Evaluation of Canada’s Development and Humanitarian Assistance Programming in West Bank and Gaza

2008-2013

Synthesis Report

July 2015

Acknowledgments

The Development Evaluation Division would like to thank all those who contributed to this evaluation. The West Bank, Gaza and Palestinian Refugee program team and other programs working in the region provided invaluable support throughout the process. We especially thank those that hosted the field missions and facilitated data gathering.

We would like to acknowledge the work of the team of consultants from the Consortium of the Canadian firms DADA International, Salasan International and Project Services International: Keith Ogilvie (team leader), Peter Hoffman and Pamela Branch, and in the West Bank and Gaza, Marisa Consolota Kemper and Ayman Daraghmeh.

Thank you to Dr. Pierre Beaudet, Associate Professor from the University of Ottawa, for his expert peer review of the evaluation.

From the Development Evaluation Division, the evaluation was managed and supervised by Gabrielle Biron Hudon and Andres Velez-Guerra respectively.

James Melanson
Head of Development Evaluation

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Executive Summary

This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations arising from the Evaluation of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) Development and Humanitarian Assistance Programming in West Bank and Gaza from 2008-2009 to 2012-2013. The evaluation was carried out between November 2013 and August 2014, with a field mission in March 2014. In addition to a substantial body of program documentation, 25 sample projects were reviewed in the priority sectors of justice, private sector development and humanitarian assistance.

Context

Although not a country, West Bank and Gaza are together classified as fragile in development terms, with a history of conflict and ongoing political instability. Over the evaluation period governance was divided between West Bank and Gaza, and the Palestinian Legislative Council has not met since 2007. Canada and most other donors consider Hamas, which controls Gaza, to be a terrorist organization and view the Fatah-supported Palestinian Authority (PA) in West Bank as the preferred development partner.

The Palestinian economy is one of the world’s most dependent on development assistance. There are structural challenges to economic growth, including limited control over West Bank land and water resources, security restrictions applied by Israel on movement of goods and people, and a lack of control over borders. Sluggish growth of the world economy and a growing shortfall in donor assistance have added to these challenges.

While some social development indicators show improvement over the past two decades (for example literacy rate, gender equality gap, maternal and child mortality rates), West Bank and Gaza continue to score low on the Human Development Index. The main social issue is unemployment, which is particularly acute among youth and women. Poverty and food security are major concerns, especially in Gaza where 70% of Palestinian refugees depend on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) for food.

Following the 2007 Hamas/Fatah split, the subsequent re-launch of the peace process in Annapolis in November 2007, and the Paris Donors’ Conference the same year, Canada made a commitment to provide $300 million in West Bank and Gaza development and security sector programming over five years from 2008-2009 to 2012-2013. This commitment was in support of a “comprehensive, just and lasting peace” negotiated directly between the parties. CIDA^{Footnote 1} disbursements in support of the government of Canada’s commitment totaled $272.6 million over the period under evaluation,^{Footnote 2} almost all disbursed through the bilateral program and distributed between three priority sectors:  justice and governance; private sector development (PSD); and, humanitarian assistance (HA).

Findings and Conclusions

The development programming context in the West Bank and Gaza continues to be one of the most complex in the world – politically, culturally and economically. The challenges become formidable when the ongoing overhang of conflict is considered. Despite these obstacles, the evaluation evidence demonstrates that Canada’s programming in West Bank and Gaza has been designed and implemented appropriately to achieve sustainable results across its three priority sectors, although some interventions require remedial attention.

Effectiveness

The evaluation confirmed results in all three priority sectors, as seen in changes in structures, internal capacity and methods of functioning of Palestinian institutions. Humanitarian programming, despite its shorter planning and results horizon, is showing sustainable outcomes in building the institutional capacity of select Ministries of the PA, and in increasing the resilience of Palestinians to manage shocks and emergencies that result mainly from ongoing conflict.

There are three caveats to this general conclusion. First, justice and PSD sector projects have only been active for two to three years and outcome level results in the target institutions will not be evident until further in the future. Second, there is an absence of information on progress against higher level outcome targets contained in the Performance Measurement Framework (PMF) for humanitarian assistance, although there is evidence of output-level results achievement. Third, some projects will not achieve all their intended results without further adjustments.

The justice sector has achieved satisfactory results, with evidence pointing to improved capacity and functioning of rule of law institutions. However, it has also experienced shortcomings in the performance of two capital construction initiatives and will not meet the original expectations of stakeholders in the Courthouses Construction and Forensic HR and Governance projects. Despite the open communications with stakeholders that have been maintained on these projects, the expected shortfalls are creating some reputational risk for DFATD in a sector where it has been regarded as a leader. The situation was compounded by reallocation of resources in the Courthouse project which took time to effect.

The PSD sector has achieved some satisfactory results. In addition to its institution building work, Canada contributed to collective efforts to address the Palestinian Authority’s structural deficit by making two contributions to the World Bank Palestinian Reform and Development Plan Trust Fund, a budgetary support mechanism allowing the PA to continue to deliver services that will (inter alia) contribute to private sector development. Canada’s contribution was meaningful and its decision to no longer contribute to this fund has reduced both its contribution to an area of ongoing need and its influence in policy dialogue on macroeconomic issues.

In the humanitarian assistance sector, the time frames and partners are different from those of the other two DFATD priority sectors. Canadian funded humanitarian assistance has been delivered within a framework of well-established international institutions and processes and has achieved most of its objectives. Some projects have had the added benefit of contributing to institutional development within the PA. Program design is moving gradually toward support for multi-year programming which would allow for longer term impacts (such as building resilience in the population), while retaining the flexibility to respond quickly to emergency needs. This could offer opportunities for future linkages with PSD sector programming. Multi-year programming could also improve efficiency for DFATD by reducing the number and frequency of project approval processes.

Relevance

Logic models at the program and project levels are linked with Canada’s policy objective of “contribut[ing] to the creation of a viable, independent and democratic Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel as part of a comprehensive peace settlement.”^{Footnote 3}  Building on this, the program made appropriate decisions on the level of resources devoted to the three priority sectors; the selection of organizations working on the ground as implementing partners; and, the cross-sectoral coverage offered by projects in the justice and private sector development portfolios. This internal coherence facilitated the prominence of Canadian programming with the PA and within the donor community, especially in the justice sector.

The selection of priority sectors was relevant and consistent with the priorities and needs of the PA and the Palestinian people as set out in the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan for 2008-2010 and subsequent National Development Plans. In the justice and PSD sectors, the choice to focus on building PA institutions was appropriate in light of constitutional/legal framework challenges and the need to take a long-term view on development objectives. Humanitarian assistance programming was aligned with the United Nations (UN) consolidated appeal and annual integrated humanitarian assistance planning and commitment process.

Sustainability

While only half of the projects in the evaluation sample were assessed as satisfactory in terms of sustainability, many of the influencing factors are outside the control of the program, such as the economic and political fragility associated with the ongoing conflict and the short duration of project cycles vis-à-vis institutional change processes. Continuity in programming directions combined with consideration for sustainability within projects will strengthen prospects for sustainability in justice and private sector development.

Cross-cutting Themes

The program has addressed the cross-cutting themes of gender equality, environmental sustainability and governance with a mixed record of success. There was emphasis on addressing gender issues in planning documents and to some extent in implementation of justice and PSD projects. Capacity for gender programming has been strengthened in OCHA, a central humanitarian assistance agency. However, the cultural context, limited allocation of gender equality and environment specialist resources, and possibly unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved within the project time frames have constrained gender and environment results so far. Environment received nominal attention and there is little evidence of related results in the justice and PSD sectors, although the program complied fully with Canadian Environmental Assessment Act screening requirements for the Courthouse Construction project.

Governance, on the other hand, has been fully integrated in the program. It is the raison d’être for the justice portfolio and has been an important theme in the PSD sector projects, both in terms of institutional change and improving the legal and regulatory environment for business.

Humanitarian assistance faces larger challenges in integrating cross-cutting themes, given its shorter time horizon and primary focus on meeting urgent needs such as food, water, shelter and protection. That said, the program did address cross-cutting themes in certain areas, for example by funding gender equality expertise in the central humanitarian assistance planning organization, OCHA. At the operational level, HA activities took into account gender and in some cases to environmental considerations as well.

Aid Coordination

Canada is recognized as an engaged participant in formal and informal aid coordination bodies. It is especially recognized for its strong support to coordination in the justice sector. There are nonetheless opportunities for improved coordination between some projects and other related donor initiatives.

Canada’s programming in the West Bank and Gaza has generally respected the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, and the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship. The program has worked to meet humanitarian needs that also align with the program priorities. However, in two of the HA projects sampled, partners noted funding changes they had not anticipated, and therefore, they perceived a lack of predictability.

Efficiency

In general, the program was delivered efficiently in terms of use of resources. Its strong field presence and use of expert resources and dedicated staff in the three priority sectors added to its visibility and credibility with the donor community and the PA. In some cases, decision-making processes – having to contend with the complexity of a conflict-affected operating context – had implications on the timing of DFATD programming.

There was little variety and hence basis for comparison between different delivery models and mechanisms. Considering the conditions on the ground and the program’s theory of change as reflected in the logic model, however, the evaluation was able to conclude that overall the choice of partners and therefore the delivery models and mechanisms were appropriate to the needs of the program. Delivery of humanitarian assistance through the bilateral program offered opportunities to link what are normally quite separate programs. This worked to the advantage of both branches, providing operational and logical coherence to DFATD’s development and HA programming in West Bank and Gaza.

Performance Management

The program’s use of results-based management and related tools at the project level has been appropriate overall, despite challenges of linking up with the systems of multilateral agencies who are acting as implementing agencies for DFATD funded projects. At the program level, there are opportunities to more systematically collect information on progress toward results achievement based on the revised Performance Measurement Framework.

Recommendations

The CIDA program to date has been responsive to Palestinian needs and Canadian priorities, has begun to show results, and has allowed Canada to establish itself as an influential donor and interlocutor with the PA. It should continue to support key Palestinian institutions in its priority sectors at the same time as it considers opportunities to expand its contribution in these sectors.

1. Canada has played a strong role in the justice sector, and there are opportunities to enhance sustainability of these investments. The program should take steps to ensure that adequate recurrent cost and specialist resourcing for physical facilities and institutions will be in place over the long-term. It should also consider ways to complement its support to facilities and institutions with commensurate support for Palestinians’ use of, and access to these institutions. Canada should use its strong presence in the justice sector to encourage inter-institutional cooperation within the PA at the operational level, until amendment of the Judicial Authority Law more formally clarifies roles and responsibilities.

2. Achievements to date in Private Sector Development (PSD) similarly offer a foundation on which to build future programming. The enabling environment for business and related institutional structures remain fragile and in need of strengthening. Consideration should also be given to more direct competitiveness initiatives with Palestinian businesses.

3. The program’s management of humanitarian assistance should continue to respect the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship, including neutrality, focus on need, timeliness, and predictability of funding. Making sure that adopting a thematic priority is managed consistently with the principle of needs-based allocation, and that decision-making is within required consolidated appeal time frames, will ensure flexibility and timeliness in responding to identified humanitarian needs. As well, there is a particular opportunity in West Bank and Gaza to address longer term resilience of populations in the event of disaster, and Canada should look for opportunities to step up joint efforts already begun with the donor community to make this an integral part of HA programming.

4. There are particular challenges to fully integrating the themes of gender and environment in the West Bank, Gaza and Palestinian Refugee Program. The program has given these themes appropriate emphasis in the Country Development Programming Framework, and is now positioned to place greater emphasis on operational implementation. Building on the foundations laid in existing projects, the program should increase its attention (and human resources, if necessary) to more complete integration of gender and environment at program and project levels.

5. The program should ensure that clear and detailed guidance is provided to staff and partners on the application of the Anti-Terrorism Clause (ATC).

6. The program has taken steps to improve its Performance Measurement Framework (PMF) but should work with implementing partners to consolidate the links that have been lacking between project level results and reporting systems and the program PMF, especially at the outcome level. This will make annual reporting a more meaningful and useful exercise to both program and project managers. As well, the program should consider working with partners and other donors to improve data collection and outcome reporting for gender and environment.

7. There is scope for greater information sharing and coherence in the field between peace and security, development, and trade programs. DFATD should ensure that its West Bank and Gaza field operations have effective practices in place for inter-program coordination and synergy.

1.0 Introduction

This report presents the findings, conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations arising from an evaluation of DFATD’s development and humanitarian assistance programming in the West Bank and Gaza over the period 2008-2009 to 2012-2013. This section provides an overview of the evaluation rationale, approach and methodology. Greater detail on the methodology employed is provided in Annex B.

1.1 Evaluation Rationale, Purpose and Objectives

1.1.1 Evaluation Rationale

This is the first program level evaluation carried out on the West Bank, Gaza and Palestinian Refugees Program of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD).^{Footnote 4}  It was undertaken to satisfy the Canadian government requirement for periodic evaluation of major programs.

1.1.2 Evaluation Objectives

The terms of reference for the evaluation set out several specific objectives, including:

• To assess the development and humanitarian results achieved by Canada in West Bank and Gaza between FY 2008-2009 and 2012-2013 based on established criteria for development assistance;
• To assess the extent to which the design, delivery and management of the DFATD development programming in West Bank and Gaza aligns with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations;  
• To assess the extent to which the design, delivery and management of the DFATD humanitarian assistance programming in West Bank and Gaza aligns with the Principles and Practices of Good Humanitarian Donorship;
• To assess the performance and results of DFATD’s various delivery mechanisms for development and humanitarian assistance in the West Bank and Gaza, including partnership with civil society organizations, bilateral programs, local funds and grants to multilateral organizations in a whole-of-department process;
• To identify good practices, areas for improvement and formulate lessons learned, and develop recommendations for improvements at the Corporate and Program levels; and,
• To inform future development and humanitarian assistance programming in West Bank and Gaza and other fragile states.

1.2 Evaluation Approach and Data Collection Methods

This evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) – Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Quality Standards for Development Evaluation, as well as related standards for evaluating development programming in fragile states.

The evaluation used three sources of information to build its lines of evidence:  a review of literature and documentation (see Annex E); a program of structured individual and group interviews in Canada with development program and foreign affairs staff of DFATD and representatives of Canadian partner agencies; and, a three week field mission that included semi-structured interviews with a number of stakeholders.^{Footnote 5}  Annex F provides a full list of people interviewed for this evaluation.

Assessment grids were completed for each sector and project in the sample, scoring performance against the evaluation criteria and indicators set out in the Evaluation Matrix. Annex B provides additional information on the methodological approach.

1.2.1 Project Sampling

From an inventory of 88 projects in the program portfolio, a purposive sampling approach was used to select 25 projects for more detailed review.^{Footnote 6} Three of those have been subject to project level evaluations. The sample focused on the three priority sectors for the program—justice sector reform, private sector development (PSD) and humanitarian assistance (HA).

The evaluation sample covered 64% of total program disbursements, including 45.7% of total HA disbursements; 98.1% for the justice sector; and 98.3% for the PSD sector. Four projects were chosen specifically to allow examination of alternative delivery models and approaches. Together, the sample projects represented a cross section of the project delivery modalities, mechanisms and channels employed by the program. Annex D lists the projects included in the evaluation sample.

1.3 Evaluation Limitations

The evaluators encountered delays in locating complete documentation and the unavailability of some local partner representatives during the field mission left information gaps that had to be filled by meeting alternate stakeholder representatives. In addition, the deteriorating security situation during the field mission precluded the planned visit to Gaza. While interviews with key contacts were achieved by internet-based communications, actual field visits in Gaza would have enabled on the ground verification.

Because the program is not working in a recognized country, many international institutions do not or have not gathered the same data on West Bank and Gaza as they do on other countries. For example, the World Bank’s annual Doing Business Review provided its first overall ranking for West Bank and Gaza only in 2013.
The performance measures set out in the program’s Performance Measurement Framework (PMF) for intermediate outcomes are directly linked to sector reporting. However, data on performance targets for all three priority sectors will not be collected until after the period covered by this evaluation.

Some targets remain undefined at the immediate outcome level of the PMF. For those that have been defined, the required reporting data has been inconsistently collected. Furthermore, the PMF for this program relies heavily on project level data collection systems of implementing partners. Due to often weak local capacity^{Footnote 7} and constraints imposed by the protracted crisis, continued insecurity and the complex situation on the ground, information is often limited to activity and output oriented reports, particularly for HA activities.

In the case of projects involving pooled funding, including the majority of HA projects with United Nations (UN) partners, baselines are prepared and reporting is done at an aggregate level that does not measure Canada’s contributions separately from those of other donors.

These limitations were mitigated by seeking alternative sources of data; placing an emphasis on ensuring soundness of the theory of change at program and project levels; and, triangulating the available data.

2.0 Context and Information on the Canadian Development Program

2.1 Context

The history of conflict and ongoing political instability has left a legacy of development needs and challenges in West Bank and Gaza. The 2007 split between Hamas and Fatah following the former’s legislative election victory in 2006 left a bifurcated system of governance, with Hamas controlling Gaza and Fatah governing in the West Bank. The Palestinian Legislative Council has not met since the split. Canada and most other donor countries consider Hamas to be a terrorist organization. Since the split, Canada has deemed the Fatah-supported Palestinian Authority (PA) as the preferred development partner.

Over the period of this evaluation, West Bank has remained relatively stable while Gaza went through two significant conflicts between Hamas and Israel, namely Operation Cast Lead in December 2008 to January 2009; and Operation Pillar of Defence in November 2012. The Middle East Peace Process was halted when the 2008 conflict began. After indirect talks between the parties, the process was restarted in 2010 by President Obama but direct talks once again ended shortly thereafter. Sporadic indirect talks took place up to the end of the evaluation period.

Palestinian law derives from several traditions that differ between Gaza and West Bank, including Egyptian law in Gaza, and Jordanian and British mandate law in West Bank, together with historical Ottoman laws, Israeli military orders and the Palestinian Basic Law passed in 2002. The result is lack of a harmonized legal framework. New laws are passed only by means of Presidential decree, an interim solution that may leave them subject to review by the Legislative Council or possibly expiry in the event the Legislative Council is not reconstituted sometime in the future.

In 2008, the Palestinian economy grew at a rate of 7.1% year over year and by 7.4% in 2009. The growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the West Bank and Gaza reached 11% on average in 2010 and 2011 (mainly due to donor-funded reconstruction and development activities), and then declined to 6.3% in 2012.^{Footnote 8}  The Palestinian economy is one of the most dependent in the world on development assistance,^{Footnote 9} and the PA faces an ongoing fiscal deficit. As GDP growth has declined, so too has budgetary support from donors, which fell 12% below the requested level in 2012. Further, the PA is dependent on timely transfers of tax revenue, which belongs to the PA and is collected by Israel on their behalf under existing agreements with the Government of Israel. Regular transfers have been delayed or frozen at least three times between 2008 and 2012. In December 2012, they were suspended after the UN statehood vote and were reinstated in March 2013.

Within the context of an ongoing conflict and political instability, the PA faces serious external constraints that make it difficult to achieve the full potential of the area’s economy. Among these are limited control over Areas B and C^{Footnote 10} with their substantial land and water resources and where Palestinian businesses do not have access to development permits. Security related restrictions applied by Israel on movement of goods and people have limited the growth of the Palestinian economy and affected its competitiveness.

“Political uncertainty and Israeli security restrictions seriously impact the investment climate in the West Bank and Gaza.”^{Footnote 11}  The amount of revenue collected by the PA from Gaza is low compared to expenditures there. The tax base in the West Bank also remains narrow due to inefficiencies in both policy and enforcement.^{Footnote 12}  Other challenges include the growing decline in donor aid (an important driver of growth over the past decade) and sluggish growth of the world economy and the Israeli economy in particular.^{Footnote 13}  These circumstances combine to make recovery from slow economic growth and high unemployment challenging, especially given global economic uncertainty.

The increasing population in West Bank and Gaza poses the greatest challenge for development programming in the face of economic stagnation. On the one hand, progress is being made on a number of social development indicators. Most of the indicators related to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for West Bank and Gaza have shown improvement over the past two decades, including:

• improving literacy rates during the period 1995 to 2012 from 78.6% to 93.6%;
• shrinking child mortality rates from 42.9 deaths per thousand births in 1990 to 22.6 in 2012; and,
• declining maternal mortality rates from 90 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 64 in 2010.^{Footnote 14}

On the other hand, West Bank and Gaza still scored lower on the 2013 Human Development Index, when it was ranked 110th in the world, than in 2003 when it ranked 98th.^{Footnote 15}  The main social issue is unemployment, which has exceeded 20% since 2001. In the first quarter of 2013, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) reported unemployment in Gaza at 31%, compared to 20.3% in West Bank. Youth unemployment, reaching 41.1% overall in 2013, is a particular concern.^{Footnote 16}  Despite improving educational achievement, work prospects for young people are dim, especially for women. Women comprise only 16% of the active labour force although they make up nearly 60% of tertiary education graduates.

In the face of the region’s economic challenges, poverty is also a major concern. Nearly 26% of Palestinians were identified as living in poverty in 2011 (by the PA definition) and half of this group was living in extreme poverty.^{Footnote 17}  Food insecurity is a major issue, especially in Gaza; in 2011-2012, 70% of the 1.2 million registered refugees in Gaza depended on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) for food.^{Footnote 18} 

2.2 Canadian Development Program in West Bank and Gaza

Canada provided US $339.02 million in net aid disbursements between 2008 and 2013, making it the ninth-ranked OECD bilateral member donor. The United States is the largest, having contributed US $3,935.23 million during the same period.

*Data extracted on 17 Feb 2015 14:21 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat

** Total Net Aid Disbursements. Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined as those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests: i) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and ii) it is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent.

Canada has supported Palestinian refugees through contributions to UNRWA since 1950. In 1993, CIDA began augmenting this support through development assistance to West Bank and Gaza with programming in the areas of social development, governance, refugee and humanitarian assistance and peace building. According to the 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework, the greatest impact of these efforts was at the community level, working with civil society organizations.

The International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) Directorate is responsible for managing humanitarian assistance programming in DFATD. However, in 2005 it was decided that humanitarian assistance for West Bank and Gaza should be delivered through the bilateral channel in order to generate more opportunities for program coherence in a complex, uncertain and unpredictable environment. An exception was made for the well-established relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent which continues to be managed by IHA. The bilateral program nonetheless consults IHA in the review and selection of humanitarian assistance projects.

Canadian development support to the PA was suspended after the election of Hamas in 2006 and all Canadian development assistance was redirected through UN humanitarian agencies, international NGOs and Canadian organizations. At the 2007 donor pledging conference in Paris that followed resumption of the peace talks through the Annapolis process, Canada made a multiyear commitment of CAD $300 million to West Bank and Gaza from 2008-2009 to 2012-2013. Of the total amount, $250 million was to be directed to development programming, with the balance committed to support security sector programming delivered through other Canadian Government departments, including the former Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (mainly the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force - START), National Defence and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.^{Footnote 19}

As CIDA began to put the various parts of its Paris programming commitment in place, it undertook the preparation of the program’s first Country Development Programming Framework (CDPF). This document was published in December 2009 and covers the period 2009-2014. In 2009, West Bank and Gaza was identified as a program of focus for CIDA.

The general strategic direction set out for the program was articulated as: 

“In line with Canadian foreign policy objectives, CIDA’s programming is intended to contribute to the creation of a viable, independent and democratic Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel as part of a comprehensive peace settlement” (Country Development Programming Framework, p.18).

Based on an analysis of opportunities and needs as well as the key elements of Canada’s foreign policy position with respect to the Middle East Peace Process, the Country Development Programming Framework identified three priority areas for development support:  justice sector reform, private sector development (PSD) and humanitarian assistance (HA).

Humanitarian assistance programming would respond mainly to emergency needs, while the justice and PSD sector strategies were to focus on the institutions and processes that define a functioning state, in direct support of overall Canadian peace-building and regional security objectives related to a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Figure 1. Total Disbursements by Priority Sector

These priority areas fell within the overarching CIDA themes of Sustainable Economic Growth, Food Security, and Children and Youth. The 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework also emphasized a Whole-of-Agency and Whole-of-Government approach aimed at linking different program delivery channels with a view to managing the program for results, as well as forging links with other Canadian Government departments, particularly for security related programming.

Detailed sector and project level planning for the new program began in late 2008 based on the general parameters of the nascent Country Development Programming Framework. However, the long lead times required to develop institution-building programming and the need for flexibility to respond to the evolving realities on the ground, particularly in the face of the flare-up of conflict in the region, resulted in Canada’s development assistance being limited to HA for the initial part of the planning period, together with budgetary support provided through the World Bank Trust Fund.

3.0 Effectiveness

This section presents key findings for effectiveness in justice sector reform, private sector development and humanitarian assistance.

The West Bank and Gaza and Palestinian Refugees Program has sought to “strengthen the capacity and legitimacy of the PA institutions by increasing public confidence in the legal system, increase prosperity for Palestinian households and improve living conditions for vulnerable Palestinians” (Country Development Programming Framework, Section 3).

This succinctly frames the choice of institutional development as the programming focus in two of the three priority sectors: justice sector reform and PSD. It also conceptually links peace and security to improving conditions for the poor through humanitarian aid and economic growth.

3.1 Influence of Political and Security Constraints on Results

Against the backdrop of the stalled Middle East Peace Process, the fragile political and security environment in West Bank and Gaza has had direct impact on program management and delivery over the period of this evaluation.

Security concerns and border closings have limited access for planning and monitoring activities, especially relating to delivery of HA in Gaza. However, the international agencies through which HA programs are implemented have effective delivery systems and monitoring processes and were able to work around these constraints, except when active conflict has prevented access by any outside agencies.

The 2008 and 2012 conflicts in Gaza between Hamas and Israel resulted in loss of life and extensive damage to basic infrastructure, and affected delivery of HA. There has also been destruction of HA-funded infrastructure on many occasions outside these particular conflicts: for example damage to irrigation and water works, agricultural plots and livestock enclosures. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, the level of loss is low enough that it is considered an acceptable cost of doing essential programming.  

The impact of political and security constraints on private sector activities is also profound. While there have been slightly positive trends in investment in recent years, there remains little incentive for private sector investment in the Palestinian economy in the face of continuing political uncertainty and possibility of conflict. Closures of borders to movement of goods for security reasons and periodic withholding of transfer of tax revenues by Israel have disrupted the economy at unpredictable intervals.

The consensus view of representatives of leading private sector organizations, donors and the PA is that, while improvement is necessary, any progress in the enabling environment for business can only be minor in to the context of the overhanging influence of potential conflict and related security constraints. Expectations of development programs have to be tempered accordingly. Nonetheless, the World Bank and others have identified certain actions that are within the PA’s power to address.

The gains that have been made over the past five years in building justice sector capacities are vulnerable to any intensification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a worsening PA fiscal situation (also associated with the conflict), political challenges of reintegration of West Bank and Gaza and donor fatigue in a donor-dependent situation.

Structural issues also have delayed project implementation and constrained the ability to effect change. Most serious are the complex legal environment and the lack of a functioning legislative body. As noted in the discussion that follows on justice and PSD sector results, this has affected the PA’s ability to legislate change and in particular to rationalize the Palestinian Judicial Authority Law. This in turn limits the scope of change that can be realized in the institutional elements of the justice system. Projects in these two sectors have also seen delays in program delivery resulting from the frequent turnover of Ministers responsible for the partner PA Ministries. There was also in-depth due diligence analysis in some of Canada’s project approvals given the complex operating and decision-making environment in fragile and conflict-affected states. This in-depth analysis affected timelines for the UNRWA Food Aid programming in 2009, which in turn had an unintended impact on HA results, as described below.

Overall, the evaluation found that the relative stability between 2009 and 2012 in West Bank, where the justice and PSD activities were taking place together with some HA activities, allowed this programming to proceed as planned with minimal negative impacts on achievement of expected results.

3.2 Justice Sector Reform

The evaluation sample covered seven projects from DFATD’s governance/justice sector reform portfolio, representing 98.1% of total sector disbursements over the evaluation period. Three of these projects, accounting for most of the sector disbursements, were approved under the 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework (CDPF). These three projects collectively worked with all the key elements of the justice system, including system administration, prosecution services, the judicial and court systems and defence council services. They complemented DFATD’s non-development activities that have worked with police and public security forces on criminal investigation and the prison system. They also complemented activities of “legacy” projects that had been started prior to the new CDPF and that had a focus on human rights and civil society engagement with the justice system.

3.2.1 Justice Sector Challenges

There are many challenges to reforming the justice sector in the West Bank and Gaza, beginning with the complexity of its historical roots (see section 2.1). The existing Judicial Authority Law which, amongst other things, defines the roles and responsibilities of the sector’s three main institutions—the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) and the High Judicial Council (HJC)—is outdated, leaving the mandates of PA justice actors, including the judicial and prosecutorial institutions, ill-defined.

Some steps have been taken to harmonize these different influences, at least in the West Bank (where the Fatah-controlled PA is dominant). However, the inability of the PA to properly legislate changes in law because the elected PA Legislative Council is not presently sitting makes broad-based judicial reform difficult.

The PA’s jurisdictional authority is also limited, partly as a result of the bifurcation of the West Bank and Gaza government in 2007 and partly because of the PA’s fragmented jurisdictional arrangements across Areas A, B and C in the West Bank. PA legal authority only extends—in part—to areas A and B, while Israeli military orders apply in Area C. Israeli law also applies to Israeli citizens throughout the West Bank. Given the political and security environment and the fragmentation of authorities, any perceived inconsistent application in the rule of law, particularly within the West Bank at the hands of either PA or Israeli authorities, serves to undermine trust in the rule of law. There are related internal structural impediments to the functioning of the justice system as well, especially the lack of decentralization in the delivery of justice which results in poor access outside the urban centres.^{Footnote 20}

Until 2006, most of the Palestinian governmental justice institutions, including courthouses and forensics facilities, were located in Gaza. The political separation of the West Bank from Gaza in 2007 meant that the starting point for West Bank centered institutions was low and the justice sector badly in need of external assistance. This continues to be true, given the fragility of the PA’s fiscal situation and its high level of donor dependency.

3.2.2 Effectiveness of Justice Sector Programming

The intermediate outcome expected of justice sector programming is “more transparent, equitable and predictable justice system institutions that apply the rule of law and uphold human rights for men, women and children”. As data is not yet being collected on all indicators for this expected result, the evaluation consulted a household survey of public perceptions of Palestinian justice and security institutions conducted in 2011-2012 by the Rule of Law and Access to Justice project as a surrogate means of measuring progress. The overwhelming majority of respondents view these institutions as legitimate and choose to use them to resolve all manner of disputes.

The survey results indicate that 91% of respondents call the police when in danger; 71% considered that courts are the only legitimate institutions through which to resolve disputes; and 37.7% were satisfied that the public prosecution maintains dignity and human freedom.^{Footnote 21}  This survey does not have an earlier point of comparison; however, it does show a reasonably high level of confidence in what the survey calls the “technical competence” of PA justice institutions at the time of the survey, approximately two years after the start of new CIDA projects in this field. While no direct link to CIDA programming or attribution can be made, there are few other donors working in this field as comprehensively as CIDA has done.

The evaluation also considered aggregate performance of sample projects as a measure of program performance. Five of the seven sample projects were considered satisfactory or fully satisfactory in terms of achievement of their intended results, including all three of the responsive projects in the portfolio (as noted in Table 2). The results achieved by these five projects are summarized below.

The assessment of results achievement for two of the above-mentioned five projects requires some qualification. First, while this evaluation found the UNDP Rule of Law program to have been a successful project, DFATD’s funding was directed away from those components aimed at providing access to justice services for vulnerable people.^{Footnote 22}  These activities were supported by other donors; therefore DFATD cannot claim attribution for the program’s considerable successes in those components.^{Footnote 23}

Second, although the Karamah project made progress in creating a judge-centred judicial education model based on human rights principles, it faced several challenges affecting sustainability. The project received inconsistent levels of support from the High Judicial Council (HJC) and the PA suspended operations of its main training partner, the Palestinian Judicial Institute. Nonetheless, the project has brought about changes in attitudes of individual project participants (judges) and in judicial education and practice that are sustained by ongoing partnerships between the universities involved and by champions of the new model within the HJC.

Two other projects, both central to DFATD’s justice sector portfolio, faced serious challenges:

• Courthouse Construction. The objective of this project was to increase the availability of safe and well-managed courthouses in the West Bank. It originally provided for the design, construction and equipping of three courthouses in Ramallah, Hebron and Tulkarem by March 2014. The Ramallah courthouse was subsequently removed as the project budget was re-scoped to address the two, higher priority, regional courthouses. At the time of the evaluation field visit, the scope of the remaining courthouses was under further review and progress had been suspended pending the approval of a revised project budget and design parameters.
• Forensic HR and Governance. At the time of the evaluation, this project was ready to commission a temporary lab facility, seven months behind schedule. Also behind schedule were the project’s various human resource development activities, for which the assessment of needs took much longer than originally anticipated.

The evaluation pinpointed a number of underlying causes for the problems being experienced in implementation of these two projects, including:

• Flawed initial estimation of space requirements, timelines and costs (for the Courthouse Construction project);
• A lack of CIDA expertise in infrastructure development or recent experience in construction management, which is required to prepare terms of reference to contract executing agencies, managers and monitors for construction projects and to review design and cost estimates;
• Weak project management at the beginning of both projects. The UNDP project manager for the Hebron Courthouse and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) project manager for the Forensic HR and Governance project were both replaced;
• Inadequate critical path scheduling and implementation by the executing agency (Forensic HR and Governance);
• Delayed contracting of a project monitor for the Forensic HR and Governance project;
• The timing of decision-making, particularly with regard to the Courthouse Construction project re-scoping;
• Delays in sub-contracting and/or procurement actions by the executing agency (Forensic HR and Governance); and
• The lack of congruence between UNODC and DFATD results-based management systems (Forensic HR and Governance).

While a number of these problems were due to shortcomings in the efforts of implementing agencies, there was also a need for more timely decision-making by DFATD (for example, in the Courthouse Construction project re-scoping). Field interviews revealed that problems with the Forensic HR and Governance project are having a detrimental impact on the relationship between DFATD and its two PA partners, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior, due to dissatisfaction with the progress made by the executing agency. The failure to deliver on the full original commitment of three courthouses will reduce the scope of the achievement of that project’s planned result of increased availability of safe and well-managed courthouses in the West Bank.

3.3 Private Sector Development

The PSD sample examined for this evaluation consisted of five projects and covered 98.3% of disbursements in this sector. Canada’s activities took two distinct forms. In the first years of the evaluation period, along with a number of other donors, the program provided budgetary support to the PA through a World Bank Trust Fund. After approval of the 2009 CDPF, the program put into place three “flagship” projects^{Footnote 24} that engaged nearly all key institutional players in the Palestinian economy in the public and private sectors, including the Ministry of National Economy (MoNE), and many of the apex private sector organizations in the West Bank. These same institutions also partner with other donors on specific projects but the CIDA strategy of focusing fully on institutional support was unique among donors.

3.3.1 PSD Sector Challenges

Many influences on the economy are outside the control of the PA, starting with security restrictions on access by Palestinians to Area C and East Jerusalem. The West Bank is landlocked and unable to move goods without going through Israeli-controlled border crossings. Poor processes of documentation make borders porous to low quality/low cost imports that evade PA import tax regulations and supplant locally manufactured products in the marketplace. Overall, exports and imports are subject to changing political and security circumstances.

Domestic and foreign investment is low due to the uncertainties caused by the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The political separation of Gaza from West Bank and security restrictions imposed on movement of people and goods in and out of Gaza have reduced potential benefits of economies of scale in production and related enterprise opportunities. The labour market and, to a certain extent, economic activity as a whole remains linked to the large number of informal, mainly family-owned microenterprises (those employing five people or fewer).^{Footnote 25}

Sustainable economic growth is a growing priority for the donor community at large and, as noted in section 7.1, is an area that is not well coordinated within the donor community. Canada is one of many contributors in the PSD sector, working with entities that also receive support from other donors. Despite the program’s unique focus on institution building, specific attribution of results is sometimes difficult.

For CIDA, the PSD sector presented challenges that made the choice to pursue an institutional strengthening focus risky, although it responded to a significant need. The starting point was characterized by weak and poorly coordinated public and private sector institutions, and the objectives of the program were complex and ambitious. In addition, institutional change is widely recognized in development literature to require long-term commitment and take a long time to manifest results.^{Footnote 26}

The Country Development Programming Framework was approved in December 2009, and the three “flagship” PSD projects were approved in March 2011. For purposes of this evaluation, this leaves only two years of implementation, insufficient to assess the full impact of these collective interventions. There were delays in the early stages of the three projects, caused by issues such as partners’ limited understanding of their roles and responsibilities; difficulties in relations between the PA and implementing partners; and generally poor understanding of DFATD’s requirements for project planning and reporting.

By the end of the evaluation period, these issues had been resolved or were being addressed. However, delays in project start-up mean that data on immediate outcomes is very limited, and no information is available on longer term results.

3.3.2 Effectiveness of PSD Sector Programming

The expected immediate outcomes set out for the PSD sector are:  increased responsiveness of the policy and regulatory framework for micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and increased access to local and international markets for Palestinian firms, including those owned by women. These support the intermediate outcome of creating a more investment-favourable business environment for Palestinian firms, including those owned by women.

Results indicators for the PSD sector at the immediate outcome and output levels are not clearly defined and depend heavily on reporting by the three “flagship” projects specifically developed under the 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework, supplemented by data to be collected by the program. Collection of this data has so far taken place for some but not all indicators. This evaluation therefore relied on other sources of information to provide evidence of progress toward achievement of intended objectives. The World Bank Doing Business (DB) indicator of “number of days to start a business” was adopted in the CIDA PMF and has seen a marginal improvement from 49 days in 2010 to 45 days in 2014.^{Footnote 27}

The World Bank’s Interim Strategy Note for West Bank and Gaza 2012-2014 states that “The 2012 Doing Business Indicators of the Bank do not reflect improvement of the business environment”.^{Footnote 28}  It goes on to identify certain changes, some introduced through DFATD-supported projects,^{Footnote 29} which the World Bank expects to be reflected in improved scores but whose impacts had not yet been identified. In fact, the overall Doing Business ranking for West Bank and Gaza improved from 145 in the 2013 report to 138 in the 2014 report, thanks mainly to elimination of a minimum requirement for paid in capital in start-ups. The other nine Doing Business component indicators remained more or less stagnant, with the “Trading Across Borders” indicator even showing a slight decline. This indicates that there are a number of areas in which PSD sector programming is active that could see further improvement as the “flagship” projects continue to be implemented.

Palestinian statistics on foreign direct investment in West Bank and Gaza and import/export data also show a slow but positive trend over the period from 2010 to 2012. These figures are short term and subject to a range of influences, only one part of which may be attributed to donor (and in particular DFATD) contributions in the PSD sector. However, they are positive trends during a period of relative stability, showing decreasing foreign investment by Palestinian investors and increasing local investment in businesses. Among other things, this may reflect increased confidence in the overall business environment, to which DFATD has contributed along with other donors.

Another point of comparison is the documented capacity of partners at the start of the Country Development Programming Framework cycle. CIDA’s 2009 PSD sector planning study noted:

“…private sector associations…admitted to lacking technical capabilities to understand the legal language of various laws... Accordingly, private sector input and effectiveness in influencing economic policy has been minimal, resulting in legislation that often seems to conflict with private sector needs.”^{Footnote 30}

The evident need for institutional strengthening and reform applied equally to the public and private sector institutions engaged in the economy. The same study noted that the Ministry of National Economy (MoNE) had “admitted its lack of capacity to implement its mandate and develop policies and procedures, promote trade and modernize industry as well as serve both producers and consumers” (p.47).

The main private sector organizations in West Bank and Gaza were functioning at various levels but “many of these institutions remain ineffective in their efforts to influence economic policy and legislation” (p.46). The key Palestinian partner in the Regional Economic Empowerment of Women Project (REEWP), the Palestinian Businesswomen’s Association (ASALA), was limited to providing small loans to women micro-entrepreneurs and lacked advocacy or business development support capabilities.

“The CIDA project has enabled a foundation of skills and capacities [in PalTrade] to be used in other strategic priorities, beginning with a central role in the formulation and eventual implementation of the National Export Strategy.”

There are many illustrations of the program’s measurable progress over the evaluation period in addressing this widespread weakness in capacity. The work of the Federation of Palestinian Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (FPCCIA) of coordinating and preparing a private sector position paper in 2012 on amendments to the Labour Law is one example. Chamber of Commerce representatives interviewed for the evaluation claimed that “No-one else has that capacity” for analysis and advocacy that the Federation has now developed with the support of the Improved Framework Conditions for Palestinian Businesses project.

The Palestinian Trade Centre (PalTrade) attributes its designation as a representative interlocutor with the PA for Palestinian business on trade matters at least partly to DFATD programming support. The organization also has been mandated, with €3 million direct European Union (EU) funding, to lead the preparation of the PA’s National Export Strategy, a clear reflection of PA and EU confidence in PalTrade’s technical and management capacity to carry out this important task.

The Palestinian Federation of Industry has also experienced a revival with the support of the Framework Conditions project, from being what one interviewee described as “nearly defunct” in early 2012 (a view confirmed by other interviewees) to being actively involved in policy and advocacy, as well as revamping its Industrial Modernization Centre to provide technical support to Palestinian industry.

There were direct governance achievements from the PRDP Trust Fund as a result of the PA’s access to core budgetary support for delivery of services to Palestinians. A clear example is the improvement documented by the World Bank in the social safety nets for poor Palestinians. There were also public financial management improvements resulting from Trust Fund performance conditionality requiring reform in budgeting, control of finances, external auditing, staff reform and other aspects of governance. In its April 13, 2011, Staff Report for the Meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, the International Monetary Fund concluded that “the PA is now able to conduct the sound economic policies expected of a future well-governed Palestinian state, given its solid track record in reforms and institution-building in the public finance and financial areas” (p.3).

ASALA, the Palestinian partner for the REEWP project, also made substantial progress in building its capacity. ASALA admitted that, at the start of the project, it “had no idea or experience at all in advocacy skills, strategies and competencies”. ASALA has now negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding with the Federation of Chambers of Commerce for special registration rates for microbusinesses that has benefitted all micro-entrepreneurs, not just women, and has significantly increased Chamber membership in this category. By the end of 2013, ASALA was close to establishing an independent commercial microcredit institution that will provide a major source of income for the NGO’s ongoing services to small and household level businesswomen. ASALA is now actively supporting and encouraging women to move into the formal sector by registering their businesses in order to take advantage of services offered through the Ministry of National Economy (MoNE) and local Chambers.

Despite this range of achievements, not all the intended PSD results have been realized, sometimes as a result of project level issues or decisions, and sometimes for reasons beyond the control of the projects themselves. For example:

• Public-Private dialogue (Framework Conditions project) is still not taking place to the satisfaction of the business community or in a manner that has produced substantive change in policy. The meetings that have taken place have been assessed by different participants as having fallen short in the hoped-for degree of engagement by MoNE;
• Gender units have been established in some organizations but have not really been integrated into ongoing operations or had an effect on policy developed by these organizations;
• Functioning of MoNE’s policy unit was assessed by an independent analyst in 2013 as having had “disappointing results so far”, mainly attributed to the internal political environment;
• The Palestinian Shippers Council made the decision to contract out research as required instead of creating a research unit as originally planned; in addition, at the time of the evaluation field visit, it had been slow in developing training materials and products.

At the time of the evaluation field mission, these issues were known to the program and to implementing partners, and steps were being taken to address shortfalls to the extent possible. By the end of the evaluation period, there was a mixed record of progress in PSD sector projects and the evidence, including assessments by other analysts, indicates that more time and effort is needed to realize the intended intermediate outcomes.

3.4 Humanitarian Assistance

The greatest proportion of Canadian assistance to West Bank and Gaza over the evaluation period is classified as emergency or humanitarian assistance. HA programming comprised half the projects implemented—44 of 88—and $171 million, or 63% of total disbursements made by the program.

A sample of ten emergency assistance projects worth $78 million, managed by the bilateral program, was assessed. All of them were responsive projects and all but one used the “multi-bi” mechanism.^{Footnote 31}  They cover all major HA partner agencies over the five years being evaluated and close to 46% of total HA disbursements. As Canada worked with the same partners year after year, key respondents like CARE, FAO, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UNICEF, UNRWA and WFP reported in interviews about their ongoing relationship with Canada rather than about any single year of funding. Thus, the sample covered ongoing relationships with partners who between them managed 92% of total Canadian HA in West Bank and Gaza during the period being evaluated.

All HA programming in West Bank and Gaza reviewed for this evaluation^{Footnote 32} responded to the UN annual Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and UNRWA appeals.^{Footnote 33} The CAP focused on harmonizing and coordinating large-scale, sustained humanitarian action, efficient and effective lifesaving and protection and promotion of livelihoods. The PA was consulted in all CAPs, which align with Palestinian plans and priorities.

DFATD HA funding supported activities including immediate relief, emergency preparedness and early recovery. In the period 2008-2009 to 2012-2013, the largest share of Canada’s humanitarian funding in the West Bank and Gaza supported food security, and this concentration increased during the period.

3.4.1 Humanitarian Assistance Challenges

Over the evaluation period, humanitarian needs in West Bank and Gaza changed very little and were characterized by “entrenched levels of food insecurity, limited access of vulnerable Palestinian communities to essential services and serious protection and human rights issues.”^{Footnote 34}  HA provided from all donors (including CIDA/DFATD) through the CAP has targeted the poor, including a large portion of the non-refugee population of West Bank and Gaza who live in poverty, mainly due to the ongoing conflict, and Palestinian refugees and their descendants.  

Documentation and key respondent interviews with other donors and humanitarian agencies revealed that donors have begun to question whether short-term humanitarian solutions are appropriate in the West Bank and Gaza, in a situation of long-term conflict. There is growing recognition that HA addresses only a portion of the needs in the West Bank and Gaza and will never be sufficient. Meeting these needs requires longer term political solutions and a resolution of the underlying political conflict.

As a result, the Consolidated Appeal for 2012-2013 adopted a two-year strategy for the humanitarian community and the UN launched its planning process for a Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for the West Bank and Gaza in December of 2012. This approach has continued after the evaluation period. Near the end of 2013, the UN released a Humanitarian Programme Cycle containing a three-year Country Strategy for the period of 2014-2017, which focused on tackling food insecurity and improving the protection environment for Palestinian communities most at risk.^{Footnote 35}

Humanitarian agencies like CARE, UNICEF and WFP noted that in the face of the global financial crisis, donor funding was constrained and there was a move towards needs-based assistance that targets only the most vulnerable, including those with refugee status. Insufficient focus and/or targeting of humanitarian assistance might be contributing to aid dependency and working against state building. This needs-based approach has been adopted by the PA’s Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), which is working with the UN agencies on developing a Palestinian system for distribution of social assistance programming.

3.4.2 Effectiveness of HA Programming

Given that six of the ten projects reviewed for the HA portfolio had a planned duration of only one year, project documentation concentrated on activities and outputs.^{Footnote 36}  Based on a rollup of the ten sample projects over the period of the evaluation, the projects achieved their output targets as specified in the program level Performance Measurement Framework. Indicative results against these targets include:

• Food distributed to over 500,000 targeted food insecure and vulnerable households (target—347,000 individuals);
• Food vouchers (or conditional cash transfers) distributed to almost 200,000 targeted food insecure and vulnerable households (target—98,000 households);
• School snacks or meals distributed to over 450,000 school children in targeted schools in food insecure areas (target—80,000 children);
• Water infrastructure improvements provided to about 330 male and female farmers (target—100 households);
• Training sessions on agricultural techniques and management practices provided to 3,350 targeted male and female farmers (target—4,000 households);
• Animal health inputs and veterinary services provided to about 1,200 targeted farmers and producers (target—800 breeders and 500 households).

The program PMF targets results at the ultimate outcome level by 2024, but results are expected at the intermediate and immediate outcome levels by 2014. Thus, by the end of the programming period some results should start to become apparent, and in fact the evaluation found evidence of progress. Indicators for both intermediate outcomes (household expenditure on food and percentage of food insecure households) are moving in a positive direction from the baselines.

However, a review of the available sources, such as the Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey 2012, does not show an improving trend in humanitarian conditions for immediate outcomes, especially access to nutritious food, largely due to the continuing lack of progress on a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While this appears to confirm the need for longer term solutions and an increased focus on building resilience, it is important to note that in many cases it is too early for a rigorous analysis of trends as we have only one or two years of data. As the crisis ebbs and flows, the year chosen for the baseline can have an impact as well.

Effectiveness can also be assessed in relation to broad expectations of humanitarian assistance programming. At the departmental level, West Bank and Gaza HA programming is expected to respect CIDA’s Guidelines for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance which states that the expected outcome of HA is “helping meet the basic human needs of conflict and natural disaster affected communities”. The program level outcomes are:  improved or maintained health; improved physical security; and, improved or maintained household and community livelihoods.^{Footnote 37}

Canada’s strategy on Food Security explicitly includes “food assistance and nutrition to provide more flexible, predictable, and needs-based funding to meet the emergency and long-term food and nutrition needs of the most vulnerable and higher-risk populations.”  The expected results of this programming are:  more lives are saved and better overall health as a result of improved access to sufficient quantities of nutritious food; and, improved quality and effectiveness of food aid programming.^{Footnote 38}  Canada was also a key proponent in the development of the Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD), which it endorsed in 2003. All DFATD humanitarian programming should respect GHD principles.

The evidence gathered in the evaluation clearly shows that nine of the ten projects reviewed were contributing to the achievement of departmental results. The tenth project, UNRWA Food Security 2009 was fully funded but, because of thorough exercise of due diligence in CIDA approvals, UNRWA could not use the funds in 2009, leaving the objectives of the project unfulfilled. Although the funds were disbursed for the intended purpose in 2010, the project was assessed as unsatisfactory.

The humanitarian assistance delivered by the program generally aligned with GHD principles. Two partners questioned either the timeliness or transparency of the rationale for funding decisions, and hence predictability. Questions were also raised about whether linking HA funding to the thematic priority of food security, rather than prioritised humanitarian needs, is strictly compatible with GHD principles. A more detailed analysis of compliance with GHD principles is set out in Annex I, and of the experience of delivering HA through the bilateral channel in Annex K.

The strategy being gradually adopted by the donor community to move toward a longer time horizon for humanitarian planning, rebuilding local capacity and avoiding creating dependency on emergency assistance will emphasize the need for close links between HA and traditional bilateral programming in future years. At the same time, ongoing programming flexibility will be required to allow the program to adapt to potential violence and instability and continue to effectively deliver both development and emergency assistance.

3.5 Policy Dialogue

An important element of Canadian development programming is engagement in policy dialogue. There are two entry points for the development program into policy dialogue processes. First, the projects, which, in the justice and PSD sectors, work at high levels in building Palestinian institutions and place Canada in close proximity to sector level policy making. Second, participation in formal donor coordination structures, particularly those supported through the Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Local Aid Coordination Secretariat (LACS) and related bodies. These donor cooperation bodies have similar sets of objectives, which include “supporting the development of sector policy papers and strategies” and “improving coordination and transparency between the PA and donors and enhancing cross-sector policy discussion”.

DFATD engages with a number of top level policy forums, including “senior officials of the Palestinian Authority, the Office of the Quartet Representative, the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, as well as through Canadian participation at the twice-yearly Ad Hoc Liaison Committee”.^{Footnote 39}

The challenges with the non-HA formal donor coordination mechanisms are documented in section 7.1 (Aid Coordination). While donors pursue their respective positions independently at the level of international relations, coordinating top level sectoral dialogue has been one of the aims at the heart of the creation of the LACS. This requires the full and substantive participation of the PA, which, it has been noted, has not always been the case in the two service delivery sectors where Canada has been active.

Below this level, and in relation to Canada’s priority development sectors, engagement has been stronger. Canada has established a very visible presence and gained access to high levels in the PA through the Sharaka project’s extensive involvement with the Office of the Attorney General, with the judicial services through the Courthouse Construction project and to some extent across the balance of the justice sector through the Rule of Law/Access to Justice and Forensic HR and Governance projects.

Influence in the justice sector, both with other donors and with the PA, was enhanced by the appointment to the Representative Office of Canada in Ramallah of a legal reform expert advisor, who has taken a prominent role in supporting cross-sectoral coordination among donors. Canada is a member of the LACS Governance Strategy Group, along with three of its component bodies:  the Election Working Group, Security Sector Working Group and Justice Sector Working Group.

Interviewees reported that Canada’s influence on economic issues has diminished following CIDA’s decision to no longer contribute to budgetary support through the World Bank’s Trust Fund mechanism as programming began under the new CDPF. On the PSD side, however, DFATD’s project portfolio, concentrating as it does on institution building with MoNE and top level private sector organizations, continues to provide access to sectoral policy decision makers. This access is important to the success of the policy level objectives for PSD sector projects. While the policy discussions at this level are important to the project level objectives, the larger economic issues confronting Palestinians remain substantially out of reach to the dialogue mechanisms enabled at the project level.

With respect to HA, policy dialogue takes place mainly through established cooperation mechanisms and channels:  OCHA and the consolidated appeal process, for example. Canada’s influence is strongest in the area of food security and food aid, given that these areas are the focus for its HA programming. The program notes that “In its interactions with humanitarian agencies and through its support for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance and its participation in the Friday Group of humanitarian donors, CIDA plays an important role pushing for greater integration of gender and environmental issues.”^{Footnote 40}

OCHA has been very active in advocacy, particularly for protection and humanitarian space. Many bilateral donors, including Canada, do not fund this aspect of OCHA programming. A minority of interviewees perceive this as a lack of engagement in support of the HA objective of protection of Palestinians and on preservation of infrastructure investment made by HA programs.

4.0 Relevance

The evaluation found the three sectors identified as priorities in the 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework to have been carefully and strategically chosen to be consistent with both the priorities of Palestinians as recorded in the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan and subsequent National Development Plans, and with Canadian development and foreign policy objectives, particularly the pledge made by the Government of Canada at the 2007 Paris conference.

In choosing its sectors and project level activities, the program consulted broadly with stakeholders and other donors. The Country Development Programming Framework and Program Strategy are subject to annual reviews, with the Strategy to be updated as necessary to respond to any changes in the situation on the ground. Given the relative stability in West Bank over the evaluation period, there has been no call for significant change in the directions for justice and PSD sector programming, and the parameters of HA programming have remained consistent.

However, the evaluation did find the program to be highly ambitious, even before considering its fragile state context. Justice and PSD projects addressed institutional strengthening objectives, widely viewed as challenging and complex, requiring extensive investment and time commitments even in the best of environments.

With almost all the target institutions for institutional strengthening identified as being weak and having limited absorptive capacity from the start of this Country Development Programming Framework cycle, and some projects only conceived as three-year endeavours (e.g., Facilitating Palestinian Trade), the extent of results achievement is bound to vary from project to project. In the end, several projects are likely to be in need of additional time and, in many cases, further investment to consolidate and protect achievements made to date.

Justice Sector Reform

The work in the justice sector goes to the heart of the Palestinian system of governance and the rule of law. The proper functioning of the PA institutions in this sector contributes directly to the peace and security related objectives that define Canada’s foreign policy and development program priorities for West Bank and Gaza.

The emphasis in justice programming was heavily on the “supply” (institutional) side as opposed to the “demand” (access to institutional services) side. This was consistent with the PA’s National Plan for the Justice Sector 2008-2010 and took into account DFATD’s positioning in the sector vis-à-vis other donors. However, current governance practice calls for a balance between the two to develop a fully functional system of justice. The evaluation acknowledges that strengthening capacity of institutions does offer inherent opportunities for increased access to the justice system; nonetheless, there is a significant need for work on the demand side to support citizens to make best use of the opportunities thus created.

CIDA’s disbursements in the justice sector over the evaluation period ($46.6 million) were large enough that the program could work directly with all the key stakeholders and in all the key organizations. This resulted in a mix of projects that was highly coherent and provided sector wide coverage.

Private Sector Development

Addressing the economic challenges of West Bank and Gaza, especially the need for private sector growth to reduce high levels of unemployment and improve incomes, is a priority for the PA. It is considered by the international community to be part of the framework for a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Intervention in the PSD sector is consistent with DFATD’s own Sustainable Economic Growth Strategy.

CIDA’s disbursements of $43.6 million to private sector development were large enough to allow it to work with all the main institutional stakeholders, including both private sector organizations and the PA. This again led to a highly coherent set of projects in this sector that addressed the needs of all the key sectoral institutions.

Humanitarian Assistance

The program provides HA funding within the consolidated appeal process, which is prepared in consultation with the PA based on in depth analysis of humanitarian needs. HA programming is consistent with DFATD’s strategic priorities, including increasing food security. Building stability in Palestinian society by helping to meet the needs of the most vulnerable members of society is consistent with supporting the peace process and maintaining sustainability.

5.0 Sustainability

The greatest influence of the fragile state environment is felt on the sustainability of development programming. As long as the political and security situation and the stability of Palestinian governance structures remain uncertain, the sustainability of any development work in West Bank and Gaza will also remain fragile and expectations should be tempered accordingly.

Development literature is clear that effecting major change in established institutions, the central strategy of both justice and PSD sector activities, is a long-term challenge. This message was reinforced by most interviewees and is reflected in the delays and partial achievements of several projects. It is particularly an issue when further progress on institution building is constrained by the absence of a sitting Palestinian Legislative Council and the resulting limitations on the scope and nature of regulatory or justice sector reform.

Justice Sector Reform

At the project level, the outlook for sustainability is mixed. Some project activities continue to function after the end of the projects, without DFATD support (MMEP II’s International Community Action Network and Karamah’s Windsor-Birzeit Dignity Institute). The newer projects face challenges that make further support important. For example, the Sharaka project, to make OAG fully operational as planned; the UNDP Rule of Law/Access to Justice project, to make permanent the positions currently filled by seconded experts and to establish deeper links with the informal justice sector; and, the Forensic HR and Governance project, to entrench enhanced individual and organizational capacities. Functioning of the two courthouses could eventually be vulnerable to staff and facility operational budget constraints, given the PA’s persistent budgetary deficit.

Private Sector Development

Financial sustainability of the program’s partner private sector organizations will depend on their ability to continue to attract outside funding and generate more revenue internally. None will be able to support itself solely based on membership fees. The evaluation notes that this is in fact the case with similar organizations in most countries, including Canada. Revenues from improved member service offerings and ongoing donor interest are likely to provide the necessary funds over the short to medium term. In all cases, there are strong incentives and commitments to retain the capacity improvements introduced to date through the program.

However, other issues pose threats to the sustainability of projects. The Palestinian Federation of Industry is poised to lose its Secretary General when his present term ends, and there is little depth in that organization’s management structures. Further progress on the Chambers’ information portal for members will depend on external funding. The PalTrade mid-term review raised questions about retention and use of the skills that have so far been imparted, even as further capacity building is taking place.

One project for which the prospects of sustainability are good is REEWP. ASALA is moving into the position of being largely and possibly fully self-supporting thanks to its newly created micro-lending institution whose profits will be directed to supporting the NGO’s ongoing operations.

Different perspectives among implicated PA Ministers, and the need to generate consensus around forward action, sometimes lead to initial timeframes being extended (Framework Conditions project). Sustainability of reform in the PSD sector will remain potentially subject to similar issues as long as the political environment remains uncertain.

The reforms and improvements in public financial management that were the conditions on which PRDP Trust Fund funds were released to the PA have been and are likely to continue to be sustained. However, the PA structural budget deficit and the current regime of security-related restrictions on trade raise questions about sustainability in the absence of ongoing donor support.

Humanitarian Assistance

HA is by definition a short-term intervention, although it still requires a sufficient time horizon to ensure effective delivery of intended relief. The evaluation found that HA programming is producing sustainable impacts in two ways. First, it has built the institutional capacity of select ministries of the PA (for example, PCBS, MoSA, MoA and others). Second, it has enhanced the ability of Palestinians to weather repeated shocks and emergencies, by developing resilience. In light of the protracted crisis in West Bank and Gaza, DFATD (along with other donors) are considering new approaches to lessen dependence and improve sustainability.

6.0 Cross-Cutting Themes

6.1 Gender

The 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework notes that West Bank and Gaza is a traditional society governed by Islamic laws and traditions. The participation of women in the labour force is one of the lowest in the world, and the majority of working women are concentrated in low paying informal sector jobs. Violence against women remains a significant issue. However, access to education and health services and greater economic and political opportunities for women and girls have improved over the last decades, and gender equality in education has almost been achieved. There is also an active women’s movement with institutional linkages.

West Bank and Gaza is thus a complex and challenging environment for gender programming, but integration of gender equality in development assistance is consistent with PA policies and priorities. The PA:

• Recognizes the role of women in development and highlights this in national plans;
• Established a Ministry of Women’s Affairs and gender units in each ministry to ensure that programming and implementation is done in a gender-sensitive manner;
• Acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 2014 and launched a Palestinian Women’s Bill of Rights that adapts CEDAW principles to the Palestinian context;
• Is committed to assist women’s advancement by improving women’s rights in the justice sector and their participation in the labour force.

The program has put into place a number of structural elements that ensure gender is mainstreamed across the three priority areas of intervention, beginning with a well-developed gender equality strategy. Justice and PSD sector projects built-in use of local and international gender experts, for example by providing a gender focal point in the Public Prosecutions office and by strengthening the gender units in the Ministry of National Economy and the Ministry of Justice. The gender strategy in these two sectors is aimed at providing women with increased capacity for public and private sector participation, more representation among decision makers, and more equitable decision-making at work.

The program has identified roles, responsibilities and resources to support the implementation of the gender equality strategy. Project officers are responsible for gender analyses for their projects and for identifying risks and mitigation strategies that they develop with the implementing partners. Increasing the capacity within the program by ensuring that each staff member receives gender training was part of the program’s gender strategy. As well, the program actively uses DFATD’s corporate gender specialists. They are routinely involved in reviewing project proposals and reports, providing input on all programming (including HA), and helping to develop better gender equality analysis, approaches and plans. The desk provides funding for the Gender Equality Specialists to undertake program support and field visits. The program also committed to hiring a local gender equality specialist to coordinate, support, monitor and report on gender equality efforts.

Annual Country Reports note a limited amount of gender-disaggregated data available from partners. They also note that the use of grant arrangements limited CIDA’s ability to require better reporting of gender-disaggregated data. The local gender advisor was to address this problem by creating a network of advisers working for specific projects, help them to establish gender action plans and provide training and coaching on integrating gender in all aspects of programming, including data gathering and reporting.

“There is a real risk of doing harm if gender is not handled appropriately within the very complex dynamics of Palestinian society.”

Unfortunately, the local advisor was only hired and started work shortly before the evaluation field mission. She noted that gender has its own particular challenges arising from the complexity of Palestinian society, and indicated that an excellent understanding of local conditions is needed to work effectively in this area. Women can play different roles in business and in the home, and a nuanced and responsive approach is required depending on the specific circumstances of each project.

Gender is becoming a more visible element of donor programming. At the time of the evaluation field visit, the Local Aid Coordination Secretariat (LACS) was finalizing their “gender charter”, aimed at ensuring that discussions of development programming are gender sensitive and respect human rights. In addition, West Bank and Gaza have strong institutions addressing gender equality issues and an important women’s movement has taken root. Nonetheless, despite the growing visibility of gender issues, the West Bank and Gaza gender development index (GDI) was 0.67 in 2012, little changed from the GDI of 0.678 reported in 2006.

Justice Sector Reform

In justice sector reform, CIDA has been working to improve the promotion and protection of the human rights of women and girls, increase awareness by the general public of the rights of women, and strengthen the response of the PA to gender-specific rights violations. This is an important concern as the formal justice system often fails to deal with legal issues involving women and children. Honour killings still occur despite vocal opposition by some high-level political leaders in both Hamas and Fatah (including President Abbas), and violence and abuse against women is common. In the West Bank, 23% of women in 2006 were reportedly subjected to physical abuse and 10.5% to sexual abuse. The numbers in Gaza are similar. Of the women who had experienced domestic violence in West Bank and Gaza, only 1.2% filed a complaint, and less than 1% sought counselling and protection. ^{Footnote 41}

The justice sector projects have had varying degrees of success in incorporating gender equality actively into their activities. Most of the required gender strategies were produced late and/or were weak. Nonetheless, some positive results were realized:

• The Access to Justice/Rule of Law project formed close working relationships with women’s CSOs, placed gender specialists in justice sector government institutions, assessed the status of women in Palestinian law and established a gender justice coordinating group;
• The Karamah project made a concerted effort to champion the rights of women. It advocated for the appointment of more female judges (those participating in the project reported increased confidence in their judicial capacities) and developed gender sensitive training materials;
• The gender focal point hired for the Sharaka project has provided assistance and guidance to the Access to Justice gender specialist operating in the Ministry of Justice. Sharaka has played a key role in facilitating the exchange of best practices in GE promotion across the key justice sector institutions;
• The two new courthouses have explicitly incorporated gender oriented provisions into their designs, including a capacity to separate male and female prisoners.

All of the projects in DFATD’s justice sector portfolio have attempted to maximize the number of women in their training programs, which has sometimes been difficult given the low number of women in their target groups.

Private Sector Development

Women only represented 17.4% of the labour force in 2012,^{Footnote 42} and unemployment for women increased by nearly 30% from the previous year to 33%.^{Footnote 43}  Women hold only 10% of private sector management positions and represent only 5.4% of formal business ownership. Most female primary graduates do not continue on to higher education and formal careers. Women most often work in the informal economy, in low-paying and labour-intensive jobs. The gender wage gap reported by Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) in 2011 was 15.9%. Over 70% of women with a university or college education are unemployed.

DFATD’s private sector development programming is intended to help women to have access to resources and benefits by helping improve their livelihoods through increased national competitiveness and by building a greater institutional capacity in the PA to design and implement policy frameworks that support and do not infringe on the rights of women entrepreneurs. PSD sector projects have varying records of attention to these objectives.

The Capacity Development for Facilitating Trade project has a gender equality strategy and analysis suggested female owned firms might benefit more than male owned firms from this project. However, the evidence suggests this issue has received little attention so far. Birzeit Continuing Education, contracted by the Palestinian Shippers Council to develop trade related courses, confirmed that there is “no gender content” in training modules under development. There are no gender related indicators at the intermediate outcome level and the 2013 UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Annual Report makes no mention of gender related activities or achievements.

The Export Development project dedicated 12% of its budget to gender and has made progress towards integrating gender equality, although some delays and challenges have been experienced. PalTrade, the implementing agency, now collects gender disaggregated data, has specific offerings for women business owners and has committed to gender participation targets in their capacity building offerings.

The Framework Conditions project had ambitious gender equality goals, including establishment of gender units in several of its partner private sector organizations and in MoNE. However, by the end of 2012-2013, it was clear that “gender equality activities suffered from a lack of attention early on, limiting what can be done in the year remaining.”^{Footnote 44}  The gender units had developed plans but were not making progress in their implementation. The Palestinian Federation of Industry was working with the Business Women’s Forum in lieu of setting up a gender unit and has included gender dimensions in their work on labour law, something they made clear would not have happened without Canadian support.

Across the program, only one project—REEWP—was specifically directed at women, in this case micro-entrepreneurs.^{Footnote 45}  Interestingly, gender mainstreaming was a concept introduced to ASALA through the project. The final report of the implementing partner, Oxfam-Québec, noted that “at the start of the REEWP…ASALA had no knowledge of gender concepts and, although it could by default be considered a gender sensitive organization, was not familiar with gender mainstreaming in practice or as an institution.”  By the end of the project, ASALA’s newly developed gender training curriculum had been widely shared (including with project partner organizations in other countries) and made available on ASALA’s website. The project PMF includes gender specific indicators and was tracked on that basis.

The PRDP Trust Fund I and II projects did not specifically target gender issues but supported the PA’s broader gender commitments through core funding.

Humanitarian Assistance

UN agencies for humanitarian assistance, including UNRWA, UNICEF, UNFPA, and WFP have recognized the need to integrate gender strategies, as have most large international NGOs. In addition, several donors have realized that, as they advance women’s rights through humanitarian assistance programs that support both males and females, they need to work to avoid a strong backlash from the male population and society as a whole.

HA projects focused on providing assistance to the most vulnerable. To the extent that women and children fell within this category, they became a focus; otherwise, there was little specific visibility for the theme in programming by HA partner organizations. In recognition of this, CIDA provided funding to OCHA in support of a gender specialist position, which increased the overall visibility of gender issues within the broad range of HA support being delivered in West Bank and Gaza.

The DFATD Directorate for Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) conducts Gender Equality Institutional Assessments and regular due diligence for both multilateral and NGO partner organizations. Both IHA and Gender Specialists are consulted in the review and selection of projects and partners for HA funding in West Bank and Gaza, and project approval documents include gender analysis.

The CAP and the short project descriptions contained therein for most HA projects did address women’s needs in general terms and seven out of the sample of ten contained a gender breakdown of intended beneficiaries. Five of the ten HA project documents discuss the higher level of vulnerability of women-headed households and seven include gender disaggregated data in their results statements and reports. However, there are rarely specific targets against which higher level results can be measured, and this includes gender equity results. This may simply be due to the short-term nature of the HA projects, and the fact that they are focused on meeting the immediate needs of the most vulnerable.

We need to understand the need to work in gender and environment and we are willing to, but working in these areas requires resources. CIDA understood this and put resources into gender.

While the integration of gender equality in HA programming is not consistent, there are indicative positive results based on the HA evaluation sample:

• The CARE program supported research on gender and agriculture. They have since integrated the empowerment of women as a key part of their program;
• UNRWA’s Food Security programs prioritized women headed households and made special arrangements for abandoned women and their children;
• WFP Food Aid program issued cards for women wherever possible and allowed women to use their husbands’ cards, empowering them in the households and resulting in higher standards of nutrition;
• OCHA reported that CIDA built gender capacity in the CAP by providing part of the funding for the Gender Advisor based at OCHA.

6.2 Environmental Sustainability

The 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework included as an annex the first environmental sustainability analysis undertaken for the bilateral program. It notes that the recurring conflict has made the environmental situation in West Bank and particularly in Gaza “extremely challenging” (p.54). Climate change is identified as an aggravating factor that could have significant impact in the region in future years, in the form of extreme weather events, long-term droughts or other effects. The political and security context, and in particular the limited access and rights of Palestinians to land and natural resources, limits their ability to manage natural assets. This and significant budget constraints have placed environmental considerations low on the list of Palestinian priorities.

Based on this assessment of the context, the Country Development Programming Framework suggested that environmental considerations could be addressed within the three priority sectors as follows:

• Undertake environmental assessment and mitigation and use green technologies in courthouse construction;
• Encourage environmentally responsible business growth in policy and regulatory reform; respect existing environmental controls around industry and commerce; and, promote environmentally friendly practice by business;
• Use HA interventions as a “portal for promotion of household-level environmental best practices”, by working with implementing partners to “ensure these issues are consciously worked into the design of engagements” (p.62).

The program has undertaken limited programming specifically addressing environmental issues beyond meeting the legal requirement of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA). This fell short of the relatively modest level of attention envisioned in the Country Development Programming Framework. There is a lack of indicators in the program level PMF, which contains only two oblique mentions of environmental dimensions in the context of capacity building, as part of a larger list of skills to be developed in certain stakeholder groups.

Canada is not a member of the Environmental Sector Working Group, the formal donor coordination structure within the Local Development Forum; nor is Canada engaged in policy dialogue in this area. The program has engaged a part time local environmental advisor to support the Ramallah office on a responsive rather than a proactive basis.

In reviewing the twenty-four sample projects for environmental performance, the evaluation found seven projects for which environmental sustainability did not apply. For example, the World Bank Trust Fund and Networking for Peace projects simply do not offer any opportunities for consideration of environmental issues, even as a cross-cutting theme.

Justice Sector Reform

The justice sector received most of the program’s attention on environmental issues because of the major investments in capital projects for courthouses and the forensics lab facility, as well as for refurbishment of buildings for the Attorney General Office under the Sharaka project.

The two courthouses were subject to screening under CEAA, as required by Canadian law. In addition, UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS, the executing agency) also assesses the ongoing Tulkarem courthouse construction project against ISO14000 Environmental Management standards and monitors environmental integrity as part of its project management. The original project concept included incorporation of certain green technologies (like grey water capture and use) but these have had to be dropped due to budget limitations. However, the final design did include consideration of passive heating and cooling.

At the time of the field visit, no Environmental Management Plan (EMP) was prepared for renovations of the temporary lab in the Forensic HR and Governance project. However, one has now been prepared and the project has an environmental advisor who has been tasked with preparing an EMP for ongoing operations of the facility. The Sharaka project also included significant investments in renovation of existing facilities to consolidate the staff of the Attorney General Office, but this did not require CEAA screening. Nonetheless, the Administrative Arrangement with UNOPS called for “integration of environmental considerations in its procurement processes” and for specific reporting on environment. The implementation of these measures was found to have been minimal.

Private Sector Development

Environment received limited attention in PSD sector projects, despite opportunities envisioned in the 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework. While individual project plans made commitments to ensure that the environment dimension was considered, there is no evidence that this has been done.

The 2013 Mid-Term Review of Export Development in West Bank notes that resources available for the environmental component were small enough that it would remain “essentially a paper exercise” (p.9). Interviews confirmed that the Framework Conditions project has similarly found little room for environmental issues in its otherwise ambitious programming.

Of the four PSD projects in which project planning documents noted environmental issues were to have been addressed, only the REEWP project was rated as satisfactory. Within the limited opportunities available, that project made efforts to incorporate the intentions set out in project plans, for example by promoting the use of eco-friendly packing containers.

Humanitarian Assistance

Most HA programming is geared to meeting immediate relief needs, and is expected to have little or no environmental impact. However, as more Canadian funding goes toward resilience programming, there may be a requirement for increased attention in this area.

There is little reference to environmental issues in six out of ten of the HA project documents reviewed, but there is evidence that Canada is engaging with OCHA and with the FAO on this in the context of HA. OCHA was in fact one exception to the general lack of attention to environmental issues, as it developed an emergency response plan covering possible environmental disasters. Another exception was the CARE Assistance to Small Farmers project, which introduced farmers to best practices relating to organic fertilizers, efficient use of water, crop diversification and sustainable agriculture.

The two Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) projects in the evaluation sample were each subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment at the start, carried out at CIDA’s request. Water management was a significant element of each project, and FAO provided technical assistance to the PA on development of environmentally appropriate agriculture policies. The local environment advisor made one visit to field sites to monitor impacts for these projects which resulted in corrective actions being taken.

Access to water is very constrained in Gaza and water quality is also very compromised (…) We are promoting water saving practices. In 2011-12, we worked on an environmental impact assessment. Our water harvesting activities are just about storage and have no long term environmental impacts but grey water use raises a lot of issues.

Finally, the WFP projects had a mixed record with the Food for Work voucher program in regards to environmental issues. Some of the projects supported reforestation and protection against environmental degradation, while others supported road building.^{Footnote 46}  In the latter case, there was no evidence of consideration of environmental dimensions; nor was environment explicitly addressed in planning or reporting.

6.3 Governance

Canadian support to the Palestinian Authority as enunciated in DFATD’s 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework is centered on a commitment to state building, with a focus on building institutions through its programming on justice and private sector development. Governance has been incorporated directly into the analyses, planning and allocation of resources in these two sectors. The program has also supported particular elements of governance in the HA sector, as outlined below. It engages specialist resources as necessary to support the governance theme and benefits from the presence of a Justice/Rule of Law expert in the field.

Justice Sector

Justice sector programming has been much more broadly oriented towards governance than simply building government departments. The UNDP Rule of Law and Access to Justice Project has engaged in building capacity of community-based organizations to help people access justice system services. The project also supported the Palestinian Bar Association to expand members’ legal aid services.

The MMEP II project has built Community Action Centers in Nablus and East Jerusalem that continue to deliver rights-based social services to disadvantaged communities. The Karamah project worked to get judges thinking about delivering justice from a rights-based perspective. The Oxfam-Québec Volunteer program and the Networking for Peace small project funding mechanism have both strengthened community-based organization capacities to deliver services and raise public awareness.

The justice sector reform programming has complemented DFATD Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) funding that included building capacity in public security, corrections and external affairs policy making, as well as funding and technical assistance to the Quartet peace building mechanism.

Private Sector Development

All five PSD sector projects have had significant governance impact by supporting the PA’s analysis and policy development capacity and focusing on private sector umbrella organizations representing members’ views to government.

The three “flagship” projects directly supported institutional strengthening within the PA’s MoNE and in key private sector organizations that interact with government, advocate on behalf of members and influence policy. While development of formal systems of effective policy dialogue between the public and private sectors has not yet succeeded, institutional partners have been influential in other ways. For instance, some projects have included activities directed specifically to improving the regulatory framework for business, as in the case of Palestinian Federation of Industry’s and the Chambers’ inputs to a new Labour Law.

PalTrade’s work with the PA to coordinate the development of a National Export Strategy was attributed in part to capacity building undertaken within the Export Development project. Other projects (e.g., REEWP and Framework Conditions) have influenced legislation and regulation such as laws on micro-lenders and labour, registration requirements for microbusiness, etc. As for budgetary support, the Trust Fund projects have a strong element of governance built-in through the disbursement conditionality that requires specific improvements in such areas as public financial management.

Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian response is not usually designed to integrate governance, and the evaluation found no evidence that it had been actively integrated as a cross-cutting theme in any of the HA projects reviewed. At the same time, the evaluation found ample evidence that UN organizations worked closely with PA ministries, even though this aspect of their programming was little mentioned in DFATD project approval documents. Humanitarian assistance programming has supported projects that have sought to shift the HA paradigm from short-term relief to greater emphasis on livelihoods and emergency preparedness. These initiatives act indirectly to influence governance, without direct impact.

There are two projects in DFATD’s humanitarian assistance portfolio that have good governance dimensions. Although OCHA’s main function is donor coordination for HA, it has recently worked with Palestinian Civil Defense to promote emergency preparedness. More importantly, it has prepared an excellent Humanitarian Overview of the Palestinian situation, which is proving to be a tool for growing public awareness about the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian situation on Palestinian lives.

The program’s support for the FAO’s Farmer Livelihood Protection project has changed the “governance dynamic” of humanitarian assistance. By working in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and a cluster of Palestinian NGOs to promote livestock development among emergency assistance dependent Palestinians, this project is promoting a more developmental model of relief assistance. Other UN humanitarian partners (WFP, UNRWA) also have worked to build the capacity of the Ministry of Social Assistance (MoSA) and the PCBS.

7.0 Management Principles

7.1 Aid Coordination

The evaluation considered aid coordination to have two dimensions:  internal (that is, coordination of aid within CIDA and within the Government of Canada); and, external (coordination with other donors and with local stakeholders).

7.1.1 Aid Coordination Within DFATD

The evaluation found high levels of coordination within the program, including between DFATD project managers in headquarters and in the field. The program consults with Policy Branch, including the Fragile States section, and with specialists responsible for sustainable economic growth, governance and the cross-cutting themes of gender and environment. The Humanitarian Assistance Directorate was consulted on HA programming under the CAP and planning documents reflect links between the IHA program and the bilateral program. Interviews show that consultations have been held with Policy Branch on Food Security.

It was noted to be a great coordinating advantage to have HA expertise in the field. Canada’s move into resilience based programming in HA, offering potential for complementarity with PSD programming^{Footnote 47}, has been explored between the bilateral program officers responsible for HA programming and those responsible for the PSD portfolio.

The REEWP project predated the 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework by a short period and was implemented by the bilateral directorate through its Middle East regional desk. Despite having been reviewed by the West Bank and Gaza and Palestinian Refugees Program at the approval stage, there was no direct link during implementation, a situation assessed as “one of the weak points” by the regional program. Given its excellent fit with the Country Development Programming Framework objectives and its unique approach, this project should have enjoyed better integration with the bilateral program. ASALA’s developing relationships with government and private sector organizations who were partners in the other PSD sector projects took place independent of, rather than because of, any efforts to connect with REEWP.

Although representatives from the three key private sector development projects participated in one another’s Steering Committees, there is no evidence that the Representative Office of Canada in Ramallah has brought together its implementing partners from time to time to review progress, exchange information on current context and issues, and explore opportunities for cross-sector coordination. Opportunities may be limited by the predominant use of the multi-bi funding channel. Nonetheless, this is a common practice in other programs and could (at least in the security and justice areas) offer an opportunity to enhance the whole-of-government approach described elsewhere.

7.1.2 Whole-of-Government Coordination

CIDA’s 2009 West Bank and Gaza Country Strategy takes the position that the whole-of-government approach “is not based on formal structures, but successfully relies on a high degree of cooperation among Canadian government departments and agencies at both the working and official levels at headquarters and in the field” (p.3). The development program has had varying levels of communication and engagement with other Canadian government players working in West Bank and Gaza, some limited and infrequent (as with Department of National Defence and Royal Canadian Mounted Police), and some very close (as with Justice Canada as an implementing partner). The program has maintained good operational and strategic links with the Foreign Affairs side of DFATD, including the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START). This has helped ensure complementarity in activities and overall coherence in terms of Canada’s security and stability objectives.

The field mechanisms for interdepartmental cooperation fall under the direction and management of the Representative Office of Canada in Ramallah. Field interviews revealed that interdepartmental meetings have not always taken place on a regular basis, and this has led to some concern that opportunities may have been lost or time wasted. Regularization of these meetings could allow development (and other) activities to take full advantage of the range of information available from the Canadian presence in West Bank and Gaza.

Further detail on whole-of-government coordination is provided in Annex K.

7.1.3 Aid Coordination with Other Donors

The main structures for donor coordination in the West Bank and Gaza operate under the framework of the Local Development Forum (LDF), supported by the Local Aid Coordination Secretariat (LACS). There are four Strategy Groups covering infrastructure, economic policy, governance and social development, each of which is comprised of a number of Sector Working Groups, Thematic Groups and Working Groups covering different specific areas. LACS also supports the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, which meets twice annually and brings a more high level, strategic and political view to its development assistance coordination role. Canada is a member of this Committee along with other key donors, as are Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Unfortunately, the main LDF structures have not functioned optimally. At the time of the evaluation field mission, the strategy groups had not met for a year, largely because roles and responsibilities remained unclear. This situation created challenges to the functioning of these bodies. Donors were noted to be much more active than the PA, but as donors and the PA act as co-chairs, the PA has to be fully committed to participating for the LDF bodies to function effectively.

DFATD has continued to work informally with other donors in the absence of an effective dialogue within the LDF framework, especially with regard to PSD and justice sector reform. DFATD has taken a leadership role in the justice sector, maintaining a “map” of donor activities in the sector, an effort that is well appreciated by other donors active in that sector.

One donor noted that “donors coordinate well, meet frequently and compare notes” despite the coordination mechanisms’ challenges. This was confirmed by other donor representatives interviewed in the field.

At an operational level, donor coordination has taken many different forms, including complementary programming in specific areas of need. For instance, DFATD is constructing two West Bank Courthouses and the EU is funding the construction of five new courthouses and expanding another two. CIDA also partnered with other donors in specific cases to support a program approach to aid delivery, such as the UNDP Rule of Law and Access to Justice Program (with UNDP and Sweden) or the Framework Conditions project (with GIZ). It also created new mechanisms for aid delivery, as in the case of donor support to the Attorney General Office capacity development, establishing an ad hoc Subgroup of Implementing Agencies on Prosecutions.

In most cases, Canada is only one of many donors supporting HA initiatives, and success depends on how well it coordinates with other donors and organisations involved in HA delivery. Overall, those interviewed felt that Canada is supportive of efforts to strengthen donor coordination and is a regular participant in the weekly meeting of humanitarian agencies and donors. Canada also engages in multi-donor activities such as the CAP and is especially active on food security issues. Overall, Canada was described as an engaged participant in the donor coordination context, attending meetings and sharing information with counterparts. This view was shared by several interviewees from donor agencies.

At the project level, however, there were some missed opportunities for operational coordination. In the justice sector, the Karamah project ignored potential links with two other donor projects working with the community of judges, and in private sector development the Framework Conditions project was considered by some interviewees to have missed potential links with other donor projects working on reform of the business environment.

Canada’s preference for directing development assistance to specific areas did raise concerns with other donors. In relation to Canada’s decision not to fund community access (legal aid and gender rights) activities of the UNDP Rule of Law project,^{Footnote 48} another contributor noted that “we are not in favour of Canada earmarking on the justice program; the components are interrelated.” 

Humanitarian assistance programming based on the thematic priority of food security needs to be considered alongside the GHD principle of focussing on need. While to date there has been enough demand for food security assistance to fully utilize Canadian funding, and other donors who do not have a thematic approach allow their funding to be used to address demand elsewhere, there will be an ongoing need to ensure that this continues to be the case and that Canadian assistance is aligned with the GHD needs focus principle.

7.1.4 Aid Coordination with Palestinian Stakeholders

DFATD program, sector and project managers meet regularly with senior officials of the PA to discuss Canada’s programming intentions and implementation progress. The forums for these meetings include:  the various levels of aid coordination bodies; project steering committee meetings; field visits by headquarters staff; and, ad hoc meetings with local officials.

In the justice and PSD sectors, the projects developed under the current Country Development Programming Framework were all a purposeful response to articulated priority needs and were planned based on scoping missions and needs assessment that fully engaged local authorities.

HA is delivered in a context where local authorities do not have the capacity to manage the crisis on their own. This is clearly the case for the PA, which lacks control over its sources of revenue and much of the territory in which Palestinians reside. In West Bank and Gaza, the PA participates actively in the CAP, which is coordinated by OCHA and in which Canada participates. Each of the CAP documents reviewed (2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012) contains clear references to consultations with the PA and their plans and priorities.          

7.1.5 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States

The Country Development Programming Framework identifies West Bank and Gaza as a fragile state in CIDA’s Programming Activity Architecture. The West Bank and Gaza and Palestinian Refugees Program has been informed by CIDA’s October 2009 Operational Guidelines for Program Management in Acutely Fragile States and Conflict-Affected Situations, which is in turn aligned with the OECD’s Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States Situations.

The evaluation found that DFATD programming in West Bank and Gaza has generally respected these principles. The decisions to move away from one of the standard channels of aid delivery in fragile state situations (i.e. UNRWA core funding), and to no longer contribute to some others (i.e. UNICEF programming and the World Bank managed budgetary support) have reduced the flexibility of the program and affected interagency coordination.

Annex H presents a detailed analysis of program performance against the elements of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States.

7.2 Efficiency

In examining the efficiency of the program, the evaluation found that the ratios of annual operating budgets to total program expenditures varied significantly over the evaluation period. While operating and maintenance costs remained relatively constant, program disbursements varied significantly depending on circumstances. For example, disbursements in Fiscal Year (FY) 2012/2013 were less than half those of the previous year. This illustrates clearly the extent to which the relative costs of maintaining a program in an unpredictable context can be subject to influences beyond the control of the program itself. In these circumstances, assessing efficiency based on the ratio of operating costs to expenditures is potentially misleading.

A CIDA study carried out in FY 2009/2010 on costs of delivering programs in fragile state environments^{Footnote 49} showed that the West Bank and Gaza and Palestinian Refugees program was marginally more efficient than other fragile state programs in Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan. While the figures are for one year only and subject to interpretation, the findings do suggest the program’s efficiency in terms of human resource utilization has been comparable to that of other DFATD programs in fragile states.

Delivery of humanitarian assistance through the bilateral program offered opportunities to link what are normally quite separate development and humanitarian assistance programs. This helped provide operational and logical coherence to DFATD’s development and HA programming in West Bank and Gaza. Better information sharing and coordination should permit stronger linkage of humanitarian programming to development programming, and facilitate planning for transition. In the case of this program, this coordination is especially strong in the field.

Most projects were found to have been efficiently implemented. Some of the private sector organizations that were the target stakeholders in the PSD projects argued that it would be more efficient to eliminate the intermediary implementing agency and provide grants directly to them. However, CIDA’s due diligence assessments of the capacity of these local partners raised concerns at the time over potential fiduciary risk and led to the decision to work through established intermediary institutions like UNDP.

Concerns were raised by some of the HA partners who felt that working through international NGOs and agencies was much less cost effective than working directly with local organizations. They pointed out that international NGOs and UN agencies worked with local implementing partners, leading to multiple levels of overhead. Most of the same local partners, however, did concede that the UN agencies added technical value.

CIDA’s standard agreement to pay UN agencies 7% of total agreement value to cover indirect costs was applied in all such arrangements in this program. These agencies were mostly established on the ground, familiar with the context and could get the projects started relatively quickly. In most cases, partnering with UN agencies produced efficiencies in project planning and mobilization times, as well as minimized programming risks. These agencies have established systems of oversight, results-based management systems and an understanding of CIDA’s cross-cutting themes.

One issue was that while specialist organizations like UNCTAD and ITC offer high quality technical assistance, their project management capacity is limited. This resulted in significant investment of program management time in the early stages of these projects. UNDP took on the management role for the Export Development project because ITC lacked the project management capacity and experience. UNCTAD experienced a number of management related issues at the outset of the Trade Facilitation project, requiring direct intervention by CIDA to resolve and strengthen the project management side at some expense to the program.

The two university linkage projects in the program’s justice/governance portfolio were financed on a matching contribution basis, adding more than 30% to the impact of CIDA’s contributions without increasing CIDA’s costs. REEWP also benefited from contributions by Oxfam-Québec and the local partners. Canada’s two contributions to the PRDP Trust Fund can be considered highly efficient, having required a minimum of DFATD oversight and management time and an overhead paid to the World Bank for administration of the fund of 6.4%, which is well below the usual level of overheads for development projects, including those implemented by the UN and its agencies.

7.2.1 Delivery Modalities

There was insufficient variation in the delivery models, mechanisms and channels of cooperation to allow meaningful quantitative analysis. However, the experience of the program provides useful insights on some implications of the delivery channels chosen.
Faced with a situation where there were few potential partners on the ground who had the necessary technical and project management skills, the program opted for extensive use of UN agencies to deliver its programming through “multi-bi” arrangements; that is, delivery of bilateral projects using multilateral partners.

The blanket agreements normally employed between DFATD and the UN call for use of the UN’s systems and processes and limit the extent to which DFATD can exercise its own systems of accountability. As a result, the program was sometimes limited in the results related data it was able to collect, and in several cases project management issues encountered early in the projects required extensive involvement by program management with the implementing agencies to resolve.

In the case of the Courthouse Construction project, the program contracted UNOPS and UNDP using a modified form of Administrative Arrangement that would allow the exercise of direct oversight (including monitoring). Documentary and interview evidence gathered for the evaluation supports this approach as entirely appropriate for this type of project. Annex J provides greater details on the delivery modalities chosen for this program.

7.2.2 Efficiency in decision-making

The time required for approval of HA funding generally met the timeframes for the CAP, with two exceptions: the UNRWA Food Security 2009 project and a project with CARE through the 2011 UN Consolidated Appeal. This was due to the complexity of due diligence and decision-making in a fragile and conflict-affected state context, which in turn can have implications for the time required to confirm the scope and scale of contributions.

There are always shocks, last winter the crisis was winter storms, and in four days Canada had approved reallocation of $1 million – it was fast and flexible and based on an exchange of emails. When foot and mouth disease broke out in Gaza, we were able to allocate $20,000 for vaccines, so Canada is very easy to deal with as long as the needs are within the objectives of the project.

The review, prioritization, selection and due diligence process is relatively heavy for one year projects, especially when the annual program is delivered through much the same group of partners proposing much the same response to similar needs, year after year. Thus, moving to multi-year funding with partners may improve efficiency in future by reducing the number of project approvals required, together with staff time and delays occasioned by the due diligence and approval process. The program has improved efficiency by packaging their planned response to the CAP in an omnibus type submission for approval of several projects together.

Once funds had been approved, several partners noted that the program had a good record of cooperation in responding to changing HA needs quickly and flexibly.
The evaluation noted concerns regarding in-depth due diligence assessments in CIDA decision-making processes that were affecting the timing of implementation; for example in the Courthouse Construction project. 

A second efficiency issue was the requirement for the two small projects funds examined in the sample—Networking for Peace and the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI)—to send small project funding proposals to headquarters for review. Departmental limits on delegated authorities would normally allow these projects to function efficiently as a field based responsive mechanism, but in both these cases review delays sometimes amounted to months, compromising the intent and value of these types of projects and incurring additional staff time for processing.

Finally, interviewees representing all HA organizations as well as local NGOs remarked on the challenges raised by the inclusion of the mandatory Anti-Terrorism clause (ATC) in all funding agreements. This evaluation recognizes the importance of this requirement of Canadian law, however interviews revealed that insufficient communication about the clause and its application have led to inefficiencies. The frequency with which this issue was raised during the evaluation suggests that there is a need for clear communication from the outset with partners regarding the ATC requirement because of the potential for confusion and misunderstanding about its application.

7.3 Performance Management

7.3.1 Results-Based Management

The 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework contained a full logic model for the program to which project level logic models have been linked. The program level Performance Measurement Framework was designed to rely heavily on data that would be provided by partners, drawing from the various project level performance data collection exercises.

The 2009 version of the PMF was lacking in definition of most baselines and targets for the chosen performance indicators. While the PMF was used as a conceptual reference, no ongoing measurement of performance at the program level took place until 2012, when it was realized that data could not practically be gathered against some of the PMF indicators. A number of reasons were cited, such as lack of consistently available statistics; lack of institutional capacity in the PA Ministries to collect data;^{Footnote 50} and, lack of data collection by partners.

Subsequently, the PMF was revised to allow use of more available and consistent data sources. However, the 2012- 2013 Annual Country Report (ACR) (p.6) noted continuing challenges even for the revised PMF:

“Limited data continues to constrain outcome-level reporting. The revised Performance Management Framework relies on project-level reporting for most outcomes. Unfortunately, partners continue to have problems reporting on outcomes as opposed to outputs and grant arrangements limit CIDA’s ability to require them to make greater efforts in reporting results. There is also a limited amount of gender-disaggregated data.”

Baselines and outcome level targets are now provided in the updated PMF for the HA sector indicators. However, the baselines and targets for several outcome indicators still await definition. Those indicators that have been defined call for annual review but have not been reported on.

A review of project reporting in all three priority sectors suggests that, while output level reporting is sound, there continues to be little information provided on outcome level results. The main challenge to the use of RBM at the project level lies with the fact that DFATD’s RBM system is not in synch with that of the UN, which continues to employ its own system under the terms of its agencies’ various agreements with CIDA.^{Footnote 51}  As many of the program’s implementing partners are UN agencies, this has led to some challenges in ensuring the systems fit together, are used and function properly.

Documentation shows that several projects in the justice and PSD sectors approved under the 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework have taken an inordinately long time to produce acceptable Project Implementation Plans (PIP). An important part of the PIP is the definition of the RBM system and the ongoing management approach for each project. Documents and interviews suggest that there is a need to be flexible in implementing projects in such a volatile environment, consistent with the principles of working in fragile states.

7.3.2 Learning and Applying Lessons Learned

The program has exercised sector level oversight from the field. Staff maintain close relations with implementing partner agencies. In addition, officers took steps to ensure lessons learned in specific projects were shared to avoid repetition of mistakes. For example, in the case of the Courthouse Construction project, the responsible officer ensured that lessons learned during construction of the first courthouse were integrated into the second project in order to avoid the same technical and management issues.

However, the evaluation found that there have been no regular meetings convened by DFATD of executing agencies to review and discuss sector level issues, learning and best practices. Nor has the program employed external monitors at the sector level who could promote this kind of sharing.

7.3.3 Risk Management

The evaluation found that risk management is built-in to program management in a variety of ways, some of which have been mentioned in other sections of this document, including:

• Use of multiple implementing partners in Courthouse Construction to mitigate risk;
• Use of established implementing partners who are already on the ground and knowledgeable of the context;
• Working through implementing partners who have proven records in project and financial management and in risk management.

In 2012, the program began a practice of updating the program’s contingency plan (a program-initiated addition to the risk register) twice annually, with particular attention to the PA financial crisis. This is reflected in the ACR for FY 2012-2013 which noted the biannual update and recorded ongoing concerns over “both the deteriorating economic situation and the unresolved conflict with Israel. CIDA will monitor this closely.”

The evaluation found no evidence of systematic review of risk at the project level other than as an element of project steering committee meetings, where these were built-in to the project management structures. Risk management has been undertaken on an ad hoc basis and linked to such ongoing management and oversight activities as monitoring.

As for humanitarian assistance, the UN prepares scenarios and contingency plans based on program risk, because in such a volatile environment, when something goes wrong it is likely to affect several projects at the same time.

7.3.4 Monitoring

The program has relied mainly on internal resources to carry out monitoring activities, except in the justice sector, where specialized expert resources have been engaged to support the Courthouse Construction and Forensic HR and Governance projects. In these two cases, the expertise of the technical consultants has been essential to the effective management of these projects and has helped put them back on track to achieve the expected results.

Locally engaged staff in the Representative Office of Canada in Ramallah monitor projects in all three priority sectors. Headquarters staff also have the opportunity to make field visits, usually once per year, but these are too short to permit detailed monitoring. Headquarters gender and environment specialists travel to the field less frequently. Monitoring at the sector level is ongoing by program management. While there is no formal process for regular recording or reporting of results, communication on progress takes place through periodic reports from the field. Responsibilities in the field are organized along sectoral lines with dedicated Canada-based and locally engaged staff in each sector, providing coherent coverage of the sector as well as individual projects.

In both the justice and PSD sectors, program staff receive regular reporting and participate in Steering Committee meetings, providing a baseline for monitoring by dedicated staff in the Representative Office of Canada in Ramallah.

In the humanitarian assistance sector, all programming under the CAP includes a plan for performance monitoring of HA projects. HA is divided into clusters, each with an organization identified as the cluster focal point. The focal point is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the agreed strategy as described in the CAP response plan, using identified indicators and monitoring systems. As the overall coordinator of the CAP, OCHA holds regular monitoring meetings with the agencies contributing to the CAP and produces web-based monitoring reports to help the humanitarian community verify the impact of humanitarian activities on beneficiaries. This information provides a basis for reviews and evaluations of the strategy contained in the CAP strategic monitoring plan.

7.3.5 Evaluation and Follow-Up

Evaluations have been undertaken for most of the projects in the justice and PSD sectors, about evenly split between formative and summative evaluations. The evaluation found that DFATD does make use of the results of project evaluations. In all cases where project evaluations had been finalized, strategies for responding to evaluation recommendations were developed and were being followed-up.

For HA, no evaluations of individual projects had been undertaken although there are program level reviews, like the FAO’s mid-term assessment of its country level Plan of Action 2011-2013. There are also evaluations of specific initiatives such as the WFP’s review of the secondary impact of the food vouchers. Interviews and documentation show that the lessons and recommendations of these studies are feeding through to programming. The UN publishes evaluations and management responses on its websites.

The program also engaged independent consultants to undertake portfolio reviews in each priority sector in 2013. The program has indicated that it is integrating the results of these studies, including lessons learned, into the drafting of the new sector and country program strategies.

8.0 Conclusions, Lessons and Recommendations

8.1 Conclusions

The development programming context that faces DFATD in the West Bank and Gaza is politically, culturally and economically complex, with the added challenge of recurrent Israeli-Palestinian conflict and uncertainties surrounding the Middle East Peace Process.
Despite these challenges, the evidence gathered in the course of this evaluation demonstrates that Canada’s programming in West Bank and Gaza has been designed and implemented appropriately to achieve sustainable results across its three priority sectors:  justice, private sector development and humanitarian assistance.

Effectiveness

The evaluation confirmed results in all three sectors, as seen in changes in organizational structures, internal capacity and methods of functioning of Palestinian institutions. Humanitarian programming, despite its shorter planning and results horizon, is showing sustainable outcomes in building the institutional capacity of select ministries of the PA, and in increasing the resilience of Palestinians to manage shocks and emergencies that result mainly from ongoing conflict. Three caveats to this general conclusion are: 

• Outcome level results in the target institutions in the justice and PSD sectors will only be able to be assessed over a longer time frame;
• For humanitarian programming, there is an absence of information on progress against the higher level outcome targets contained in the Performance Measurement Framework, although there is evidence of output-level results achievement; and,
• Some projects will not achieve all their intended results without further adjustments.

The justice sector has achieved satisfactory results, with evidence pointing to improved capacity and functioning of rule of law institutions. However, it has also experienced shortcomings in the performance of two capital construction initiatives and will not meet the original expectations of project stakeholders in the Courthouses Construction and Forensic HR and Governance projects. Despite the open communications with stakeholders that have been maintained on these projects, the expected shortfalls are creating some risk for DFATD in a sector where it has been regarded as a leader. The situation was affected by CIDA’s need to exercise due diligence in a challenging environment for the reallocation of resources in the Courthouse project.

The PSD sector has achieved some satisfactory results. In addition to its institution building work, Canada contributed to collective efforts to address one of the PA’s most significant issues, its structural fiscal deficit. Canada made two contributions to the World Bank PRDP Trust Fund, a budgetary support mechanism allowing the PA to continue to deliver services that will (inter alia) contribute to private sector development. Canada’s contribution to this fund has been a meaningful response in an area of need, and the decision to no longer contribute has reduced its influence in policy dialogue on macroeconomic issues.

In the HA sector, the program worked with shorter time frames than those of the other two DFATD priority sectors, with different partners and within a framework of well-established international institutions and processes. Here again, the program has largely achieved its objectives and has respected the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship. Some projects have had the added benefit of contributing to institutional development within the PA. There is a move toward support for multi-year programming which would allow for longer term impacts (such as building resilience in the population), while retaining the flexibility to respond quickly to emergency needs. This area could offer opportunities for future linkages with PSD sector programming. Multi-year programming could also have the benefit of improving efficiency for DFATD programming by reducing the number and frequency of project approval processes.

Relevance

The program’s theory of change is reflected in the hierarchy of logic models at the program and project levels. Both levels link clearly with Canada’s policy objective of “contribut[ing] to the creation of a viable, independent and democratic Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel as part of a comprehensive peace settlement.”^{Footnote 52}  

The program made appropriate decisions on the level of resources devoted to the three priority sectors; the selection of implementing partners; and, the cross-sectoral coverage offered by justice and PSD projects. This internal coherence facilitated the prominence of Canadian programming with the PA and within the donor community, especially in the justice sector.

The selection of priority sectors also was relevant and consistent with the priorities and needs of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian people as set out in the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan for 2008-2010 and subsequent National Development Plans. In the justice and PSD sectors, the choice to focus on building PA institutions was appropriate in light of constitutional/legal framework challenges and the need to take a long-term view on development objectives. Humanitarian assistance programming was aligned with the UN consolidated appeal and annual integrated humanitarian assistance planning and commitment process.

Sustainability

While only half the projects in the evaluation sample were assessed as satisfactory in terms of sustainability, many of the influencing factors are outside the control of the program, such as the economic and political fragility associated with the ongoing conflict and the short duration of project cycles vis-à-vis institutional change processes. Continuity in programming directions combined with consideration for sustainability within projects will strengthen prospects for sustainability in justice and private sector development.

Cross-cutting Themes

The program has addressed the cross-cutting themes of gender equality, environmental sustainability and governance with a mixed record of success. There was emphasis on addressing gender issues in planning documents and to some extent in the implementation of justice and PSD projects. Capacity for gender programming has been strengthened in OCHA, a central humanitarian assistance agency.

However, the cultural context, limited allocation of gender equality and environment specialist resources, and possibly unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved within the project time frames have constrained gender and environment results so far. Environment received nominal attention, and there is little evidence of related results in the justice and PSD sectors, although the program complied fully with CEAA screening requirements for the Courthouse Construction project. Governance, on the other hand, has been central. It is the raison d’être for the justice portfolio and has been an important theme in the PSD sector projects, both in terms of institutional change and improving the legal and regulatory environment for business.

The HA sector faces larger challenges in integrating cross-cutting themes, given its shorter time horizon and primary focus on meeting urgent needs such as food, water, shelter and protection. That said, there are some positive indications. The program directly supported gender equality by funding related expertise in the central HA planning organization, OCHA. At the operational level, HA activities took into account gender and in some cases to environment as well.

Aid Coordination

Canada has been constructively engaged in formal and informal aid coordination bodies. It is especially recognized for its strong support to coordination in the justice sector. There are nonetheless opportunities for improved coordination between some justice and private sector development projects and other related donor initiatives.

Canada’s programming in the West Bank and Gaza has generally respected the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, and the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship. The program has worked to meet humanitarian needs that also align with the program priorities. However, in two of the ten HA projects sampled, partners noted changes in funding they had not anticipated, and as a result, they perceived a lack of predictability.

Efficiency

In general, the program was delivered efficiently in terms of use of resources. Its strong field presence and use of expert resources and dedicated staff in the three priority sectors added to its visibility and credibility in the donor community and with the Palestinian Authority. The timing of decision-making – within a complex and conflict-affected context – was noted as an issue.

There was little variety and hence basis for comparison between different delivery models and mechanisms. Considering the conditions on the ground and the program’s theory of change as reflected in the logic model, however, the evaluation was able to conclude that overall the choice of partners and therefore the delivery models and mechanisms were appropriate to the needs of the program. Delivery of humanitarian assistance through the bilateral program offered opportunities to link what are normally quite separate programs. This facilitated operational and logical coherence in DFATD’s development and HA programming in West Bank and Gaza.

Performance Management

The program’s use of RBM and related tools at the project level has been appropriate overall, despite challenges of linking up with the systems of multilateral agencies who are acting as implementing agencies for DFATD funded projects. At the program level, there are opportunities to more systematically collect information on progress toward results achievement based on the revised PMF.

8.2 Lessons

The evaluation took note of a number of lessons that can inform this program, including:

• Strengthening institutions, particularly in a fragile state context, is a long-term process that requires commitment to long-term funding.
• When implementing a management for change agenda, monitoring projects for emergent challenges, lessons learned and corrective actions has to go hand in hand with managing for results. Monitoring needs are especially high in institutional strengthening initiatives.
• When delivering a complex program in a fragile state situation, it is critical that program decision-making be as agile and timely as possible. The untimely delivery of humanitarian assistance can have consequences for beneficiaries.
• It is challenging to build government institutions, either singly or sector wide, when institutional mandates are ill defined. For instance, justice sector institution building must be accompanied by justice sector reform.
• When undertaking a highly technical project, it is important to have the proper mix of technical and managerial expertise appropriate to the needs of the project, including at least a minimum level of technical expertise within DFATD, as illustrated by the Courthouse Construction and the Forensic HR and Governance projects.
• The evaluation noted a number of instances of donor-executing agency and executing agency-client relations that could influence project results achievement depending on the quality of the relationships. Communication is also important when major changes in long-term funding relationships are planned.
• State building in fragile state situations requires extraordinary levels of donor coordination. The evaluation witnessed positive impacts of donor coordination in the UNDP Rule of Law and the Framework Conditions projects, and the negative impacts of weak donor coordination in the Karamah project.

8.3 Recommendations

The CIDA program to date has been responsive to Palestinian needs and Canadian priorities, has begun to show results, and has allowed Canada to establish itself as an influential donor and interlocutor with the PA. It should continue to support key Palestinian institutions in its priority sectors at the same time as it considers opportunities to expand its contribution in these sectors.

1. Canada has played a strong role in the justice sector, and there are opportunities to enhance sustainability of these investments. The program should take steps to ensure that adequate recurrent cost and specialist resourcing for physical facilities and institutions will be in place over the long-term. It should also consider ways to complement its support to facilities and institutions with commensurate support for Palestinians’ use of, and access to these institutions. Canada should use its strong presence in the justice sector to encourage inter-institutional cooperation within the PA at the operational level, until amendment of the Judicial Authority Law more formally clarifies roles and responsibilities.

2. Achievements to date in Private Sector Development (PSD) similarly offer a foundation on which to build future programming. The enabling environment for business and related institutional structures remain fragile and in need of strengthening. Consideration should also be given to more direct competitiveness initiatives with Palestinian businesses.

3. The program’s management of humanitarian assistance should continue to respect the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship, including neutrality, focus on need, timeliness, and predictability of funding. Making sure that adopting a thematic priority is managed consistently with the principle of needs-based allocation, and that decision-making is within required consolidated appeal time frames, will support flexible and responsive action on identified humanitarian needs. As well, there is a particular opportunity in West Bank and Gaza to address longer term resilience of populations in the event of disaster, and Canada should look for opportunities to step up joint efforts already begun with the donor community to make this an integral part of HA programming.

4. There are particular challenges to fully integrating the themes of gender and environment in the West Bank, Gaza and Palestinian Refugee Program. The program has given these themes appropriate emphasis in the Country Development Programming Framework, and is now positioned to place greater emphasis on operational implementation. Building on the foundations laid in existing projects, the program should increase its attention (and human resources, if necessary) to more complete integration of gender and environment at program and project levels.

5. The program should ensure that clear and detailed guidance is provided to staff and partners on the application of the Anti-Terrorism Clause (ATC).

6. The program has taken steps to improve its Performance Measurement Framework (PMF) but should work with implementing partners to consolidate the links that have been lacking between project level results and reporting systems and the program PMF, especially at the outcome level. This will make annual reporting a more meaningful and useful exercise to both program and project managers. As well, the program should consider working with partners and other donors to improve data collection and outcome reporting for gender and environment.

7. There is scope for greater information sharing and coherence in the field between peace and security, development, and trade programs. DFATD should ensure that its West Bank and Gaza field operations have effective practices in place for inter-program coordination and synergy.

Annex A – Summary Terms of Reference

Evaluation Documents: The TORs called for the evaluation team to be guided by and take into account a number of specific documents applicable to this evaluation, including the following:

• Department international aid effectiveness commitments, including the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008);
• The emerging international consensus on development cooperation (e.g. Millennium Development Goals);
• DFATD’s key steps to implement the Aid Effectiveness Agenda, launched in 2011 (i.e. greater focus, effectiveness and accountability);
• DFATD’s Development Evaluation Policy and related Directive;
• OECD DAC’s Evaluation Quality Standards for Development Evaluation;
• TB Policy on Evaluation (2009) and accompanying Directive and Standard;
• OECD DAC Network on Development Evaluation guidance on Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility;
• OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations; and Canada’s related Operational Guidelines for Program Management in Acutely Fragile States and Conflict-Affected Situations;
• OECD DAC Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship.

Evaluation Purpose and Objectives: The purpose for conducting the Evaluation of DFATD development and humanitarian assistance programming in West Bank and Gaza is to satisfy the Canadian Government reporting requirements as well as to contribute to learning for policy and program improvement, specifically:

• To provide an evidence-based neutral assessment of development and humanitarian assistance in West Bank and Gaza from FY 2008-2009 to 2012-2013 to the Canadian public, Parliamentarians, Ministers, Central Agencies, DFATD’s Deputy Minister of International Development and management, partners and beneficiaries;
• To contribute to informed decision-making and support policy and program improvement by helping to identify lessons learned and best practices.

The Consultant’s objectives in conducting the DFATD evaluation of development and humanitarian assistance programming in West Bank and Gaza are:

• To assess the development and humanitarian results achieved by Canada in West Bank and Gaza between FY 2008/-2009 and 2012/-2013 based on established criteria for development assistance (relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, management principles, performance management as well as cross-cutting issues of gender equality, environmental sustainability and governance);
• To assess the extent to which the design, delivery and management of the DFATD development programming in West Bank and Gaza aligns with the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations;
• To assess the extent to which the design, delivery and management of the DFATD humanitarian assistance programming in West Bank and Gaza aligns with the Principles and Practices of Good Humanitarian Donorship;
• To assess the performance and results of DFATD’s various delivery mechanisms for development and humanitarian assistance in the West Bank and Gaza, including partnership with civil society organizations, bilateral programs, local funds and grants to multilateral organizations in a Whole-of-Department process;
• To identify good practices, areas for improvement and formulate lessons learned and develop these into recommendations for improvements at the Corporate and Program levels; and,
• To inform future development and humanitarian assistance programming in West Bank and Gaza and other fragile states, including the development of a new Program Strategy by the West Bank, Gaza and Palestinian Refugee Program of the Geographic Programs Branch (GPB).

Evaluation Audience:  The intended audiences for this evaluation include:

• Canadians, DFATD’s Deputy Minister of International Development and DFATD’s management;
• Other government departments and agencies;
• The Palestinian Authority;
• Partner NGOs and other development agencies working with Canada in West Bank and Gaza.

Evaluation Scope:  The evaluation will cover a period of five years, from FY 2008-2009 to FY 2012-2013. This period was guided by the 2009 West Bank and Gaza and Palestinian Refugees program Strategy (CPS) and the 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework (CDPF). Selected key legacy projects, approved before Canada’s 2007 commitment and continuing to disburse funding during the period under review may also be included in the projects sample.

The 2012 corporate evaluation of DFATD’s International Humanitarian Assistance examined humanitarian assistance delivered by Multilateral and Global Partnerships Branch in West Bank and Gaza. As such, the Consultant will not examine MGPB/IHA funding in this evaluation. The Consultant will however, build upon the findings of the 2012 IHA evaluation. Specifically, the Consultant will examine humanitarian assistance delivered by GPB.

The Consultant will assess the three sectors of focus of the development and humanitarian assistance programming in West Bank and Gaza, namely:

• (1) justice sector reform;
• (2) private sector development; and
• (3) humanitarian assistance, with a focus on food security and children and youth.

In addition, the Consultant will assess the program’s three crosscutting themes of gender equality, environmental sustainability and governance.

This evaluation will not focus on programming areas that represented less than 10% of disbursements, such as improving health, strengthening basic education, peace and security and environment.

The methodology for this evaluation will be adjusted to take into account the following:

• DFATD’s channels of cooperation for development and humanitarian assistance (i.e. bilateral, multilateral, partnership);
• DFATD’s different delivery approaches for development and humanitarian assistance (e.g. directive and responsive) and investment modalities (e.g. projects, programs, program-based approaches, pooled funding, trust funds); and,
• The range of executing agencies (e.g. firms, multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations).

Evaluation Approach and Methodology:  The evaluation will cover program-level activities as well as a review of a purposive sample of specific projects, using different indicators and sources of information at each level. No recommendations will be made for specific projects. The evaluation will rely largely on secondary sources of information, including previously completed project level evaluations.

The evaluation will rely on review of available documentation, individual and group interviews, and visits to projects and institutions in the field. Use of case studies may be considered.

The Evaluation Team will consist of three (3) senior evaluators with one individual designated as the Team Leader (TL), and two (2) local Consultants. The Consultant will report to the DFATD Development Evaluation Division.

Annex B – Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation’s primary point of reference was the Canadian International Development Agency’s (CIDA) Operational Guidelines for Program Management in Acutely Fragile States and Conflict-Afflicted Situations.^{Footnote 53}  This document was the principal source of guidance to the program during the evaluation period. It describes itself as being “consistent in spirit” with the OECD DAC’s Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations.^{Footnote 54}  At the heart of both these sets of guidelines is the commitment to state building, conflict prevention and peace building.

In carrying out the evaluation, bearing in mind best practices for evaluating development programming in failed and fragile states,^{Footnote 55} the evaluators took the approach of:

• Trying their best to do no harm;
• When assessing results achievement, being sensitive to the limited control the Palestinian Authority is able to exercise within its borders;
• Paying attention to the promotion of accountability and learning as well as to results achievement;
• Being sensitive to the challenges to planning and delivering development assistance that relate specifically to the West Bank and Gaza context of limited Palestinian Authority jurisdiction over its territory;
• Developing and using an evaluation design matrix and data collection protocols appropriate to the West Bank and Gaza context; and,
• Being as inclusive as possible in the judgments that it heard and as balanced as possible in its assessment of them.

The evaluation employed three main sources of information to build its lines of evidence:

1. Document reviews covering key planning, reporting, review and evaluation documents for the program as a whole and for each project in the sample, contextual documents providing analysis and history of the regional context for development programming, and documents addressing the special needs of programming and evaluation in the context of fragile states (see Annex E for a full list of documents consulted);
2. Individual and group interviews in Canada with 20 DFATD development staff including specialist advisors, 3 DFATD foreign affairs staff and 3 representatives of Justice Canada both prior to and following the field mission (see Annex F for list of interviewees);
3. A three week long field mission that included semi-structured interviews with 19 representatives of the Canadian development program, political and Department of National Defence (DND) field staff addressing program and project level questions. The evaluators also conducted formal interviews with 99 representatives of partner organizations, project beneficiaries, international agencies, the donor community, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), universities and media,^{Footnote 56} as well as with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and staff of the Representative Office of Canada in Ramallah (ROC). In addition, four site visits were made during the course of the field mission, affording the opportunity to meet with partner institution program delivery staff and beneficiaries.

To provide the basis for field level analysis, the evaluation followed a purposive sampling approach to select 25 projects for more detailed review out of an inventory of 88 projects in the program portfolio for the period under consideration, representing $272,634,530 in disbursements. Of the 88, 25 projects were legacy projects approved prior to articulation of the 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework but for which significant disbursements occurred during the evaluation period.

The sample focused mainly on the three priority sectors for the program—humanitarian assistance (HA), justice sector reform and private sector development (PSD) or sustainable economic growth (SEG)—and covered 64% of the total program disbursements, including 45.7% of total HA disbursements, 98.1% of justice sector disbursements and 98.3% of those in the private sector development (PSD) component of the program. Four projects were chosen to allow examination of alternate delivery models and approaches; two were examples of cooperation with Canadian universities, and two were small project funds administered from the field. Together, the sample projects represented a cross section of the project delivery modalities, mechanisms and channels employed by the program.

Figure 2. Sample vs. Overall Program Disbursements ($100 million)

Based on the information collected through the three main sources, the evaluation conducted analyses at the program, sector and project levels. Assessment grids were completed for each sector and project in the sample, scoring performance against the evaluation criteria and indicators set out in the Evaluation Matrix. Scoring was done on a qualitative scale provided by DFATD Development Evaluation Division (see Annex G for the summary of scoring results and the detailed definition of the scale). The evaluation undertook a collective scoring exercise at the start of this process to ensure a common understanding of criteria and comparability of ratings. The project level assessments were rolled up and supplemented by additional data to develop the sector and program level assessments.

Based on this approach the evaluation was able to develop findings and conclusions based on multiple sources. Debriefings were held with ROC staff and with program staff at headquarters on conclusion of the field mission to provide an opportunity for the program to give preliminary feedback to the evaluators on their findings.

Annex C – Program Logic Model

Annex D – List of Sample Projects Reviewed

Annex E – List of Documents Reviewed

---. (2005). An Overview of Canadian Capacity in International Legal and Judicial Reform Programming.

Al-Botmeh, Reem. (2012). A Review of Palestinian Legislation from a Women's Rights Perspective. UNDP Rule of Law and Access to Justice Programme, United Nations Development Programme.

Biron Hudon, Gabrielle. (2013). Evaluation Background Profile: CIDA’s Programmes in West Bank and Gaza (FY 2008-09 to 2012-13). Evaluation Directorate, Strategic Policy and Performance Branch—CIDA.

Canadian International Development Agency. (1996). CIDA’s Policy for Performance Review.

Canadian International Development Agency. (2006). Guidelines for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Project Proposals and Reports.

Canadian International Development Agency. (2008). Contribution Agreement for the Project on Judicial Independence and Human Dignity.

Canadian International Development Agency. (2009). Amendment to UNRWA 2009 Emergency Appeal project to include 2010 expenses.

Canadian International Development Agency. (December 2009). Country Development Programming Framework (CDPF) 2009-2014:  West Bank and Gaza and Palestinian Refugees Program.

Canadian International Development Agency. (2009). Grant Arrangement between CIDA and UNRWA, West Bank & Gaza 2009 Emergency Appeal

Canadian International Development Agency. (2009). Operational Guidelines for Programme Management in Acutely Fragile States and Conflict-Affected Situations.

Canadian International Development Agency. (2009). Project Approval Memo, UNRWA West Bank & Gaza 2009 Emergency Appeal (Omnibus including this project as one of 5 under option 3, recommended for approval), Signed March 26, 2009.

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Annex F – List of People Interviewed

Numbers next to person indicate that more than one interview was conducted with that person.

Total Interviewees: 139
Total Interviews: 145

Annex G – Summary of Project Ratings

Project scoring was done on a qualitative scale provided by DFATD Development Evaluation Division. The evaluation team undertook a collective scoring exercise at the start of this process to ensure a common understanding of criteria and comparability of ratings. The project level assessments were rolled up and supplemented by additional data to develop the sector and program level assessments.

Scoring schedule:

HS = Highly Satisfactory—meets all evaluation indicators for the given criterion

S = Satisfactory—meets most evaluation indicators for the given criterion

N = Neither Satisfactory nor Unsatisfactory—mixed results observed

U = Unsatisfactory—does not meet most of the evaluation indicators for the given criterion

HU = Highly Unsatisfactory—does not meet any of the evaluation indicators for the given criterion

NA = Not Applicable—no rating, criterion does not apply

Annex H – Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States

The following table provides a detailed analysis of the program’s ratings against CIDA’s October 2009 Operational Guidelines for Program Management in Acutely Fragile States and Conflict-Affected Situations, which is in turn aligned with the OECD’s Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States Situations. See Annex B for more details on the methodology.

Annex I – Principles and Good Practices of Humanitarian Donorship

The following table provides a detailed analysis of the program’s ratings against each component of the Principles and Good Practices of Humanitarian Donorship.

Annex J – Delivery Modalities

Delivery Models and Mechanisms

In the sample portfolio, eight of ten HA projects were delivered through UN agencies, as were three of four non-legacy justice sector projects and two of the three “flagship” PSD sector projects. One major project (Sharaka) used Justice Canada, a partner with which CIDA had worked in other programs, as the implementing agent. No private sector organizations were directly engaged to deliver projects. Four were carried out with NGOs as partners (two HA projects with CARE and two regional or global projects through Oxfam-Québec). Two (legacy) projects were with Universities and two were locally administered.

UN agencies with which Canada worked had an established presence on the ground, an understanding of the complex local political, social and development context and reliable reputations for program delivery. They were also familiar with and working in the priority sectors defined in the 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework. The other consideration that weighed in this choice of partners was the need for efficient (i.e., relatively fast) ways of contracting in order to be able to meet the funding commitments made by Canada at the 2007 Paris conference. CIDA had well established methods of contracting with UN organizations, offering an opportunity for expeditious response and more efficient use of CIDA resources.

Delivery Models

As defined by the data set provided to the evaluation, of the 25 projects in the sample, 23 were classified as responsive and two as directive. In reality, several projects could better be described as “responsive/directive”, where the program was defining the broad parameters of a project and leaving the partner to develop the details. The Sharaka project, implemented by Justice Canada, is an example, as is the Forensic HR and Governance project. In the PSD sector, examples include the Capacity Building for Export Development and Trade Facilitation projects.

The two Directive projects were the CFLI (which is implemented by DFATD and really functions on a responsive basis at the sub-project level) and the Courthouse Construction project. With regard to the latter, DFATD normally works with UN Agencies through simple Administrative Arrangements that conform to the general conditions (including reporting requirements) of a blanket contracting arrangement negotiated with the UN. In the case of the Courthouse Construction project, the program negotiated within CIDA to be able to contract with UNOPS and UNDP to act as implementing agencies using a modified form of Administrative Arrangement that deviated from the normal form of UN contracting. This was done to ensure the projects could be subject to the kind of oversight (including monitoring), reporting and accountability arrangements this type of project normally demands. The request to use the amended form of agreement deviated from the usual practice, but the evaluation found this to be necessary to ensure the required level of accountability. Robust DFATD oversight of the Courthouse Construction and Forensic HR and Governance projects (for example, in the form of independent technical monitoring) has proven both warranted and useful.

It further illustrates the major issue with “responsive/ directive” projects, borne out by the experience of this program. The program invested significant time and funds in developing a coherent strategy, consisting of a number of highly complementary areas of opportunity within each of the three well defined priority sectors. To be able to direct the program in a way that allows it to be accountable, the bilateral desk has to be able at least to define the expected results of the “core” strategic projects, especially in the non-HA sectors. These are the ones, mostly implemented in partnership with UN agencies, which would largely fall into the “responsive/directive” category.

The program also needs to be able to rely on systems of monitoring and reporting that meet the needs and coverage of DFATD’s own RBM systems. And finally, it needs to be able to exercise its own independent oversight function without restriction. However, the blanket agreements normally employed between DFATD and the UN bodies call for use of UN’s systems and processes and limit the extent to which DFATD can exercise its customary level of accountability.  This is true even in the case of projects like Courthouse Construction or Forensic HR and Governance that could be implemented using partners engaged through CIDA controlled contracting or contribution agreements. These challenges were acknowledged in the ACR for 2011-2012 which noted:  “grant arrangements limit CIDA’s ability to require partners to make greater efforts in reporting results.”

A special subset of these issues arose in respect of the PSD sector programming, where the intent to contract with members of the UN “family” who were not resident or necessarily familiar with the local context created its own problems. In the case of the Capacity Development for Trade Facilitation project, UNCTAD was qualified but it rapidly became apparent that it did not possess the project management approach or capacity required to properly manage this project in the field. Its centralized approach caused extensive delays in the beginning and, ultimately, the requirement for high level intervention by the CIDA program to put the project back on the rails. The preferred partner for implementation of the Export Development project, the International Trade Centre (ITC), declined to manage that project, requiring UNDP to be brought in to take on this role with ITC providing specialist technical assistance. This complicated relationships and raised a number of questions about efficiency and accountability over the life of the project.

This problem was not an issue for HA programming, where there is a much greater consensus on accountability arrangements, a clear collective vision of what assistance is required and good coordination across the donor community. There is no formal process of calls for proposals from HA partners, as projects and partners are proposed via the CAP.

Delivery Mechanisms

The data set is unclear about the choice of delivery mechanisms in many cases. At least one of the sample projects is miscoded and many have been left uncoded. The evaluation analysis was therefore based on the reading of the files.

In light of the heavy reliance on UN agencies as implementing partners in all three priority sectors, it is obvious that most of the projects with the various UN agencies would be classified as “multi-bi”, or channeling of bilateral funds through multilateral partners. Multi-bi projects comprised over 71% of the portfolio, and 96% of HA programming.  

The balance of the portfolio consisted of:

• Program-Based Approaches representing 11% of disbursements and comprising the two contributions to the World Bank managed multi-donor Trust Funds;
• The bilateral responsive mechanism accounted for 5.5% of funds disbursed (one HA project in the sample);
• Partnership with Canadians Branch (PWCB) responsive programming accounted for 3.1%;
• Two “other government” projects with Justice Canada and the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) made up 6.6% of the value of funds disbursed; and,
• CFLI projects, program support activities and small grants.

There was insufficient variety in the mechanisms employed by the program to allow for meaningful comparison of the mechanisms by the evaluation.

Channels of Cooperation

All of the justice and PSD sector projects in the evaluation sample except one were delivered through Geographic Programs Branch. One project—REEWP—was delivered through the regional rather than the bilateral program. This was found to be a relevant and successful project in terms of achievement of intended results (see section 3), at least insofar as the West Bank part of the project was concerned, even though it had minimal operational links with the bilateral program and was entirely separately planned.

PWCB projects that related to West Bank and Gaza tended to be global programs with local elements, like the OQ Volunteers Program that was included in the sample. There were a small number of multilateral projects funded in the region early in the evaluation period (9 projects in the data set representing 3% of disbursements), but in recent years these were limited to support to the ICRC.

In terms of categories of partners, the benefits and challenges of working with UN agencies have been well documented elsewhere in this report. Two NGO partners were involved in three of the sample projects:  CARE (an HA project, Assistance to Small Farmers) and Oxfam-Québec (REEWP and OQ Volunteers). All three projects were found to havesatisfactorily achieved their intended results. Both university projects (MMEP II and Karamah) experienced relationship issues between DFATD and the responsible academic institution. Based on an examination of the files, the evaluation attributes this in part to the differences between university and government cultures, and in part to the fact that the universities saw what they were about as a long-term endeavor, while DFATD understood that its funding was to be directed to a fixed term project.

Annex K – Additional Questions

Provision of Humanitarian Assistance by the Bilateral Program

In all other bilateral programs where Canada has both humanitarian and development programming the two are completely separate; the IHA Directorate manages humanitarian programming and the Bilateral Branches manage development programming. Although the Haiti and Afghanistan bilateral programs have handled humanitarian programming in the past, currently the West Bank and Gaza and Palestinian Refugees program is the only bilateral program that manages both within its Country Development Programming Framework. The evaluation undertook some comparison of these approaches.

Whether IHA management or bilateral management is a better option may depend, in part, on the nature of the humanitarian crisis. In a rapid onset disaster, the larger number of dedicated human resources and faster approval process of IHA could be critical in responding quickly. However, there is an emerging consensus among humanitarian actors that protracted conflicts like that in West Bank and Gaza tend to induce crises by undermining resilience.

In this situation it may be important to have the larger budget and longer time frame allowed by the bilateral program in order to do more programming in building resilience and emergency preparedness. This would ensure the necessary local capacity is built up to address repeated disasters and help reduce the need for future humanitarian assistance. The bilateral program may also be well placed to address transition financing, which is increasingly recognized as important in protracted emergencies. The growing importance being placed by the donor community on resilience and livelihoods programming for HA indicates that this is occurring in the West Bank and Gaza.

Although there are few examples of coordination between humanitarian and development programming, as HA moves into resilience and livelihoods there will be more scope for such coordination to take place. For example, in 2010-2011 the CFLI funded a project under which a local NGO helped women with beekeeping providing equipment inputs, training and so on. Field staff involved in Sustainable Economic Growth (SEG) visited the project to learn more about it and they have included what they learned in a larger SEG program for income generation. In contrast, the 2012 CIDA corporate evaluation of humanitarian assistance found that “except for particular instances, humanitarian and development programming are generally implemented in silos both at headquarters and in the field”, although it noted that IHA had made efforts to improve its outreach to the field.^{Footnote 60}  The current evidence indicates that the West Bank and Gaza program has moved beyond these silos identified in the HA evaluation.

In most bilateral programs, field staff do not have a clear mandate for humanitarian programming, and this limits information flows and DFATD’s ability to participate effectively in coordination activities and policy dialogue. Given the size of the HA portfolio in West Bank and Gaza, having experienced HA staff on the ground has provided an important element of coordination between the two types of programming.

As noted in Annex I, using a thematic priority (or sector of focus) to guide HA programming is not automatically aligned with the GHD principle of needs focus. In the case of the West Bank and Gaza program, food security has nonetheless been a relevant need throughout the period evaluated.

The program has pursued several strategies to address food security ranging from food aid to working with women’s groups, farmers and herders on building sustainable livelihoods. Canada is known to be engaged in food security, and other donors know that Canada will allocate significant funds toward this in the consolidated appeal. Other donors are also known to fund certain areas. However, several interviewees representing other donors and implementing agencies expressed concern that Canada does not have the flexibility to allocate funds based strictly on humanitarian need, especially in cases when only the food security part of a project is funded, potentially leaving some other needs unmet.

Humanitarian Assistance and Development

IHA manages the balance of DFATD’s humanitarian assistance, both in programming countries, where integration of development and humanitarian programming is possible and in countries that are not countries of focus or modest presence, where integration would not be possible. Given the communication and coordination difficulties noted above, there are very few examples of the integration of humanitarian and development programming in either DFATD countries of focus or modest presence. In West Bank and Gaza, the bilateral program is managing both, which as noted above should create greater opportunities for synergies, although few have emerged as yet.

The need to rebuild local capacity and avoid creating dependency on emergency assistance has been discussed for years, as has the gap between relief and development programming. This is a particularly important concern in the West Bank and Gaza, which is one of the most aid dependent countries in the world^{Footnote 61} and which has been embedded in a protracted crisis for over sixty years.

Current thinking^{Footnote 62} rejects the idea that relief and development are part of a continuum, which encouraged the idea of a linear movement from one to the other as the situation stabilized on the ground. It is now accepted that relief and development should be implemented simultaneously and this thinking is being implemented in the West Bank and Gaza, where the UN has both a Common Humanitarian Action Plan and a UN Development Action Plan, and where funding for recovery and livelihoods activities is happening at the same time as emergency aid.

Humanitarian funding in the area shows that the balance between recovery and emergency funding ebbs and flows with the situation on the ground. The same balance is apparent in Canadian funding, although the trend is clearly toward more resilience funding. HA funding consumed about two thirds of the annual program budget and development programming a bit more than one third. This balance has shifted from year to year. However, it is likely in the right ball park given the complex context, recurrent humanitarian needs that change with the ebb and flow of the crisis and limited absorptive capacity of Palestinian partners. When violence flares, as in 2009, the space for development programming contracts but there is greater need for humanitarian assistance.

Whole-of-Government

The whole-of-government approach has several objectives, referred to in various parts of the West Bank and Gaza 2009-2014 Country Development Programming Framework:  to ensure the overall objectives of the Canadian government are met; to ensure Canadian representatives speak with a common voice in support of Canadian government policy; and to add value to the respective programming of the different components of Canadian government active in WBG through ongoing sharing of information. Among other functions, related activities and coordination should serve to strengthen Canada’s presence at key dialogue tables.

CIDA’s 2009 West Bank and Gaza Country Strategy takes the position that the whole-of-government approach “is not based on formal structures, but successfully relies on a high degree of cooperation among Canadian government departments and agencies at both the working and official levels at headquarters and in the field” (p.3). As this suggests, the development program has had varying levels of communication and engagement with other government players working in West Bank and Gaza:  some limited and infrequent (as with Department of National Defence (DND) and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)), and some very close (like the link with Justice Canada as an implementing partner).

At headquarters, the program has had informal and ad hoc but ongoing relations with the Foreign Affairs side of the Department, including START. These links have been needs based, convening around issues or opportunities rather than taking the form of regularly scheduled consultations. The so far unstructured approach has been effective in keeping communications channels open; however, some interviewees express the hope that these relationships might become closer now that the DFATD departmental integration process is well under way. Given the different nature of their respective mandates in West Bank and Gaza, relationships with DND and the RCMP have been less close, existing mainly in the context of larger meetings convened by other stakeholder departments.

Closer relations in the field have offered more direct possibilities both for improving the performance of the development program and for bringing leverage derived from the development program’s relationships and complementary activities to bear on other Canadian engagements. Interviews suggest that the activities in which other Canadian departments are engaged can provide useful operational insights and contacts that could reinforce justice sector development activities, and vice-versa.

Justice and security are key to the Canadian government’s stability and development objectives in West Bank and Gaza. Canada’s overall engagement in the justice sector is relatively transparent to Palestinians, who do not differentiate between, for example, Canadian support to renovation of the Ramallah prison (supported through START) and the development program’s courthouses and forensics lab projects. Given the challenges in maintaining donor coordination and the Representative Office of Canada in Ramallah’s visibility in the formal coordination mechanisms of the justice sector, the development program can play a very important role in representing the full spectrum of Canadian activity. This is especially true as the START program considers an evolution from its (mainly) policing and justice base into new areas of engagement that are complementary to development initiatives, subject to approval of ongoing START programming.^{Footnote 63}

Even when they were separate entities, the former DFAIT and CIDA worked together in the field to preserve the perception of Canada as a single intervener across the justice and security sector, despite having different mandates and time horizons.^{Footnote 64}  At an operational level, development program field staff have been called upon to help monitor START projects while they conducted their own field visits.  

The field mechanisms for interdepartmental cooperation fall under the direction and management of the leadership of the Representative Office of Canada in Ramallah. Interviews in the field revealed that interdepartmental meetings have not always taken place on a regular basis and that this has led to some concern that opportunities may have been lost or time wasted. The program may wish to encourage the regularization of these meetings in the interests of ensuring that development activities can take full advantage of the range of information available from the Canadian presence in West Bank and Gaza.

The decision to deliver Canadian support to strengthening the Palestinian Prosecution Service using another Canadian government department has proven effective. While START programming has focused mainly on infrastructure development in the areas of prisons, for example, on supporting the Quartet dialogue process and on supporting the security reform work of Operation PROTEUS, former CIDA programming has focused on strengthening prosecution, criminal investigation, judicial, court and justice sector administration. This complementarity has been a good fit in ensuring broad coverage across the justice system.

It should be noted that although it is focused mainly on security, the START program also provides funding for the Quartet office, including support for a technical advisor in the finance area. This is potentially an important link to the SEG/PSD theme of the development program and would be an important element of field level coordination.

Only one PSD sector project offered opportunity for working with other Canadian government departments and this was very limited. Consultations took place internally in CIDA and with DFAIT prior to submission of the PRDP Trust Fund projects for approval. There is no record of similar consultations having taken place with other Canadian government departments for the three “flagship” projects. In these cases the choice of implementing partners—two UN agencies and GIZ—limited the opportunities for engagement of Canadian expertise. As the program evolves, however, there may be possibilities to engage, for example, the DFATD Trade Commissioner service (which is quite active in Israel); Industry Canada (which has broad experience with framework conditions for trade facilitation); Agriculture Canada in addressing food safety and sanitary and phytosanitary standards; and possibly Export Development Corporation, whose experience with export financing and risk management could be relevant to further development of Palestinian exports.

While DFAIT, CIDA, DND, and the RCMP have all been active in the West Bank and Gaza, this is a protracted crisis which has not called on any of the available whole-of-government mechanisms for managing emergency assistance. At the level of individual humanitarian responses, the desk consults with IHA, and on some occasions with the former DFAIT, but there is little evidence that other government departments are involved.

For HA programming, CIDA and DFAIT also used to coordinate on Canada’s humanitarian positions, where they discussed issues regarding multilateral partners and communicated this information in annual policy discussions with the partners, with more or less success depending on the partner. However, this activity is not part of IHA’s current mandate, nor does it seem to be the responsibility of the bilateral desk, which may be problematic for organizations like UNRWA, where the desk has responsibility for the relationship.  

Annex L – Management Response

Preamble to Recommendations

The CIDA program to date has been responsive to Palestinian needs and Canadian priorities, has begun to show results, and has allowed Canada to establish itself as an influential donor and interlocutor with the PA. It should continue to support key Palestinian institutions in its priority sectors at the same time as it considers opportunities to expand its contribution in these sectors.

DFATD introduction to Management Response

DFATD’s West Bank and Gaza Development Program appreciates the opportunity presented by the evaluation for an in-depth review and for constructive comments that will shape the program’s future directions. DFATD agrees that the West Bank and Gaza Development Program has made substantial progress, even if it is not to the ambitious level of achievement initially envisaged in 2009. DFATD intends to build on this progress by maintaining its focus on priority sectors – i.e. justice, sustainable economic growth, and humanitarian assistance (including food security) – within the limits of its assigned budget, and within the constraints imposed by a complex context. Projects funded by DFATD will continue to involve key Palestinian organizations. Undertaking policy dialogue between DFATD, the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian organizations, and other donors and partner organizations in these sectors will continue to be a key component of DFATD’s programming approach.

This management response reflects the departmental priorities as expressed at the end of the evaluation period. Going forward, management responses will reflect new Departmental priorities as they evolve.