where recipients may not be fully committed to the goals of the GP. The evaluation also considered the extent to which GPP has collaborated with and leveraged the experience and expertise of Canada's network of missions abroad, other programming and policy divisions within DFAIT, and OGDs with relevant experience in the area of WMD for the purpose of implementing the global expansion of the Program.

3.2 New Departmental Requirements for Project Approval and Implementation

In implementing projects under its Global Expansion mandate, the Program has had to adjust to new departmental practices and procedures for the approval of projects. Project proposals must receive approval from the Minister of Foreign Affairs prior to the negotiation of any legal instruments (e.g., Implementing Arrangements, Contribution Agreements, Supply Arrangements, etc.) with implementing partners. As a result, the Program has had to adopt a more flexible approach to strategic planning and program implementation. This was key consideration in the assessment of the Program's performance.

4.0 Evaluation Complexity & Strategic Linkages

4.1 Multiple Thematic Portfolios

In order to respond to the priorities of the GP, GPP has delivered on Canada's commitments through the development of large thematic portfolios for programming and project implementation. The activities implemented under each portfolio are diverse in terms of size, complexity and delivery mechanisms. In assessing the relevance and performance of the GPP, the evaluation team had to examine the issues of relevance and performance at the level of each portfolio prior to integrating this information to speak to the relevance and performance of the Program as a whole.

4.2 Geographic Expansion and the Evolution of the GPP's Mandate

As noted in the Background section, GPP was developed to implement Canada's commitments under the Global Partnership, with Russia and the FSU being the countries of initial priority. Over time, the GP has identified new priorities in response to the evolving nature of threats to international security posed by the proliferation of WMDs. As a result, GPP has been in the process of completing the delivery of its original programming commitments while establishing new programming streams, identifying new programming opportunities, and developing a plan for future programming. These changes have added to the complexity of the evaluation in that the evaluation had to assess not only the results achieved by a mature Program, but also the means through which the Program has adapted to changing priorities. The Program now finds itself in a relatively novel programming context requiring increased emphasis on strategic planning and strategies for the establishment of new programming relationships.

4.3 Stakeholder Engagement and Coordination

With GPP now increasingly implementing projects on a global scale, the need for cooperation and collaboration with other DFAIT Security Programs, as well as departmental policy shops that work with non-proliferation issues has become substantial.

Increased communication among capacity-building programs such as the Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program (ACCBP), the Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP), and the Security Programs falling under DFAIT's Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), is becoming necessary in order to ensure complementarity among these programs, leverage established programming relationships and share best practices.

The Program has also started building broader relationships with experts from other government departments (OGDs) that possess domestic expertise relevant to GPP programming, but lack an international mandate, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Public Safety Canada (PS), the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), to name a few. As such, the evaluation directed attention to how the Program has addressed these coordination challenges and capitalised on related opportunities.

4.4 Trade Promotion and Business Development

Although not among the core objectives of GPP, the Program has implications for the Department's trade promotion objectives and priorities under the Global Commerce Strategy as well as Departmental objectives in the area Science, Technology and Innovation. Canada is one of the world's largest producers of uranium.^{Footnote 14} Projects implemented under the NRS portfolio have the potential to help brand Canada as a responsible trading partner for radiological materials and promote better trading relationships with countries that have had difficulty securing and/or disposing of spent radiological materials, including countries in priority regions such as Asia and the Americas. Accordingly, the evaluation sought to assess the extent to which GPP has positioned itself to capitalize on the commercial benefits for Canada through its programming.

5.0 Evaluation Approach & Methodology

The following section outlines the approach used by the evaluation team to assess the evaluation issues and questions. To answer the evaluation questions, the evaluation team applied qualitative and quantitative data analysis approaches using multiple lines of evidence including literature reviews, file and document reviews, interviews with key stakeholders and field visits.

5.1 Evaluation Approach

Given the plurality of programming domains, each with their respective objectives, delivery mechanisms, and challenges, the evaluation tailored its approach, methodology and results reporting frameworks to the unique characteristics of the five portfolios. Further, as stated at the outset, the evaluation focused its attention on GPP Phase III, and in particular on the transition to an expanded geographic reach under the Geographic Expansion mandate granted to the Program in February 2011. The evaluation revisited the existing program architecture, governance model, and delivery instruments to ascertain whether they are well suited for and responding to the unique opportunities and challenges associated with the GPP's expanded mandate.

5.2 Evaluation Matrix

An Evaluation Matrix was developed based on the evaluation issues and questions documented in the evaluation Terms of Reference (TORs) and on the input received from Departmental stakeholders. The Evaluation Matrix sets out the evaluation issues, the related questions, associated performance indicators, data sources, and data collection techniques. The Matrix serves as the main tool for designing the data collection instruments and reporting on the evaluation findings.

5.3 Evaluation Methodology

5.3.1 Primary Data Collection

Key Informant Interviews

In person and telephone interviews were conducted with approximately 94 stakeholders, including representatives from a large number of Canadian and international organizations, such as:

United States

• Department of State (DOS)
• Department of Defense (DOD)
• National Security Council (NSC)
• Department of Energy (DOE)
• Stimson Centre
• Cooperative Threat Reduction Support Centre (CTRSC)
• Gregg Security Services

Russian Federation and Ukraine

• Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (MOD)
• International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC)
• Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine (STCU)
• Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation (ROSATOM)
• Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute (PNPI)
• Institute for Theoretical and Experimental Physics (ITEP)
• Russian Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF)
• Eleron Special Scientific and Production State Enterprise (Eleron)
• Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation (MINTPROMORG)
• Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (KIAE)

United Kingdom

• Ministry of Defense (MOD)
• Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
• Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC)
• Closed Nuclear Cities Program (CNCP)

France

• World Organization of Animal Health (OIE)

Switzerland

• World Health Organization (WHO)

Field Visits

Given the nature, scope and sensitivity of the issues to be examined, as well as the need to assess achieved results, the evaluation team conducted three filed visits to the US, UK and Russia. These visits facilitated the collection of data and evidence related both to the relevance and performance of each programming portfolio and the Program as a whole. The opportunity to conduct in-person interviews with partners, stakeholders and beneficiaries allowed for a more reliable assessment of the effectiveness of GPP and the projects implemented in Russia and the FSU.

5.3.2 Secondary Data Collection

File and Document Review

Relevant files, documents and literature were reviewed to assess the relevance and performance of GPP and the individual portfolios. These included descriptive and analytical reports and studies, previous program audits and evaluations, relevant planning and scoping documents, progress reports, communication plans, strategies and tools, business plans, memorandums, minutes of meetings, briefing notes, agreements, decision papers, publications and other policy documents.

Literature Review

The evaluation team also reviewed reports and publications of other countries, partners and beneficiaries, academic institutions and think-tanks, which helped to better understand the rationale for each sub-program (portfolio).

6.0 Limitations to Methodology

While the methodological approaches used were adequate to report on the relevance and performance of GPP, there were, nonetheless, certain limitations inherent in the evaluation methodology. These limitations and the respective mitigating measures adopted are briefly described below:

Attribution of Results and Success

The growing scope and increased membership of the GP, as well as the implementation of joint projects, e.g., Canada with the US (NRS and NPSD projects, Russia, US and UK (CWD projects), Japan and Korea (NPSD and rail road construction in the Far East), makes the attribution of success to Canada's efforts a challenge. To overcome this challenge, the evaluation team used multiple lines of evidence, including documentary evidence (partner reports, international publications), as well as feedback from key partners (US and the UK) with knowledge of and experience in working with other partners on GPP projects.

Access Restrictions

The time required to follow standard processes for gaining access to secure sites where Canada has implemented programming through GPP made it infeasible for the evaluation team to conduct site visits for the present evaluation to observe the results achieved through key projects. To overcome this challenge, the evaluation team met off-site or conducted telephone interviews with Russian representatives. Additionally, the evaluation team relied on documentary evidence (partner reports, international publications), as well as the feedback of other partners with knowledge of and experience with the relevant project beneficiary.

Time and Budgetary Constraints

Owing to time and budgetary constraints, the evaluation team was unable to meet with representatives from several key multilateral partners e.g., OPCW, IAEA, OIE and WHO. To overcome this challenge, the evaluation team leveraged the resources of the Department's recipient audit team to obtain relevance and performance data from OIE and WHO.

International Comparison

Again, short time frames did not allow for a comparative analysis of Canada's performance with that of other GP member states. To overcome this challenge, the evaluation team relied on the feedback from contractors and independent consultants who had worked with other partners on projects in Russia and the FSU. Additionally, the evaluation team relied on annual GP Working Group reports which outlined the financial and in-kind contributions of member countries.

Global Expansion

The evaluation was undertaken at a time of transition for the GPP from its historical focus on Russia and the FSU to a program of global reach. Much of the GPP's planned projects under the Global Expansion are in a nascent stage of implementation such that there is insufficient results data to assess the performance of projects implemented under the geographic expansion of the Program. Additionally, Global Expansion has triggered a major re-organization of the GPP in terms of its programming portfolios, governance structures, implementation mechanisms, and policies and procedures, all of which are in various stages of development and implementation.

Given the above, the evaluation team placed emphasis on factors that could promote the achievement of results once the final approval for project implementation is received, including:

• Alignment between the GPP's proposed programming, Canada's international commitments and the priorities of the Global Partnership;
• The extent to which lessons learned in Russia and best practices of other international security programs have been incorporated into the planning process; and
• The extent to which opportunities for synergy between GPP streams and other international security programs at DFAIT have been explored and leveraged.

7.0 Evaluation Findings

The following findings are based on the triangulation of information from relevant literature, project documents and file reviews, key stakeholder interviews and field visits. Some issues raised under the Relevance section are also applicable to the Program's performance, as many evaluation findings speak to both evaluation issues to varying degrees.

7.1 Relevance Issue 1: Continued Need for the Program

Finding 1:
Canada's Global Partnership Program (GPP) continues to be relevant to the threats identified by G8 Leaders and the commitments made by the Global Partnership (GP) at the Kananaskis Summit in 2002.

Although preventing the proliferation of WMDs has preoccupied the international community for decades, the events of 9/11 and evidence that terrorist groups had previously attempted to obtain and use WMDs underscored the urgent need for global cooperation in securing and destroying the world's stockpiles of WMDs. In response to this threat, the G8 leaders established the GP to "prevent terrorists, or those who harbor them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials equipment, and technology."^{Footnote 15}

At the time the GP was formed, it was recognized that the threat of WMD proliferation was most acute in Russia and the countries of the FSU. Insufficient funding and inadequate maintenance of physical protection systems for facilities housing chemical, nuclear and radiological materials increased the risk of sabotage or theft. Decaying Soviet-era nuclear submarines powered by highly enriched uranium and lighthouses powered by highly radioactive materials posed both security and environmental threats for Russia and its neighbors in the Arctic. There was also serious potential that unemployed and underemployed former weapons scientists and engineers in the FSU, numbering in the tens of thousands, could be tempted to sell their expertise to malicious actors.

Most importantly, Russia lacked the capacity to address these issues and meet its international obligations without assistance from the international community. Accordingly, GP member states pledged funds to support "specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues."^{Footnote 16} The following priorities were identified by the Government of Russia (GoR) and the GP to help guide the implementation of cooperation projects:

• Dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines;
• Destruction of chemical weapons;
• Redirection of FWS; and
• Securing and disposal of nuclear and fissile materials.

The sections below provide a more detailed review of how GPP has responded to the need to address key WMD proliferation threats in Russia and the countries of the FSU.

7.1.1 Relevance of GPP Commitments to Russia and the FSU

Nuclear Powered Submarine Dismantlement Portfolio (NPSD)

At the time the GPP was created, Russia possessed approximately 200 decommissioned nuclear powered submarines (NPSs) from its North Atlantic and Pacific fleets awaiting dismantlement and defueling. These submarines contained on average two reactors fueled by Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Most of these submarines were in an advanced state of decay and poorly protected, thus posing not only a nuclear proliferation risk, but also a serious environmental threat to the Arctic and Pacific ecosystems. In 2002, GoR expressly sought assistance from the international community under the GP. Canada, through the GPP, allocated close to $300 million for the dismantlement of Russia's decommissioned nuclear submarines.

During the first year of the Program, the NPSD portfolio also contributed $32 million to the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP), a program of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to address radioactive and hazardous waste issues in Northern Russia and the Arctic.

Between 2004 and 2010, GPP implemented projects focusing on the defueling and dismantlement of submarines in the Zvyozdochka shipyard in North West Russia. This shipyard was selected based on the potential threat posed to Canada's shared Arctic marine ecosystems and the capacity of the shipyard to support the dismantlement and defueling process, including the available workforce and appropriate physical infrastructure. The US had previously made improvements to the shipyard's physical infrastructure and had established a modern land-based defueling facility, providing an opportunity for Canada to leverage existing experience and infrastructure and coordinate activities with international partners.

Between 2008 and 2012, projects were implemented to facilitate the transportation, defueling and dismantlement of Yankee Class submarines at the Zvezda shipyard in Far Eastern Russia, along with a contribution to the construction of an 18 km railway to facilitate the transportation of spent nuclear fuel from the shipyard. This shipyard was selected based on the presence of a similar class of submarines to those dismantled in North West Russia, which provided an opportunity for Canada to leverage the experience gained through previous GPP projects and maximize the results achieved with the remaining funds.

Chemical Weapons Destruction Program (CWD)

Under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) administered by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), state parties^{Footnote 17} are required to destroy their chemical weapons stockpiles in an environmentally friendly manner. Russia was reported to possess the largest stockpile of chemical weapons in the world, amounting to 40,000 metric tons of deadly nerve agents (Sarin, Soman, VX) and blister agents, such as mustard and lewisite. An initial deadline for these activities was set for 2007, with the possibility of a 5 year extension.^{Footnote 18} Although Russia ratified the CWC in 1997, it became clear by 2002 that Russia would need support in order to meet the CWD deadline. G8 Leaders identified the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia as a key priority for the GP and emphasized the need for international assistance to enable Russia to fulfill its obligations under the CWC. Owing to capacity challenges in disposing of its stockpiles of chemical weapons, in 2007 Russia was officially granted an extension to April 2012 by the OPCW.

Under the GPP's CWD portfolio, Canada contributed to the construction of two chemical weapons destruction facilities (CWDFs) at Shchuch'ye and Kizner by providing critical equipment and contributing to the development of key infrastructure, such as railways and early warning systems. Shchuch'ye and Kizner were considered priorities for Canada since they housed Russia's most lethal and human-portable stock of dangerous nerve agents, thus posing a considerable threat to international security.

Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists (RFWS)

Following the dissolution of the FSU, tens of thousands of former weapons scientists (FWS) and engineers with knowledge of how to design, build and deliver WMDs became unemployed or underemployed and therefore less able to support themselves and their families. Under such circumstances, it was feared that some of these scientists might be tempted to sell their expertise to terrorist organizations or countries of proliferation concern. This threat was exacerbated as Russia was unable to maintain funding for research activities in the closed nuclear cities and restrictions on the movements of scientists with sensitive knowledge and expertise were gradually being reduced. Engaging FWS in peaceful projects and creating opportunities for sustainable employment was identified as one of the four GP priorities at the Kananaskis Summit to help address this concern.

Canadian contributions to this programming domain were primarily made through two non-proliferation science centres: the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science and Technology Centre in Kyiv, Ukraine (STCU). These inter-governmental non-proliferation institutions coordinated the efforts of numerous Western governments, international organizations and private sector industries to provide FWS with opportunities to undertake research in collaboration with scientists from around the world.

As part of its involvement with the ISTC and STCU, Canada's FWS programming sought out Canadian individuals, institutes, NGOs and companies to act as partners to each centre. These partners would directly fund or co-fund Research and Development (R&D) projects involving FWS. Canada also funded workshops organized by the ISTC and STCU that provided a forum for Canadian businesses and organizations to meet with FSU scientists, exchange information and explore opportunities for future collaboration, thereby contributing to a reduction of the proliferation risks.

In addition to the ISTC and STCU, Canada also provided funding to the UK Closed Nuclear Cities Program (CNCP), which similarly engaged scientists in Russia's closed cities.

Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS)

The vast stockpiles of nuclear material inherited by Russia from the Cold War era posed a considerable proliferation threat. Of these stockpiles, only 25% were estimated to be properly secured against sabotage or theft, thereby presenting an enormous risk to the security of both Russia and the international community. The magnitude of the threat was underscored by reports of nuclear material theft in the FSU and several high-profile seizures of FSU material in Europe during the early 1990s. In 1993 alone, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs reported 8,793 crimes involving the theft or sale of numerous types of potential WMD materials, including nuclear substances.^{Footnote 19} Between 1993 and 2002, the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) logged over 500 state-confirmed cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, the vast majority of which could be traced to Russia.^{Footnote 20}

It was against this backdrop that Canada responded by creating the Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS) portfolio under GPP, which addressed the issue through six areas of programming: 1) Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials; 2) Radiological Security 3) Plutonium Disposition 4) Border Security and Prevention of Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Material; 5) Secure Transport of Nuclear Material and 6) Contributions to the International Funds and Organizations. The major programming themes pursued under each portfolio are described below.

Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

Through GPP, Canada partnered with the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of Russia (Rosatom) to upgrade the security at six facilities housing vulnerable weapons grade (IAEA Category 1) nuclear materials. Activities such as upgrading the access controls and detection capabilities were implemented with the intention of bringing these facilities in compliance with IAEA security standards.

Radiological Security

Radiological Security programming implemented by GPP focused primarily on the security of Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs), which use highly radioactive material as a power source for lighthouses in remote coastal regions of Russia. In 2000, the GoR acknowledged the serious security and environmental hazard posed by these RTGs, estimated at approximately 1000 in number, to both Russia and its Arctic neighbors, and declared its commitment to decommission these RTGs and to replace them with alternative power sources (APS).

Canada initially responded to this threat by contributing to the development of Russia's RTG Master Plan, led by the Kurchatov Institute, a Russian research and development institution in the field of nuclear energy. The RTG Master Plan made a full inventory of the RTGs, noting their location and condition, which helped to define the scope and amount of the work necessary for their dismantlement and disposal. Canada further supported, in cooperation with Norway and the US Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)^{Footnote 21}, the removal of RTGs. Additionally, Canada contributed to the manufacture of shielded containers and sling sets (VNIITFA) used to transport the decommissioned RTGs to designated sites for disassembly and disposal.

Plutonium Disposition

The GPP's Plutonium Disposition programming primarily supported the implementation of the Russia-US Plutonium Disposition Agreement, which called for the destruction of surplus stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium. Under the NRS programming portfolio, Canada contributed to a US-led project, completed in cooperation with five other donors, to shut down Russia's last functioning plutonium production facility at Zheleznogorsk. Canada further contributed to the construction of a fossil fuel plant to replace the former facility, which was the only source of electricity for the town. This programming stream also supported the installation of physical security upgrades at four plutonium storage facilities which had all been deemed to be non-compliant with IAEA security guidelines. Additionally, Canada provided specialized railcars and other vehicles needed to safely transport special nuclear material for storage and disposition.

Transportation Security

Nuclear materials are often vulnerable to theft during transportation, when fewer layers of protection are in place and back-up response units are often far away. The GPP successfully completed four projects to enhance the safe and secure transportation of nuclear materials in Russia by providing special cargo trucks and locomotives. Additionally, Canada partnered with the United States Department of Energy (US DOE) to construct a Counter-Terrorism Training Centre in Abramova, Russia, to provide specialized training to MoD personnel on the protection of nuclear materials in transit.

Border Security and Prevention of Illicit Trafficking

The Washington Nuclear Security Summit Work Plan (2010) highlighted potential threats arising from unsecured transport and transfer of nuclear materials and called on GP member states to strengthen transport security for nuclear materials, both within countries and across borders.

The illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials was recognized as another serious proliferation threat and the Ukraine was identified as one of the most vulnerable countries. Between 1993 and 2005, the ITDB reported over 60 cases of the illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological material along Ukraine's borders.^{Footnote 22} Canada partnered with the US DOE's Second Line Defense Program (SLD), which works to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials through securing international land borders, seaports and airports that may be used as smuggling routes for radiological materials.^{Footnote 23}

GPP Contributions to International Funds and Organizations/ Nuclear Safety/ Chornobyl

In order to support the improvement of nuclear and radiological security in the FSU and around the globe, Canada contributed funds to key international organizations and initiatives, including the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund (NSF), the Nuclear Security Account (NSA) and the Chernobyl Shelter fund (CSF). In addition, Canada contributed to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)^{Footnote 24} and to the InterAction Council, which is an independent international organization made up of former heads of state and government dedicated to fostering international cooperation and action on such issues as international peace and security, world economic revitalization and universal ethical standards. The GPP's contribution to the InterAction Council supported the development of the Hiroshima Declaration, which focused on potential acquisition and use of WMD.

The NSF was established by the IAEA in 2002 to support the implementation of activities under its Nuclear Security Plan (NSP), which supports global efforts to achieve effective nuclear safety and security practices worldwide through capacity building, guidance, human resources development, and risk reduction. Projects under the IAEA's NSF support a wide range of activities, including, but not limited to, physical protection and border security upgrades, securing dangerous and highly radioactive sources, and nuclear and radiological security training. A key benefit of working through the IAEA is that it permits Canada to implement projects in countries of the FSU with whom it does not have relevant bilateral agreements, Examples include physical security upgrades (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Azerbaijan), border security (Ukraine), source recovery (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine), and security training (Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Uzbekistan). The NSF is dependent on donations for extra budgetary funds by IAEA member states. Examples of activities outlined in the 2012-2013 NSP include the conduct of needs assessments, the development and distribution of guidance materials to states seeking to enhance their nuclear security practices, improvements to nuclear security related infrastructure, and the provision of technical assistance to help states meet and implement their obligations under international instruments related to nuclear security.

The NSA was established in 1992 as part of a G7 initiative to address nuclear safety concerns regarding Soviet-designed nuclear power plants in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as other FSU countries. The NSA is managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The NSA now exclusively funds site remediation projects at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant. The Chornobyl Shelter Fund, also managed by EBRD, was established in 1997 as part of a G7 initiative to better contain the Chornobyl accident site, which is currently protected by a hastily built sarcophagus in an advanced state of decay. It is estimated that more than 200 tons of highly radioactive uranium and close to one ton of radio nuclides remain at the original shelter site underneath the sarcophagus, posing a continued threat to the environment and to human health.^{Footnote 25}

The CSF finances the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP), a nuclear safety initiative that aims to reduce the collapse probability of the sarcophagus, to improve nuclear safety and existing monitoring systems in Ukraine, and to implement a long-term strategy for converting Chornobyl into an environmentally safe site. The SIP's core project involves the construction and implementation of a New Safe Confinement (NSC) to contain the Chornobyl accident site for the next 100 years.

Biological Non-Proliferation (BNP)

Although Biological Non-Proliferation (BNP) was not officially identified as a programming priority in 2002, owing mainly to strong objections by Russia, the GP committed to implement "concrete national and international steps to expand or initiate new bio-surveillance capabilities to detect terrorist attacks, improve prevention and response capabilities, increase protection of the global food supply, and respond to alleged uses of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease."^{Footnote 26}

Early BNP programming under GPP was conducted primarily through the RFWS portfolio. Canada was able to negotiate a separate funding stream for bio-related projects through the ISTC and STCU. Through the science centres, GPP contributed to the development and distribution of international standards and guidelines for biosafety and biosecurity, the integration of scientists into the international biosafety community, the provision of training through workshops and conferences, and implementation of facility upgrades in target countries.

In 2007, BNP became a separate programming portfolio. Under Phase III, the BNP portfolio allocated funds for the construction of a new biological human and animal health laboratory in the Kyrgyz Republic in response to the potential threat from the deliberate or accidental release of dangerous infectious diseases (e.g., anthrax, plague) from poorly-secured biological laboratories in the Region. Existing facilities in Kyrgyzstan stored significant quantities of various dangerous biological agents. However, many of these biological agents presented serious risk of loss, theft or diversion, as they were stored without proper security, safeguards or means of transport. High levels of poverty, the proximity of the Kyrgyz Republic to countries of proliferation concern and active terrorist groups in the Middle East and Asia, and the existence of known trafficking routes through the country further contributed to the identification of the Kyrgyz Republic as an area of particularly high risk for the proliferation of biological weapons and related expertise.

In addition to the development of a bio-containment laboratory, the BNP portfolio committed to implement interim security upgrades to existing labs in the Kyrgyz Republic. Of note, these upgrades, completed in 2009, played a key role in preventing unauthorized access to one of these facilities (and the dangerous pathogens stored within) in June 2010, during a period of civil unrest. BNP also implementeda range of complementary smaller projects to support or supplement the development of the new laboratory, including the development of a regional biosecurity association.

In sum, the GPP and its portfolios have been relevant to the threats and priorities identified at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit. The content of the Program's main portfolios has responded directly to WMD proliferation threats in Russia and the countries of the FSU, as well as requests for international support and assistance. GPP has addressed these issues through implementing projects in cooperation with Russia and other states, particularly the US and the UK, in accordance with the founding principles of the GP.

7.1.2 Relevance of GPP's Global Expansion

Finding 2:
GPP has been responsive to the changing nature and geographic scope of the WMD proliferation threat and to the evolving priorities of the Global Partnership.

As the GP member countries continued to implement programming in Russia, it became increasingly clear that the nature of WMD proliferation threats was evolving, moving beyond concerns of non-state actors acquisition of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons to potential diversion of dual-use materials and technologies. Furthermore, as these proliferation concerns existed worldwide, GP members realised that non-proliferation programming had to become global in scope to properly address the evolving threat. The need to adjust programming to respond to this evolving threat environment was formally affirmed at the 2007 G8 Summit in Heiligendamm, and the 2008 G8 Summit in Toyako.

At the Deauville Summit in 2011, GP members acknowledged the "concrete and measurable" results that had been achieved in Russia and stated that the priorities identified at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit would largely be accomplished by the end of the Global Partnership's initial mandate in 2012.^{Footnote 27} A decision was made to renew the mandate and objectives of the Global Partnership by expanding its geographic scope and refining its thematic priorities, focusing specifically on the four areas identified during the Muskoka Summit:

• nuclear and radiological security;
• biosecurity;
• scientist engagement; and
• implementation of UNSCR 1540.

In response to these new challenges, in 2011, GPP received authorities to broaden its geographic mandate and to focus on the new programming priorities, namely BIO, NRS, UNSCR 1540 and SEP, while winding down its commitments to CWD and NSDP in the FSU. GPP's response to these evolving needs and priorities is discussed in greater detail below.

Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD)

Russia, with the help of its international partners, is successfully advancing with the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpiles. Although these stockpiles are not expected to be completely destroyed by 2015, key informants within GPP and partners in Russia, the US and the UK indicated that Russia has built the capacity to complete the destruction process without further international assistance. Even though Russia had indicated at the Deauville Summit that it could benefit from additional international assistance to complete the CW destruction process, Canada, as well as other GP member states, decided to focus their attention on more vulnerable states possessing poorly protected CW stockpiles.^{Footnote 28} In recognition of the fact that there is a reduced need for international assistance to support chemical weapons destruction in Russia, a decision was made by GPP to no longer maintain CWD as a core programming stream. Going forward, CWD programming will be part of the new UNSCR 1540 portfolio.

As additional parties accede to CWC, opportunities may arise for the GPP to implement further CWD programming outside of Russia on a case-by-case basis. Libya, for example, acceded to the CWC in 2004 and declared that it possesses stockpiles of chemical weapons, including 24.7 metric tons of sulfur mustard, 1390 metric tons of precursor chemicals and 3563 unloaded chemical munitions, in addition to 3 former chemical weapons production facilities.^{Footnote 29} The destruction of these stockpiles began in October 2010, but the process was halted in February 2011 due to Libya's internal conflict and the fall of the Gaddafi regime. In November 2011 and February 2012, Libya's new government declared a previously unreported stockpile of chemical weapons, including several hundred munitions loaded with sulfur mustard and a few hundred kilograms of sulfur mustard in plastic containers, along with its readiness to accept international support for the destruction of these stockpiles.^{Footnote 30}

In October 2011, Canada made a voluntary contribution of $6 million through OPCW to support the efforts of the Libyan government in completing the destruction of their chemical weapons stockpile. The OPCW committed to use Canada's funding for: 1) Project management and training of personnel to operate the destruction facility, 2) Purchase of equipment and related materials for destroying sulfur mustard agent and chemical weapons munitions stored at the Ruwagha depot, 3) Provision of support services for OPCW on-site inspectors at Ruwagha.

Need for chemical weapons destruction support has also become apparent in Iraq, which acceded to the CWC in February 2009, and subsequently declared two bunkers with filled and unfilled chemical weapons munitions and precursor chemicals, as well as five former CW production facilities.^{Footnote 31} Iraq is currently in consultations with representatives from the US, Germany and the UK to discuss options for eliminating its chemical weapons stockpiles.

Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRS)

The IAEA estimates that approximately 50% of the global supply of weapons-usable nuclear materials exists in civilian stockpiles, including 132 civilian HEU reactors, 51 of which are outside the FSU.^{Footnote 32} Furthermore, vulnerable radiological sources that could potentially be used to construct radiological dispersion devices (RDDs) or "dirty bombs" exist worldwide, including 220 in Latin America, 100 in the Middle East and North Africa, and 600 in Asia.^{Footnote 33} There is also evidence of continued attempts by non-state actors to traffic nuclear and radiological materials. Between January 1993 and December 2011, a total of 2164 incidents involving the illegal possession, trafficking, theft or loss of nuclear or radiological materials, including 20 incidents involving HEU, were reported to the IAEA's ITDB.^{Footnote 34} As a result, the decision was made to direct NRS programming to new geographic regions of concern that lack the capacity and resources to address outstanding nuclear and radiological security issues without international assistance.

Since 2011, 21 projects dealing with physical protection upgrades, border security, training and technical assistance, have been proposed for approval, involving over a dozen different countries, including Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Sudan, Libya, South Africa, Morocco, Malaysia, and Turkey. These countries were identified by the international community as requiring assistance in dealing with vulnerable sources of nuclear and radiological materials. Consistent with the global expansion mandate of GPP, the NRS portfolio continues to provide support to multilateral initiatives such as the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS)^{Footnote 35}. GPP has also contributed funds to the GTRI to support the conversion and repatriation of HEU at two sites outside of Russia: the Da Lat reactor in Vietnam; and the Salazar reactor in Mexico.

In addition, Canada contributed to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)^{Footnote 36} and to the InterAction Council, which is an independent international organization made up of former heads of state and government dedicated to fostering international cooperation and action on such issues as international peace and security, world economic revitalization and universal ethical standards. While it is presumed that Canada's contribution to the InterAction Council relates to the "peace and security" agenda, the relevance of this contribution to furthering the mandate of the NRS is not patently obvious.

Scientist Engagement Portfolio (SEP)^{Footnote 37}

While concerns about the unemployed and underemployed FWS continue to exist in Russia and the FSU, the GP has started directing its efforts and focus toward the changing nature of the WMD knowledge proliferation, and more specifically the threat from the intentional or unintentional dual-use of the expertise of scientists, engineers and technicians around the world for malicious purposes. In 2009, the Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG) noted the need for increased emphasis on education and training to raise awareness among scientists about the potential dual-use applications of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear expertise, with the objective of increasing awareness of WMD knowledge proliferation risks and fostering a sense of professional responsibility.

As noted above, GP officially endorsed Scientist Engagement as a programming priority at the 2011 G8 Summit in Deauville, stating that a "renewed Global Partnership could continue to serve as an important mechanism for global scientist engagement." Suggested objectives for ongoing programming in this area included promoting awareness and responsibility among Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) scientists; engaging CBRN experts in civilian public health projects; promoting best practices and collaboration; developing a safety and security culture; and promoting responsible access to CBRN knowledge and technology.^{Footnote 38} Specific projects were envisioned to include the promotion of scientist engagement and delivery of training through regional CBRN centres of excellence and existing international mechanisms.

In line with the evolution of the GP priorities and new programming objectives for scientist engagement, the GPP's RFWS portfolio was re-named the Scientists Engagement Portfolio (SEP) in 2011. According to its updated mission statement, the GPP's SEP was to focus on building awareness, capacity, and collaboration among global scientists and experts to strengthen international security and the sustainable use of critical chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives (CBRNe) science. To achieve this outcome, SEP committed to work with a range of multilateral, governmental and NGOs, centres of excellence and civil society organizations to implement projects in the following areas:

• Promoting awareness and outreach to identify and address the risks associated with the accidental or deliberate proliferation of CBRN knowledge; and,
• Fostering education and best practices in CBRN security through training and mentorship projects.

While SEP continues to work on identifying new projects that target critical CBRN knowledge and proliferation concerns on a global scale through alternate mechanisms and partners, such as WINS and the Landau Network Centro Volta, the SEP has been cast as a cross-cutting initiative in support of the NRS and BNP portfolios.

Biological Security (BIO)

Due to advances in biotechnology, the increased availability of dual-use materials and the ease with which biological agents can be transported undetected across borders, the threat posed by bioterrorism is seen as increasingly significant. Bio-agents are stored in facilities that conduct critical research, diagnostic and confirmatory testing and disease surveillance activities that are essential for public and animal health. The physical security of these facilities, however, varies across the globe. Furthermore, many countries in Central Asia, Africa, Asia and South America lack the public health infrastructure necessary to identify, track, report and respond to suspicious incidences of illness that might suggest an attack with biological weapons, which increases the potential impact of an attack and places other regions of the globe at risk. The inability to readily detect the theft of biological materials combined with the proximity to known trafficking routes and the ease with which biological materials can be transported further heighten the risks that an act of bioterrorism may occur.

As noted above, Canada's GPP implemented a stream of biological non-proliferation projects in FSU partner countries that focussed on enhancing biological security, strengthening multilateral biological non-proliferation initiatives and engaging former biological weapons scientists. During Canada's G8 Presidency in 2010, GPP developed a new 5-pillared strategy for Strengthening Global Biological Security (SGBS), and was successful in having Biological Security recognised at Muskoka as a Priority for future GP programming.

The GP formally endorsed biosecurity and global expansion as new forward-looking programming priorities at the G8 Summit in Deauville in 2011. The following five priorities for biosecurity programming were established in the SGBS, and formally endorsed at the 2012 G8 Summit in Camp David:

1. Secure and account for materials that represent biological proliferation risk;
2. Develop and maintain appropriate and effective measures to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the deliberate use of biological agents;
3. Strengthen national and global networks to rapidly identify, confirm and respond to biological attacks;
4. Reinforce and strengthen biological non-proliferation principles, practices and instruments, and;
5. Reduce proliferation risks through the advancement and promotion of safe and responsible conduct in the biological sciences.

In accordance with the above, greater emphasis was placed on promoting biological security and the name of the portfolio was changed to the Biological Security Portfolio (BIO). In accordance with the SGBS strategy, the GPP's BIO portfolio implements projects in countries of bioterrorism and biological proliferation concern to address a broad range of risk factors to reduce the potential of terrorists acquiring biological weapons and materials. These Projects cover all three stages of prevention, detection, and response and include programming to i) improve biological security (e.g., enhancing the security and safety of existing collections of dangerous pathogens through improvements to laboratory infrastructure and provision of equipment and training), ii) manage biological risks (e.g., Supporting the development and implementation of biosafety, biosecurity and bio-containment guidelines and standards, legislation and best practices) and iii) detect and report deliberately caused disease (e.g., strengthening regional and sub-regional disease surveillance and detection networks and supporting the gathering of epidemic intelligence). BIO has lead GP efforts to strengthen ties with relevant international organisations, and has forged active and effective partnerships with key multilateral partners such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and INTERPOL.

To date, Biological Security projects have been approved for countries in Western and Eastern Africa, Central America and the Caribbean for the provision of equipment and training, security upgrades for existing facilities, promotion of sustainability of biosecurity improvements and development of regional centres of expertise.

A major challenge for the BIO portfolio, however, will be to ensure a consistent link between its programming activities under the geographic expansion and the non-proliferation objectives of the GP. Clear roles and responsibilities will need to be delineated between DFAIT and other departments and agencies whose mandates touch on biological security issues, such as Health Canada, PHAC, and Public Safety. This clarity is particularly important in the case of projects that seek to strengthen public health infrastructure in regions where there is a presence of naturally occurring pathogens of proliferation concern (e.g., Africa, South America, and Central Asia) but the risk of bioterrorism is low.

UNSCR 1540

As remarked earlier, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) places binding obligations on all UN State Members to take measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, and establish appropriate domestic controls over related materials to prevent their illicit trafficking. As opposed to other international instruments that focus on the activities of state actors, UNSCR 1540 emphasizes the need to prevent WMD proliferation by non-states actors by imposing civil and criminal liabilities. More specifically, the resolution obliges States to:

• Refrain from supporting non-state actors in developing, acquiring, transporting or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or their means of delivery;
• Adopt laws prohibiting the development, acquisition, transport, or use of nuclear chemical or biological weapons or their means of delivery;
• Prohibit attempts to engage, assist, or finance non-state actors in carrying out the above activities;
• Implement effective border controls and law enforcement measures to combat trafficking; and
• Implement effective national export laws and domestic regulations to combat illicit proliferation.

A special UNSCR 1540 Committee was established in New York to track the implementation of the Resolution by UN Member States, which were asked to submit a report within 6 months of the adoption of the Resolution detailing the progress achieved. Although the initial mandate of the Committee was to last for just two years, the mandate of the Committee was extended to 2012 through subsequent resolutions in light of widespread lack of capacity among UN Member States to implement the requirements of the Resolution. For example, as of April 2011, only one third of UN Member States had implemented any measures relevant to UNSCR 1540 pertaining to biological weapons.^{Footnote 39}

Section 7 of UNSCR 1540 states that the UN Security Council "Recognizes that some states may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests…" to fulfill the requirements of the Resolution.^{Footnote 40} The Resolutions subsequent to UNSCR 1540 place increasing emphasis on the need to provide assistance to states that lack the capacity to implement the requirements of the Resolution and promote the implementation of coordinated assistance efforts through bilateral agreements; regional programs; regional, sub-regional and multilateral organizations; and civil society organizations. Between 2009 and 2011, formal requests for assistance were submitted by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Côte D'Ivoire, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guatemala, Iraq, Madagascar, Mexico, Mongolia, Qatar, Serbia and Uganda. During this time, two regional organizations, the Caribbean community (CARICOM) and the Central American Integration System (SICA) also submitted requests for assistance.^{Footnote 41}

The implementation of UNSCR 1540 became a new priority for GP programming at the Muskoka Summit. The Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG) suggested that the renewal of the GP and the identification of new priorities could provide an opportunity for GP members to, upon request, provide assistance to countries that currently lack the capacity to implement the requirements of UNSCR 1540 through the provision of training, expertise and equipment. Under its renewed priorities and global expansion, Canada's GPP has provided UNSCR 1540 assistance for programming that addresses two key areas of need: the development of legislative and regulatory frameworks to address the legislative aspects of the Resolution; and training of first responders to address the enforcement aspects of the Resolution. For example, first responders training to a CBRNe threat is provided by the Canadian National CBRNe response team under an MoU with DFAIT to States requesting this training. Assistance in developing and implementing legislation and regulatory frameworks is implemented through contributions to the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), an independent, non-profit organization that supports the development, implementation and verification of international agreements.

7.2 Relevance Issue 2: Alignment with Government Priorities

Finding 3:
GPP is relevant to the GOC's priorities in the area of international security and is aligned with Canada's evolving foreign policies, strategies and commitments.

Protecting the security of Canada and Canadians within a stable global framework is a key objective of Canada's foreign policy. GPP is one of Canada's strategic instruments for mitigating long-term WMD proliferation and terrorism threats to both Canada and Canada's allies and for implementing Canada's international commitments pertaining to non-proliferation and disarmament. The Program directly supports Canada's commitments to international treaties and disarmament initiatives, such as:

• the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
• the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention;
• the Chemical Weapons Convention; and
• the UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

GPP also helps support domestic security strategies such as Canada's Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear and Explosives Strategy, which seeks to "protect Canada and Canadians by taking all possible measures to prevent, mitigate and respond effectively to a potential CBRNe incident."^{Footnote 42} Canada's CBRNe Strategy involves an international component, through which Canada seeks to prevent the occurrence of CBRNe events through supporting global efforts to combat terrorism and prevent the proliferation of WMDs. The Strategy identifies DFAIT as the coordination lead for:

• Canada's response to CBRN incidents outside of Canada involving Canadians or Canadian interests;
• the negotiation of international agreements pertaining to the control of CBRN-related materials and technologies;
• coordination of international requests for CBRN assistance; and
• implementation of Canada's commitments to the Global Partnership through the GPP.

Finding 4:
GPP is consistent with DFAIT's strategic objectives and directly serves the Department's ongoing priority to contribute to international security through reducing the WMD proliferation threat, contributing to the establishment of better CBRN regimes abroad, and developing relationships with new partners.

GPP is aligned with DFAIT's strategic objective to promote Canada's priorities and values abroad through diplomacy, programming, and whole-of-government coordination. The promotion of democracy, human rights, effective global governance and international security is a core objective of Canada's foreign policy and one of DFAIT's ongoing Departmental priorities. The GPP contributes to the promotion of international security through supporting global institutions and partnerships that focus on results, accountability and effective burden sharing in the area of non-proliferation, and on implementing programming that addresses security challenges such transnational crime, terrorism, and WMD proliferation.

The GPP also indirectly supports the Department's objective of generating international opportunities for Canadian businesses through opening and expanding markets; facilitating two-way trade and investment; and encouraging innovation through international science and technology partnerships. Evidence from interviews with key informants suggests that the GPP's activities under its NRS portfolio have helped brand Canada as a responsible exporter of nuclear and radiological materials and encourages the development of trade relationships with countries receiving assistance. Furthermore, GPP activities through the ISTC and STCU have facilitated the establishment of successful business partnerships between Russian scientists and Canadian companies seeking to apply weapons expertise and expertise in a way that is innovative, peaceful and profitable.

7.3 Relevance Issue 3: Consistency with Federal Roles & Responsibilities

Finding 5:
GPP's delivery is within the responsibilities of the federal government and the mandate of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Ensuring the safety and security of all Canadians and developing and implementing Canada's foreign policy are among the primary roles of the Federal Government of Canada. DFAIT supports this role through its mandate to "work with a range of partners inside and outside government to achieve increased economic opportunity and enhanced security for Canada and Canadians at home and abroad."^{Footnote 43} Among other activities, this mandate involves:

• conducting all official communication between the Government of Canada and the governments of other countries and international organizations;
• conducting and managing international negotiations on behalf of Canada;
• fostering the development of international law and its application in Canadian external relations; and
• developing and delivering programs related to the promotion of Canada's interests abroad, including fostering the expansion of Canada's international trade and commerce, and the provision of assistance for developing countries.

Delivery of the GPP is an appropriate role for the federal Government of Canada and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade because its management requires negotiation and coordination with the governments of both donor and recipient states and several multilateral organizations. Furthermore, the Program implements Canada's international commitments abroad, promotes adherence to international law, and leverages DFAIT's network of missions to shape the international agenda in accordance with Canada's priorities and values. Although DFAIT is not specifically mandated to ensure the security of Canadians domestically and lacks specific CBRNe-related expertise, no other government organization is mandated or resourced to carry out the GPP's core activities pertaining to international negotiation, communication with other governments and multilateral organizations, and program delivery abroad.

Finding 6:
GPP has leveraged the expertise of other government departments to help create a coordinated whole-of-government response to WMD proliferation threats.

As noted above, although DFAIT is the only federal department that possesses the international mandate necessary to implement the GPP, DFAIT lacks specific expertise pertaining to CBRNe events, materials and practices. To address this need for specific expertise, GPP collaborates with a range of Other Government Departments (OGDs) that possess CBRN-related expertise, but lack an international mandate to support the planning and implementation of programming activities abroad. In doing so, DFAIT not only leverages the expertise of OGDs to promote the effectiveness of its programming, but also provides professional development opportunities for OGD staff, allows OGDs to expand their collaborative networks abroad, and encourages exchange of knowledge and best practices, all of which help OGDs better deliver their respective domestic mandates.

DFAIT collaborates with a range of OGD stakeholders in delivering the GPP, including the Canada Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), CNSC, Canada Space Agency, EC, NRCan, PHAC, and RCMP. Examples of collaboration between DFAIT and OGDs in delivering GPP programming are described briefly below:

Canada Food Inspection Agency (CFIA)

The CFIA possesses specific scientific expertise pertaining to food safety and animal health. GPP has engaged a senior research scientist from CFIA to support food defense projects funded through the ISTC and STCU. Since the departure of a key internal expert working with the BNP portfolio, this resource will be providing support for projects involving biological laboratory safety and security. Collaboration between CFIA and GPP has resulted in increased opportunities for shared research, expanded international scientific networks, and opportunities to benefit from Russian scientists' advanced knowledge and experience with biological agents.

Canada Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)

The CNSC possesses specific expertise regarding safety and security controls for radioactive sources. With GPP support, CNSC delivers nuclear security training through the World Institute for Nuclear Security. Furthermore, GPP support has allowed CNSC to send officers to key conferences such as Interpol's International Radiological and Nuclear Trafficking and Terrorism Analysis Conference. Collaboration with GPP has raised the prolife of CNSC internationally, providing expanded opportunities for knowledge exchange, participation in research partnerships, and professional development.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

Canada's RCMP possesses expertise in selecting and training police officers for domestic duties as well as deployment abroad. GPP leverages the RCMP's experience in delivering police training through an MOU between DFAIT and the RCMP. RCMP officers deliver CBRNe training in recipient states under the GPP's newly created UNSCR 1540 portfolio. The RCMP develops the training course based on a needs assessment and then delivers tailored capacity building training based on proven Canadian CBRNe first response techniques following a modified "train the trainer" approach. Training is being delivered initially in Colombia, but additional requests have been made by other states in the Americas and Middle East.

7.4 Performance Issue 4: Achievement of Expected Outcomes

Finding 7:
As a member of the Global Partnership, Canada, through GPP, has made considerable progress toward delivering on all commitments made to Russia and the FSU in Kananaskis.

In accordance with tasks identified in Kananaskis and specific commitments made for GPP Phase III, the evaluation found that significant progress was made under the five Program streams and most planned results were achieved, including:

• Provision of equipment and infrastructure for CWD facilities;
• Dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines;
• Improving the security of nuclear facilities;
• Engaging FWS in peaceful projects and providing sustainable employment,
• Programming in support of bio-security and biological non-proliferation.

Table 2 presents details the achievement of results against its expected outcomes during the second 5-year term of the GPP.

Table 2: Results Achieved Against Expected Outcomes

Objective #1 - WMDs Destroyed

Planned Results: Increased Russian capacity to destroy chemical weapons at Shchuch'ye and Kizner

Achieved Results:

• Canada provided destruction equipment worth $200 million to the two Russian facilities. Destruction operations began at Shchuch'ye in 2008 and will commence at Kizner in 2013.

Planned Results: Dismantlement of nuclear submarines and safe storage of spent nuclear fuel

Achieved Results:

• Canada contributed close to $200 million to fully dismantle and defuel 16 nuclear-powered attack submarines and two strategic submarines in cooperation with the US and Russia.

Planned Results: Reduction in opportunities for the proliferation of WMD materials and expertise in Russia and the FSU

Achieved Results:

• Canada contributed to over 400 research initiatives involving 4000 scientists and experts to develop civilian applications of dual-use technologies through the ISTC in Moscow and the STCU in Kyiv (Ukraine).

Planned Results: Concrete implementation of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policy and objectives.

Achieved Results:

• Since 2002, Canada has played a played a leadership role in mitigating proliferation threats and encouraging states to join the Global Partnership..

Objective #2 - WMD Materials and Facilities Secured

Planned Results: Increased security at sites with vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials.

Achieved Results:

• Canada has provided physical protection upgrades at ten Russian nuclear sites; and removed vulnerable thermoelectric generators along Russia's Northern and Far East coast.

Planned Results: Reduction of trafficking incidents involving WMDs from Russia and the FSU.

Achieved Results:

• Canada, jointly with the US, provided equipment and training to Ukrainian border posts to deter and detect illicit nuclear trafficking.

Objective #3 - Dangerous Pathogens Secured

Planned Results: Additional biocontainment and biosecurity/biosafety training facilities.

Results Achieved:

• Supported the establishment of a Bio-Safety Association for Central Asia and the Caucasus (BACAC).
• Supported the establishment of regional training centres in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia.

Planned Results: Biocontainment facilities built in two-three locations and interim security upgrades executed for existing facilities.

Results Achieved:

• Completed urgent interim security upgrades at three Kyrgyz biological facilities.
• Implemented biosafety and/or biosecurity improvements at 26 biological laboratories in Russia and the FSU.

Planned Results: Concrete implementation of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) policy and objectives.

Results Achieved:

• Engagement of state representatives in BTWC conferences and events contributed to the accession to BTWC by FSU states such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
• Legislative support programming resulted in drafted BTWC and CWC implementing legislation for countries such as Afghanistan, Madagascar and Yemen.

Objective #4 - Sustainable employment for FWS

Planned Results: Increased employment of FWS in sustainable, peaceful pursuits.

Results Achieved:

• GPP managed to employ thousands of weapons scientists in a variety of research areas, including projects aimed at improving nuclear safety, bio-security and bio safety.
• Funding provided to support 450 research initiatives and capacity building projects in Russia and the FSU, valued at nearly $100 million.
• Contributions made to the UK Closed Nuclear Cities Program (CNCP) for Russia.

Planned Results: Reduction of proliferation incidents involving WMD expertise from the FSU.

Results Achieved:

• No evidence available.

Objective #5 - Industrial and Scientific Benefits to Canada

Planned Results: Canadian project management, design, engineering and security capacities are enhanced.

Results Achieved:

• Participation in joint project design and project implementation with the UK, as well as involvement in projects of international organization has increased Canada’s project design, management and delivery capacity.

Planned Results: Canadian industry, academics and governments benefit from FWS' knowledge and expertise to complement their own research and development (R&D), leading to direct mutual commercial benefits.

Results Achieved:

• The RFWS portfolio has played an active role in selecting the research projects for funding that meet program objectives but also complement research and development efforts of Canadian scientists.
• Canadian institutes and academia have benefited from the cooperation with Russian and FSU scientists and have been able to conduct joint research and scientific experiments.

Planned Results: Increased number of Canadian public and private sector partners and industrial and S&T linkages.

Results Achieved:

• Reports of newly established S&T linkages between Russian and Canadian companies.

In terms of benefits for Canada, GPP projects under the NPSD, NRS (RTGs) and CWD portfolios have contributed to a positive environmental impact, as multiple toxic agents have been secured or destroyed. These results are particularly important for the fragile Arctic region which Canada and Russia share.

In addition, all five programming areas within the GPP were expected to play an important role in maintaining and increasing international confidence and goodwill by establishing a wide range of important international relationships. Feedback gathered through interviews with international partners indicate that Canada has indeed demonstrated leadership and has significantly contributed to raising the credibility and profile of the Global Partnership with key international security organizations as well as to attracting new partners to join the GP. Canada's achievements through the GPP have received a high recognition not only from the Russian partners but also from all GP member countries and have significantly enhanced Canada's image as a country that delivers on commitments.

The results achieved by each GPP portfolio are examined in greater detail in findings 8 through 16, below.

7.4.1 Nuclear Powered Submarine Dismantlement (NPSD)

Finding 8:
The Nuclear Powered Submarine Dismantlement Program achieved all of its declared outcomes, ultimately reducing a serious proliferation and environmental threat to Russia and the international community.

The NPSD Program was concluded in November 2011, after having accomplished the recovery of over 8,000 spent fuel assemblies from 35 Russian naval reactors and the full dismantlement of 16 Russian decommissioned NPSs and 2 strategic boats.^{Footnote 44} The fuel assemblies recovered under the NPSD Program resulted in approximately 11 tons of HEU and Plutonium being secured.

Following the imposition of a moratorium on towing, GPP program managers worked with their Russian counterparts to develop new protocols for submarine towing, which allowed for lifting the moratorium and helped to expedite the dismantlement process.^{Footnote 45} Canada further contributed to the development of new safety protocols for submarine dismantlement which have been adopted at all dismantlement shipyards.

Four of the NPSs allocated to Canada for elimination were deemed to be in such poor condition as to rule out towing the vessels to the shipyard. To overcome this challenge, the Program proposed to place the submarines on the work-deck of a Heavy Lift Vessel (HLV), which was unprecedented. Undertaking this highly complex and risky operation required special approval from the Russian Prime Minister which, after lengthy negotiations, was obtained in 2005. In the summer of 2006, two Victor I Class submarines were individually transported from the Murmansk area to the shipyard in Severodvinsk as dry deck cargo on HLV Transshelf. This highly complex operation created considerable administrative challenges due to the involvement of eleven Russian ministries, however the challenges were successfully overcome and the operation completed.

The same approach was used to simultaneously transport two Victor Class submarines from Petropavlovsk to Bolshoi Kamen near Vladivostok in the Far East in 2009. This operation was a major achievement and proved an enormous success.

Under the NPSD Program, up to 5% of the value of each Implementing Arrangement (IA) could be used for shipyard infrastructure improvements directly related to NPS dismantlement and defueling. GPP contributed to a number of physical infrastructure projects, including an upgrade of the rail line linking Bolshoi Kamen and Smolyaninovo in the Far East, the manufacturing of 30 steel containers for solid radioactive waste storage, the provision of a hazardous waste incinerator at the Zvyozdochka shipyard and the provision and installation of radiation detection monitors to ensure that no radioactive or nuclear materials could leave the shipyard inadvertently or through theft.

Several of the contributions cited above pertain to environmental safety, which was an important component of the NPSD Program. In compliance with Canada's Environmental Assessment Act, Canada contributed to the development of the Environmental Management Plan (EMP), which documented the planned risk mitigation measures to address potential environment risks associated with NPS dismantlement, fuel removal and disposition. Additionally, Canada provided nuclear and environmental safety training to personnel at both Zvyozdochka and Zvezda.

Further, though recovery of value from the scrap generated from dismantlement activities was not a core objective of the NPSD Program, Canada did fund the break-up of the pressure hull and structures of the submarines into "furnace pieces" which allowed for the recovery of a variety of metals, including precious metals such as gold, silver and platinum, as well as plastics and rubber. The recovery of these materials not only generated value, but also environmental benefits, from the recycling.

In sum, Canada fulfilled its commitments to Russia and the GP with regard to the NPSD Program within the established implementation schedule. Interviews with both Russian and US interlocutors confirmed that Russia now has, as a result of Canadian and other Partners' assistance, the infrastructure and capacity to complete the dismantlement and defueling of its remaining inventory of decommissioned NPSs.^{Footnote 46} As a consequence, a serious proliferation threat has been contained and the environmental threat to the shores of Canada and other Artic neighbors significantly reduced.

7.4.2 Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD)

Finding 9:
The CWD Program has achieved its short-term objectives in supplying chemical weapons destruction equipment for Russia. The Program made significant progress against longer-term objectives contributing to the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons and reduction of security and environmental threats.

Since the creation of the GPP, Canada has delivered on commitments pertaining to the development of the CWD facilities (CWDF) at Shchuch'ye and Kizner. For its initial project under GPP, Canada contributed $33 million for the construction of a railway connecting the chemical weapons storage depot with the CWDF at Shchuch'ye. The construction of the railway started in 2006 and was completed in 2008. In 2005, Canada announced a $55 million contribution to finance the provision of equipment to be installed in the second main destruction building at the Shchuch'ye facility, including catalytic reactors, destruction process lines and metal parts furnaces. An additional $10 million was committed for infrastructure projects including the development of a local public address system and inter-site communications system. These contributions were completed in 2008 and the facility commenced operations in 2009.

In 2006, Canada made a $100 million commitment to supply the destruction equipment, including metal parts furnaces, destruction process lines and catalytic reactors for the CWDF at Kizner. Canada's commitments were delivered successfully in 2011 and the facility is expected to commence operations in 2013.

Canada also provided financial support to Green Cross Russia through Global Green USA to support the dissemination of independent and objective information about Russia's chemical weapons destruction program, including information about health, safety and environmental concerns pertaining to the CWD operations. With Canada's support, Green Cross conducted outreach activities serving the communities surrounding the CWD facilities, providing education about ongoing CWD activities and providing information and education about potential environmental, health and safety risks.

The 2004 Bilateral Treaty between Russia and Canada required that activities supported by Canada adhere to Canadian environmental and safety standards. State Environmental Control and Monitoring Regional Centers (SECMRC) operational at each CWDF helped ensure the environmental safety of the CWD process by conducting regular operational safety, environmental and health monitoring. Laboratory tests conducted over the past several years have indicated that the environmental conditions at the CWDFs have been stable with no instances of illness in the surrounding community being linked to the effect of toxic agents on the human body.^{Footnote 47} In short, Canada's delivery of equipment and support for CWD in Russia has contributed to a faster elimination of Russia's CW stockpiles, thus decreasing the proliferation and security threat posed by these weapons, both for Russia and the international community.

With assistance from Canada and other international partners, Russia was able to meet extended deadlines for Phase III of the CWD process, requiring at least 45% destruction by December 31^st 2009. Key informants among Canada's partners stated that Russia has made considerable progress, having destroyed over 64% of its chemical weapons stockpiles. Currently, five of the seven CWDFs in Russia remain active. The destruction process has been completed at both Gorny and Kambarka and small quantities remain to be destroyed at the Leonidovka and Maradikovsky facilities. Approximately 53% of the chemical stockpiles at the Shchuch'ye facility have already been destroyed and chemical weapons destruction is expected to be competed at Pochep and Kizner in 2014 and 2015 respectively.^{Footnote 48}

While Russia has indicated that it won't refuse additional help from the GP, representatives from the GPP as well as GP interlocutors believe that Russia now has the capacity and the infrastructure to complete the destruction of the remaining CW without further international assistance. Therefore, a decision was made by GPP with the completion and delivery of the equipment for the Kizner CWDF, Canada would have fulfilled its commitments to the CWD Program in Russia.

7.4.3 Nuclear and Radiological Security Program (NRS)

Finding 10:
The NRS projects in Russia and the FSU have achieved their objectives and contributed to increased nuclear and radiological security.

Canada's support to the nuclear and radiological security agenda in Russia has been significant and second only to that of the U.S. among the GP members, a fact that is well recognized and appreciated by both the Government of Russia and other GP member countries. The contributions through the NRS have solidified Canada's reputation as a competent, collaborative, and trusted partner. Sufficient achievements under each sub-program follow:

Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

In the area of physical protection upgrades, Canada adopted a layered approach to first secure the nuclear and radiological materials at sites, followed by the provision of security upgrades to buildings within which such materials are stored, and finally by upgrading the facilities' perimeter and "protective zone." These measures were augmented by the installation of access controls and detection sensors and related training, along with response force installations.

All physical security upgrades were designed by and vetted though experts to ensure that relevant standards are met and identified vulnerabilities addressed. The IAs with recipients included, as a rule, provisions for spare parts, and warranties surviving the completion of the work in compliance with Russian laws. Once work at a site was complete, and equipment installed and duly certified as operational, responsibility for operations and maintenance (O&M) was assumed by the recipient.

Five out of six facilities that received physical security upgrade assistance from Canada have achieved their objectives and are now deemed to not only meet IAEA security standards, but also Russian security guidelines, which are reported to be even more exacting than those of the IAEA. Russian laws, for example, require that periodic vulnerability assessments be undertaken at nuclear facilities in order to ensure that physical assets, equipment, and systems are operationally ready to respond to threats. Discussion with Russian officials confirmed that security upgrades to the and Mayak PA facilities remain in good condition and that the equipment provided is fully operational, even after the warranties for some of the projects had long expired. Several of the sites referenced above have received O&M support from the US Sustainability Program, which has helped to preserve Canada's investments in these facilities.

Regarding the outstanding project, for which Canada had originally envisaged to fund the implementation of security upgrades, the contribution did not extend beyond the design phase. Due to major delays (two years) in obtaining Russia's approval and the failure to reach an agreement about the costs of the upgrades, Canada decided to withdraw its support for the project. The work was later completed by the US and the facility was brought in compliance with IAEA and Russian security guidelines.

Radiological Security

In the area of radiological security, Canada's contribution to the development of the RTG Master Plan proved instrumental for the decommissioning of the RTGs. By establishing a comprehensive inventory of RTGs in Russia and providing an assessment of their respective conditions, the Master Plan became the basis for the development of the RTG Action Plan, financed by the US, which in turn supported donor participation in its implementation. By July 2012, approximately 942 RTGs out of the 1007 identified had been removed. Russian officials remarked that the remaining 65 operational RTGs will be decommissioned and replaced by Alternative Power Sources (APS) within two years. All RTGs that have been replaced by APSs,^{Footnote 49} including the 5 funded by Canada in conjunction with Norway, and the 59 decommissioned through the US GTRI, are reported to be operational and their performance is being monitored remotely.

While the decommissioning of RTGs is on target, thereby mitigating a serious environmental and security threat, their disassembly and the securing of the radioactive material content are not done at the site of retrieval. The RTG reactors need to be transported to one of the two specialized facilities, VNIITFA or ISOTOPE, for disassembly and then to Mayak for disposal. As noted earlier, Canada provided funds to support the manufacture of 16 shielded containers and 20 sling sets (VNIITFA) to facilitate the transportation of RTGs to the sites for disassembly and disposal. Though the evaluation team obtained confirmation from Russian authorities that the sling sets and shielded containers remain in use, an undetermined number of containers were acknowledged to be used to store RTGs because of capacity constraints relating to both the disassembly and disposal of RTGs at the specialized facilities. It is estimated that around 257 RTGs are currently in storage with about 143 awaiting disassembly.

Plutonium Disposition

In the area of plutonium disposition, Canada contributed to the shut-down of the plutonium production facility at Zheleznogorsk, which was producing 500 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium each year. In addition to the shut-down, Canada contributed to the construction of a fossil fuel plant which now provides energy to a community of approximately 100,000 residents.

Canada's other contributions through the NRS Portfolio focused on physical security upgrades to various sites managed by other ministries of the Russian government, and the provision of specialized rail cars and other vehicles needed to transport special nuclear material for storage and disposition. All security upgrades completed at the time of writing were confirmed to have met both IAEA and Russian security guidelines. The evaluation team received assurance that the remaining sites where work was still in progress would meet those guidelines upon completion. With respect to the rail cars and other vehicles furnished by Canada, the evaluation team obtained confirmation that these were in use and highly valued.

Border Security and Prevention of Illicit Trafficking

Canada's contribution to border security upgrades in the Ukraine, through the US SLD, concluded in February 2011. Under this project, Canada provided financial support for the provision and installation of radiation detection and related communications equipment, maintenance of the equipment, and training of Ukrainian border guards at numerous sites, including the Odessa Seaport, the Mariupol Seaport, the Berdyansk Seaport, the Boryspil (Kiev) and Odessa Airport as well as land crossing at Uspenka and Iloviask. As a result, these border crossings are now considered secure and there have been no reported incidences of attempts to smuggle nuclear or radiological material through the same.^{Footnote 50} Additionally, Canada, through the IAEA NFS, provided financial support to several other projects in the Ukraine involving the provision of detection equipment and training (Ovruch and Zhytomyr). Discussions with representative from the US DOE, which is charged with administering the SLD, confirmed that as a result of these interventions, and the interventions of other partners, the Ukraine is now much less vulnerable to the illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological material than in the past. Systems supported by the GPP have been instrumental in the detection of at least one known case of illicit trafficking.

Transportation Security

Transportation security also emerged as an important area of programming, and Canada's contributions in the form of equipment (rail cars, trucks, containers, etc.) have helped to expedite the disposition of nuclear and radiological material in Russia. Canada's contributions in the area of training in the protection of nuclear and radiological materials, both while in transit (Abramova) and while stationary (Obninsk), have helped to strengthen the human dimension of Russia's security infrastructure - something that is increasingly being recognized as of equal importance to physical infrastructure. Projects supported through the IAEA NSF in other countries within the FSU have all achieved their respective objectives and, collectively, have helped to diminish the proliferation threat originating from the same.

All GP Partners consulted in the course of this evaluation, including representatives from the Russian government, conveyed the view that after nearly 10 years of programming, Russia now has the capacity to deliver on its WMD disarmament commitments and to manage in a secure manner its stock of nuclear and radiological material, thereby achieving the primary objective of the NRS.

Contributions to Chornobyl

Regarding Canada's contribution to the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) and the Chornobyl Shelter Fund (CSF), the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) has been beset with schedule and cost overruns due to both technical and political challenges. In 2005, the EBRD reported to donors that technical issues related to facilities for handling radioactive waste and spent fuel would impact the final cost of SIP projects. Lack of commitment from Ukraine at the highest political levels, as well as ongoing change in Ukraine's political structures and institutions have disrupted the oversight and decision-making processes for SIP projects. Furthermore, recent indications that the Ukrainian government may decide not to uphold agreed exemptions from certain regulatory standards, as well as recent changes to Ukraine's policies and procedures regarding value-added tax implementation, may complicate the design process and further increase projected construction costs.^{Footnote 51}

Finding 11:
NRS programming beyond the frontiers of the FSU is at a nascent phase, which precludes reporting on outcomes at this stage, except for some progress in programming.

Apart from a hand full of small projects implemented by the IAEA though Canada's contributions to the NSF in countries outside the FSU, and its contributions to WINS and the InterAction Council, the HEU reactor conversion and nuclear fuel repatriation projects in Vietnam (Da Lat) and Mexico (Salazar) stand as the NRS's most significant initiatives related to the expanded geographic mandate of the GPP. With regard to the facility in Vietnam, Canadian funds have been used in the conversion of the research reactor at Da Lat from HEU to Low-enriched Uranium (LEU). Additionally, Canadian funds have been used to remove the spent fuel rods and transport the same to Mayak, Russia, from which the nuclear material originated.

The project in Mexico is similar in design, except for the addition of a physical security upgrade component, which was covered by the US DOE in the case of Da Lat. At the time of writing, the spent fuel at the Da Lat facility had been removed (around 11.6 kg) and was reported to be cooling in "cooling ponds", which is a precondition for the safe transport of the fuel. The nuclear material is scheduled to be transported to Mayak in 2012, and the project fully completed by 2013. With regard to the project in Mexico, approximately 11 kg of nuclear fuel was reported to have been shipped to the US.

Canada's contribution to the GICNT helped support and organize a radiological security workshop in 2008 which brought together public and private practitioners to share best practices relating to the security of radiological materials. For the development of the Hiroshima Declaration, which focused on potential acquisition and use of WMD, the evaluation could not, however, find any other outcomes for NRS contributions to the InterAction Council.

With regard to global expansion, 21 projects dealing with nuclear and radiological security (physical protection upgrades, border security, training, technical assistance) had been proposed since 2011, involving at least 12 different countries. At the time of writing, approximately 12 of the proposed projects had obtained Ministerial approval, including projects in Colombia, Costa Rica, Brazil, Libya, and South East Asia, involving at least 10 countries, and 1 for the Inter Action Council.

7.4.4 Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists/ Scientists Engagement Program (RFWS/SEP)

Finding 12:
The RFWS Program achieved its objectives in Russia and the FSU by redirecting and/or finding employment for FWS through contributions to the two science centres in Moscow and Kiev and through direct or jointly funded research undertaken by Russian institutions.

The RFWS programming deals with the mitigation of an intellectual threat. Even though it is not always possible to attribute non-proliferation success to the contributions of a particular country or project, some tangible results achieved by Canada's SEP portfolio attest to the success of GPP.

Since 2003, GPP, and its RFWS stream in particular, have funded approximately 450 research initiatives and capacity building projects in Russia and the FSU, valued at nearly $100 million. More specifically, Canada sponsored projects in Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan through which 137 scientists were engaged in projects and nearly 4000 scientists received funding to redirect their work.

Under Phase III, the RFWS portfolio also committed to provide contributions to ongoing programs of other countries and organisations (e.g., the US and UK) identified as cost-effective and supportive of Canada's priorities. One of these is the Closed Nuclear Cities Program (CNCP).

In July 2010, following the signing of a MOU between DFAIT and the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), Canada contributed $1.5 million to the CNCP, initiated by the UK as a partnership with Russia in 2002.

The aim of the CNCP Program was to help reduce the risk of the spread of nuclear weapons technology and nuclear materials within and from the FSU by assisting the authorities to minimise the danger of former weapons staff transferring knowledge or materials to potential proliferators. The CNCP was created with a specific focus on the 10 Closed Nuclear Cities of the Russian Federation, which were created to carry out various stages of the design, manufacture and maintenance of nuclear weapons.

These 10 cities have a total of 770,000 inhabitants, with about 130,000 of them being employed in nuclear weapons related activities, such as managing the production, storage and disposal of a massive inventory of sensitive nuclear materials. Following the changes in Russia's defence policy in the late 1990s, many of these highly skilled scientists and technicians, whose expertise could be of interest to states seeking to acquire the capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction, were at risk of losing their jobs or were underpaid.

DFAIT's contribution to the CNCP was designed as a separately identifiable Canadian program of work for the period 2010-2012, to enable further job creation in Russia's closed cities and support the establishment of a sustainable infrastructure by:

• Providing grants for small and medium sized business ventures that create employment for staff from former Soviet nuclear institutes and enterprises;
• Training nuclear engineer and scientists in key business skills;
• Assisting with market research and building commercial partnerships;
• Supporting the development of a modern entrepreneurship, technology transfer and commercialisation system in the partner cities and research institutes.

Since 2010, the Canadian CNCP financed a range of technology- based business start-ups and development initiatives. Canada also supported the work of Business Development Agencies and Commercialisation Units in partner cities and nuclear research institutes. Feedback received from the UK partners involved in the management of the CNCP, indicates that Canada's contribution has led to the creation of new work places and has helped to develop the economic potential of partner institutes and closed nuclear cities. The Canadian CNCP also promoted knowledge and experience transfer to Russian, Belarusian, Kazakh and Uzbek specialists engaged in economic development and in building modern skills and work practices. It supported training, market research, business planning and exchange of experience in partnership with Russia and the UK, with approximately 50% of the cost of these activities being covered by GPP.

In sum, as demonstrated in Table 3 below, the RFWS portfolio achieved its key short-term results as per commitments made in the 2008 TB Submission.

Table 3: Results Achieved - RFWS Portfolio

Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists: Results Achieved

Expected Outcome: Scientists with WMD knowledge redirected to projects conducted for peaceful activities.

Achieved:

• GPP funded 450 research initiatives and capacity building projects in Russia and the FSU, valued at nearly $100 million.

Expected Outcome: Increase in sustainable employment for scientists working at specific institutes resulting in a reduced threat at these institutes.

Achieved:

• 137 scientists were engaged by Canada and nearly 4000 scientists received funding to redirect their work.

Expected Outcome: Increase in collaboration between Canadian public and private sector partners and scientists in Russia/FSU.

Achieved:

• $1.5 million contribution to the Closed Nuclear Cities Partnership.
• Initiated two Canada-Ukraine Business Summits (Ukraine- Canada) 2008.

Expected Outcome: Increased emphasis placed on security/counter-terrorism projects supportive of the overall GPP mandate.

Achieved:

• Organized a number of Partnership Promotion Missions (2008-2009)
• Sponsored a Nuclear Forensics Experts Workshop (2010)
• Organised Canada - Ukraine Aerospace Partnering Event (2011)

Under GPP Phase III, Canada committed to continue to fund regular research projects and facilitate linkages between FWS and western counterparts. Over this period, Canada continued to encourage the centers to transform and adopt best practices so that they can remain relevant to the changing needs of the scientists and facilitate links between FWS and Western counterparts. In addition to regular projects, both ISTC and STCU created a Partner Project category which was more directly related to the research needs of Western private and public sector entities, and facilitated the commissioning of new joint research projects, including projects with Canadian companies.

Partner projects also presented an opportunity for Canadian government departments and agencies to get involved in joint research in fulfilments of their operational mandates. GPP, for example, committed to provide a risk-reduction incentive to Canadian ISTC and STCU partners - fostering interest among Canadian companies, particularly research-based small and medium size enterprises. In general, GPP contributes about half of the value of projects funded by Canadian STCU partners, up to a maximum of $40,000 as a risk reduction incentive.

Evidence collected for the purpose of this evaluation indicates that Canada's contributions to reducing the proliferation of WMD knowledge and skills continue to be meaningful. The impact can be measured both in terms of the number of FWS redirected via Canadian-funded projects, and the partnership research initiated between Canadian and Russian scientists. In addition to the concrete results, the RFWS portfolio has also brought some ancillary scientific and industrial benefits to Canada through research jointly undertaken by Russian and Canadian institutes. In some cases, Canadian researchers have even been able to use Russian facilities for joint research and experiments.

Reported benefits for non-proliferation have to be taken, however, on faith since they are more difficult to determine, and attributing success to specific projects funded by Canada is a challenge as well. Also, different countries perceive differently the benefits from scientist engagement. For example, the benefits of this program for Canada are different from those for the US. Reportedly, the US has had a stronger focus on commercialization of the research. While achieving potential business development benefits for Canadian organizations was part of the conceptualization of the RFWS programming stream, this objective was subordinate to the goal of WMD knowledge non-proliferation. Evidence that Canadian support to FWS has generated commercial benefits to Canada is limited.

Scientist Engagement and Geographic Expansion

Finding 13:
Canada's decision to consider withdrawing its support for the ISTC and STCU is seen as being in line with the new Global Partnership priorities for scientist engagement beyond the FSU.

At the Muskoka Summit in 2011, partners agreed to promote best practices and collaboration in CBRN security among the international scientific community and expand efforts to promote awareness and support projects in fields such as global public health, bio security and energy. A decision was made for a stronger focus on the promotion of scientist engagement through regional CBRN Centres of Excellence^{Footnote 52}, utilizing existing international mechanisms and enhanced training/collaboration. Canada's RFWS portfolio was respectively re-named to Scientists Engagement Program (SEP).

The status of the future of the Science Centres in Moscow and Kyiv and their slow process of restructuring, has, however, become a major challenge for Canada in terms of justifying the relevance of the project review and approval processes, as well as the projects proposed for funding. Russia has already withdrawn its support for the ISTC, believing that the Centre has fulfilled its mandate and is no longer needed under the changed economic and political circumstances in Russia. Other funding parties, including Canada, have been encouraging some major changes to the management of the centres over the past few years. In 2012, Canada announced that it would suspend its future contributions to the ISTC pending evidence of initiated reorganization.

In the absence of specific science centers with concentration of knowledge and expertise of proliferation concern, SEP activities could be further managed and implemented under the UNSCR 1540 portfolio, which has clear links to scientist engagement objectives through its training component, or as a cross-cutting initiative supportive of the BIO and NRS portfolios.

Overall, evidence collected through interviews and field visits speaks to the positive experience and short-term results for both Canada and the FSU from the RFWS program; however, identifying longer-term results or the overall impact of Canada's programming under the RFWS remains a challenge.

7.4.5 Biological Security (BIO)

Finding 14:
The funding of biological non-proliferation projects in Russia and the FSU through the ISTC, STCU and other mechanisms has resulted in positive outcomes for Canada, and for scientists and organizations in the Former Soviet Union.

Between 2003 and 2008, under Phase I and II, Canada's GPP implemented BNP projects on a small scale under the RFWS portfolio, using the ISTC and STCU as delivery mechanisms in Russia and the FSU. During this period, BNP programming covered three main activity areas:

• Redirection of former biological weapons scientists;
• Biosafety and biosecurity; and
• Support for global BNP initiatives.

Under Phase III of GPP, BNP was declared a discrete programming portfolio with a broader set of activities, such as:

• Assistance with the development and implementation of national biosafety standards and guidelines;
• Support for the establishment and operation of new biosafety associations;
• Provision of training opportunities and establishment of regional biosecurity and biosafety training centres;
• Funding for physical biosecurity and biosafety improvements to address proliferation concerns; and,
• Construction of a Bio Laboratory in Kyrgyzstan.

Some of these activities continued to be implemented through the ISTC and STCU, while others were based on contribution agreements with NGOs, international organizations, as well as bilateral cooperation projects. Under GPP Phase III, there was a shift in emphasis from bio non-proliferation to biological security, which was also reflected in the change of the portfolio's name from Biological Non-Proliferation to Biological Security (or simply BIO for communication purposes).

Achievements under BIO in relation to the above mentioned priorities are summarised below.

Assistance with the development and implementation of national biosafety standards

Programming under the BIO portfolio promoted the implementation of effective and practical biosafety and biosecurity standards and guidelines by increasing countries' access to existing international standards documents, supporting the development of new biosafety standards and guidelines, and working directly with government organizations to facilitate the implementation of guidelines and regulatory frameworks.

The BIO portfolio promoted access to international standards and guidelines through funding the translation of several existing standards documents into Russian and Kazakh in order to better enable scientists in Russia and the FSU to consult existing best practices and incorporate them into their work. Key documents that have been translated and distributed include the Canadian Biosafety Guidelines, the OIE Standards and Guidelines for Veterinary Laboratories, and the American Biosafety Association (ABSA) Anthology of Biosafety X and XI. Additionally, through a contribution agreement with the European Committee for Standardization (CEN), GPP arranged for public access to the CEN Biorisk Management Standard, a document that facilitates compliance with and implementation of international biorisk legislation and best practices.

The BIO portfolio also cooperated with CEN to develop a professional credentials standard for the European Biosafety Association (EBSA) to provide competency benchmarks for biological research professionals. Furthermore, GPP worked directly with the Kyrgyz Ministry of Health to revise existing national guidelines for biosafety and biosecurity and helped implement the CEN Biorisk Management Standard at key labs of the Ukraine's Central Sanitary and Epidemiology Station (CSES).

Support for the establishment and operation of new biosafety associations

As part of its Phase III activities, the BIO portfolio supported the of development of the Biosafety Association for Central Asia and the Caucasus (BACAC), an organization that promotes biosecurity and biosafety in Central Asian and FSU countries. Key objectives of BACAC include integrating Central Asia into the global biosafety community, enhancing biosafety and biosecurity practices, providing biosecurity training, enhancing regional standards and regulations, and promoting awareness of biosecurity issues.

Since the establishment of the BACAC, the BIO portfolio has provided ongoing financial and logistical support for the BACAC's annual conferences and, in particular, has supported the attendance of biological scientists from Russia and the Former Soviet Union at conferences and events held by more established biosafety organizations, such as the American Biosafety Association (ABSA).

Provision of training opportunities and establishment of regional biosecurity and biosafety training centres

The BIO portfolio has increased the availability of training opportunities by supporting the establishment of regional training centres in priority regions, funding the delivery of training, and developing new training materials. It contributed to the development of regional training centres in the FSU, such as at the Kazakh Science Centre for Quarantine and Zoonotic Diseases (KSCQZD) in Almaty and the Ukrainian Anti-Plague Research Institute in Odessa, and funded the delivery of courses and workshops pertaining to biosecurity, biosafety and biorisk management at existing regional training centres, including the Centre of Modern Medical Technology (TEMPO) in Russia.

With regard to the provision and delivery of training, the BIO portfolio has provided ongoing support for the provision of a Biosafety Cabinet Certification Course implemented by the Eagleson Institute, a non-profit organization whose mission is to promote the principles and practices of laboratory safety. The Biosafety Cabinet Certification Course used a "train the trainer" model to train scientists in the testing and certification of sensitive laboratory equipment. This course has been administered at various locations, including regional training centres such as UAPRI and KSCQZD.

The BIO portfolio has also provided funding for ongoing biosecurity and bioterrorism preparedness workshops implemented by INTERPOL. These workshops, delivered through regional training centres such as KSCQZD, seek to raise awareness of bioterrorism and biosecurity issues, encourage interagency cooperation, and enhance the capacity of first responders to address instances of possible bioterrorism activity.

Finally, the BIO portfolio has supported the development of new training tools to promote improved biosecurity and biosafety practices in Russia and the FSU, including a university-level bioethics course at Ukraine's National Academy of Sciences; instructional DVDs on current best practices for work with human and animal pathogens in biological containment level II laboratories; and a virtual reality training tool for biosafety level III materials. The GPP has also been involved in the development of an updated manual on microbiology and lab diagnostics of especially dangerous pathogens for the KSCQZD regional training centre.

Funding for physical biosecurity and biosafety improvements

Critical infrastructure upgrades were implemented at three laboratories in Kyrgyzstan that faced elevated risk of theft or accidental release of pathogens. Each of these laboratories was in a serious state of decay and none possessed adequate biosecurity measures to secure their collections of particularly dangerous pathogens. One of the facilities that received physical security upgrades through GPP successfully repelled an attack during the civil unrest in the Kyrgyz Republic in June 2010. Furthermore, these facilities lacked adequate means to transport biological materials and GPP provided three secure transportation vehicles to promote safe transport of pathogens within Kyrgyzstan.

Other physical security upgrades included:

• Site security upgrades, such as lighting, gates, locks and video surveillance;
• Facility security upgrades, such as electronic access control, monitoring and alarms systems and communication systems;
• Pathogen accountability upgrades, such as secure storage containers, security alarms, and database tracking systems; and
• Personnel strategies, such as background checks and identification badges.

The major focus of BIO programming in the area of physical biosecurity and biosafety improvements under GPP Phase III was the design and construction of a new Level III biological containment laboratory in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Unfortunately, the project collapsed just before the start of the construction stage.

Construction of a Bio Laboratory in Kyrgyzstan

Finding 15:
Although the Kyrgyz Laboratory project fell short of achieving its objectives, the project was well managed and provided valuable lessons learned.

The core of GPP's BIO programming under Phase III was the programming, design and construction of a new Biosafety Level III (BSL3) containment laboratory in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic. The main objective of this project was to increase regional biological security through consolidating dangerous pathogen strains into a modern, secure facility which would be designed and built with Canadian funds and managed on an ongoing basis by the Kyrgyz government. The Kyrgyz government was to provide an "in-kind contribution" to the project by donating the land for the laboratory site. The lab project enjoyed a high level of support from the Kyrgyz Government, including the President, Prime Minister and Ministries of Agriculture, of Architecture, and of Health, as well as from scientists and laboratory directors, who were well aware of the risks from unprotected biological materials and pathogens.

Planned activities under Phase III of the Program included the conduct of a feasibility study, the design of the laboratory, and the planning of the construction phases of the project. Funding authorities supporting the construction of the facility were sought and approved in a separate Treasury Board submission in 2009, amounting to $39 million over a period of four years. Based on higher than expected estimates for construction costs, this amount was subsequently increased to $57 million in 2011.

It was originally anticipated that the project would be completed in 2012, with the initial planning phases starting in 2008 and the construction phase starting in 2010. Delays were experienced in the pre-design and design phases of the project, however, pushing the start date for the construction phase of the project back to 2011.

GPP adopted a whole-of-government approach to the lab project, enlisting technical expertise from PWGSC, RCMP and PHAC and contracting expertise from the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC). PWGSC and PHAC supported GPP experts in identifying the functional requirements of the laboratory, which were used to inform its design and develop appropriate contracting criteria. CCC supported the contracting process for the design and construction of the laboratory and solicited bids soliciting bids from qualified companies with the appropriate technical and financial resources to implement a project of this scale.

Although the approval of the Kyrgyz government had been sought on an ongoing basis and the Kyrgyz President, Prime Minister and Cabinet were engaged throughout the process, the project was ultimately derailed by the political situation in Kyrgyzstan. Days before construction of the laboratory was set to begin in 2011, the Kyrgyz government made a last minute decision to de-commit the lands selected for the laboratory site in 2008. Evidence from interviews and reviews of project documents suggested that this decision was unexpected for GPP because the laboratory site had long been approved in accordance with the terms of the Canada-Kyrgyz Treaty and the Kyrgyz government had reaffirmed this commitment of land in a Parliamentary Act, a Presidential Decree, and a signed IA for the construction of the laboratory. It is believed that the decision of the Kyrgyz government was based on numerous political factors such as ongoing political instability and civil unrest, and a growing public opposition to the laboratory. Public opposition to the lab was stoked by media and political criticism based on inaccurate and misrepresented information, claiming that a "dangerous lab" was being built in a public area.

Canada subsequently made a decision to cancel the construction of the laboratory based on an assessment of the potential risks and costs associated with the pursuit of a new site. Canada decided that discontinuing the project was the most responsible management option available, despite the ongoing threat posed by unsecured pathogens. After the collapse of the project, the $50 million allocated to the project was redirected to other GPP programming areas, including $30 million to fulfill Canada's commitment to the Chornobyl Shelter Fund announced by the Prime Minister in May 2011.

Despite the collapse of the Kyrgyz Laboratory project, most of the stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation considered its discontinuation to be a disappointment rather than a failure based on the fact that the project had been well-managed and that its collapse was based on factors outside of the Program's control. A fulsome planning process was conducted including a sound risk management framework. For example, robust legal agreements were implemented, the Canadian Embassy in Kazakhstan was engaged to manage diplomatic relations, and the Kyrgyz government was engaged through regular meetings held every 6 weeks. The contract negotiated for the construction of the laboratory did, however, identify the availability of the site as a major condition for the contract to come into force. Thanks to this condition, GPP was able to settle with the construction company for costs accrued totalling only $850,000.

Given that the implementation of the project was at an advanced stage, however, the evaluation noted that the substantial amount of funds that had been disbursed in the planning and design phases of the project could not be recovered. This project should also help GPP to derive some lessons related to programming in developing countries and countries with unstable political climate. For example, the inherent difficulty associated with implementing complex projects in politically unstable developing countries and the ultimate collapse of the Kyrgyz project also suggest that there is an ongoing need to demonstrate whether the degree of risk associated with each project is reasonable given the cost of a potential collapse, and whether such a cost can be offset by the potential benefits of a successful implementation.

Overall results achieved in Russia and the FSU

BIO programming has aimed at increasing the awareness and capacity of biological scientists in Russia and the FSU to conduct their work in a manner consistent with international best practices for biosafety, thereby helping to reduce public health risks stemming from dual-use biological materials. BIO has reported that the translation and public dissemination of key international biosafety and biorisk management standards has increased awareness of best practices for preventing the unintentional release of dangerous pathogens, whereas the provision of training has increased the capacity of scientists to put international biorisk management standards into practice; however, determining the actual impact of these activities has been a challenge.

BIO programming has also contributed to strengthening the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime by providing assistance to recipient states for the ratification of the BTWC and the implementation of UNSCR 1540. Engagement of state representatives in BTWC conferences and events has contributed to the accession to BTWC by FSU states such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

According to some interviewees, there have been some industrial and scientific benefits to Canada as a result of BIO programming. Examples of such benefits were mainly related to the opportunities for Canadian scientists to meet and work with scientists from Russia and the FSU through conferences and research projects funded by the ISTC and STCU. Several Canadian researchers have indicated that they have benefitted from Russian expertise pertaining to multi-resistant bacteria and from the opportunity to augment their understanding of the current body of research on this topic.

Overall, the evaluation found evidence that some of the BNP portfolio's activities in Russia and the FSU have contributed to the achievement of results at the level of short-term and medium-term outcomes, especially those related to securing of WMD materials and facilities. The success of GPP's programming in Russia and the FSU was due, in part, to the fact that the Program was able to address multiple facets of the biological non-proliferation issues within one centralized geographic region. However, it has been more difficult to determine the extent to which BIO activities have reduced "environmental and health risks stemming from WMD materials," or strengthened "international non-proliferation regimes." Part of the challenge stems from the difficulty to attribute any change in the level of proliferation threat to Canada's interventions only. Some tangible results, however, relate to the physical security upgrades to facilities in Kyrgyzstan, which have contributed to securing dangerous pathogens. These upgrades played a key role in preventing unauthorised access to one of the facilities during the period of civil unrest in June 2010.

BIO Geographic Expansion

Finding 16:
Although BIO programming on a broader international scale has not yet fully unfolded, with only a few projects having received Ministerial approval, there is a trend to cover multiple activities through various delivery mechanisms rather than to focus on fewer priorities and areas where Canada can make a difference.

The geographic focus of the GPP's biological non-proliferation activities under the Biosecurity and Biosafety Strategy has shifted since the Program was granted a mandate for geographic expansion in 2010. As discussed previously, biological security activities have increasingly focussed on Africa, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and South America. Along with the shift to a broader geographic scope, the program has placed a greater emphasis on physical security and on outbreak detection and response practices.

New BIO priority activities introduced under the global expansion of the GPP include:

• Promotion of better security and management practices for biological materials;
• Strengthening of national capacities to prevent, prepare for and respond to a bioterrorism incidents;
• Strengthening of global networks for rapid detection, identification and response to bioterrorism incidents; and
• Reinforcement of global biological non-proliferation principles, practices and instruments.

In order to promote better security and management practices for biological materials, the BIO stream is in the process of implementing physical security upgrades to biological laboratories and updating the pathogen repositories in medical research facilities in Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana and the Caribbean to better enable scientists in these countries to securely store and track their stocks of potentially dangerous pathogens.

BIO is also planning to contribute to strengthening regional and global capacity in Africa, Central America and the Caribbean to prevent, prepare for and respond to incidences of bioterrorism through the provision of training and equipment. Through a contribution agreement with the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), BIO is contributing to the development and provision of improved software that will increase the ability of recipient states to track and map national, regional and global outbreaks of animal diseases as well as training seminars and ongoing support for national points of contact in Kenya, Lebanon, Panama, Argentina, Mali and Botswana. The BIO stream also is contributing to an initiative to be implemented by the World Health Organization (WHO), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the Caribbean Epidemiology Centre (CAREC) for the provision of mobile polymerase chain reaction (PCR) instrument kits and modular infectious substance sampling kits to improve capacity to collect and identify pathogens. This project also involves the delivery of improved information management systems and biorisk management training for laboratory professionals.

Strengthening International Biological Non-proliferation Regimes

BIO has continued to support international organizations that promote respect for international obligations stemming from the BTWC and UNSCR 1540 as well as to fund activities of the UNODA's BTWC International Support Unit (ISU) along with the provision of logistical and financial support for BTWC events, workshops and review conferences. Contributions have also been provided to support the UNODA Secretary General's Investigatory Mechanism to allow the Secretary General to conduct investigations into possible acts of bioterrorism or state-level use of biological weapons.

Financial contributions have also been made to VERTIC's National Implementation Measures Program, which supports the implementation of national legislation required under the BTWC and UNSCR 1540. With support from the GPP, VERTIC has conducted legislative drafting workshops and needs assessment missions in several countries within Africa, South America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia that require assistance to fully implement the BTWC and meet their obligations under UNSCR 1540. Legislative support programming implemented through VERTIC has resulted in drafted BTWC and CWC implementing legislation for countries such as Afghanistan, Madagascar and Yemen.

Finally, BIO has continued to support the operation of newly established regional biological safety organizations. As part of this ongoing support, GPP through its BIO portfolio, contributes funding to an international biosafety association "twinning" program implemented by the International Federation of Biological Associations (IFBA), through which newly-created associations are mentored by more established associations. This initiative has thus far resulted in the implementation of at least four mentoring arrangements between new and established biological safety associations.

Despite promising initial steps taken toward implementing BIO programming on a global scale, there is a need to address potential challenges pertaining to a more holistic programming approach and tracking of respective results under the new geographic mandate of the program. There is a need for better coordination with the other GPP portfolios (e.g., UNSCR 1540 and SEP) and a more strategic, rather than opportunistic choice of countries of intervention. Finally, as the BIO stream begins to implement programming outside of Russia and the FSU, the lack of a critical mass of biological non-proliferation activities within a discrete geographic region could make more difficult the achievement and attribution of results at the outcome level.

7.4.6 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540)

Finding 17:
While programming in support of UNSCR 1540 implementation has only recently started, there is evidence of progress and initial results.

GPP's support to the UNSCR 1540 implementation has focused on two areas: the development of legislative and regulatory frameworks, and training of first responders. With regard to the first area, programming has primarily been executed through VERTIC. Over the study period, two Contribution Agreements (CA) were signed between DFAIT and VERTIC. The first CA was used to fund travel for officials from Afghanistan to London for a workshop to develop legislative frameworks with VERTIC. Tangible impacts of Canada's work through VERTIC are demonstrated by the bill drafted for Afghanistan, and submitted to Afghanistan's Parliament.

Canada has also provided support to VERTIC's National Implementation Measures (NIM) Program which assists states in understanding what measures are required at the national level to comply with WMD conventions, such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), UNSCR 1540 and other international convention relating to nuclear and radiological security. As a result of Canada's contribution to NIM, 58 surveys of existing legislation were conducted, 10 BWC laws and 5 CWC laws were drafted, information was provided to 3 section parties, assistance was provided to 10 BWC states, as well as support for drafting BWC bills or action plans that informed policy and programs among countries requiring stronger legislative frameworks. In terms of geography, Canadian funding contributed to VERTIC's work in Costa Rica, Georgia, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, Poland, India, Thailand and Zimbabwe. One of the benefits of working through VERTIC has been the opportunity to work with other countries that might not have otherwise been as open to certain partners (e.g., the US), as they have been to this organization. This has ultimately had a positive impact on GPP's progress toward achieving program outcomes.

In the area of training, DFAIT entered into an MOU with the RCMP, signed February 12, 2012, to facilitate CBNR training in select countries. Under this MOU, DFAIT is funding a training coordinator position in the RCMP. Colombia was to be the first target state for CBRNe training, delivered through 2 one-week courses on how to handle biological, chemical and radiological threats in terrorist situations. For the purpose, $117,000 were allocated to cover the costs of 10 facilitators and 1 coordinator to go to Bogota. The training facilitators include 6 representatives from the RCMP, 2 bio experts from PHAC, a chemical weapons expert from DND, and a nuclear and radiological safety and security expert from CNSC. The Colombian project will also involve the provision of CBRNe protection and detection equipment through the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC) - DFAIT MoU with RCMP as the technical authority to determine the technical specifications for the equipment required. The equipment being sourced includes primary detection and personal protection equipment as well as lab equipment for identification of CBRN agents. It was reported that Brazil, Mexico and CARICOM have also forwarded requests to Canada for similar training and equipment.

Canada, and GPP in particular, has also contributed funds to support the establishment of a UNSCR 1540 coordinator position with the Central American Integration System (SICA), to conduct training on the implementation of nuclear security related international legal instruments.^{Footnote 53} Another contribution has been made to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to provide equipment (an airborne gamma-ray spectrometer system) and training for its use. Procurement for the equipment will be done through the CCC, while NRCan is expected to provide the technical input and training on the use of the equipment.

7.5 Performance Issue 5: Demonstration of Efficiency & Economy

In its assessment of the Program's efficiency and economy, the evaluation team relied mainly on information from project documents, interviews, reports on similar programs delivered by other GP member countries, such as the US and the UK. These sources provided reliable information on the extent to which the GPP has delivered on commitments made by Canada at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit and subsequent G8 and G20 summits. The comparison with other partners' programming in Russia and the FSU has also been indicative of the extent to which GPP is delivering good value-for-money.

7.5.1 Program Governance

Finding 18:
The management structure under GPP Phases I, II & III supported the effective delivery of projects and achievement of results in Russia and the FSU. In response to the challenges of the geographic expansion, the Program has initiated revisions to this management structure; however, its effectiveness cannot yet be assessed in the absence of sufficient implementation evidence.

A Senior Program Manager (SPMs) is assigned to each portfolio and charged with identifying, designing and managing projects implemented under the specific portfolio. SPMs were supported by a small team of project managers and, in the case of NSPD, NRS and BNP, by contractors with expertise in the areas of submarine dismantlement, nuclear and radiological security and biosecurity respectively. While SPMs were granted considerable latitude in the identification, design and management of projects under their respective envelopes, all projects up to $5,000,000 required Director General level approval. The Assistant Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (International Security Branch) was authorized to approve projects with a value of up to $7,500,000 per project, while projects of higher value up to $25 million required Ministerial approval e.g., NPSD, CWD, NRS (Chornobyl).

As noted in Section 1.5 of this Report, Under Phases I and II, and partly under Phase III of GPP (up to 2010), policy and programming were guided by two advisory committees: the Global Partnership Advisory Group (GPAG) and the Science, Trade, and Technology Advisory Group (STTAG)- an inter-departmental advisory body composed of senior officials from a wide range of OGDs, and chaired by the Director General/Senior Coordinator IGX.^{Footnote 54}

The mandate of the GPAG was to provide broad policy advice and support on the direction of the GPP activities and ensure that relevant Canadian interests were reflected in the delivery of GPP projects. In addition to the GPAG, another interdepartmental advisory body was created - the Science, Trade, and Technology Advisory Group (STTAG), representing 20 federal government departments and agencies and also chaired by the Director General/Senior Coordinator IGX. The STTAG provided a forum for discussing international science, technology, and trade aspects of the RFWS/SEP envelope with the view to ensure that projects involving the redirection of former weapons scientists reflected Canadian priorities in research and development (R&D). These advisory groups were deemed inefficient and not contributing to the Program, and were consequently disbanded under Phase III of the GPP.

With the abandonment of the GPAG and the STTAG, the strategic guidance and management of GPP became almost entirely a responsibility of IFM and the Director General of GPP with the support of the SPMs for the individual portfolios. Past evaluations of GPP, while remarking that this management structure led to "siloes" with minimal interface between the programming envelopes, also remarked that this governance structure was appropriate and efficient, given the specificity of each programming envelope.^{Footnote 55} This evaluation agrees with this observation.

The transition to global programming, however, introduced a new set of challenges and administrative imperatives that will impact the way in which GPP will be governed and managed in the future. For example, moving forward, GPP will be implementing a larger number of smaller projects (both in scope and value) in a greater number of countries. This will require a more active engagement with DFAIT's geographic desks than was in the case with the FSU. With the global expansion, GPP will also seek a greater degree of engagement of OGDs in project design and delivery than ever before. The broader geographic scope will also result in GPP programming being delivered in new countries alongside other DFAIT security programs, such as the CTCBP, the ACCBP, and the GPSF, which will increase the need for coordination. The recasting of SEP and UNSCR 1540 as "cross-cutting" programming domains will further demand a more integrated approach to programming. In short, governance of the GPP will require standardised structures and procedures, particularly with respect to country selection, project identification, review and approval, which are inclusive of a greater diversity of stakeholders.

The Non-Proliferation and Security Threat Reduction Bureau (IGD) managing GPP, is reported to be in the process of establishing an annual priority country selection review process to support strategic decision making. It is unclear at this point, however, whether this "review process" will involve the establishment of a committee to perform such a role, though regular consultations with DFAIT's geographic and functional divisions are envisaged to ensure that GPP activities are aligned with DFAIT's objectives and GoC foreign policy priorities.

In anticipation of greater OGD engagement in GPP programming, MOUs have been established with 8 (eight) OGDs.^{Footnote 56} Though GPP's foundational documents reference the engagement of OGDs to "review priorities, trends and developments that directly inform GPP programming," it is still unclear whether the review and priority setting processes will be accomplished merely through consultations or through specific governance bodies, such as advisory or steering committees. With the expectation of a more intensive engagement of OGDs during the global expansion mandate, arguably there may be a case for reviving structures akin to the GPAG.

The recent decision to consolidate the GPP, the CTCBP, the ACCBP, and Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Policy under the Director General of IGD, bringing together for the first time all security programs and policy relating to disarmament and non-proliferation. This is a positive development which stands to support both policy and programming coherence and coordination within DFAIT.

Declaring the UNSCR 1540 and SEP streams as cross-cutting in nature and supportive of GPP's remaining core programming portfolios, has been an effective step toward establishing the legal framework for a more holistic in-country programming while addressing the human dimension relating to WMD non-proliferation. There is an expectation that UNSCR 1540 and SEP programming will be guided by the GPP's Strategic Directions document and related priority country selection review process.

7.5.2 Program and Project Planning

Finding 19:
Frameworks and procedures put in place during Phases I, II and III of GPP to support programming in Russia and the FSU were effective, however the development of similar frameworks to support programming globally remains a work in progress.

For Phases I, II and much of III of the GPP, program planning was guided by the priorities declared by the G8 Leaders at the Kananaskis Summit of 2002 and subsequent summits, which until 2009 remained largely focussed on Russia and the countries of the FSU. With the signing of the bilateral treaty between Canada and Russia in 2004, the legal framework for program implementation was established, addressing such critical issues as indemnification, tax exemptions, intellectual property, rights and privileges with respect to access to information and sites, adherence to Canadian safety and environmental standards, etc., all of which laid the ground for effective program and project planning in the same. Project selection was undertaken in consultation with GP Partners and with relevant representatives from the Government of Russia to ensure that that programming was aligned with declared needs.

As remarked earlier, program planning outside Russia and the FSU has introduced a host of new planning challenges that IGD is beginning to address. IGD, for example, has recently developed a GPP Strategic Directions document which outlines an approach to programming (geographic and thematic) based on: 1) identified WMD threats and vulnerabilities; 2) regions/countries of foreign policy priorities to Canada, and; 3) opportunities for strategic partnership with key G8 allies, such as the US.^{Footnote 57} As indicated above, IGD is in the process of establishing an annual priority country selection review process.

At the portfolio level, IGA has, with respect to NRS, begun work on developing a Radiological Source Security Strategy, which outlines the factors to be considered to support decision making with respect to programming in select countries, as well as the type of assistance eligible for funding - provision of technical expertise, securing identified radiological sources in-country, and recovery of identified radiological sources. IGA has, with respect to the BIO portfolio, adopted the 5 objectives/deliverables declared by the GP (2012) as a broad framework for BIO programming, though a criteria for country and project selection has yet to be fully developed for this portfolio.^{Footnote 58} As for CWD, though no longer a discrete programming envelope, funds are to be set aside to respond to programming needs as they arise, which will in turn call for the development policy framework for engagement. The same can be said for cross-cutting programming UNSCR 1540 and SEP.

Finding 20:
Project planning during Phases I, II and III was rigorous, which contributed to the efficiency and effectiveness of program delivery by portfolio. Programming outside Russia and the countries of the FSU will however introduce new planning challenges.

As noted earlier, SPMs were granted considerable latitude in identifying and planning projects within their respective envelopes. Project identification was undertaken in consultation with international partners and more specifically with relevant stakeholders in Russia. Though the Canada-Russia Bilateral Treaty, which provided an overarching framework for GPP programming in Russia, was concluded only in 2004, project planning commenced before that date. For example, under the NPSD envelope, consultations were undertaken in 2003 with the IAEA Contact Expert Group (CEG) to obtain an understanding of the issues involved in implementing a NPSD program in Russia. Discussions were also conducted with the US Cooperation Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which at that time had extensive experience with NPS dismantlement in Russia, followed by consultations with Rosatom to identify the type of submarines for dismantlement and possible shipyards.

These consultations concluded with a decision for Canada to initially partner with the US CTR program in the dismantlement of a single class of NPS at the Zvyozdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk in North Western Russia. The rationale for Canada's decision was twofold: first, US was an experienced partner in the dismantlement of submarines in Russia, and second, this shipyard already possessed the requisite infrastructure to conduct NPSD and defueling. Another important decision made by Canada, which ultimately contributed to the undeniable success of this program was to focus on a single class of submarines, thus minimizing management and planning costs.^{Footnote 59}

Canada, through the NRS portfolio, also partnered with the US Department of Energy (DOE) in the reactor shutdown of the plutonium production facility at Zheleznogorsk, capitalizing again the experience of the US is this area. Similarly, in the domain of CWD, Canada initially partnered with the UK Ministry of Defence (UK MoD) in the establishment of the CWD facility at Shchuch'ye. Canada benefited from this arrangement by gaining access to the management capacity and expertise of the British partners at a time when such capacity and expertise were unavailable in Canada. With the RFWS program, which preceded SEP, Canada capitalized on the infrastructure and networks of pre-existing science centres (ISTC and STCU) to conduct its programming, which was the only viable option to engage FWS in Russia and the countries of the FSU. The science centres also provided the platform for early programming in the domain of BNP. In short, the decision in the early years of GPP to program through other GP Partners and multilateral organizations was prudent, providing GPP management with an opportunity to gain valuable insights into how to program in what was then a novel environment, which ultimately served the Program well as it evolved over the years.

With the signing of the Canada-Russia Bilateral Treaty in 2004, GPP management was better positioned to negotiate Implementing Arrangements (IAs) with prospective recipients directly, thereby granting GPP management with a degree of control over its programming that it did not enjoy when programming through other GP Partners and multilateral organizations.

Programming in Russia was done in a responsible manner with GPP managers carefully analysing all aspects related to potential projects and initiatives. For example, prior to entering into negotiations with a potential recipient, management would undertake a pre-assessment of a proposed project to ascertain the materiality of the threat to be mitigated, the capacity of the recipient, and the scope of the work. In the case of the NPS envelope, this meant assessing the capacity of the shipyard Zvyozdochka and, under Phase II of NPS, the shipyard at Zvezda in the Far East to implement all phases of the defueling and dismantlement process. In the case of the NRS, management, accompanied by contracted physical security experts, conducted independent assessments of proposed sites, which served as the basis for developing the design specifications for each project and determining the level of work required. Contractors maintained a price list of inputs (materials and labour) to ascertain approximate costs of project implementation, which was used in negotiations with the recipient.

All negotiations with recipients on the IAs were conducted "face-to-face" and on-site with the support of subject matter experts and legal counsel. IAs were carefully designed to avoid the risk of overlap or duplication of effort with other donors (e.g., disclosure clauses relating to the contributions of other donors) and to minimize financial risk to the Crown. Additionally, IAs were negotiated on a fixed cost basis, thereby shifting the risk associated with price fluctuations on to the recipient. Further, all IAs identified clear and measurable deliverables aligned with milestones, which served as the basis for payment. The linking of payments with the achievement of specific milestones, backed by clauses pertaining to the suspension, reduction or cancellation of payments, significantly strengthened GPP's management control over the resources dedicated to a given project, thereby providing evidence of exemplary planning at the project level.

For much of the life of GPP, the Government of Russia has been a willing and cooperative partner, thereby facilitating planning. With global expansion, GPP programming outside of Russia and the countries of the FSU will likely become more responsive and dependent on the willingness of countries to accept international help, as well as their respective capacities to make their own contributions, neither of which can be taken as a given. Another distinction between programming in Russia and the countries of the FSU and that of programming globally is that in Russia, WMD material was under state control, while in the new countries and regions of programming WMD material is more likely to be found under civilian control.

With global expansion, GPP has started programming in countries with which Canada has no signed MOUs or agreements related to non-proliferation. While some of the lessons learned and best practices relating to the design of IAs in Russia may be adaptable to agreements with implementing partners in other countries, success in doing so in new countries is by no means assured. Nor may the Program likely have the benefit of a cadre of personnel at missions to support programming or the resources to monitor compliance with agreements with implementing partners to the degree that was possible in Russia. This translates in the likelihood that program delivery will increasingly be executed through third countries or multilateral institutions.

With a return to a greater reliance on multilateral institutions for program delivery, the question of funding authority assumes renewed importance. For Phases I, II, and III of GPP, the Program was limited in its use of grants, which is the preferred option for multilateral institutions. While the lack of grant authority under Phases I, II, and III of the GPP did not constitute a significant impediment to programming, multilateral partners see that as a factor diminishing the efficiency and effectiveness of project implementation. Assuming that with global expansion GPP will be relying more heavily on multilateral institutions for program delivery, a case can arguably be made that the GPP would benefit from having such authority.

Finding 21:
The global expansion is presenting new programming challenges which require a more structured project review and selection process, inclusive of potential stakeholders.

Preceding findings indicated that while some progress has been noted in the development of strategic frameworks to assist in the identification of potential projects for funding, more detailed criteria are needed to support project selection as the Program expands to new geographic regions and countries. IGA has recently developed technical assessment guidelines to assist in the review of project proposals relating to nuclear and radiological security. These guidelines are based on four factors: 1) material attractiveness [suitability for use in an attack]; 2) country threat environment [evidence of terrorist activity in the area]; 3) site conditions [compliance with IAEA security standards]; and 4) portability [proximity to potential target]. Based on information received to date, no similar guidelines have been developed for the other programming envelopes.

Though the GPP foundational documents envisage a formal project review process involving SPMs, the Deputy Director of Policy, Legal, Finance, and representatives from relevant geographic divisions and missions, it is unclear whether this review and selection will again be merely consultative or through a formal body. Nor is it clear at this juncture the extent of OGD involvement in this process.

A review of the project proposals developed in the last year confirms that most involve a third country (US or UK) or multilateral institutions as the implementing agents. Negotiations with these implementing partners can be both lengthy and costly in terms of level of effort, which could be justified if they result in approved projects. Most partners enter into such negotiations on the assumption that if an agreement is reached, the project implementation will proceed as planned. However, with the adoption of the new process requiring prior Ministerial approval in principle, no such assurance can be provided following a preliminary agreement. The sunk costs associated with negotiating and developing project proposals, which apply to both Canada and prospective partners, and the uncertainty related to the actual project approval, may adversely impact the efficiency of the Program administration and, potentially, Canada's reputation as a reliable and preferred partner.

7.5.3 Risk Management

Finding 22:
The risk management strategies developed over time for the GPP and each specific portfolio have proven to be robust and effective for the programming activities undertaken in Russia and the FSU. Some of these strategies, however, will need to be updated to respond to the different types of risks associated with global expansion.

As noted previously, risk mitigation measures were built into the bilateral treaty between Canada and Russia which served to minimize exposure to the Crown. Examples include provisions relating to tax exemptions, intellectual property, environmental protection, access to information and sites, indemnification from nuclear and non-nuclear liability, and payment terms and conditions. Within this legal framework, the Program developed a detailed Risk Management Plan (risk registry, risk matrix, and risk mitigating strategies) whose components were integrated into each programming portfolio. Under the NPSD portfolio, for example, a comprehensive risk management architecture was adopted using a dedicated software application ["RIAS" by Davion Systems] to formalize risk reduction and mitigation measures related to dismantlement of nuclear submarines. Risks were tabulated along with impacts and mitigation actions on a monthly reporting cycle. Similar risk registries and specific mitigation strategies were developed for each of the remaining portfolios.

The Canada-Russia Bilateral Treaty also informed the design of IAs which likewise included indemnification clauses to protect the Crown and specific clauses dealing with potential risks to the project design and implementation. For example, most projects were signed on a fixed cost bases, thereby shifting the financial risk (e.g., currency fluctuations) to the recipient. Further, the linking of disbursements with the achievement of specific milestones as well as the clauses pertaining to the suspension, reduction or cancellation of payments constitutes another safeguard against exposure to risk.

These and other provisions included in the legal instruments helped to considerably reduce the risk of implementing projects in Russia and the FSU and ensured that Canada could withdraw from a project if conditions are not met without penalty. For example, although Canada had originally envisaged funding the implementation of security upgrades at MCC, the Program decided to withdraw from the project owing to lengthy delays in obtaining approval (two years) from the Russian government and an inability to agree on the costs of the upgrades. Under these circumstances, Canada's decision was assessed as appropriate, since it protected the Crown from exposure to possible future costs. The decision also had the added benefit of sending a clear signal to other potential recipients that while contributing to and supporting non-proliferation, GPP management remains cognizant of project risks and protective of Canada`s interests and the ways in which taxpayers' money is spent.

Sound risk management is further evidenced by the decision to withdraw support for the Kyrgyz laboratory project. Although the contract with the construction company selected to build the facility had been signed, the contract included the delivery of the site as a conditions precedent, thereby relieving the Crown of any legal obligation for specific performance absent the fulfillment of that condition. As events unfolded, the Kyrgyz Government was unable to deliver on the site, despite its commitment to do so as documented in the Canada-Kyrgyz Treaty, thereby rendering the contract void. While Canada compensated the construction company for incurred sunk costs, the Program likely spared the Crown millions of dollars in additional costs had the project proceeded, which in any event was unlikely given the absence of political commitment to the project.

Global expansion is expected to expose Canada to new risks which will have to be respectively managed, e.g., countries with which Canada has no bilateral agreements, new recipients of varying institutional capacity, untested implementing partners, and unstable or insecure implementing environments. One of the lessons learned derived from the GPP's experience in Russia and the countries of the FSU is that the best way to mitigate risk is to build risk mitigating measures in all legal instruments. The extent to which these best practices can be adapted and applied to arrangements with other partners outside the FSU remains to be seen, however risk mitigation strategies will need to be developed to address risks specific to countries for which GPP has previous experience. IGD is reported to be in the process of developing a new risk management strategy to deal with these and other risks associated with global expansion.

7.5.4 Performance Monitoring and Comptrollership

Finding 23:
Mechanisms and procedures put in place to support performance monitoring and results reporting during the study period were robust and highly effective, though global expansion is presenting new challenges for performance monitoring and results reporting.

The GPP was guided by goals centered on achieving clear, tangible, and measurable results with respect to each of its portfolios. As remarked earlier, the Canada-Russia Bilateral Treaty contained express provisions dealing with access to information and sites to support effective project monitoring and reporting. These and other provisions were subsequently built into IAs with recipients. Under the NRS portfolio, for example, IAs imposed exacting accountability and reporting requirements on recipients, requiring the latter to furnish DFAIT with written updates summarizing the status of implementation of cooperation projects against predetermined milestones. IAs included express provisions permitting DFAIT and its contractors (Raytheon and later Gregg Protection Services) access to information and sites to verify the progress and completion of milestones. The same access rights and privileges were applied to the IAs with other recipients under other portfolios.

In addition, recipients were required to produce and deliver to DFAIT a "Final Report", which includes a description of the activities under each cooperation project, achievement of milestones, a comparison of planned versus actual activities, including an explanation of variances, problems encountered, actions taken, results and lessons learned, and conclusions and recommendations. DFAIT contractors are similarly required to produce and deliver an "end-of-project report" upon project completion. IGA, for its part, developed a "close-out report" template which, based on the foregoing, summarizes the achievements of the project, strengths and weakness in the project's design and implementation, lessons learned therefrom, and with recommendations relevant to future programming. With respect to most of the programming activities, the evaluation found these reports to be comprehensive and useful. Results reporting for activities such as the delivery of training and attendance at conferences, however, often failed to demonstrate the results achieved at the outcome level. Furthermore, the evaluation did not find evidence of any effort to consolidate the available performance and results data at the portfolio and overall Program levels.

Again, as the GPP moves forward with global expansion, performance monitoring and results reporting will encounter new challenges. Programming a larger number of small projects disbursed over a larger number of geographic locations will preclude the kind of intensive monitoring that took place in Russia and the FSU. Performance monitoring and results reporting requirements will need to be calibrated to the differing institutional capacities and risk profiles of eligible recipients. While standardized reporting requirements templates may be suitable for some recipients, they may not be suitable for all recipients. Different operating environments are another factor that will have to be taken into account. Monitoring of projects in some geographic locations may be difficult for safety and security reasons. Additionally, different delivery mechanisms, including the use of "flow-through" from third parties, grants to multilateral institutions, and "piggy-backing" on third party programs, will also require different monitoring and reporting requirements which may make it difficult to attribute results to GPP interventions. Finally, cross-cutting programming areas, such as SEP and UNSCR 1540, will likewise require a different approach to performance monitoring and results reporting - one which will highlight the contributions of the latter to the outcome articulations of the former.

7.5.5 Human Resource Management

Finding 24:
Human resources dedicated to the GPP under Phases I, II, and much of III were well aligned with the technical requirements for effective program delivery, however, the Program's Human Resources Strategy will need to be updated to account for the challenges posed by global expansion.

The management cadre of GPP consisted of SPMs, backed by a small team of project managers and contractors with subject matter expertise relating to submarine dismantlement, environmental protection, nuclear and radiological security, railway engineering, and physical infrastructure development. Additionally, the Program was supported by several financial officers, a lawyer and other subject matter experts drawn from OGDs (e.g., PWGSC, DND and CCC) on an as needed basis. Program delivery was also supported by CBS and LES staff based in Moscow. This mix of skills, drawn from the public and private sectors both in Canada and abroad, proved highly effective in supporting program planning and execution.

Over the life of the GPP, the Program has benefited from a strong and stable team of professionals with little turnover at the SPM level which contributed to greater administrative continuity - a feature regarded favourably by partners, particularly in Russia. Reference has already been made to the contribution of DFAIT's legal staff in crafting the Canada-Russia Bilateral Treaty and subsequent IAs which served the Program so well. Administrative continuity was further reinforced by the durable presence of GPP personnel in Moscow, who played a critical role in collecting information to support planning, developing relations with Russian partners, liaising with the same, and providing logistic support to GPP management and contractors.

The Program further benefited from its judicious use of contract expertise. The contractor support team for the NPSP portfolio (Teledyne Brown), for example, consisted of a former program manager with the US Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, two former nuclear submarine officers from the US and British navies, an environmental engineer, marine salvage experts from the Netherlands, two railway engineers, a project information management consultant and six official interpreters.^{Footnote 60} The technical capabilities of the team greatly contributed to the success of this programming portfolio, which was acknowledged by the Russian interlocutors interviewed during the course of this evaluation.

So too did the NRS portfolio benefit from the expertise of its contractors (Raytheon and Gregg Protection Services) whose program management experience in leading multidisciplinary teams and providing technical services relating to nuclear security protection and security systems proved instrumental in contributing to the success of this programming portfolio. The services of Bechtel, one of the world's largest engineering firms, played a critical role in the development and oversight of the construction of the railway at the CWD facility at Shchuch'ye. The services of Teledyne Brown were again engaged to assist in the development of the CWD facility at Kizner under the CWDP. Contractors (Tim-Tech and Smith-Carter Engineers) were also engaged in the design of the Kyrgyz laboratory under the BIO portfolio. Overall, the use of contract expertise in the planning, design, implementation, and monitoring of projects added much to the program's success.

With global expansion, GPP is undergoing a significant reorganization, both in terms of program design and management structure where roles and responsibilities are shifting. As remarked earlier, the GPP will with some certainty be supporting a larger number of smaller projects disbursed over a greater diversity of countries, which will actually increase the level of effort required to support project planning, design and oversight. This level of effort will likely further be exacerbated by the absence of a cadre of staff in-country, of the kind enjoyed by the GPP in Russia, to support project planning, execution and oversight.

Nor is it clear at this juncture the extent to which the GPP will be able to rely on the services of contractors, who served the Program so well while programming remained focussed on the Russia and the FSU. Conversely, the anticipated reliance on multilateral institutions and third parties for program delivery may reduce the level of effort required for program management. In short, global expansion will have a significant impact on the human resource composition of the GPP management team, both in terms of the number of staff and skills mix. IGD is reported to be reviewing its human resource requirements and developing a human resource development plan to respond to anticipated needs.

7.5.6 Information Management

Finding 25:
While information management systems developed by SPMs during the study period were determined to be adequate, global expansion will require a more integrated information management system.

Over the study period responsibility for records management (paper-based and electronic) was delegated to SMPs who in turn developed systems appropriate for their needs. As a whole, this approach worked well while the portfolios were discrete programming streams. For example, under the NPSD portfolio, the SPM used a customized data management system in order to share program data with external contractors. This system was developed using an externally provided secure server which hosted both applications and project data accessible to authorised users via the Internet. The SPMs for the NRS and CWD portfolios similarly developed their own records management systems, complete with filing conventions, which were reported to have worked well.

With the move to a more integrated, country focused approach to programming, which requires all operating programming streams to work in concert, the need to share information among SPMs assumes greater importance. The Bureau is reported to be working on instituting an integrated (financial and non-financial) program level database that could be accessible to all staff along with related records management conventions and procedures. This initiative was in a nascent phase of development during the period of the evaluation and no conclusive assessments about its potential operability, efficiency and effectiveness could be made.

7.5.7 Financial Management

Finding 26:
GPP has managed to efficiently deliver on all commitments within allocated or reduced budgets without compromising the quality or sustainability of achieved results.

Internal and recipient audits and evaluations of the GPP conducted to date have indicated that the Program has established sound financial management practices. The latest Audit Report (2010) quotes "…the active involvement of dedicated GPP advisors in project budget management and the use of formal monthly reviews of financial information contained in the Integrated Management System (IMS)" as one of the Program's strengths.

The evaluation found that GPP Management has continued to demonstrate financial responsibility and stewardship in implementing projects in a complex and challenging environment. Expenditures at the project level have been diligently tracked with payments released against milestones and delivery of reports on results. However, financial reporting at the portfolio level and tracking of actual versus planned budgets has been a challenge, mainly due to the lack of a centralised data-base. The ability of the Program to transfer money among portfolios has, on the one hand, provided GPP with flexibility to adjust and direct expenditures to priority projects, but on the other - has significantly increased the complexity of the financial management for the Program.

Transfers of International Assistance Envelope (IAE) funds among the GPP, START and the two Capacity Building Programs (e.g., from GPSF to GPP and ACCBP), while possible, have presented GPP management with challenges on maintaining current information on these transactions. For example, the Program had difficulty presenting a consolidated report on actual program expenditures and budget cuts (both from Vote 1 and Vote 10), demonstrating how the authorised $1 billion was spent over the 10-year programming period. The lack of a readily available financial report was explained with the significantly reduced staff complement in the Finance Section and their preoccupation with ongoing planning and reporting. The lack of appropriate database was another reason for the difficulty in collecting the necessary financial information. However, the lack of a database has further implications for the day-to-day management and planning of the Program at the portfolio and project level as well.

Table 4, below, presents a summary of the overall budget allocations, actual expenditures and budget cuts to the Program over the period of 10 years.

Despite the challenges presented to the Program by the current project approval process, GPP has been able to disburse its Vote 10 allocations for 2011-2012.

While the lack of a Program database, the complexity of the Program and the need to constantly adjust programming to the changing nature of proliferation threat and the evolving priorities of DFAIT and GP have increased the programming challenges, the evaluation team was able to find sufficient information and evidence indicating prudent and responsible financial management.

In sum, GPP has managed to deliver on all commitments made to Russia and the FSU despite some considerable budget reductions to Vote 1 and Vote 10 made over the past years. Some of these were part of the overall cuts to the IAE funding; others resulted from the reference level cuts following the Department's response to the GoC Deficit Reduction Action Plan 2012.

7.5.8 Efficiency and Effectiveness of Program Delivery

Finding 27:
The administration of the GPP was highly efficient, thereby contributing to optimal results at the least cost.

Over the life of the GPP, the Program, but for several projects which for sound reasons had to be abandoned, was able to achieve all its declared objectives and at a cost roughly 15% below budget. Further, this was achieved with an administrative overhead around 10% of the total disbursements, which is acceptable given a program as large and complex as the GPP. Much of this success can be attributed to the rigorous front-end planning of projects, which contributed significantly to the efficiency and cost effectiveness of delivery. Reference has already been made in the preceding findings to proactive measures taken with respect to the crafting of legal instruments to minimize financial risk to the Crown, such as the reliance on fixed price contracts, which effectively transferred the risk of price fluctuations on to recipients.

Other efficiencies and savings were generated in the design of projects. For example, under the NPSD portfolio, the decision to focus on one class of submarines generated economies of scale benefits. The Victor Class submarines were deemed the most cost-effective to dismantle because of the reactors (2 per submarine) hold approximately the same number of fuel assemblies as that of larger vessels, but the small size meant that there was less to dismantle and less non-nuclear waste to dispose of. Concentrating on one shipyard also minimized project management costs by reducing travel costs and administrative overhead. By leveraging the experience of a former US CTR program manager with knowledge of costing at the Zvyozdochka shipyard, Canada was able to negotiate the lowest cost per submarine of any other GP Partner involved in the submarine dismantlement program. This cost became a benchmark for subsequent IAs with the shipyard at Zvezda.

Under the NRS portfolio, similar efficiencies and savings are evident. The services provided by IGA's resident Security Advisor, combined with the services provided by DFAIT's contractors (Raytheon and Gregg Protection Services), proved instrumental in ensuring that Canada obtained optimum value for least cost. All costs estimates submitted by recipients, for example, were subject to intensive scrutiny against a price list (labour and materials) maintained by Gregg Protection Services, which resulted, on average, in a 30% to 40% reduction in project costs. Russian interlocutors interviewed in the course of this evaluation all remarked on how well prepared their Canadian partners were entering into negotiations and how effective they were in advancing Canada's interests in the same.

The GPP Management Team also demonstrated sound stewardship over the resources at its disposal in its choice of implementing partners. As stated earlier, the decision to program through multilateral institutions and third parties during the first year of the Program in Russia was wise, providing GPP management with an opportunity to capitalize on the expertise and resources of partners while gaining valuable insights into how to program in what was then a novel environment. Reference has been made earlier to the choice of the shipyards at Zvyozdochka and Zvezda for the reason that the US had already invested significant resources in improving the physical infrastructure of these sites to support effective submarine dismantlement and defueling; of the choice to partner with the US EPWGPP in the reactor shutdown of the plutonium production facility at Zheleznogorsk, thereby capitalizing again on the experience of the US is this area; and, of the choice to partner with the UK MoD in the establishment of the CWD facility at Shchuch'ye, to name a few. In each of these cases, Canada benefited from these arrangements, both in terms of minimizing costs and in obtaining valuable insights into programming which later served the GPP well.

Even when certain inefficiencies were reported, as was the case with the arrangement with the UK MoD on the Shchuch'ye project, the lessons learned from that experience were put to good effect in the design and implementation of the project at Kizner.

Major losses were avoided, and important lessons learned, from the decisions to withdraw support for certain projects, notably the MCC project in Russia and the Kyrgyz laboratory project in Kyrgyzstan. These decisions likely saved the Crown millions of dollars.

In short, GPP through Phases I, II and III delivered on its mandate in highly efficient manner, optimizing results for least cost.

Finding 28:
Though the return on investment in WMD non-proliferation is difficult to quantify in monetary terms, GPP contributions to avoid a catastrophic event precipitated by the use of WMD for malicious purposes are overall deemed good value for money.

Measuring a return on investment in security is difficult. Like an investment in insurance, the value of which only becomes material when needed, the value of an investment in security only becomes material in the breach. One need only consider the immediate economic effects arising from the September 11 attacks, which caused approximately US $40 billion in insurance losses alone, to appreciate the economic ramifications of the possible use of a WMD in a major metropolitan centre.^{Footnote 61} Against such measurable economic losses, to say nothing about the human tragedy associated with an event of this kind, the investments of the international community, including Canada's investments through the GPP, in securing WMD material from falling into the wrong hands is money well spent.

8.0 GPP Overall Strengths, Weakness and Lessons Learned

Centralized Program Delivery

Canada's GPP is often described as "unique" compared to other countries' non-proliferation programs. Part of this "uniqueness" is due to its design and delivery structure. Being a dedicated program designed to meet GP commitments; GPP resembles the UK's Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP) but differs considerably from the US multi-prone programming executed by a large number of departments (State, DOD, DOE, etc.) and agencies.

Creating a single unit to administer the GPP turned to be one of the strengths of the Program. GPP location at and delivery through DFAIT provided a single point of contact within the government that facilitated coordination with international partners and beneficiaries, reduced the possibility of duplication of effort or issues being overlooked; and allowed for an integrated approach across all priority areas. The lack of specific expertise at DFAIT was compensated by hiring expert technical advice and monitoring services from external service providers when and as needed.

This evaluation, and in particular the reviewed projects and the evidence of achieved results indicate that the Program has effectively managed to compensate for the lack of such expertise by hiring the most appropriate consultants when as for as long as needed. In most cases, the time-limited contracting mechanisms used by program managers have led to major savings increased efficiency in the implementation of complex projects.

Powerful Diplomatic Tool

GPP is also often described as a flexible diplomatic tool that can actively be used beyond the implementation of non-proliferation projects. Projects require the development of networks and negotiations with partner and recipient countries, as well as with international organizations. The establishment of such relationships and networks for Canada has had ancillary and longer-term benefits beyond the direct impacts of projects in the field. For example, building relationship of trust with the WHO for the purpose of the bio security programming, has taken time and effort but the benefits for future collaborations and links to other countries for partnering could be great.

Benefits for Canada

Canada has worked closely with the US throughout the first five years of the GPP and has engendered a high level of respect among the US partners for the way in which Canada fulfills its commitments, the quality, consistency and effectiveness of Canada's projects, as well as the overall management of the Canadian Program.

Even though GPP's mandate has not been tied to trade objectives, there are potential trade benefits for Canada. For example, Canada is a large uranium producer and the GPP Is helping to brand Canada as a safe and reliable producer and high-quality trading partner.

By implementing projects that prevent the proliferation and illegal trafficking of materials of mass destruction or dual use substances, GPP is potentially reducing the probability of incidents and strikes using such materials. Evidence shows that a single strike could instantly cripple 10% of the world's economy.

Establishment and development of networks

GPP can be a flexible diplomatic tool used beyond the simple implementation of projects. The initiation of programming and the delivery of projects internationally, increasingly require the development of networks with partners, international organizations and recipient countries. The establishment of such relationships and networks could have ancillary and longer-term benefits for Canada beyond the impact of projects in the field.

Leveraging the Experience from Russia

As WMD proliferation threats are successfully dealt with in Russia and the FSU countries, and with Russia's increased capacity and experience in securing and managing its nuclear and radiological facilities, there are growing opportunities for the cooperative involvement of Russia and leverage of its expertise in dealing with proliferation threats worldwide. The Global Partnership and Canada's GPP in particular have contributed to a more mature relationship between Russia and GP member states in dealing with proliferation threats on a broader international scale. There are expectations that Russia would support the Global Partnership in the effort to improve security and minimize the threat from CBRN proliferation on a broader international scale.

Potential Challenges related to Global Expansion

The worldwide expansion of GPP places a new challenge in terms of increased program complexity. Working in more countries on smaller projects without bilateral contracts or MOUs covering liability issues and outlining specific roles and responsibilities, may require a lot of upfront research and negotiations.

The lack of such bilateral MOUs could be offset by an increased use of multilateral channels of program delivery, mainly third countries and bilateral mechanisms. While providing the necessary legal framework, these mechanisms deprive Canada from direct involvement and experience gathering in new countries.

9.0 Conclusions of the Evaluation

The GP was formed in 2002, following the Kananaskis Summit in that same year, to respond to what was perceived to be one of most serious security threats to the international community, that of terrorists groups and states of proliferation concern obtaining WMD. The GPP, established in 2003, was Canada's answer to the appeal from the G8 Leaders for member states to support cooperation projects, initially in Russia and the countries of the FSU, to destroy and/or secure vulnerable WMD and related material and to address the threat posed by WMD knowledge proliferation. Since 2003, the GPP has aligned its programming with the evolving programming priorities defined by the G8 Leaders, the GP Working Group, and the foreign policy priorities of the GoC. Those evolving priorities have seen a shift in attention from the threat posed by WMD and related materials and expertise under state control in Russia and the countries of the FSU, to the threat posed by WMD related materials under civilian control in countries across the globe. GPP has adjusted its programming to this new threat environment, thereby affirming its continued relevance to the current WMD non-proliferation agenda and to Canada's security interests.

Among the members of the Global Partnership, Canada's financial contribution to the WMD non-proliferation agenda has been second only to the US and Russia. During the past nine years, GPP managed to deliver on all its commitments and achieve its intended outcomes in Russia and the countries of the FSU within budget and schedule, thereby providing evidence of exemplary planning, risk management, and comptrollership over the resources at its disposal. In addition to the specific WMD threat reduction achievements of its varied portfolios, GPP made significant contributions to the long term capacity of Russia and other FSU countries to dispose of WMD material and maintain the security of sites housing such materials. Additionally, GPP has enhanced Canada's standing in the international community as a leader in WMD non-proliferation and strengthened Canada's bilateral relationship with Russia and other GP Partners, notably the US and the UK.

Despite challenges related to the new departmental project approval process, the evaluation notes progress in programming outside of Russia and the FSU in conformity with the GP vision and GPP's new expanded geographic mandate. Measures to establish the administrative infrastructure to support programming globally, however, remain works in progress, and thus incomplete. For example, while the Program is seized of the need to adopt new governance bodies that are more inclusive of intra-departmental and inter-departmental stakeholders in decision making, the mandates of these bodies and their composition have yet to be finalized.

The Program is also cognizant of the need to create new strategic planning frameworks to inform country and project selection for its remaining programming portfolios; however, these frameworks remain at a nascent phase of development. The same observation applies, to varying degrees, to other critical infrastructure components, such as an updated risk management plan, an integrated records management system, a robust financial management system, and Standard Operating Procedures, all of which are needed to support efficient and effective programming.

Based on these findings and related analysis, the evaluation advances the following recommendations to enhance the relevance and performance of the GPP.

10.0 Recommendations

Recommendation 1:
GPP Management, following consultations with all relevant intra- and inter- departmental stakeholders, establish a governance framework to provide policy advice and strategic guidance to GPP programming and support the coordination among DFAIT's Security programs.

GPP's selection of countries to engage with cannot be a political exercise only, or an approach based on identified proliferation threats. The selection process will require a more precise analysis of where Canada's projects will have the greatest impact. Some interviewees have indicated that this is the approach taken by other countries and a better coordination among GP members may also be needed.

GPP may achieve better results by identifying Canada's strengths and chances to make a difference in a specific country or region or by building on upon existing relations, gained experience and trust (e.g., in the Americas) through other DFAIT programs and initiatives, rather than by only addressing the greatest threats, that could be in a country with which Canada may not have strong political or trade relations.

While sound risk management practices have been applied to all GPP projects implemented in Russia, the program will need to upgrade its risk mitigation strategies to reflect the new environment in which projects will be selected, planned and implemented. The new risk management practices need to be tailored to and integrated in the expectation that GPP will be operating in a higher risk environment.

Recommendation 2:
GPP establish strategic frameworks for the leading and cross-cutting thematic program domains/portfolios.

Such frameworks will help to:

• Establish overall Program priorities for GPP for the next five years and decide on respective budget allocations;
• Determine the extent to which projects will be initiated on a pro-active/ preventive vs. reactive/responsive basis;
• Plan for a reasonable distribution of program delivery methods (e.g., bilateral, trilateral, multilateral, as well as the use of grants vs. contributions); and
• Identify the scope of engagement within each priority area that is commensurate with GPP's financial and human resources, and with Canada's international priorities.

Recommendation 3:
IGD establish a Program Risk Framework with respective Risk Mitigation Strategies which take into consideration the new risk profile related to geographic expansion.

The Risk Framework should take into consideration factors, such as:

• Program implementation in countries with which Canada has no bilateral treaties;
• Project implementation in vulnerable states;
• Implementation of a larger number of smaller projects; and
• Challenges with measuring and attributing results.

Recommendation 4:
GPP accelerate efforts to develop an integrated records management system that will integrate financial and program data to facilitate reporting on performance and results at the portfolio and program level.

An integrated Records Management System will help Program management to:

• Respond to the need for increased information sharing and cooperation between portfolios, and with other DFAIT security programs;
• Enable performance measurement at the portfolio and program level, and
• Facilitate strategic planning, budget allocation and expenditure tracking.

Recommendation 5:
GPP develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to guide the implementation of the program and specific projects under the new thematic and expanded mandate.

To enable a smooth transition to its expanded geographic mandate and changed priorities, GPP will need to develop clear guidelines for project development, along with editability criteria for grants and contributions.

When implementing project on a bilateral basis in countries with which Canada does not have prior experience of legal frameworks for cooperation, sound legal advice will be needed to identify the necessary liability requirements and ways in which these could be ensured, e.g., MOUs, special contracts, IAs, etc.

11.0 Management Response and Action Plan

Recommendation 1:

GPP Management, following consultations with all relevant intra- and inter- departmental stakeholders, establish a governance framework to provide policy advice and strategic guidance to GPP programming and support the coordination among DFAIT's Security programs.
Associated Findings: X, Y, Z (or Overall as Applicable)

Management Response & Action Plan: Agreed. As part of the renewal of the GPP, the Program has developed a Strategic Programming Framework (SPF) planning process, which provides for a comprehensive, annual priority-setting exercise involving relevant departmental and inter-departmental stakeholders to identify key target countries / regions where the GPP will seek to undertake programming to reduce the threat posed by weapons and materials of mass destruction and related expertise. This process also engages all other DFAIT security programs to ensure optimal horizontal coordination.

This SPF exercise ensures alignment with Canadian foreign policy priorities and takes into consideration where Canada's projects will have the greatest impact, including the capacity of beneficiary states, willingness to burden-share, risk management factors including the security / political and economic conditions and reliability of the target country or region.
Responsibility Centre: Director, Global Partnership Program Division (IGA)
Time Frame: Complete

Recommendation 2:

GPP establish strategic frameworks for the leading and cross-cutting thematic program domains/portfolios.
Associated Findings: X, Y, Z (or Overall as Applicable)

Management Response & Action Plan: Agreed. All three GPP programming portfolios (Nuclear and Radiological Security, Biological Security, UNSCR 1540 & Chemical Weapons) are currently drafting updated strategic frameworks to take into account the new global focus of the GPP with the incorporation of revised risk management and performance indices. These frameworks will be consulted with other DFAIT security programs to ensure coordination of effort and de-confliction of proposed activities.

These frameworks will set out program priorities, notional budget allocations, the distribution of program delivery methods, and performance and risk management indicators.

On an overall strategic level, the GPP will retain flexibility to respond quickly to new and emerging threats and priorities as identified by Ministers on an ongoing basis in close coordination with other DFAIT security programs.
Responsibility Centre: Senior Program Managers and Director, IGA
Time Frame: September 2013

Recommendation 3:

IGD establish a Program Risk Framework with respective Risk Mitigation Strategies which take into consideration the new risk profile related to geographic expansion.
Associated Findings: X, Y, Z (or Overall as Applicable)

Management Response & Action Plan: Agreed. Geographic expansion brings about a new set of risk factors that need to be carefully managed.

Overall, the GPP has a ten-year record of excellent risk management which has always been an integral part of the GPP's project planning cycle.

IGA is currently revising our risk mitigation strategies with a view to having a new Program Risk Management Framework in place in the first quarter of the new FY.
Responsibility Centre: Director, Global Partnership Program Division (IGA)
Time Frame: September 2013

Recommendation 4:

GPP accelerate efforts to develop an integrated records management system that will integrate financial and program data to facilitate reporting on performance and results at the portfolio and program level.
Associated Findings: X, Y, Z (or Overall as Applicable)

Management Response & Action Plan: Agreed. Since August 2012, IGA and IGC have been working with the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force on integrating IGD project management processes into the Global Peace and Security Framework (GPSF) Project Management Database, with the goal of harmonizing and streamlining project data within the existing GPSF database. While significant progress has been made, further work on this initiative is required in the coming months.
Responsibility Centre: IGA, working with IGC and IRC
Time Frame: September 2013

Management Response & Action Plan: IGA is also working closely with GBA on the development of Panorama/MapAmericas, a long-term Department-wide database and communications information management solution currently being spearheaded by GBA as requested by MSFA. IGA will continue to emphasize that the Panorama initiative needs to include the ability to migrate data from the GPSF database, rather than requiring manual data entry from one system to the other.
Responsibility Centre: GBA
Time Frame: On-going; timeline not yet defined

Recommendation 5:

GPP develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to guide the implementation of the program and specific projects under the new thematic and expanded mandate.
Associated Findings: X, Y, Z (or Overall as Applicable)

Management Response & Action Plan: Agreed. IGA has drafted new Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) consisting of Project Lifecycle stages which contain step by step descriptions of each stage of the project management life cycle. The SOPs complement the aforementioned Strategic Programming Framework.

The overarching GPP's revised Terms and Conditions (effective April, 2013) address eligibility requirements for both grants and contributions programming.
Responsibility Centre: Director, IGA
Time Frame: Complete; effective April 2013

Management Response & Action Plan: As with previous programming efforts, IGA will continue to adhere to the advice provided by DFAIT's Department of Justice legal advisors (JUS); DFAIT's Centre of Expertise for Grants and Contributions (SMFC), and, where appropriate, DFAIT's Treaty Law Division (JLI).

Responsibility Centre: Director, IGA

Time Frame: Ongoing