Evaluation of the Canadian Police Arrangement and the International Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Program

August 2017

List of Tables and Figures

• Table 1: IPP Program Funding 2011/12 to 2015/16. 3
• Table 2: Average Deployment Number Broken Down by Affiliation per FY.. 4
• Table 3: IPP 2015 Evaluation Interview Breakdown by Department 7
• Table 4: Number of Missions and Deployments per FY.. 12
• Table 5: IPP Program positions at RCMP HQ 1 . 44
• Table 6: Average Number of RCMP HQ Support Staff (FTEs) & Total Salary Dollars per FY.. 45
• Table 7: Activity and Staffing with Total Percentage of IPP Program Funds Spent per FY.. 46
• Table 8: RCMP A-Base Funds and Incremental Costs per FY.. 47
• Table 9: Forecasts and Actual Costs of Missions of Focus per FY.. 49
• Table 10: Forecasts and Actual Costs of RCMP HQ Support Staff 50
• Table 11: Forecasts and Actual Costs of Rapid Deployment Capacity 51
• Table 12: ODA and Non-ODA portions of the IPP Program.. 52
• Figure 1: Evaluation Interview Breakdown by Categories. 7
• Figure 2: Percentage of Female Officers Deployed through the IPP Program (March 2011-March 2015) 33

Acronyms and Symbols

Acknowledgements

The evaluation team would like to extend its appreciation to the many individuals and organizations who agreed to participate in the interviews, both in-person and by telephone. A number of people in Canada and abroad graciously gave their time and identified additional sources. The participants included: RCMP police officers, RCMP personnel, public servants, deployed police officers from provincial/municipal police forces, representatives from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), Heads of Mission both for Canadian embassies and European Union (EU) peacekeeping missions and other non-governmental stakeholders. Also, we would like to thank representatives from likeminded countries who shared their perspectives regarding police deployments to peacekeeping operations.

Executive Summary

Background

The International Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations (IPP) Program has deployed more than 3,800 police officers in more than 30 countries. IPP deployments are comprised of Canadian police officers from the RCMP as well as from provincial/municipal police partners. The IPP Program is guided by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) entitled the Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA) that outlines the managerial and accountability relationship between the three Partners involved in the IPP Program: Global Affairs Canada (GAC); Public Safety Canada (PS); and, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The goal of the IPP Program is to support Canada’s commitment to build a more secure world through police participation in international peace operations.

In accordance to the Treasury Board of Canada’s Policy on Evaluation (2009), the respective evaluation sections of these Partner departments conduct the evaluation for the IPP Program. The evaluation covers a period of four fiscal years from April 1, 2011 to March 31, 2015.

Key Findings

Finding 2: The IPP Program considered the needs and priorities of missions. Notwithstanding the political and security sensitivities, there are examples where the Program was limited in its ability to meet the needs of mission.

Finding 3: Anecdotally, the Program referenced domestic benefits to Canada as a result of its participation to CPA missions. The most frequently identified domestic benefit to Canada was the skills that Canadian police officers either acquired and/or enhanced.

Finding 5: The IPP Program complemented the Government of Canada’s and the international community’s approach to fragile and conflict affected states. However, there is still room to improve coherence by enhancing synergies and increasing coordination in similar thematic areas.

Finding 7: The IPP Program has developed performance measurement tools to track, monitor and report on deployment activities and outputs. However, the tools were not consistently used to report on performance nor were they directly aligned with the outcomes in the CPA logic model.

Finding 8: While the IPP Program has contributed to the achievement of results under its immediate and intermediate outcomes, the extent to which they were met could not be measured as there was a lack of performance information. In particular, this was evident in the outcomes of strengthened judicial systems and domestic benefits.

Finding 11: Deployed Canadian police officers contributed to gender initiatives to promote the participation and protection of women in the affected areas. However, there was limited evidence to suggest that gender is strategically taken into consideration in mission selection criteria, planning and implementation.

Finding 15: The IPP Program has numerous reporting requirements. The reports generated are not consistently produced nor do they indicate planned results and overall impact.

Finding 16: The number of IPP Program support positions classified and staffed at RCMP headquarters has fluctuated below the authorized 54 FTEs. Based on the ratio of 3:1 between operational personnel in mission to headquarters support staff, the Program was understaffed in relation to the number of deployments in 2011/12 and 2012/13, and overstaffed in 2013/14 and 2014/15.

Finding 20: Lessons learned were captured inconsistently in IPP Program documents and there was limited evidence that these were routinely incorporated into on-going and future missions.

Recommendation #1 The IPP Program should strengthen and streamline its performance measurement and reporting tools to consistently capture outcomes and lessons learned at both the mission and program level. In particular, the CPA performance information should be revised to reflect and further define expected results under the thematic areas of gender, judicial reform and domestic benefits.

Recommendation #2 CPA Partners should update and implement operational and guidance documents in order to:

• increase flexibility of deployments and develop guidance that strengthens the IPP Program’s ability to address the needs of the police force in the fragile or conflict affected states;
• consistently reflect all considerations and apply the tools that support the mission selection process;
• satisfy and streamline the reporting requirements at all levels;
• increase communication regarding IPP deployments with GC representatives in Canada and at missions;
• clarify and refine ministerial roles and responsibilities that reflect an amalgamated GAC; and,
• provide clear expectations for supporting exercises such as tracking of requests and lessons learned.

Recommendation #3 The RCMP is encouraged to continue to document the roles and staffing levels of the 54 FTEs in order to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the resourcing model.

1.0 Introduction

The evaluation for the International Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations (IPP) Program was conducted in accordance with the Treasury Board of Canada’s Policy on Evaluation (2009). The IPP Program is guided by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) entitled the Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA). This MOU was renewed for a period of five years as of April 1, 2011. The MOU defines the managerial and accountability relationship between the three Partners involved in the IPP Program: Global Affairs Canada (GAC)^Footnote 1; Public Safety Canada (PS); and, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

The respective evaluation sections of these Partner departments are mandated to conduct evaluations of direct program spending once every five years. The last evaluation of the IPP Program was finalized in 2012.

The target audiences for this evaluation are:

• the Government of Canada (GC), including Parliament and other government departments that are relevant to the program;
• GAC, PS and RCMP senior and program management; and,
• the Canadian public, including relevant stakeholders.

The evaluation of the IPP Program covers a period of four fiscal years from April 1, 2011 to March 31, 2015.

2.0 Background

Since 1989, Canada has participated in more than 60 international police peacekeeping operations led by: the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), bilateral agreements, and those conducted by other international partners, commissions or institutes. The IPP Program has deployed more than 3,800 police officers in more than 30 countries.

As part of the international community’s efforts to promote comprehensive and sustainable rule of law (ROL), Canadian police officers have played a wide range of roles within each mission, from training and mentoring their police counterparts and providing humanitarian assistance to ensuring security for elections and investigating human rights violations. International police peacekeepers support longer term Security Sector Reform (SSR) and conflict prevention efforts. Canadian police officers also contribute to efforts to restore human security, social stability and ROL as preconditions for longer-term development.

2.1 Mandate and Scope of the IPP Program

The CPA MOU outlines the managerial responsibilities and the accountability relationships between the three Partner departments: GAC, PS and RCMP. The Program’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) outlines how the three departments carry out their responsibilities as defined in the MOU.

The Program funding was initially approved in 2006 and renewed in 2011. It provides the Program with stable and consistent funding. It also allows provincial/municipal police partners (other than the RCMP) to backfill positions in Canada, while their officers are deployed abroad.

The goal of the IPP Program is to support Canada’s commitment to build a more secure world through police participation in international peace operations. The objectives of the CPA are as follows:

1) Provide police expertise, training and advice to police services, in the context of integrated peace operations, in states that require assistance, including those which have recently experienced or are threatened by conflict, so that local police forces may carry out their policing responsibilities in accordance with democratic principles and international human rights conventions;

2) Strengthen the GC’s ability to plan and develop timely and coordinated whole-of-government (WoG) responses to international crises in support of Canadian foreign assistance priorities; and

3) Promote comprehensive and sustainable ROL through the re-establishment of effective public institutions such as law enforcement and judicial systems.

While not its primary function, the IPP Program also seeks to maximize the Canadian domestic benefits of international police peacekeeping activities wherever possible, including through contributions to improved domestic policing capacity and improved security in Canada.

The scope of the Canadian police expertise provided under IPP operations includes:

• International police peacekeeping and peace operations: training, advising and mentoring of national police in the context of multidimensional integrated operations, as part of broader police reform efforts in countries threatened by conflict or instability;
• International criminal courts and tribunals as well as international commissions and inquiries; and,
• Technical assistance which can include response to crisis, development of international policy and non-peacekeeping-related police deployments to respond to international peace and security challenges.

The expected results of the Program are defined in its Logic Model in Appendix 2.

2.2 Resources of the IPP Program

The Program is funded through the Peace and Security Pool of the International Assistance Envelope (IAE) which is separated into two funding types. Table 1 and discussion in this section is based on policy and financial authorities approved for the IPP Program in 2011. Subsequent changes to IPP Program funds are presented in Finding 17 (Section 4.4), addressing Performance Issue 5: Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy.

The RCMP receives the first type, $36.8M annually in direct A-base funds that supports salaries and benefits for the deployment of up to 170 Canadian police officers abroad and a cadre of 54 staff at RCMP headquarters to administer the program. RCMP HQ staff support the recruitment, selection, training, medical and psychological assessment, deployment, support and reintegration of Canadian police officers for overseas missions. The $36.8M (later reduced to $35.5)^Footnote 2 portion also includes $500,000 for rapid deployment capacity. In addition to the 54 staff at RCMP, 1.5 full-time equivalents (FTE) at GAC and 1.5 FTE at PS support the implementation of the Program over the reference period of the evaluation, for each fiscal year. Positions in PS and GAC are not funded by the IPP Program.

GAC receives the second type, $11.4M annually to support the incremental costs of deployments. Incremental costs are to be used for, but not limited to: allowances, travel, uniforms and equipment, vehicles and telecommunications and specific health costs. These funds are provided by GAC to the RCMP via the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) on a cost-recovery basis.

Affiliation of deployed officers

IPP deployments are comprised of Canadian police officers from the RCMP as well as from provincial/municipal police partners. As such, the RCMP regularly liaises and coordinates operations with domestic police partners who deploy officers. Provincial and municipal police partners began contributing members in support of international police deployments in 1995. At the time of analysis, the RCMP had a total of twenty-five active MOUs in place with participating provincial and municipal police partners.

The participation of the provincial and municipal police partners, retired RCMP police officers and active RCMP officers are provided in Table 2. Over the reference period, the ratio of provincial/municipal police resources to RCMP resources for the Program varied from 60:30^Footnote 3 percent to 70:30 percent.

2.3 Governance of the IPP Program

The CPA MOU and the CPA SOP outlines the managerial and accountability relationship and the authorities to approve deployments in five different categories. Three of the deployment categories are: deployments to peacekeeping and peace operations, international criminal courts and tribunals; and, technical assistance which require the approval of the Ministers that are responsible for the IPP Program^Footnote 4. Ministerial approval will also be sought if there is a significant change in the mandate of an IPP mission or if Canada's commitment increases above the levels previously authorized. Two other deployment categories are: rapid or short term deployments that respond to police training and rapid deployments that respond to specific crisis situations which requires the approval of the Working Group (WG) or the Director General (DG) Advisory Committee. The Working Group and Committees are described in further detail below.

As per the MOU and the SOP, GAC provides foreign policy expertise and leadership such as identifying activities where police can contribute to local peacekeeping, stabilization and peacebuilding efforts that are consistent with Canadian foreign policy and international security objectives. As part of the development component, GAC also provides in-depth country and cultural knowledge and enhances linkages between police interventions and longer term development work. The MOU outlines the structure and management of the three CPA committees that are all chaired by GAC:

• Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) Steering Committee –Its role includes discussing and approving ongoing Canadian policy priorities for peace operations; reviewing the framework and activities under the terms of the CPA MOU; and, making recommendations to the Participants’ Ministers regarding proposed amendments to the MOU. Beyond the signatory departments of the CPA, the Department of National Defence (DND), the Department of Justice, Correctional Service of Canada (CSC), the Privy Council Office (PCO), Department of Finance and Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) may also participate as observers.
• Director General (DG) Advisory Committee – Established after the 2012 CPA Evaluation, this Advisory Committee is responsible for: providing advice to the CPA Working Group, monitoring and assessment IPP Program activities and finances; reviewing and approving annual reports; and, reviewing and approving rapid deployment activities and assessment missions. The committee is comprised of DG-level representatives of the CPA signatory departments, and additional observers as appropriate.
• The CPA Working Group (WG) – Its responsibilities include, but are not limited to: coordination of day-to-day activities within the CPA; strategic analysis and input that supports the CPA Steering and Advisory Committees; monitoring activities and finances related to progress of missions; and, preparation of memoranda to Ministers as well as amendments to the CPA MOU. Representation on the WG includes the Directors with the responsibility for the CPA or their delegates.

The RCMP manages all stages of the deployment of Canadian police officers, including selection, preparation, training, medical and psychological assessment, deployment, support and reintegration of personnel providing Canadian police peacekeeping expertise internationally.The RCMP also provides input on Canadian domestic policing issues and supports the identification, selection and planning of new missions.

PS ensures that the IPP operations are consistent with Canadian policing policy and overall requirements and ensures Canadian domestic security priorities are advanced and represented.

3.0 Evaluation Purpose and Scope

The evaluation assessed the IPP Program’s relevance and performance by applying a mixed-method approach using multiple lines of inquiry where both qualitative and quantitative methods were applied. Data collected was aggregated to leverage existing information, smaller sample sizes and missions of focus to address evaluation objectives which are elaborated upon below.

3.1 Evaluation Objectives

In accordance with the 2009 TBS Policy on Evaluation, a systematic evidence-based data collection process was applied to assess the relevance and performance of the IPP Program. The objectives of the evaluation were:

1. To determine the on-going need of the IPP Program to strategically support the GC’s international peace and security outcomes;
2. To determine the extent to which the IPP Program has been effective and efficient in achieving its outcomes;
3. To determine whether the IPP Program’s governance and planning structure supports an efficient and economic allocation of resources; and,
4. To determine the extent to which progress has been made on the implementation of recommendations from the 2012 evaluation.

3.2 Evaluation Design

The evaluation objectives were elaborated on with detailed evaluation questions (Appendix 3) which addressed specific aspects of relevance and performance. Some evaluation questions were further developed into sub questions with respective indicators that were reflective of different departmental structures.

Information gathered from interviews, documents, and RCMP and GAC financial units was analyzed to respond to evaluation questions. Evidence was triangulated to determine trends, similarities, and points of divergence or convergence. Data collection included an updated Management Response and Action Plan (MRAP) to the 2012 evaluation.

In 2015, the evaluation team refocussed its efforts to develop preliminary findings that addressed key evaluation questions in order to provide timely information for the renewal of the Program. The key evaluation questions were 1.1, 1.3, 2.3 and parts of question 5.2 (Appendix 3).

Subsequently, all findings and the draft evaluation report were reviewed during the Evaluation Advisory Committee (EAC) meetings where EAC members were solicited for their feedback and fact validation.

3.3 Data Sources

Interviews

A purposeful selection of interviewees was employed, based on the individual’s background knowledge and current or previous roles and responsibilities. A number of them were selected as they were able to provide extensive and detailed information that would otherwise not have been available and were therefore a valuable source of information. Consultation with IPP Program staff helped to identify and prioritise the interviewees for in-person or telephone interviews. PS and GAC conducted semi-structured interviews while RCMP conducted structured interviews.

In using a purposeful sampling method, views from a few interviewees may be presented for the following reasons: they captured views of the Partner departments; they were key informants whose position and knowledge were of particular relevance; they represented views of their organisation; or, the purpose of the question was to obtain broader views. Finally, it is important to note that in quantifying interviewees, the number of interviewees that may be qualified to answer a particular question may be from a small population of five or ten, rather than the total sample of 97 interviewees of this evaluation.

Some interviewees fell into more than one category but were captured in the following table based on the primary role for which they were interviewed. Of interest, two interviewees in the stakeholder category were also police coordinators from provincial/municipal police partners. Four interviewees under the category of Program and Policy were also deployed police officers, while one deployed police officer was also affiliated with Program and Policy.[1] Other stakeholders included heads of EU peacekeeping mission, relevant policy staff within the EU’s European External Action Services, and relevant policy staff within the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO).

Figure 1: Evaluation Interview Breakdown by Categories

Document, performance and financial data review

Foundational documents of the IPP Program were used to assess the alignment with departmental priorities and strategic outcomes. Operational reports tracked Program planning, finances, activities and performance. External sources, including UN reports, media articles, NGO surveys and third party publications, provided useful background literature for understanding Program relevance, impact on beneficiaries and possible performance results.

Missions of Focus

Missions in Afghanistan, Haiti, and the West Bank were selected as areas of focus for the evaluation. Detailed descriptions of the missions are found in Appendix 4. Factors that were considered in selecting these deployments included: diversity in the types of deployment missions within the reference period; strategic linkages to the GC priorities; consultations with program representatives in the three partner departments; and, the expected presence of reliable and available data sources. The rationale for selecting these three missions is expanded upon below:

Afghanistan

From 2003 to 2014, Canadian police officers deployed to Afghanistan supported the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the broader international effort to make Afghanistan a more stable and self-sufficient state. The Program deployed police officers to the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A), the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) and the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB). From 2011 to 2014, Canada’s engagement in police reform focussed on four niche areas: leadership and management training and mentoring; specialized policing (advanced investigational and anti-corruption policing); Ministry of Interior reform and capacity building; and, community policing. The presence of several IPP missions in Afghanistan over the reference period and presence of other GC security and development programming provided a unique opportunity to compare and contrast Canada’s whole-of-government (WoG) engagement within one country.

Haiti

The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is Canada’s largest and longest-standing police contribution which has accounted for almost half of all IPP deployments since the beginning of the Program. Canada has contributed to areas such as community policing, middle management mentoring and serious and organized crime. IPP Program deployments to Haiti provided a potential opportunity to observe the intermediate and immediate outcomes of the logic model due to the Program’ s longer period in this fragile state.

West Bank

Canada deployed police officers to two missions in the West Bank over the reference period to assist in the reform of the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP): the European Union Police Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) and the U.S Security Coordinator (USSC) team under Operation PROTEUS. The EUPOL COPPS mission seeks to support PCP reform and development, strengthen and support the criminal justice system, and improve prosecution - police interaction. Separately, a senior police officer member works as a technical police advisor to the U.S Security Coordinator (USSC) team under Operation PROTEUS. The USSC has a mandate to encourage co-ordination on security matters between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). These two missions were selected to capture issues that may arise in small scale non-UN deployments.

3.4 Limitations

The following section outlines the limitations of the evaluation:

• There were no on-site interviews of the missions of focus due to the timing of elections in Haiti, the closure of missions in Afghanistan, and the small size of the Canadian police contingent in the West Bank. The evaluation team acknowledges that the lack of field visits may have limited the extent to which efficiencies and effectiveness on the ground were captured. For instance, there were limitations to accessing persons who had first-hand observations on sustained results, indirect benefits and the extent of positive or negative intended and unintended impacts. This would include candid feedback from beneficiaries and stakeholders. Beneficiaries include the local/national police force to which the Canadian police officers were deployed, vulnerable sections of the population or targeted communities and neighbourhoods. Stakeholders include other countries and international organisations that worked on SSR in the fragile area and other police and peacekeeping officers deployed to support the local police force.

• Where possible, the evaluation team mitigated this limitation by consulting various secondary sources including the UN, the IPP Program reports, academic and NGO literature to name a few. The number of interviews was also increased with previously deployed police officers, program and policy staff and stakeholders with prior experience in the field.

• The rotational nature of deployments hampered the continuity of observations for the evaluation. Evaluation methods mitigated some of these issues by tracking individuals who had current and historical knowledge on the specific files over the reference period of the evaluation.

• Incomplete development of a Performance Measurement Strategy (PMS) limited the ability of the evaluation to assess whether the IPP Program achieved its expected outcomes as defined in the CPA Logic Model (Appendix 2). Where there was incomplete or inconsistent information documented in results reporting, the evaluation team consulted additional sources for results and noted areas where gaps remained. Analysis was supported by interviews that addressed progress towards achievement of outcomes and documents that reported on broader achievements related to the intermediate and ultimate outcomes of the Program.

In addition, there are numerous factors independent from police reform and the Program’s contributions that affect a country’s stability and fragility, including the affected area’s own governance structures, socio-economic development and the role of other foreign actors. As much as possible, the evaluation took these external factors into account.

4.0 Evaluation Findings

4.1 Relevance Issue 1: Continued Need for the Program

Finding 1: The IPP Program addressed a continued need for international police peacekeeping and peace operations missions, despite a steady decline in authorized missions and deployment numbers. While needs varied depending on the particular mission, the Program demonstrated strengths including access to diverse and professional police officers from across Canada.

As demonstrated through multilateral peacekeeping operations, special political missions and other stabilization operations, the nature of police in peacekeeping and peace operations is changing. Their roles within the host state may include SSR, operational support for local police and other law enforcement institutions, or conducting interim policing and other law enforcement duties.

Traditional police deployments of the United Nations have been limited to monitoring, observing and reporting.^Footnote 1 These traditional types of deployments have been declining, according to the documents reviewed, and the Program has been exploring more strategic, non-traditional deployment opportunities. As demands on police deployed are increasingly diverse and complex,^Footnote 6 police deployments now have roles in areas such as technical assistance, co-location training, and mentoring programs to support host state policing and other law enforcement institutions. IPP deployments have taken on some of these roles which are described in more detail throughout the report. The UN Security Council (UNSC) recognizes that UN policing-related work is an invaluable contribution to peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding, security and ROL and creates a basis for development.

Responsiveness to multidimensional issues of fragility

The evaluation found that the IPP Program has the ability to deploy to different contexts and respond to varying institutional and mission needs. The IPP deployments assisted, and continue to assist, in police reform through training and capacity building missions.

Afghanistan

• Afghanistan remains a fragile state after more than 30 years of conflict and insurgency that continues to pose a threat to its peace and security. The Government of Afghanistan has made progress in its transition towards democracy in recent years but grave concerns persist in terms of the government’s commitment to fight corruption and protect human rights. The government also continues to face obstacles in its ability to provide security to the Afghan people with the existence of a resilient insurgency that has weakened state control over the territory, an underground economy of illicit drug production, and the withdrawal of international security forces.

• The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), comprised of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), gradually assumed responsibility for Afghan security beginning in June 2013 but the ANSF’s effectiveness was limited by weak institutional and human capacity. The insurgency continues attacks in Kabul and the northwestern ethnic Tajik and Uzbek regions, which resulted in the deaths of more than 4,600 members of the ANSF in 2014 alone. Canadian police officers were able to address police reform in Afghanistan prior to their withdrawal in 2014. Examples of their contribution include assisting in training and doctrine development in the NATO-led mission and establishing a border management system in the EU-led mission (detailed descriptions in Appendix 4).

Haiti

• Haiti is the poorest country in the Americas and has struggled with political instability and rampant corruption in its transition to a stable democracy. Government infrastructure remains weak and resources are limited which directly impacts the ability of the state to provide security to its population, including through delivering on police reform commitments.

• IPP deployments to Haiti addressed a need for international police peacekeeping and the Program demonstrated an ability to adapt to challenges on the ground. To contribute more directly to the needs of the Haitian National Police (HNP), the IPP Program created specialised teams (details in Finding 2). While great strides have been made on police reform in Haiti with the assistance of MINUSTAH and Canadian police officers, the HNP still scores high in terms of corruption in the public sector, demonstrating a continued need for international support.^Footnote 7

West Bank

• The protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict has contributed to weak institutions, underdeveloped infrastructure and widespread criminality and unrest in the region. The economic situation in the West Bank, characterized by high unemployment and widespread poverty, is a major contributing factor to social unrest. Violent clashes between Palestinians and Israeli Security Forces are common place. Tensions between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas have also contributed to an unstable security environment. The Palestinian Civil Police Force’s (PCP) limited control over the territory and borders, with nearly 60 percent of the region administered by Israel, creates additional challenges for police reform in the region.

• Prior to the establishment of the PCP in 1994, the West Bank did not have a functioning police force and the area was largely controlled by clans and warlords. Since 2005, the EU has been providing training to the PCP to professionalize the force and build capacity. The IPP Program began deploying Canadian police officers to EUPOL COPPS in 2008 and contributed to the broader goals achieved under the mission. Prior to the arrival of international forces, public confidence in the PCP was low and police corruption was rampant. The PCP had limited ability to patrol during periods of intense fighting as they were perceived by Israeli Security Forces as combatants rather than a legitimate security force. While progress has been made in the West Bank, the PCP still require training and capacity building to enhance accountability, establish reporting mechanisms, and ensure greater oversight.

Access to diverse and professional police officers

The evaluation found that Canada, as one of only a few countries which deploys serving police officers, is a leader in both civilian policing and Security Sector Reform (SSR). The IPP Program can draw professional police officers from multiple police partners across Canada which allows it to draw upon a wide range of skill sets.

Interviews provided evidence that Canadian police officers were valued for their knowledge, language abilities, cultural sensitivity, emphasis on human rights and expertise in thematic areas such as community policing and sexual and gender based violence (SGBV). Others expressed that Canadian police officers work well with the local police, are well-respected, professional, and proactive. Sources noted that Canada is a global leader in deploying highly trained and effective police officers.

Decrease in IPP deployment numbers and authorized missions

The authority to deploy Canadian police officers requires securing approval from the Ministers of the three Partner departments^Footnote 8. Only short term rapid deployments for crisis situations are approved at the WG or DG-level Committee.^Footnote 9The evaluation found that the reported number of officers deployed, both authorized and actual per mission varied by data source. For instance, the 2012/13 Annual Report stated that deployments ranged between 125 and 185. A Deployment Table generated by International Liaison and Deployment Centre (ILDC) in the RCMP revealed that deployments ranged between 142 and 174 for the same period. Based on Program documentation and/or performance data, it was not clear why this variance existed. However, the Program staff informed evaluators that deployment numbers can vary depending on when the information was extracted due the officers rotating in and out of a mission.

Drawing from various Program data sources, there were a total of 17 IPP Program missions over the reference period. These missions do not include representation at Canada’s Permanent Representative Mission to the UN in New York (PRMNY), the deployment to the UN Standing Police Capacity Unit in Brindisi, Italy and the position at the UN DPKO. The number of missions steadily declined from 2011/12 to 2014/15 (see Table 4). This decline can be attributed to several factors, namely, the fulfillment of mission mandates and/or the cancellation of some missions.

In 2012/13, a comprehensive review of the Program’s mission resulted in GC decisions to realign IPP deployments. The Review included the foreign policy priorities of the time, Canadian police participating in the mission, their accomplishments, and their role as part of WoG efforts. Subsequently, missions to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ivory Coast and South Sudan were closed. Personnel already deployed to these three missions were permitted to carry out the remainder of their deployments into 2013/14. Further, missions to Afghanistan concluded in 2013/14. In January 2015, the Program received Ministerial authorization for up to ten police officers to be deployed to Egypt and in March up to five police officers to be deployed to Libya. However, these deployments never occurred due to challenges reaching agreement with the host state or organization on deployment details, or security considerations.

Program responsiveness using rapid deployments

The IPP Program has the ability to respond to unpredictable policing needs and short term requests, including in crisis situations or post-conflict contexts. The Program, specifically the ILDC within the RCMP, developed a Rapid Deployment Team Roster (RDT) to respond to an increase in the number of requests for international Canadian assistance that often has very short timelines. The RDT also responds to an interest to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of Canada’s policing engagements. Assessment and approval to deploy from the RDT can be done by the DG committee within 24 hours if required.

The police officers on the RDT are able to deploy at short notice for up to 6 months at a time. The International Deployment Services (IDS) prepares job bulletins to recruit potential candidates from across the RCMP and provincial/municipal police partners. Successful members are placed on the roster for one year. As of March 2016, approximately 33 candidates had been assessed and considered for the RDT. However, at the time of analysis, no police officers were deployed from the RDT.

One situation where a rapid deployment capacity may be necessary is with Disaster Victim Identification (DVI). For example, following the 2011 tsunami in Japan, the CPA was asked to cover the costs of deploying municipal and provincial officers. At the time, there were no clear guidelines or GC lead to respond to these types of requests. Consequently, the CPA partnered with OGDs responsible for disaster response and developed guidelines for DVI in 2012/13. The document provides guidance for GC officials in responding to situations where a DVI request is received from an international body. Specifically, the document provides direction on how to respond to a request, how such a deployment would be governed, and potential sources of funding. The DVI guidelines were approved by the DG Advisory Committee and are included in the CPA SOPs as an annex. Subsequent rapid deployments from the Program to the Philippines in 2013 (Typhoon Haiyan) and to the Ukraine in 2014 (MH17 plane crash) were both part of larger international teams.

Finding 2: The IPP Program considered the needs and priorities of missions. Notwithstanding the political and security sensitivities, there are examples where the Program was limited in its ability to meet the needs of mission.

A majority of interviewees agreed that the Program met the needs of missions. However, some of these respondents mentioned that the degree to which mission needs were met varied. Some also noted the difficulty of measuring progress towards the achievement of mission needs. In particular, the Program’s limits on deploying civilian subject matter experts, organising bilateral deployments and flexibility in deployment duration and timing limited its ability to fully meet the needs of missions. It is important to note that the varying political and security sensitivities of the affected region may have also impacted the ability of the Program to respond to mission needs.

Afghanistan

• In general, the Canadian police officers deployed to Afghanistan met the needs of the NTM-A/CSTC-A, EUPOL Afghanistan and the IPCB. Interviews confirmed that Canadian police officers were highly valued for their skills, expertise and overall quality and professionalism. In particular, Canadian officers adopted a leadership role in promoting gender awareness and training. The Program also demonstrated adaptability in Afghanistan once the mission moved from Kandahar to Kabul where the training needs of the ANP were different. In Kandahar, the local police required basic training whereas the Afghan police in Kabul required more specialized training. A few interviewees noted that there was also frustration expressed with Canadian police deployments to NTM-A/CSTC-A as these positions did not always draw upon the expertise and skills of the officers.

• Despite the challenging security and political environments, the majority of Kandaharis polled in 2011 by the Asia Foundation reported perceptions of improved security in their community. The gains, though fragile can be attributed in part to the increase in capability of the ANSF through efforts of Canadian police officers. EUPOL conveyed that they would have liked Canadian police officers deployed under the IPP Program to remain with the EU mission until the end of its mandate in 2016 and continued to express a need for Canadian police officers once Canada withdrew.

• The Program addressed ANP reform which is only one element of law enforcement under the purview of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) in Afghanistan. In addition, the MoI is also responsible for the Afghan Special Narcotics Force, the Counter Narcotic Police of Afghanistan, and the Afghan Public Protection Force. Many of these areas are supported by civilian specialists whom the IPP Program could not deploy.

Haiti

• Beginning in 2013, three specialized teams were deployed to MINUSTAH. The use of specialised teams was recognized as a best practice by the UN in 2015.^Footnote 10The teams drew from Canadian police expertise to provide targeted assistance to MINUSTAH and the HNP to achieve objectives outlined in the HNP Development Plan. Each specialized team has its own Terms of Reference (ToRs) with clear mandates, objectives and linkages to expected outcomes. The duties and responsibilities, along with the necessary skill sets required for each position, are also referenced in the ToRs.

• For the first specialized team, Canadian police officers were deployed to the Community-Oriented Policing Team which was recognized as an area in need of capacity building within the HNP. The primary objectives of the team were to develop and implement a community policing doctrine and national implementation strategy, including training and administration; and to coordinate the community policing work of other partners and police-contributing countries in a manner consistent with the HNP national community policing doctrine. Between February and June 2013, the Canadian-led community policing specialized team ran a bicycle unit pilot project. The objective of this pilot was to assist specialized HNP community policing agents to remain connected with communities and also to deal with the shortage of transportation within the HNP. Three police bicycle units were created during the first phase of the pilot in Delmas, Petion-Ville and Croix des Bouquets, with plans to expand these units throughout the country.

• The objective of the second specialized team, Management Advisory Team, was to follow-up with and provide support to the police officer graduates of the HNP Management Academy in a mentoring function once they returned to their work place. The ultimate objective was to develop the capacity within the HNP Academy to manage the Program of Support for Graduated Commissaires. Finally, the third specialized team, Serious Crime Support Unit, contributed to objectives in the HNP plan to prevent crime and violence, specifically strengthening of the Bureau de Renseignements Judiciaires and strengthening of the Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciare.

• During the evaluation reference period, reporting of activities for all specialized teams was received from Canadian police officers’ Individual Monthly and Quarterly Reports (IMRs/IQRs). While the IPP Program reported on the activities of the specialized teams, the performance measurement component of this reporting was insufficient on outcomes and results.

• Aside from the teams noted above, two Canadian police officers were specifically requested by United Nations Police (UNPOL) to continue the work to set up a centralized office for sexual violence crimes in the HNP Central Directorate of Judicial Police.

• Several interviewees were of the opinion that Haiti is an example of a country where the Program has been meeting mission needs. Nonetheless, a lessons learned exercise conducted by the Program in 2012 noted that the HNP suffers from a shortage of technical expertise, including financial administration, human resources, vehicle maintenance, and forensics. The Exercise further identified the need to better support improvements to the judicial reform process. Interviewees confirmed a need to deploy civilian experts to address, in particular, criminal or intelligence analysts, judicial reform and correctional services. Further, the Program deployment schedule did not always align with the HNP Academy training schedule resulting in rotations during the school year that impacted the consistency in training that students received.

West Bank

• Despite Canada’s modest contribution of police to the EUPOL COPPS and Op PROTEUS, Canadian police officers were seen as effective and were valued for their skills and expertise. They were regarded as culturally respectful and were valued for their emphasis on human rights, gender equality and focus on community oriented policing.

• There were areas where the Program was not able to respond to needs. For instance, EUPOL COPPS requested forensic analysis expertise and justice expertise from Canada which the IPP Program was not able to deliver because these are generally civilian positions as opposed to police officers. The low ceiling on Canadian police deployments into EUPOL COPPS (a maximum of 2 officers) also confined the ability of the Program to respond to missions’ needs. In 2011/12, the Program was not successful in their request to authorize an increase in deployments from two to six officers.

• EUPOL COPPS also requested longer deployments from Canada. It was suggested that 18 months to 2 years may be ideal for a deployment. A few interviewees suggested a period of overlap at the beginning and end of an officer’s rotation in order to minimize the transition period.

Flexibility in deployment duration

As outlined in the IPP Program’s SOPs, the standard deployment length is one year to allow police officers enough time to adapt to the mission environment, achieve substantive work objectives, and prepare for a handover to the next individual. In addition, a one year deployment also enables Canadian police partners to backfill vacant positions. The 12 month deployment length is in alignment with recommendations from the UN report on peace keeping.^Footnote 11 Notwithstanding, additional flexibility for both longer and shorter deployments are valued. The evaluation found that relevance and responsiveness to mission need was partially limited by the fixed deployment duration in both the missions of focus and other missions reviewed.

For instance, there were requests to extend deployments to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Kyrgyzstan and the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). The Closure Report for the STL alluded to the possibility of considering longer deployments to international courts and tribunals. RCMP also noted in a Steering Committee meeting that higher rank positions often necessitated longer deployments. There was also support to deploy for shorter periods of time between one to six months. One female police officer with young children suggested that shorter deployments, of less than six months, might improve female participation in the IPP Program. The evaluation also found one needs assessment report that was completed under the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) civilian deployment since the IPP Program was not able to fund assessments that took longer than one month to complete.

Relevance of civilian deployments

The IPP Program is designed around the way policing is delivered in Canada, which is not always aligned with the police structure in the region where the Program is deployed. The Program’s SOPs stipulate that applicants must be a police officer from within Canada. The police institutions in the missions of focus often carry out responsibilities that are different from those carried out by Canadian police officers, including corrections, fire and coast guard. For instance, the HNP is divided into several specialized policing divisions and are responsible for coast guard and paramilitary activities. The inability of the Program to deploy civilians for these other types of responsibilities may hamper Canada’s ability to meet the full range of mission needs. It also has an impact on the achievement of long term stability as the entirety of the police structure is not being addressed. An external review of the UN Police Division conducted in 2016 affirms the important role civilians can play in the success of missions.

Many interviewees supported the idea of expanding the Program’s ability to include civilian professionals that are typically embedded inside police services, including analytics, communications and forensics experts. A few interviewees felt that having a set number of civilian deployments was important. More people expressed caution that increasing the flexibility of the Program in this way would necessitate consideration of available resources as well as additional effort to avoid duplication with other government programs (notably START’s civilian deployment and the Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program (ACCBP).

Bilateral deployments

Bilateral deployments provide an opportunity to achieve Government of Canada priorities in contexts when there are no multilateral peace support operations, or where the mandate or role played by peace support operations may be limited. Over the reference period, the Program looked for ways to increase its flexibility to deploy bilaterally. Missions to Ukraine^Footnote 12 and Kyrgyzstan were delivered outside of multilateral organizations. The CPA SOPs notes that such deployments are limited to 5 percent of total officers deployed outside of traditional multilateral peacekeeping missions and peace operations. At the time of analysis, there was no structure in the Program’s governance documents to administer bilateral deployments. In parallel with the policy considerations, bilateral deployments requires additional effort and resources of the IPP Program to plan, execute, and operate functions that are normally the responsibility of multilateral missions (e.g. duty of care, security, policy coherence, negotiation with host government). A few interviewees confirmed that the limit on bilateral missions was perceived as inflexible and problematic.

Record of requests and rejections

Finally, the evaluation could not fully assess whether the IPP Program has met the needs requested since the Program has not comprehensively tracked requests for police to support peacekeeping missions and other forms of assistance (e.g. technical assistance, response to crisis). The Program has developed a tracking table with more recent UN requests and maintains a partial record of approval or rejection for mission contribution requests that are received. This remains a gap given the political sensitivity connected with the Canadian response to such requests and was identified for corrective action in the previous evaluation in 2012.

Finding 3: Anecdotally, the Program referenced domestic benefits to Canada as a result of its participation to CPA missions. The most frequently identified domestic benefit to Canada was the skills that Canadian police officers either acquired and/or enhanced.

In keeping with the objectives of the International Assistance Envelope (IAE), the IPP Program funds are to be used exclusively for the purpose of delivering the IPP Program mandate, particularly for the deployment of Canadian police officers to contribute to initiatives in support of peace, security and justice. While not the IPP Program’s primary function, the Program seeks to maximize the domestic benefits to Canada wherever possible. This includes, contributing to improved domestic policing capacity and improved security in Canada. Within the CPA MOU, the guidance to assessing requests for Canadian police contributions to peace support includes a specific point on considering Canadian domestic policing interests.

Domestic security benefits

IPP Program documents noted instances where the Program contributed to addressing threats posed by drug trafficking, serious and organized crime and national security. The lessons learned report on Haiti noted that the presence of Canadian police officers increased security by increasing the capacity of the HNP to impede/intercept narcotics and human trafficking threats. Similarly, in the Afghanistan missions, domestic benefits were referenced with regards to building the capacity of the ANP to address national security and narcotic threats. Almost half of the relevant interviewees indicated that the international missions helped in reducing crime in Canada.

Domestic security interests, a secondary consideration in the mission selection phase, has been considered more consistently in the past few years. Some of the interviewees noted that domestic needs have not played a significant role in the selection of missions and the link to domestic benefits in mission selection was not documented consistently in memos and Program annual reports from earlier in the evaluation’s reference period. However, a review of more recent documents found that domestic benefits are starting to be considered as part of the IPP mission selection process. The RCMP and PS’s respective International Strategic Framework (ISF) help guide mission selection, decision-making and priority areas with respect to international engagements and IPP deployments. Beginning in 2010/11, PS’s ISF was used to identify priorities based on the principle that international security engagements should complement PS’s mandate to ensure the safety of Canadians is developed in coordination with the department and its portfolio of agencies. This includes identifying specific countries of concern to Canadian national security. In 2014/15, the RCMP also developed an ISF. Evaluation analysis found that for the RCMP’s ISF, four out of six IPP missions in 2014/15 aligned with either a priority or watch list countries. The evaluation found that countries that have a low crime nexus to Canada are not frequently prioritized, whereas countries that have a high crime nexus such as Haiti are prioritized.

Domestic benefits for Canadian police officers

CPA reporting documents noted that the most frequently identified domestic benefit has been the enhanced skills of police officers who have served in an international police peacekeeping mission. Based on the evaluation’s analysis, the skills that were most frequently repeated were cultural awareness, working in positions or with colleagues of higher rank and, managerial skills.

Police are immersed in a cultural experience that vastly differs from that of Canada. Once they return to Canada, with its cultural diversity, deployed officers have a useful perspective. Some interviewees noted that Canadian police officers returned home with a cultural understanding and sensitivity to those ethnic communities they had worked with internationally which enhanced community policing (e.g. Haitian, Somalian and Middle Eastern communities in Canada).

The RCMP Individual Quarterly Reports (IQR) included questions related to skills being utilized and acquired. From 2012 to 2015, 740 out of 891 (83 percent) responses from police officers reference skills that were either utilized or acquired. Of those 740, 81 percent either strongly agreed (25 percent) or agreed (56 percent) that skills were acquired due to their participation in an international police peacekeeping mission. According to this data, the top eight skills acquired by Canadian Police Officers were communication, teamwork, relationship building, strategic planning, leadership, conflict management, people skills and technical policing.

When interviewees were asked whether there were skills gained while on international police peacekeeping missions, the majority affirmed that they had strengthened existing skills. While most were hopeful that their mission experience would help them in the advancement of their careers, some indicated that they were unsure mission experience would be an asset during promotional considerations. Based on interviews, half of the interviewees felt they have benefited from these skills professionally. Although interviewees referenced a correlation between missions and enhanced skills, the evaluators were unable to validate this beyond the IMRs/IQRs and interviews.

4.2 Relevance Issue 2: Alignment with Government Priorities; and, Relevance Issue 3: Consistency with Federal Roles and Responsibilities

Finding 4: The IPP Program aligned with the GC priorities. The Program was an important tool for advancing foreign policy objectives.

Foreign policy objectives at country level

Canada has a history of active engagement in many countries to which the IPP Program deploys. The evaluation found that the deployments complemented Canada’s foreign policy priorities. The following are examples specific to the missions of focus:

Afghanistan

• The IPP Program deployments to Afghanistan were supportive of Canada’s WoG priorities of promoting democracy, ROL and respect for human rights and contributing to effective global governance and international security and stability. The GC committed $330M from 2013 to 2017 to help sustain the ANSF which directly aligned with the mandate of the IPP Program in Afghanistan. IPP deployments stressed the creation of an ethical police force built upon respect for human rights. The evaluation found that deployments were also aligned with the Ten Year Vision for the ANP, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, and the GC’s six priorities and three strategic projects for Afghanistan, demonstrating a concerted effort to maintain coherence. Evidence showed that the IPP Program in KABUL made efforts to maintain a direct channel to coordinate with HQ on foreign policy priorities.

Haiti

• The IPP Program in Haiti aligned with the priorities of all three partner departments. In particular, the Program aligned with two of the four GC foreign policy priorities, i.e. ROL and security, and Democratic and accountable government, by increasing the capacity of the HNP to provide security and establishing effective law and judicial institutions. In addition, the Program aligned to GC priorities outlined in Canada’s Strategy for Engagement in the Americas which emphasizes a WoG approach to a secure, prosperous and democratic hemisphere. The Program’s mandate to enhance the capacity and skills of police and reform security institutions in Haiti was related to Goal 2 of the Americas Strategy which aims to address insecurity and advance freedom, democracy, human rights and rule-of-law.

• A common challenge with multilateral missions, including MINUSTAH, is that the international mission has its own strategic priorities and objectives that do not always align seamlessly with GC strategic priorities. At times, Canadian police officers deployed to MINUSTAH were assigned to positions that did not always draw upon their unique skills and expertise. For instance, two Canadian officers with work experience in internal investigative units were not assigned to related duties within MINUSTAH.

West Bank

• The IPP Program in the West Bank aligned with the GC’s international and global security commitments and priorities by contributing to effective global governance and international security and stability and promoting democracy and respect for human rights. Deploying Canadian police to build the capacity and skills of the PCP provided support to the Canada-Israel Strategic Partnerships Memorandum of Understanding. This MOU states that Canada and Israel will work toward greater regional stability and security by continuing to support targeted development assistance and training opportunities relevant for the institutions of the Palestinian Authority.

Foreign policy objectives at regional level

Aside from the missions of focus of the evaluation, through a review of documents, it was noted that the Canadian police deployment to the Community Security Initiative of the OSCE in Kyrgyzstan included support for an anti-trafficking initiative which was aligned to the GC’s regional objective of disrupting drug trafficking out of Afghanistan. Deployments to South Sudan to support police reform recognized that if the new country were to become a failed state, there would be more opportunity for terrorist networks to expand their foothold across the broader Sahel region.

Broader GC priorities in security

The Program aligned well to the broader GC priority of building a safe and secure world through international engagement. The CPA MOU stipulates that international police peacekeeping efforts are to be directly linked to Canada’s foreign policy objective of building a more secure world through the re-establishment of effective public institutions such as law enforcement and judicial systems in fragile and conflict-affected states.The thematic priorities under the IAE are broad and align with a number of GAC funded security programs, including the IPP Program.

Police peace operations continue to be a key tool in the maintenance of international peace and security. PRMNY recognizes that Canadian police deployed in or alongside UN peace operations provide valuable training, development, and leadership opportunities in the UN system. The IPP Program deployments have been able to support the promotion of peace and security, democracy, human rights and ROL while providing Canadian representation abroad.

Broader GC priorities in development

Seven countries to which Canadian police officers were deployed were also countries of focus for Canada’s development assistance. The evaluation found that the Program contributed to two of Canada’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) thematic priorities, specifically advancing democracy and promoting stability and security.

Afghanistan

• IPP deployments to Afghanistan helped build the capacity of the ANP to strengthen women’s participation in politics by increasing awareness of women’s right to vote and ensuring greater security at election polls. To facilitate Canadian development projects, Canadian police officers were able to reach out to local officials and communities on behalf of development officers who were limited by their security protocols.

Haiti

• Haiti is Canada’s largest aid beneficiary in the Americas receiving more than $1.4B in development and humanitarian assistance since 2006. In 2014, Canada’s bilateral focus on Haiti included economic growth and prosperity, democratic and accountable government, ROL and security, and the health and welfare of Haitian women and youth. The evaluation found examples where Canadian police deployments complemented GC bilateral development funding and programming by creating the conditions for longer term development. The continued reform of the HNP contributes to greater stability and security in the country which creates a more stable environment for Canada’s development programming to take place.

West Bank

• In 2014, the West Bank was confirmed as an area of focus for Canada’s bilateral development assistance which provides support to core justice and security institutions to build capacity and improve ROL, complementing the work of the IPP Program in the region.

The IPP Program is a unique tool in the GC’s integrated toolkit for Canada to advance its foreign policy objectives by deploying police officers to fragile states and conflict-affected states. For instance, the evaluation did not find another GC program that can draw upon police officers from over 25 Canadian police partners to deploy abroad.

Finding 5: The IPP Program complemented the GC’s and the international community’s approach to fragile and conflict affected states. However, there is still room to improve coherence by enhancing synergies and increasing coordination in similar thematic areas.

Coherence and complementarity within the Government of Canada

The evaluation found that efforts were on-going to improve coherence and complementarity between government departments, within GAC and between international partners.

Within GAC, coherence is supported by the cross representation of CPA partner DGs in the START advisory committees. There is also a deliberate complementarity between the CPA’s Ultimate Outcome and that of START/GPSF. CPA partners were active in interdepartmental working groups such as the Afghan Task Force, PS’s Portfolio WG on Haiti, and the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) WG.

CPA partners maintain contact with and consult other GAC divisions (i.e. Geographics, Counter-terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP), and ACCBP), particularly when assessing a new mission. The overarching mandate of ACCBP and CTCBP is to enhance the capacity of key beneficiary states, government entities and international organizations to prevent and respond to threats posed by international criminal and terrorist activity respectively. Interviewees confirm that IPP Program deployments are aware of the activities of other GAC programs. They also affirmed that the risk of duplication is diminished because the Program has often deployed to different countries than ACCBP and CTCBP. PS also continues to consult with PS Portfolio agencies (i.e., CSC, CBSA, CSIS) to determine relevance and interest in new missions. A number of interviewees noted that cooperation among Other Government Departments (OGDs) was apparent. The missions of focus demonstrate coherence with other GC programming and contribution to WoG strategies.

Afghanistan

• Canada’s engagement was closely coordinated across OGDs to ensure a coherent GC approach. PCO established ‘community practice committees’ for each of the six GC priorities in Afghanistan and these WoG committees met on a regular basis to report on benchmarks. The Ambassador in KABUL was briefed on a daily basis on GC programming and there were regular meetings with management and Canadian police officers to update mission staff. There was also a specific position in KABUL through which the IPP Program coordinated police deployments and ensured that positions aligned with GC priorities.

Haiti

• Correctional services and the coast guard fall under the responsibility of the HNP. Canadian police officers coordinated with CSC in order to develop corrections plans together. GPSF funded the procurement of patrol boats for the Haitian Coast Guard and Canadian police officers provided the training. Canadian development funding supports the Initial Training and Professional Development for the Haitian National Police's Managerial Staff (FIPCA-PNH) Project. The Project aims to train HNP managers and specialists in line with the professionalization of the HNP being a key objective of the HNP development plan.

West Bank

• IPP deployments to the West Bank supported Canada’s WoG approach in the region, in part, by deploying a Canadian Police Officer alongside Canadian Forces to Op PROTEUS to enhance coordination. Deployed police officers were regularly invited to briefings with other Canadian representatives at RMLAH^Footnote 13 to share information.

Within GAC’s headquarters, it was evident that the IPP Program consults with development. While not a specific requirement of the Program, interviewees noted that there was limited contact with development officers in the field. Development programming in fragile and conflict areas can overlap with other programming in related areas of security, ROL and stabilization making communication important. Interviewees expressed potential benefits to increased communication in the field. For instance, development officers noted that sharing of detailed on-the-ground IPP mission information could be useful for development programming. Development officers at mission could tap into peace and security aspects of their work if they were more involved in contributing views to the planning of IPP deployments. They noted this would require more time than currently provided to consult at the Canadian mission. More broadly, a few interviewees did observe an improved link between development and peace and security programming since former-DFAIT and former-CIDA amalgamated.^Footnote 14

Among the three missions of focus, interviewees noted that better coordination with development officers at the Canadian mission would support potential synergies in similar thematic areas. Related interviews noted that the IPP Program generally had some interaction with the political section and less with development.This is not surprising considering the nature of the police work. A few interviewees reflected that in cases where development and the IPP Program were complementary, they were ad hoc initiatives on behalf of individuals rather than strategically planned at the program level.For instance, individuals with the IPP mission were able to assist in bridging communication between the development program in Afghanistan and officials of the local community groups.

From another perspective, a few interviewees noted that in cases where communication and coherence between the IPP Program and the Canadian mission was not problematic, the information was still at times compartmentalized back at headquarters. In KABUL, interviewees noted there was effort to organise the office arrangement in thematic groups rather than by department. Other steps to improve coherence include an IPP Program position placed in KABUL^Footnote 15 to support operation and coherence, regular briefings at the Canadian mission (KABUL, West Bank) or concise program and policy linkages to the IPP Program (START projects in Haiti, GC policy in Afghanistan). Overall, interviewees noted that this coordination was largely with the political and security sections of the Canadian missions. Other suggestions gathered from interviews included pragmatic training for political and development officers before their posting regarding the IPP Program and how to communicate with police. A few other interviewees suggested utilizing the coherence secretariat within International Security Branch of GAC to better articulate development opportunities that lie within peace and security.

While there is greater potential for duplication or overlap of Canadian programs and projects in countries where Canada is actively engaged, there was no evidence that the IPP Program duplicated other GAC security programming. At the same time, interviewees noted that there was minimal effort to examine how GC programs could work better together.A few interviewees expressed that they would have liked better coordination in the field when an international organization discontinued their work.

Specific to Haiti,while police deployments had synergies with GPSF for a period of time, security specialists noted that there was a gap in GC programming in terms of security and ROL with the withdrawal of GPSF. This was mentioned as having an impact on the ability of the IPP Program to engage in complementary programming in SSR. In Afghanistan, interviews suggested that more coordination and complementarity, particularly between the IPP Program and capacity building programs, was necessary. Suggestions included improvements to consultation and communication.

Coherence and complementarity with international community

The IPP Program has worked successfully alongside international allies. In Haiti, Canadian police officers formed a number of international partnerships to enhance the delivery of the Program. Canadian police officers partnered with the United States (U.S) to repair HNP motorcycles, worked with the Sri Lankan army to focus on high risk areas where the HNP did not patrol, and developed and provided training on SGBV to the HNP in partnership with the Norwegian contingent. So as to minimize the risk of duplication, the Program coordinated with other countries in the affected fragile state.

• The IPCB in Afghanistan represented an important attempt by the international community to ensure that donors in SSR were engaging in consultation. Two Canadian police officers were deployed to this body and played an integral role in ensuring coherence with other countries and assisting in the development of the ANP 10-Year Vision Plan.

• In Haiti, a donor committee is in place to monitor donor coordination in SSR and ensure the efficient use of funds. The committee meets monthly with the main donors in Haiti (Canada, France, U.S, Brazil, EU) and is headed by the Commander in Chief of the HNP and co-chaired by the MINUSTAH Police Commissioner. There is also a larger international committee for other donors that meets twice a year.

• In the West Bank, EUPOL COPPS holds regular meetings with partners, including Canada, to ensure coordination and coherence of efforts. However, it was noted by one Canadian police officer that the multiple international initiatives may be duplicating training efforts related to policing, security coordination and justice.

Finding 6: The IPP Program is aligned with its three partners’ respective strategic outcomes and priorities.

Alignment to strategic outcomes and federal priorities

The IPP Program aligns to GAC’s Third Strategic Outcome (SO): International Development and Humanitarian Assistance, under the program area of Fragile Countries and Crisis-affected Communities. Canadian police officers have contributed to departmental priorities that support Canadian security, promotion of democracy, international security and stability, respect for human rights, effective global governance and ROL. The Program mandate is further aligned to GAC’s longstanding interest in Afghanistan and Haiti, as stated in the 2011/12 Departmental Performance Report (DPR) which identified strengthening security and ROL as key priorities. The Program supported three of GAC’s International Security Branch expected results in transnational crime, security and stability of fragile states; and, supported enhancement of GC and international responses to crisis and disasters. Further, Haiti, Afghanistan, the West Bank and South Sudan supported GAC’s areas of focus for development assistance. The evaluation also found that the Program aligned with Canada’s international commitments to peacekeeping, the protection of civilians and other UN efforts.

The IPP Program’s mandate and objectives consistently aligned with RCMP’s SO and priorities. The Program aligned to RCMP’s SO: Canada’s police provide international collaboration and assistance while maintaining a rich police heritage nationally. Through participation in IPP missions, the RCMP addressed the transnational scope of crime and terrorism by building relationships with international policing partners and by supporting law enforcement capacity for states at risk. The Program aligned to RCMP SO: Canada’s police provide international collaboration and assistance while maintaining a rich police heritage nationally. Specifically, the Program carried out activities that support RCMP Program Activity 2.1 International Policing Operations under sub-program 2.1.1 International Stability and Development. The Program is also referenced under sub-sub-program 2.1.1.1. International Peace Operations. Through participation in IPP missions, the RCMP addressed the transnational scope of crime and terrorism by building relationships with international policing partners and by supporting law enforcement capacity for states at risk.

There was alignment between PS’s Departmental priorities, its SOs and the IPP Program. The Program directly contributes to PS’s SO of building A Safe and Resilient Canada. Under this SO, the Program is particularly aligned to PS’s Program 1.3 on Countering Crime and sub-programs 1.3.1 on Crime Prevention and 1.3.2 on Law Enforcement Leadership. In particular, the Program provides an opportunity to advance government-wide priorities that include international initiatives which impact public safety.

Alignment to mandates and roles and responsibilities

As stated in the MOU, GAC’s responsibilities included “defining and reviewing the expected foreign policy results of proposed IPP operations and the appropriateness in the geographic context”. GAC’s responsibilities, activities and tasks in the SOP were found to be generally consistent and in accordance with the descriptions in the MOU.

RCMP’s mission, “to preserve the peace, uphold the law and provide quality service in partnership with our communities,”extends internationally through the IPP Program as it provides operational support services to other police and law enforcement agencies abroad. As it relates to international policing, this Program addresses the transnational scope of crime and terrorism by building relationships with international policing partners. The RCMP actively participates in multiple missions abroad in a peacekeeping role and by providing support to nations at risk in building their law enforcement capacity. Domestically, the RCMP leads in the role to consult with domestic stakeholders, including police services and associations in regards to consideration of domestic security and policing interests.

PS is responsible for providing policy advice to the Minister on all matters related to international policing engagements as they relate to national security and public safety. This includes reflecting domestic considerations to the extent possible in IPP Program decision-making. PS’s responsibilities in the IPP Program are aligned with their Department’s mandate to promote safer communities by continuing to provide policy leadership, program support and research in areas such as national security, border strategies and countering crime.

4.3 Performance Issue 4: Achievement of Expected Outcomes

Findings 7, 8 and 9 follows the CPA Logic Model in Appendix 2.

Finding 7: The IPP Program has developed performance measurement tools to track, monitor and report on deployment activities and outputs. However, the tools were not consistently used to report on performance nor were they directly aligned with the outcomes in the CPA logic model.

The IPP Program developed a number of tools to track, monitor and report on mission activities and outputs, including: Program and mission specific Performance Management Frameworks (PMFs) and logic models; monthly operational reports; contingent commander reports; closure of mission reports; lessons learned reports; and, Individual Monthly Reports/Individual Quarterly Reports (IMRs/IQRs). Despite a concerted effort to track deployment activities and outputs, the evaluation found that these reports were not standardized and did not consistently align activities and outputs to the expected outcomes as identified by the CPA logic model (Appendix 2). This impacted the ability of the Program to consistently capture and demonstrate achieved results.

While the outcomes contained in the Program’s PMF were somewhat aligned with outcomes contained in the CPA logic model, outcome language varied between documents. The evaluation also found that the Program’s PMF was incomplete and did not consistently track or report on the outcomes for each mission over the years. The PMF for 2013/14 fiscal year was missing indicators, making it difficult to assess how results were measured. There were no collection tables for the other fiscal years resulting in information gaps on performance. The 2013/14 CPA Annual Report identified the need to develop PMF’s per mission. The Haiti mission and two of the three specialized teams had their own logic model and PMF but the Program only fully reported on performance indicators in 2013/14. With the exception of data collected on Canadian police officers skills through IMRs/IQRs, there was no evidence that the Program consistently monitored, tracked or reported on domestic benefits in a standardized fashion. While domestic benefits is a secondary consideration for mission selection, the Program is responsible for capturing performance information on domestic benefits in the output, immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcomes stage as identified in the CPA logic model.

A review of the IPP Program’s tracking, monitoring and reporting documents also showed a lack of distinction between reporting on activities and reporting on results (outputs/outcomes stated in the CPA Logic Model). This undermined the Program’s ability to demonstrate results achieved in support of the Program’s expected outcomes. For example, Closure of Mission Reports mostly listed activities and did not consistently link these activities to the achievement of broader outcomes. Planning documents, such as reports on mission needs assessments, did not define or set the expected baseline information and data sources that would contribute to reporting on activities and results. The evaluation revealed that Canadian police officers were at times unaware of the expected outcomes of their mission reporting that there was a lack of guidance on what they were expected to achieve.

Finding 8: While the IPP Program has contributed to the achievement of results under its immediate and intermediate outcomes, the extent to which they were met could not be measured as there was a lack of performance information. In particular, this was evident in the outcomes of strengthened judicial systems and domestic benefits.

The evaluation found that the IPP Program has contributed to the achievement of results under its Immediate Outcomes, including: International Efforts-Enhanced GC and international capacity to respond to crises in fragile states, Police Reform-Increased ability of law enforcement to provide security, Policing Services-Increased skills and knowledge of local police force, and, in some cases, International Justice-Increased capability of international criminal courts or tribunals to advance ROL. The Program also contributed toward the achievement of results under its Intermediate Outcomes of Strengthened GC and international responses to crises situations in fragile states and Strengthened institutions in fragile states, in particular law enforcement institutions. The evaluation noted that linkages between the outputs and the Intermediate Outcome of Strengthened judicial systems was less clear and there was limited evidence to support achievement in this area. For policing to function effectively, it is necessary that the international community invests in establishing ROL across the criminal justice system, including the prosecution, justice and corrections sectors.

The missions of focus highlight how some of the immediate and intermediate outcomes were achieved.

Afghanistan

• Despite numerous challenges, the IPP deployments in Afghanistan made progress on the immediate outcomes of the logic model. Results were not routinely captured in reporting documents. However, interviewees and external sources noted that the Program enhanced GC and international capacity to provide law enforcement support through the deployment of Canadian police officers to EUPOL, NTM-A, MCTF and IPCB; increased the ability of the ANP to provide for the security and human rights of the local population; and, increased the skills and knowledge of the ANP. The increase in the skills and knowledge of the ANP and their ability to provide security was exemplified in a 2013 national survey conducted by the Asia Foundation which found that, overall, 72 percent of Afghan respondents felt confident in the ability of the ANP. In particular, 86 percent believed that the ANP helps to improve security and 85 percent felt that the ANP was honest and fair with the Afghan population. The ability of the ANP to provide security was also demonstrated in the 2014 election polls during which there was a noticeable reduction in the expected violence due, in part, to the presence of the ANP at polling stations.

• The IPP deployments also contributed to the Program’s intermediate outcomes of strengthened GC and international responses in Afghanistan and strengthened Afghan law enforcement institutions, in particular, the ANP. With the support of Canadian police officers, the Afghan 10 Year Vision for the ANP was completed in early 2013/14, resulting in a strengthened ANP capable of assuming full responsibility for its policing. Furthermore, the Canadian police deployments indirectly contributed to the intermediate outcome of strengthening judicial systems by enforcing norms around ROL in the police force and training ANP officers on proper investigation procedures. An initiative by a Canadian police officer deployed to EUPOL contributed to enhancing collaboration between the ANP and the Afghan justice sector.

Haiti

• IPP deployments complemented the engagement of OGDs and other programs working in SSR including DND, CSC and development. The Program contributed toward CPA logic model Outputs and Immediate Outcomes in Police Reform and Policing Services by: increasing the ability of the HNP to provide for the security and human rights of the population; and, increasing the HNP’s skills and knowledge. The HNP are now trained in a number of new skills such as using police dogs at airports and community policing which can be attributed, in part, to the work of Canadian police officers. The HNP are also taking more of a community policing approach to reduce crime by completing spot checks on cars and providing their number to community members in case of emergencies.

• In terms of the intermediate outcomes, there has been significant progress towards strengthened law enforcement institutions and Canada’s response to specific crisis in Haiti. Interviews confirmed that there has been a noticeable increase in the capacity of the HNP over the past five years and an increase in their overall professionalization due to the work of MINUSTAH and Canadian police deployments. For instance, there was an observable increase in the HNP’s capacity to monitor and track records; interpret and apply laws; and, interact with different situations such as providing assistance in Internally Displaced Persons camps.

• There were some challenges in achieving planned results in Haiti due in part to the funding structure as defined in the Program’s foundational documents. Some Canadian police officers sent to train and mentor the HNP did not have access to the funds to support training tools. A few interviewees noted that it affected the ability of some Canadian police officers to perform their duties. Some officers secured funds outside the Program, including through their own personal efforts, in order to address gaps in resources.

West Bank

• IPP deployments to EUPOL COPPS and Op PROTEUS achieved its immediate outcomes of enhancing the capacity of the GC and international community to respond to instability in the region; increasing the ability of the PCP to provide security; and, increasing the skills and knowledge of the PCP. In 2012, EUPOL COPPS released the results of two independent surveys on Palestinian attitudes towards the PCP which found that 78 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank held a positive view of the PCP and 91 percent of Palestinians said they would choose to call the PCP if they felt endangered. A few interviews noted civilians have greater access to a fair police force that is judicious in its use of force and arrests and able to exchange security information with ISF. However, they noted that progress was still needed.

• Progress has also been made toward achieving the intermediate outcomes of strengthened GC and international responses to instability in the region and strengthened law enforcement institutions in the West Bank. The Program is aligned with the GC’s investment package to support the justice and security sector in the West Bank. EUPOL COPPS and Op PROTEUS, both of which involve Canadian police officers, have been credited with establishing basic law and order in the region and increasing the professionalism of the Palestinian Security Forces, including the PCP. More specifically, Canadian police officers contributed to the development of a police code of conduct and assisted in the expansion of PCP capacity across 12 districts which strengthened law enforcement institutions in the West Bank.

Weaknesses in the logic model

The evaluation found that in order for the IPP Program to reasonably achieve the entirety of its outcomes as stipulated by the CPA logic model, there is a need for stronger links between Program outputs, the immediate outcomes of police reform and policing services, and the intermediate outcome of strengthened judicial systems. This is particularly important considering that the Program structure does not clearly permit the deployment of civilian experts. In addition, there is no plan on how to consistently capture or measure the secondary consideration of domestic benefits as it is identified as part of the expected results (Finding 7). The latter challenge is further amplified by the lack of defined outcomes and activities for domestic benefits.

Contributions of the Senior Police Advisor (SPA) at Canada’s Permanent Mission in New York (PRMNY)

The previous evaluation recommended that the CPA enhance its use of diplomatic channels in UN missions. Since then, a Special Police Advisor (SPA) has been deployed to PRMNY. The SPA is responsible for advancing Canada’s policing interests at the UN, serving as a primary point of contact for all Canadian UN police deployments. As appropriate, the SPA provides strategic advice and guidance and represents Canada in meetings and workings groups. The SPA interacts regularly with and receives direction from the CPA Partners.

The SPA has contributed to two Outputs:Canadian Police are deployed to multilateral peace operations and international organizations and Canadian Police expertise and technical assistance was provided to train, reform, professionalize and democratize local police and national law enforcement bodies in fragile states. The SPA has reduced some of the challenges related to the broader UN DPKO human resources system, including improving matches between deployed officers and available positions. Further, the SPA is involved in assessing the relevance of initial requests for deployments and has been involved in identifying opportunities for Canada to train police peacekeepers in other contributing countries. The latter has provided opportunities for Canada to influence norms related to police peacekeeping.

The SPA also supported part of an immediate outcome on International Efforts: to enhance capacity for international responses to develop international policy, standards and norms related to police peacekeeping. Canada’s diplomatic narrative on peacekeeping in the UN relies on insightful and timely information from its current deployments. This information is often via the SPA’s knowledge from Canadian police officers on the ground. Additionally, the SPA advanced and strengthened Canada’s position by working with like-minded countries, including through the development of key UN resolutions. The SPA supports Canada’s chairmanship of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of the UN (C34) and Canada’s chairing of the Ad-hoc working group on peacekeeping in Haiti.

In regards to the immediate outcome on Police Reform, the presence of the SPA and a second Canadian police officer deployed in the Transnational Organized Crime Unit of the UN Police Division allowed Canada to be directly engaged in the 2015 UN review on peacekeeping and an external review of the UN DPKO Police Division that took place in 2016.

Part of the success of the SPA is the position’s ability to adapt to shifting priorities in light of a steady decline in IPP deployments. The SPA was able to respond to emerging needs. For instance, the SPA supports Canada’s chair of the Friends of Corrections Group, with the engagement and collaboration of CSC and GAC, which supports more holistic ROL reforms.

Several interviewees noted that, while police are less well-known in peacekeeping compared to the military, the SPA has furthered a strong working relationship with UN DPKO and Canada’s contacts in likeminded countries. This provides Canada with access to contacts on specific issues and facilitates responsiveness to Canada’s requests related to peacekeeping. The role of the SPA is key as Canada does not emphasize the number of deployed police officers as a strategy to seek leadership and decision-making roles in the UN system.

Over the evaluation reference period, the SPA contributed to the intermediate outcome: Strengthened international responses to specific crisis situations in fragile states by enhancing diplomatic channels and supporting optimization of deployments.While the results of this role are significant, the reporting and documentation of these efforts as it pertains to the expected results of the CPA logic model is minimal. Improved reporting towards expected results would clearly define the opportunities and the expectations for diplomatic roles in the IPP Program.

Finding 9: The evaluation could not assess whether the Program achieved its ultimate outcome due to a lack of consistent performance reporting and factors beyond the reach of the Program.

Anecdotally, it was reported that the IPP Program contributes to greater security and stabilization in affected areas by addressing police reform which is a necessary component of long term security and stabilization in fragile and conflict affected areas. As such, it was difficult for the evaluation to assess the extent to which this outcome was achieved for several reasons.

First, the IPP Program lacked documentation on the extent to which the ultimate outcome was achieved. Second, while the UN acknowledges that SSR is essential for achieving long term security and stability in post-conflict and fragile states, the Program’s focus on the deployment of police officers addresses only one pillar of SSR. Police reform is not sufficient on its own to ensure long term stabilization in fragile and conflict affected areas. The evaluation acknowledges that ultimate outcomes are intended to be overarching and broad. However, the achievement of the CPA ultimate outcome requires activities and resources that are outside the scope and mandate of the IPP Program.

Third, there are a number of independent factors that contribute to instability and state fragility, including political conditions and underdevelopment, which are beyond the reach of the Program. Fourth, as mentioned during the 2013 Annual General Meeting, performance in mission has been extremely difficult to measure as “intervention takes decades to see the results.” Attendees discussed the potential of introducing shorter term performance metrics and finding an area of specialization that would allow for better measurement of the ultimate outcome. The observations from the missions of focus place the reasons noted above into context.

Afghanistan

• The IPP Program experienced challenges in achieving its ultimate outcome of ensuring effective stabilization in Afghanistan due to socio-economic and political factors present within the country and difficulty in sustaining the Program’s intermediate results once it withdrew in 2014. It was noted in several interviews that the Program needed to stay longer in Afghanistan in order to achieve its ultimate outcome which requires greater sustainability of its immediate and intermediate outcomes.In terms of capacity and overall ability, the ANP is further behind the ANA which received funding and mentoring from the international community over a longer period. Indeed, the Asia Pacific Foundation’s 2013 survey confirmed that support for the ANA across the country was significantly higher than support for the ANP.In 2014, the Foundation also found that 55.7 percent of respondents believed that the ANSF, which includes the ANP, still needed foreign support to do their job properly.

Haiti

• The IPP Program has made some progress towards achieving its ultimate outcome of long term stability and security in Haiti. For instance, PMF results for the Haiti mission collected in 2013/14 show a marginal downward trend in crime statistics and, in particular, that the average number of kidnappings decreased by 53 percent compared to the previous year. A survey conducted in 2013 revealed that 88 percent of the 2000 respondents felt that the HNP was doing a good job at reducing crime. Nonetheless, there are a number of challenges beyond the control of the Program that impact the achievement of long-term security and stability in Haiti, including socio-economic and political factors within the country and challenges with MINUSTAH.At times, MINUSTAH was seen as an invading power and was met with animosity by the general population. This was identified as a challenge for Canadian police officers in securing buy-in with the Haitian community.

West Bank

• Challenges continue for the IPP Program in achieving its ultimate outcome in the West Bank given the current socio-economic and political context. There are constraints on what the Program can reasonably achieve given that the PCP exercises limited control over the West Bank territory and does not control its own borders. The lack of progress towards peace and ongoing tensions between Israel and Palestine at the political level affected the ability of the Program to deliver upon its full mandate. For instance, there were challenges in obtaining Israeli approval for equipment and forensic chemicals for the PCP which affected training and police operations. The ability of the PA to fund police operations has presented another difficulty. In 2014, the Israeli government withheld the taxes it collects on behalf of the PA in response to the PA’s decision to seek membership in the International Criminal Court. As a result, PCP officers received only 60 percent of their December salary and it constrained day-to-day police operations.

Finding 10: Deployments resulted in both unintended positive and negative outcomes internationally and domestically in Canada.

Surpassing expectations in the fragile and conflict–affected state or communities

Canadian police officers deployed to CPA missions have performed beyond their expected duties by supporting local vulnerable populations, reacting professionally during natural disasters and building collaborative partnerships.

Canadian police officers supported communities in Haiti and South Sudan through volunteer work at the local orphanages. The Canadian contingent regularly visited orphanages and brought toys and food, some even continued to do so after their deployment was over. In South Sudan, a deployed officer volunteered at a children’s centre, “Confident Children out of Conflict”.

In Haiti, Canadian police officers deployed throughout the country became an unintended positive asset for capturing fuller on-the-ground information to report on security and stability for PRNCE^Footnote 16. They also formed a number of international partnerships to enhance the delivery of activities, as noted in Finding 5.

Unintended positive impact for recruitment of officers in Canada police partners

The ability to be deployed into the IPP Program missions, are at times, a positive recruitment incentive for Canadian police partners. For instance, the Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal has promoted the Program deployments in a variety of media.

Unintended negative impact- misconduct by Canadian police in Haiti

The 2016 Report of the UN Secretary-General on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by peacekeepers demonstrates that nearly all Canadian police officers deployed to UN missions behave in a respectful manner that is consistent with the principles of the UN and Canadian values. From 2011 to 2015, out of nearly 600 Canadian police deployments, there were five reported cases of sexual misconduct. These actions are in direct violation of the UN zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. It also violates the Program’s policy which strictly forbids sexual relations with the citizens of host countries, due to the difference in real or perceived power and authority. All deployed personnel are informed of this policy prior to and during pre-deployment training in Canada and each individual must sign a letter agreeing to refrain from sexual relations with the local population of the site to which they are deployed. In each of the five cases of reported sexual misconduct, the accused officers were immediately repatriated to Canada.

Canadian police in mission are subject to the code of conduct of their police service and that of the host organization. They are expected to uphold the highest standards of conduct at all times. Allegations of serious or criminal misconduct against Canadian police officers are investigated in mission by the host organization (e.g. the UN). The RCMP is kept apprised of the investigation and its outcomes. In addition, the Canadian police service to which the member belongs to initiates its own internal code of conduct investigation. Once a police officer has returned to Canada, any disciplinary action for misconduct in mission is the responsibility of the officer’s home police service.

During the evaluation period, the RCMP implemented a number of measures to prevent sexual misconduct and to further align with Canada’s National Action Plan (CNAP) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). Through the Enhanced Selection Process (see Finding 13) the RCMP began to further screen applications sent by partner police agencies. In addition, pre-deployment training for police deploying to peace operations included sessions on cultural awareness, gender awareness, code of conduct and ethics. Pre-deployment training for police deploying to United Nations peace operations also included two mandatory online modules which addressed Effective Mandate Implementation and Standards, Values and Core Business, as well as key elements to effectively implement a mission’s mandate, international human rights law, and expectations of members in mission.

Finding 11: Deployed Canadian police officers contributed to gender initiatives to promote the participation and protection of women in the affected areas. However, there was limited evidence to suggest that gender is strategically taken into consideration in mission selection criteria, planning and implementation.

There were several examples of Canadian police officers taking gender into consideration in mission projects and activities. These initiatives supported the implementation of CNAP for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions on WPS and contributed toward results under the pillars of Prevention, Participation, and Protection. For instance, in Afghanistan, several Canadian police officers collaborated with the Netherlands’ Military Gender Advisors who provided Afghan police women with uniforms to assist in their equal participation in policing. In Kyrgyzstan, Canadian police officers created a safe space for girls to discuss harmful traditions, such as bride kidnapping, and worked with community leaders to create awareness and promote the protection of girls. In Haiti, Canadian police officers deployed to the SGBV Unit worked with a Norwegian-Canadian team to train HNP officers on SGBV. Canadian police have also been deployed into the MINUSTAH gender unit, including as its head.

The IPP Program also supported the UN’s efforts to increase female police participation in peace operations by delivering training for an all-female Pre-Assessment for Mission Service (AMS) Selection Assistance and Assessment Team (SAAT) project. The UN observed low pass rates among female candidates during mandatory UN SAAT testing and requested Canada’s assistance in providing instructors to help implement a two-week pre-SAAT training course.For the first time in 2014/15, Canadian police officers received SAAT training in Ottawa and subsequently travelled to Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Rwanda and Benin to deliver AMS SAAT training in the areas of language, shooting and driving skills to assist female officers to pass their UN SAAT testing. In total, 373 female candidates participated in the Pre-AMS SAAT training sessions in 2014. As of January 2015, pass rates increased from 37 percent to 71 percent for deployments to unarmed UN missions and increased from 30 percent to 45 percent for deployment to armed UN missions.

There is evidence that the IPP Program has integrated gender considerations into some reporting tools, in particular under the theme of protecting women and girls’ human rights. Starting in 2012/13, all deployed police officers were required to capture in their IMRs/IQRs any incidence of observed or credibly reported violations of women and girls’ human rights and determine whether these were reported and acted upon by the appropriate mission authorities.

While the IPP Program has made some progress in integrating gender considerations into missions, there is limited evidence of strategic guidance and consideration under this thematic area. For instance, gender considerations are absent from the 13 points for selecting IPP operations that are outlined in the MOU and SOP. In addition, the RCMP is responsible for developing a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) document for each IPP operation. The evaluation found two completed reports over the evaluation reference period with two sub-sections on gender-related issues.

Finding 12: There has been an increase of female Canadian police officers participating in the IPP Program, through targeted initiatives, such as the use of communications tools and specific language in job posters to encourage women to apply.

Figure 2: Percentage of Female Officers Deployed through the IPP Program (March 2011-March 2015)

The IPP Program has made significant progress since 2011 in increasing the active participation and involvement of female police officers. In 2014/15, the Program successfully achieved and surpassed the 20 percent female target set by the UN (See Figure 2). From April 2011 to March 2015, there was a 12 percentage point increase in females participating in the Program.

A number of senior positions were occupied by female officers over the reference period. These positions included: the SPA to PRMNY, Senior Police Advisor and Team Leader to EUPOL COPPS, Deputy Head of the International Police Coordination Board in Afghanistan, Chief of MINUSTAH in the Community Policing Unit, Director General of International Policing (Ottawa) and Director of RCMP’s International Affairs and Policy Development Branch (Ottawa).

The increase in Canadian female police officer participation can be attributed in part to efforts undertaken by the IPP Program. In 2012/13, the RCMP reviewed its recruitment tools to identify challenges and barriers to female police officers’ participation in international police peace operations. The majority of stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation were aware of one or more actions and/or initiatives that had been undertaken to increase Canadian female police participation in the Program. For instance, the RCMP highlighted female participation through its communications by presenting pictures and stories from female police officers on mission and participation in international events. In 2012/13, job bulletins advertising employment opportunities for peace operations began including language encouraging women to apply in alignment with the RCMP’s employment equity objectives and the GC Employment Equity Act.

As part of the IPP Program’s pre-deployment training, a concerted effort was made to provide courses that addressed the differential impact of armed conflict on women and girls by including modules on gender, WPS, and SGBV. As required, the RCMP offers pre-deployment courses that focused on mission-specific gender issues. For instance, Canadian police officers deployed to Haiti were given training on human trafficking in Haiti, and information about MINUSTAH and its Gender Unit. In 2015, the RCMP introduced a Peace Operations Training Institute course for deployed police officers that focus specially on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 on WPS. Over the evaluation reference period, the RCMP also selected a number of Canadian police personnel to undergo additional training on gender issues in conflict. In 2013/14, two Canadian police officers completed a ‘Gender in Operations’ course at the European Security Defence College. In 2012/13, two female Canadian police officers participated in a UN course on preventing and investigating SGBV.

As part of the IPP Program, the RCMP continues to actively address barriers to women’s full participation in police peace operations. The relevant unit recently conducted a literature review to identify additional barriers. The evaluation was not able to assess whether the increase in female police officer participation had an impact on operational effectiveness as gender-related performance data is not tracked.

4.4 Performance Issue 5: Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy

Finding 13: The IPP Program has a formalized selection process and has made enhancements to respond to mission-specific needs. Improvements have also been made to the pre-deployment training and duty of care.

Selection process

Once a mission has received Ministerial approval, a recruitment team within the RCMP is responsible for the selection process. The RCMP posts available international police peacekeeping positions, both internally and externally. There are general selection criteria candidates must meet prior to applying for an international deployment. This criteria may be modified to address mission-specific requirements or compliance with UN selection criteria. For instance, specialized teams in Haiti (MINUSTAH) have defined objectives and outcomes with respective duties which are factored into the selection criteria for these positions to ensure selection of specialized candidates. Results from a combination of interviews and an IPP Program administered survey demonstrate that the majority of deployed Canadian police officers agreed that IDS provides sufficient information to select quality candidates.

As a result of recommendations from the 2012 evaluation, the IPP Program made changes to the selection process, including the requirement for two additional reference checks and an additional attestation letter from their respective police force. These changes helped to develop the Enhanced Selection Process (ESP), approved in February 2016. The ESP was developed to identify and match candidates to specific mission requirements so as to ensure the strongest and most suitable candidates are selected. Through the ESP, the RCMP began to further screen applications sent by partner police agencies and recommended the most suitable candidates for medical and psychological assessments. At the time of the evaluation, the ILDC was in the process of finalizing the SOPs for the ESP so that consistent standards are used by the police partners to identify candidates.

Pre-deployment

RCMP training for IPP deployments is given six weeks prior to deployment and can take between one to six weeks. The evaluation’s review of documents found that the average training period ranges from one to three weeks depending on the complexity of the mission’s mandate and operational environment. For instance, evaluation evidence noted there was mission-specific weapons-training added to the training curriculum for Haiti and Afghanistan missions since these deployments were armed. Mission-specific training may also include modules on human rights, international law or mine awareness.

Pre-deployment training is designed to prepare candidates for working and living in an international environment. The core training program is divided into three general areas: duty of care responsibilities; a generic understanding of the host organization and its core values; and, human rights. In 2012/13, the ILDC made changes to enhance the training curriculum in a number of areas. Intended improvements to the training curriculum were further identified in the Program’s 2014/15 Annual Plan. Of note was the Program’s plan to, “shift from awareness-based training to practical-based training with a more hands-on approach, training on leadership and mentoring as well as a greater focus on Security Sector Reform (SSR) and cultural awareness.”

The majority of interviewees asked, agreed they were adequately trained for the mission in which they served. In a 2012 IPP Program administered survey, a few respondents noted additional training was provided from their respective police agency for some of the following reasons:

• perceived shortfalls by the municipal/provincial police service of the IPP Program’s pre-deployment training;
• information provided by IHPW during training, for operational stress injury and peer/family support was perceived not to be reflective of present mission realities; and,
• members’ desire for more practical/one-on-one training and discussions with recently returned mission participants to discuss practical matters.

Beyond RCMP training, police officers participating in multilateral missions may also receive additional specialized training. The RCMP requires police officers to complete four online training modules, available through the Canadian Police Knowledge Network, that provide a strategic overview of peace operations, their establishment and functioning, implementing their mandate, as well as values and core business. Officers must pass this training prior to participating in the Program’s pre-deployment training in Ottawa. For EU missions, police officers attended a pilot course, offered by the EU, in 2015 for three-and-half days in Brussels prior to arriving in mission. The intent of the pilot was to socialize officers to the EU-specific mission and to the general workings of the EU.

The IPP Program has been exploring alternative training programs and delivery models from other likeminded states. For instance, the Program conducted a comparative analysis of similar delivery models from Norway and Sweden which resulted in eight recommendations specific to training. At the time of this evaluation, three of these recommendations were implemented. These included: enhanced code of conduct and ethics training; a full-day training workshop on WPS; and, a capacity-building workshop for Haiti (shorter version for smaller missions). Due to capacity issues, implementation of the other recommendations was still outstanding (e.g. increase inter-cultural awareness, training for senior strategic positions; as well as the addition of scenario based and international instructors in the pre-deployment training).

Duty of care

Often referred to as “duty of care”, the RCMP is responsible for the occupational health and safety of all Canadian police personnel deployed in an international peace operation. This responsibility requires a team of specialized professionals including psychologists and occupational health and travel medicine nurses and doctors. The RCMP’s International Health Protection & Wellness (IHPW) section is responsible for mitigating health risks and providing health support during a mission cycle. IHPW is involved throughout all phases of the deployment process - pre-deployment, in mission and post- deployment. Evidence shows that IHPW has conducted research to gather quantitative data on the impact(s) missions have had on the police officers’ health and well-being and to their families. In addition, IHPW developed written resources and tools to support police officers in all phases of deployment.

Of the interviews conducted with Canadian police officers currently deployed or having participated in an IPP mission, the majority stated that the duty of care/support they and their family received was good. The most cited examples were medical/psychological support received while on mission and duty of care received through pre-deployment training. In terms of areas for further improvement, half of these interviewees suggested there should be better duty of care and support for the officers and to their families. A few mentioned the management of expectations prior to application and deployment and the inclusion of families in the pre-deployment training process.

While the Program has made a number of improvements to its duty of care, the results and impact of these improvements were not documented at the time of the evaluation. For instance, IHPW developed a Duty of Care Framework with the intent to help secure the health and well-being of all Canadian police officers by making them better aware of the potential risks while working abroad and developing mitigation strategies to minimize those risks. In 2014 the Program administered a survey to police officers that had been deployed looking at post mission outcomes related to health, family and work reintegration. A smaller survey was also administered in 2015 to gather information about the perspective of spouses on challenges during mission and their views on the need for support.

Also in support of duty of care, the Program develops threat and risk assessments prior to deployments.These assessments take into account factors such as: disease in the area of operation, access to health facilities, living conditions; and, transportation. As part of pre-deployment training, officers receive the information contained in assessment at the proper security level. They may also receive an extra module entitled “special situations” which provides up-to-date intelligence and mission-specific content. Given the security classification of these assessments, the number and extent to which these assessments support duty of care could not be determined given their security classification.

Support – in mission

The IHPW provides a range of support to deployed police officers while in mission, including medical support, psychological support, peer counselling and a critical incident plan. A contract was signed in 2013/14 with a new medical emergency assistance provider to enhance medical assistance for RCMP and partner police officers while on mission. There were also internal processes developed and implemented with the intent to “enhance deployed police officers’ ability to receive emergency medical assistance while deployed on mission.”

In addition to the above noted services, IHPW developed educational materials on topics such as communication while in mission; stages of adaptation to mission and to support partners and family members. The intent is to provide these materials as online resources. However, implementation was ongoing at the time of the evaluation.

In addition to the role of the IHPW, the Program has a primary point of contact for family members to refer to or to contact while the police officer is deployed. Should a situation arise, family members and/or the deployed police officer can contact the desk officer from the Program or the RCMP’s National Operations Centre. IDS also has a peer and family support coordinator in Ottawa.

The views regarding support provided by the RCMP to families that was gathered from interviews was mixed. A few interviewees did not believe that frequent support from the Program was required. However, an equal number of interviewees felt that support for the families was not adequate. A couple other interviewees felt that the support given to families was good. A larger survey also administered by the Program in 2014, solicited comments from respondents on recommendations for support to spouses during missions. The most common recommendation (28 percent) was for check-in calls to be made from the Program or from an IHPW representative.

Overall, while there is evidence that the Program offers deployed police officers support while in mission, there was minimal evidence that there was routine or formalized support to family members of deployed police officers.

Post-mission: re-integration

There is evidence of a re-integration process that considers duty of care for deployed police officers. All personnel, upon their return from mission, are assessed medically and psychologically by health professionals to ensure that they are fit to return to work. All police officers returning from mission are given a minimum of two weeks of personal leave prior to returning to work. There was also evidence that the RCMP liaises with police partners as required with regards to their deployed police officers during the re-integration process.

Police officers also provide debriefs to outline their: observations of the mission; assessment of the recruitment process; and, deployment and administrative processes. They also comment on what they have taken away from the mission experience; and, what their mission experience might mean for their policing duties back to Canada. However, it was unclear whether the information gathered through de-briefs is used to inform improvements to the IPP Program.

Given the high level of risks involved during the Afghanistan missions, a Third Location Decompression (TLD) Program was developed. The TLD Program, which was police-specific, was to provide an environment that promoted rest, mental and emotional adjustment to stress arising from the mission and to prepare police officers for re-integration into family and work life upon their return from mission.” Overall, 18 TLD sessions were delivered by the end of the mission in March 2014.

From the TLD Program’s inception, the IPP Program administered an evaluation form to police officers following their participation in the TLD. In total, 223 police officers completed the Program’s evaluation form. Based on the results collected by the Program, the TLD was regarded as “a valuable experience” for more than 90 percent of those attending. Eighty-nine percent felt they were well informed and prepared for the transition back to life at home, and 88 percent felt better rested, physically and mentally, for the return. Ninety-six percent recommend the program and 97.6 percent thought that some form of a TLD was a good idea.

IHPW is in the process of drafting a booklet which lays out what to expect once an officer returns from mission from a physical and mental health point of view that is specific for police. Adapted from an Australian model, the booklet includes sections such as homecoming, intimacy, children young and old, back to work, dealing with anger, and alcohol. The intent is to provide the guide to all deploying officers and their families to better prepare them for the homecoming and re-integration process.

When asked if the IPP Program’s re-integration process is working well, the results were mixed. Less than half of the interviewees agreed while a few others disagreed. Regarding ways in which the re-integration process could be improved, the most often cited areas were: re-integration support/communication with RCMP headquarters; more recognition of their international work upon return; and, mentioned by two interviewees, expanding the third location decompression.

Finding 14: CPA governance (e.g. committees, MOU, and SOP) provides a clear operational structure. However, there are some challenges in its design and implementation.

Observations in this finding address the structure and management of the IPP Program, including the process of the three Partners to select missions, seek authorization from three ministers and prepare for deployment.

Committees

To coordinate collaborative decision-making, the Program is supported by an inter-departmental committee structure comprised of a Director-level Working Group, a DG-level Advisory Committee, and an ADM-level Steering Committee. Detailed roles and membership are described in Section 2.3.

The CPA Director-level Working Group is expected to meet monthly, or as needed. Over the reference period, the WG averaged just over nine times per fiscal year. Analysis showed that the WG meetings were a fruitful forum to work out issues of the Program. The WG provided opportunities to discuss issues and bring together the various positions of the CPA Partners. The WG records demonstrate that the meetings presented useful opportunities to consider missions, including rationales for their rejection. Overall, the WG was a good forum to review incoming requests among the Partners as there were instances where action was agreed to quickly, including a mission assessment with possible approval and authorization.

The creation of the DG Advisory Committee has been a positive evolution since it became a formal and integral part of the IPP Program’s decision-making process. This Committee is to meet on a quarterly basis, or as needed. During the reference period, this committee met at least five times. Documents reviewed and interviews conducted confirmed that it provided greater coherence amongst the Partners. This Committee is expected to review rapid deployment requests and approve the Annual Plan and Annual Report. Interviewees noted that the DG committee was useful for reviewing content, and providing oversight and strategic advice.

The ADM-level committee is intended to support coherence and information-sharing among the Partners. ADMs are to meet at least annually but corporate records only confirm two meetings during the reference period. These two meetings were held for strategic-level discussions such as ministerial approvals and other governance matters. There was less evidence that it was used for decision-making. Some interviewees viewed it as a less relevant committee since holding an ADM-level meeting is not always the most appropriate method for informing this level of senior management.

In both the WG and DG meetings, the evaluation found evidence of updates on existing missions, discussions of proposed and new missions, along with decisions and some documented rationale. Representatives from all Partners were present at these meetings. Meetings at these two levels were not held as frequently as intended. The evaluation found there were challenges in the ADM-level committee to fully achieve its intended role.

CPA MOU and the SOP

The CPA Partners’ managerial and accountability relationship are defined in its MOU and SOP. The evaluation found that the MOU and SOP complement each other. The CPA MOU has an overview of each Partners’ roles and responsibilities while the SOP has details that are intended to describe, step-by-step, an effective managerial relationship.

Nonetheless, there are areas of operation and guidance that could be improved upon within the documents. For instance, the evaluation found that it was difficult to distinguish the type and number of police officers that could be deployed without ministerial approval for training, short-term assignments or technical assistance. IPP Program staff also sought legal clarification on this matter. There is opportunity to clarify and adjust the guidance in the SOP during the renewal process in a manner that responds to current needs and achievement of expected results.

Deployment priorities were not always clear for all three Partners when implementing the governance documents. While the RCMP started using an ISF in 2014/15 to support mission selection, some interviewees within the RCMP noted a need for more strategic and forward planning within the mission selection process. RCMP interviewees also remarked that there was a lack of clarity when it came to CPA Partners’ roles and responsibilities, while the small sample of PS interviewees noted that efficiencies could be gained by having common priorities among the three Partners. The majority of RCMP interviewees stated that decisions to support IPP deployments were based on CPA Partners' priorities. Almost half of these RCMP interviewees also referenced political decisions and GC priorities equally. Some referenced the feasibility of the mission as a factor the RCMP considered when deciding to support a mission. Finding 4 addresses how the IPP Program advanced the GC foreign policy objectives in detail.

GAC interviewees remarked positively that the balance of work is not rigidly tied to the MOU and they felt there was good cooperation and flexibility demonstrated by Partners when developing the corporate reports. With regards to areas that worked well within the governance structure, a few RCMP interviewees mentioned good collaboration between CPA Partners, the WG structure, the governance aspect and re-engineering of the International Program within RCMP as areas that were working well.

Over the evaluation reference period, a majority of RCMP interviewees viewed that they were becoming more influential or had a good level of influence on the decision-making process on mission selection. Nevertheless, the RCMP expressed further interest to take on a more prominent role within the IPP Program and to not be perceived as solely the “delivery arm” of the Program.

Authorization of deployments

The authorization of deployments requires the approval of three ministers.^Footnote 17 Interviewees remarked that the authorization process to seek approval from three ministers for deployments was cumbersome demonstrating inefficiency in governance design.

The WG expressed that the authorization process was a challenge to plan for deployments, given that the rotational cycle and that approval timelines where unknown or varied. A majority of interviewees noted that delays in authorizing missions affected the number of deployments within a fiscal year. It hindered the Program’s ability to undertake discussions on: candidate selection or personnel rotations; shaping roles with international organizations; as well as notification of potential closures of missions.

As well, the requirement for a biannual omnibus^Footnote 18 memo seeking extension of missions proved problematic as questions on one mission potentially delayed approvals for all missions. The omnibus memo was intended to create efficiency, but threatened to be a bottleneck in 2015. Accordingly, the omnibus memo was adjusted to create separate memos in order to avoid deployment delays. Interviewees expressed an interest in other options to approve deployments such as delegated authority or incorporating deployments into other approval documents (e.g. country-related programming) while maintaining the IPP Program’s own funding source.

Thirteen points of assessment of missions

The evaluation found that there are gaps in how the IPP Program assesses requests for police officer deployments. According to the MOU and the SOPs, each proposed operation is to be assessed against the guidelines of the policy framework, referred to here as the 13 points. These 13 points of assessment range from Canadian foreign policy interests, to role of the policing personnel, to expected results, and domestic interests. The evaluation found that there was minimal documentation covering the analysis across all 13 points. There were only a few missions where all 13 points were comprehensively documented. It was not clear in which mission-specific planning or approval documents this information could be found. It was also not clear whether all 13 points were consistently considered and what level of detail was required. These points were designed to ensure missions aligned with strategic planning on priorities and results and reflected the political sensitivity connected to responding to requests for contribution when making recommendations to Ministers.

At the same time, a few interviewees noted that the 13 points and the assessments have been very useful. Consultations to support the assessment included relevant Geographic and thematic divisions at GAC, RCMP operational and financial unit and PS for domestic security. By the time a formal decision to approve a mission is sought, there is already agreement among the CPA Partners.

Amalgamated GAC

Historically, the IPP Program ended its bilateral funding arrangement with the former Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in 2006 when the RCMP received its A-based funding. Thereafter, former-CIDA was no longer required to engage in operational issues of the Program as there was no funding role. Between 2006 and 2013, former-CIDA signaled its interest to withdraw from its management responsibilities in the CPA MOU. Presently, in the amalgamated GAC, two ministers are required to approve existing and new missions. Working-level documents and interviews conducted found that the development representatives participated in CPA WG meetings on an ad hoc basis, particularly at the country-level, where their contribution is most relevant. Sources also noted that the role of development is valued, particularly for giving balance to discussions on longer term impact; providing knowledge of country–specific linkages; and, in consulting on new missions (some discussion in Finding 5).

DG and working-level documents and interviewees from GAC’s foreign affairs and development sections reaffirm a concern on the effectiveness or efficiency of signing authorities of two ministers in one department for authorizing deployments and approving the CPA MOU . Thus far, these concerns have been moved to senior management where decisions were postponed. The issues of police operations and reform have a limited role for development since this is outside of development priorities. The peace and security programming mandate is under foreign affairs, to which development can still provide country-specific input within GAC without being a part of the approval process. Interviews noted that these approvals and consultations can take place effectively at the Director/DG/ADM-level levels of management.

Finding 15: The IPP Program has numerous reporting requirements. The reports generated are not consistently produced nor do they indicate planned results and overall impact.

The evaluation noted that the IPP Program has numerous requirements to plan, track and monitor at the mission-level. As well, there are reporting requirements that encompass the entire Program’s planning, operations and results. The length, number, and types of documents suggest a heavy reporting load. Information contained in the reports was modeled after each other while reports of similar types were not standardized.

In August 2012, the IPP Program piloted a new monthly reporting tool (IMRs) for deployed officers. The IMR was designed to capture overall deployment successes; identify areas needing improvement; develop strategic priorities; and, respond to a number of government reporting requirements linked to program funding. Information in the IMRs supported the development of: Monthly Operations Reports; C-NAP reports; and, the CPA Annual Report. In October 2013, the IMR became mandatory for all missions and was adjusted to quarterly (IQRs) reporting to improve efficiency and the quality of the data included. The reports provide a snap shot of an activity or outcome at a specific point in time. One IMR/IQR noted that there were improvements made towards achieving the immediate outcome of Police Reform within the work of the PCP’s Jericho Police Training School in West Bank. Other IMR/IQRs collected information relating to working in community policing. While these reports were used to support broader reporting requirements, analysis of a sample of these reports did not find evidence that they were used to roll-up the activities in a manner that reported on planned outcomes of the Program or that further demonstrated the overall impact of the mission.

Needs Assessment Missions (NAMs) are in-mission visits to meet with stakeholders and other interlocutors in order to assess the following: requests for Canadian participation; the needs within the mission; whether the mission corresponds with current operational capacities and capabilities; alignment with CPA objectives and foreign policy priorities; and, to establish the parameters for possible Canadian contributions. Over the evaluation reference period, there were six NAM reports produced.

Four of the NAMs included more than one CPA partner. A few of them included GAC on the first visit. Following the first in-mission visit, RCMP deployment and/or health protection personnel returned to some of the mission areas to conduct a Recce^Footnote 19 (reconnaissance mission) to collect further logistical details. Subsequent visits may also take place to assess progress or to implement changes in a mission.

A review of six NAM reports found that the common components in the reports were: needs of the fragile state, potential areas of IPP Program contribution, review of host organization, review of potential international partners and conclusion. The NAM reports did not provide consistent information on WoG approach; duty of care; integration of broader development and security issues; and, linkages to CPA objectives and PMF. The length and level of detail across the NAM reports varied significantly.

The inconsistencies made it difficult to understand how the NAMs contribute to the planning of operations, delivery of results and duty-of-care for a mission, including the development of a Concept of Operations (CONOPS). In particular, there was limited detail on issues relating to logistical matters. The evaluation recognizes that some of these issues may have been addressed in subsequent Recces; however, there was no evidence of related documentation.

For each IPP mission, the CONOPS is a comprehensive document that identifies the objectives, expected results, duration and incremental costs, as well as administrative and logistical details of the mission. CONOPS should be consistent with the information contained in the memoranda for seeking approval of deployments. The evaluation found only two completed CONOPS out of 17 missions over the reference period. The lack of CONOPS was previously noted in the April 2013 Internal Audit from the Office of the Comptroller General. This lack of information creates challenges for:

• capturing performance measurement information;
• connecting monthly reports to activities and results;
• financial planning and understanding of a full cost of a mission;
• completed Close of Mission Reports/lessons learned to assess the extent to which performance measures were achieved; and,
• use in Annual Reports to summarize progress against mission objectives.

There were also no NAMs documented in developing the CONOPS for the mission in South Sudan. Analysis also points to the following weaknesses in the South Sudan CONOPS report:

• excessive historical details concerning the IPP Program; operational environment;
• lack of clarity on whether domestic benefits were considered for a particular mission;
• lack of information and descriptions on the role and purpose of potential deployments and subject areas;
• lack of financial forecasts of A-base and incremental;
• lack of performance measures, activities and outputs necessary for monthly, closure and annual reports, as it relates to the logic model; and,
• lack of a brief executive summary to inform broader users.

While CONOPS are aimed to guide policing activities on the ground, the overview would also be informative for broader GC use at Canadian missions in order to strengthen complementary of programs and policy considerations.

Closure of Mission Reports are prepared to assess the extent to which anticipated results were achieved, including the plans as outlined in the CONOPs. It is also expected to address a range of issues related to the contribution of the Canadian police deployments. Analysis of the six closure reports available found that; overall, they captured relevant issues in detail that would be useful for the development of future missions. Four of the reports had a similar structure, covering the following topics: Background, Foreign Policy Relevance, Overview, Achievement of Results, Management of Deployment and Lessons Learned. The Closure Report for Guatemala was missing the Foreign Policy Relevance section and three reports, including Guatemala, did not discuss interdepartmental and departmental coordination.

Further, four of these reports were still in draft stage after the missions had been closed for over 24 months. The SOPs do not specify a timeframe to complete Closure Reports once a mission is closed, nor is there guidance on whether non-traditional IPP deployments require such a report.

For Afghanistan, there was an End of Mission Report, rather than a Closure Report that was written in the first-person of a deployed officer, dated March, 2014. It addressed conditions on the ground, including security, human resources management, equipment, clothing, accommodation, benefits and financials. It did not provide information on the background of the mission, corporate results, relevance to Canadian foreign policy and lessons learned for the program.

A few interviewees mentioned that they would like to see more regular and broader sharing of reports beyond IPP Program colleagues, given the significant efforts to produce them.Other suggestions include better integration of the SSR perspective into mission reports and reporting that consolidated RCMP’s activities internationally. However, the Program had not produced an annual report for 2013/14 or 2014/15 nor an annual plan since 2014/15.

Overall, the evaluation found that reporting was generated at the mission activity-level which posed a challenge in determining overall impact and results of the Program. While the IPP Program has a heavy reporting load, there is room to improve reporting so that it clearly and consistently addresses delivery of results in the planning, operational and post-mission phases in a streamlined fashion.

Finding 16: The number of IPP Program support positions classified and staffed at RCMP headquarters has fluctuated below the authorized 54 FTEs. Based on the ratio of 3:1 between operational personnel in mission to headquarters support staff, the Program was understaffed in relation to the number of deployments in 2011/12 and 2012/13, and overstaffed in 2013/14 and 2014/15.

The CPA MOU prescribes the RCMP’s need to deliver timely deployments, targeting within four to eight weeks of the receipt of Ministerial approval. In addition, as described in Finding 13, the RCMP must provide adequate duty of care for those deployed, pre, during and post mission. Reflecting these responsibilities, the former-International Policing Development (IPD)/International Liaison and Deployment Centre (ILDC) is comprised of a variety of multidisciplinary and interconnecting units that continues to be refined and streamlined to ensure effective service delivery.

In 2008/09, a Program-led assessment of the capacity and function of the IPP Program determined 54 FTEs was required to support the deployment of up to 200 officers. Further, findings in this Assessment concluded that a ratio of operational personnel in mission to support employees should be 3:1. This ratio was developed in accordance with the best practices put forward by the Canadian Forces and the Australian Federal Police. A ratio that is greater than 3:1 could pose a risk to the Program’s ability to meet its deployment obligations and to provide adequate duty of care to those deployed. With cost increases since 2006, the Program has revised and lowered the deployment numbers from 200 to “up to 170” deployments in 2011.

In 2011, the IPP Program’s organizational chart outlined the 54 FTEs individual functions in the Program’s Annual Report. In February 2013, the RCMP initiated a re-engineering process across the Federal Policing business line which affected the Branch from which the IPP Program operated. This process continued until April 2015 and explored ways to consolidate processes relating to international deployments within the RCMP. In ILDC, staffing levels fluctuated during the reference period. As of March, 31, 2015, 35 positions had been classified^Footnote 20 with 19 remaining. Further, 31 out of the 54 CPA positions were staffed.

Table 5 lists the supporting sections within the RCMP that were charged with delivering, managing and supporting the IPP Program as of March 31, 2015. These include the number of funded, classified and staffed Program positions.

The RCMP interviewees expect that the IPP Program funded positions will continue to manage, develop, administer and support the Program. ILDC includes positions funded by the IPP Program and others that are funded by the RCMP. The changes are intended to improve efficiency and effectiveness across international programs, for instance by reducing duplication and mutually leveraging resources and on-the-ground knowledge back to RCMP’s HQ.

Table 6 identifies the number of RCMP HQ Support Staff (FTEs), ratio of Canadian police officers to support staff and the HQ support staff salary dollars per fiscal year. RCMP HQ has not staffed or classified all 54 authorized FTE positions.The average number of staffed FTEs has been 45.5 with an average salary cost of $4.5M per fiscal year, including Employee Benefits Plan (EBP).The majority of staffed employees within ILDC have been Regular Members followed by indeterminate full-time employees.

From 2011/12 to 2012/13 the ratio of the number of deployed officers to HQ staff was in excess of the 3:1 ratio. With fewer deployments in 2013/14 and 2014/15, HQ was overstaffed as the Program operated below the 3:1 ratio. ILDC noted that as a result of the 2012/13 GC decision to realign deployments, there was a steady decline in the number of authorized missions and Canadian police deployed. As such, the RCMP allowed HQ staff to decrease through attrition and new staffing actions were not prioritized.

The evaluation recognizes that while the IPP Program estimated the number of deployments per fiscal year, actual deployment numbers can fluctuate due to various reasons (i.e., authorizations, state of security, etc.) and generate uncertainty in the relative number of HQ Support Staff required in a given fiscal year. As well, deployments to unforeseen missions (i.e., Haiti Reconstruction) generate ambiguity around the level of support staff that is sufficient.

The evaluation gathered multiple views on issues related to the efficiency and effectiveness of the 54 FTEs. While some of these views are each supported by only a couple of respondents, it enriched the evaluation team’s understanding of the issue. Among interviews in RCMP, the majority of interviewees viewed the number of HQ staff as sufficient to support the delivery of the IPP Program. More than half caveated their response by stating that Program funding would be sufficient if all 54 FTE positions were staffed. A couple interviewees stated it was insufficient and a few others felt that the number of 54 HQ staff was excessive.

Among the relevant interviewees in GAC, almost all noted that they do not have a clear picture of the roles of the 54 HQ staff in RCMP. A few interviewees remarked it was difficult to comment on the effectiveness of 54 FTEs without this information. The evaluation recognizes that the IPP Program has undergone changes to its operating environment that have affected the roles and responsibilities of CPA headquarter support staff within RCMP the past four fiscal years. As a result, the impact of these changes could not be measured at this time.

Finding 17: Inclusive of monies carried forward, the IPP Program funds in 2011/12 and 2012/13 satisfied the delivery of the Program. In 2013/14 and 2014/15, there was a 17 percent decline in the percentage of funds spent. The Program lapsed funds each fiscal year due primarily to the reduction of deployments. Unspent funds were not fully carried over each fiscal year.

Decline and reduction in missions, deployments and spending

Table 7 shows that the IPP Program funding inclusive of A-Base and incremental funding declined steadily over the last four fiscal years, including monies carried forward from the previous fiscal year. There was also a decline in Program expenditures over the same period that is due mostly to the decrease of missions and the reduction in the number of deployed police officers.

On average, the IPP Program spent 88 percent of its funding over the four fiscal years. The years 2012/13 to 2013/14 represented the most significant decline in Total Program Funds spent, from 96 percent in 2012/13 to 79.6 percent in 2013/14.

Over the four fiscal years, the declines have occurred for a number of reasons:

• In 2011/12, there was temporary funding of $12.5M to support the Haiti Reconstruction Mission; and, a legal contingency of $1.32M within RCMP’s reference level. The legal contingency was removed in 2012/13.

• In 2012/13, Program funding declined by $10.6M even though $3.1M was carried forward from 2011/12. There was a notable reduction in the number of deployed police officers and its funding as the Haiti Reconstruction Mission concluded.

• In 2013/14, Program funding declined by $1.6M, and a $1.5M carry-forward requested from 2012/13. The decline was due to a reduction in the overall number of deployed police officers as missions closed in Africa and the conclusion of the Afghanistan Mission and its funding.

• In 2014/15, Program funding reflected A-Base reference levels only as these funds were able to absorb the same year incremental costs of $5.14M.No monies were carried forward in this fiscal year even though there was a $7.20M lapse from 2013/14. The percentage of total funds spent increased slightly even though deployment numbers continued to decline.In addition, the costs of two UN missions, Brindisi, Italy and Special Project SAAT, were covered by the UN.

From the totals at the bottom of Table 7, the IPP Program spent 87 percent of its A-Base funding and 92 percent of its incremental funding. Of interest, in 2012/13 and 2013/14 there was a 15.26 percent decline in A-based spending which reveals an excess of approximately 20 percent in available total funds in 2013/14 to 2014/15.

Lapse of funds

The decline in IPP Program expenditures over the four fiscal years created lapsed funds each year. In keeping with the Program’s authorities, the Program’s A-based funds are to be used exclusively for the purpose of deploying Canadian police officers through the Program.Any unused portions of these funds in any given year can be available for the same purpose in the subsequent year. These funds are to enable the RCMP to sustain a standing capacity to deploy police officers for international peace support operations. Since 2012/13, A-Base funding levels have remained consistent at $35.53M (exclusive of monies carried forward from the previous fiscal year). Unspent incremental funds are to be returned to the IAE Peace and Security pool or GAC/GPSF.

The evaluation found that the A-based funds that lapsed in one fiscal year were not fully carried forward into the next. In September 2014, the CPA Working Group discussion noted that while unused funds can be carried forward from year to year, funds were returned in 2013/14 as the IPP Program had regularly underspent in the recent past. As a result, none of the lapse was carried forward into the 2014/15 funding reference levels. Also in 2014/15, the Program tried to manage increasing amounts of lapsed funds by absorbing incremental costs in the amount of $5.14M since GAC/GPSF amounts had not been secured.This resulted in a smaller amount of lapsed funds. While analysis revealed that there was a correlation between a decline in the number of deployments and total A-based expenditures, it also notes that this occurred while lapsed funds fluctuated.

As noted in Table 8, between 2011/12 and 2014/15, the IPP Program received a total of $157.7M in A-Base funds. In 2011/12 the Program lapsed $20.8M and only $4.68M was carried forward. This resulted in a lapse of $16.1Mor 10 percent of its A-Base funds within a four fiscal year period. This includes additional monies provided in support of the Haiti Reconstruction Mission. For 2015/16, the Program anticipated a lapse of approximately $24M but noted that the number may change due to foreign policy priorities, operational issues and security.

Over the past four fiscal years, the IPP Program lapsed $3M of its incremental funds which is generally consistent with the decrease in the number of missions and deployments. Of minor note, in 2012/13, incremental funds were insufficient by $0.04M which contrasts 2013/14, when only 76 percent of $11.4M in incremental funds were spent. Unused incremental funding per fiscal year is returned to the IAE Peace and Security pool or GAC/GPSF.

The majority of interviewees noted that there were sufficient funds to support program delivery. Some interviewees pointed out that moving to more complex missions such as bilateral missions or ones with greater security risks may require more funding. The evaluation noted that efficiencies are more difficult to assess when the IPP Program is not maximized.

Finding 18: Improvements to financial data have enhanced the transparency and level of detail shared among the CPA Partners. Financial forecasts were generated annually and aligned with planned missions. Forecasts contained the majority of the elements of the IPP Costing Model. Total Program expenditures were made in accordance with planned deployments per fiscal year.

The previous evaluation recommended improvements to financial comptrollership, including a review of the key assumptions of the IPP Program Costing Model. The RCMP is responsible for the annual consolidated financial report of the RCMP reference levels and GAC’s incremental contribution. As per the CPA MOU and the SOP, specific financial elements for the IPP Program Costing Model for fiscal years are expected to include: number of deployments, cost per deployed police officer (including salaries, employee benefits and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs), number of HQ Program Support, cost per FTE, and rapid deployment capacity.

The evaluation found that the IPP Program budget forecasts and deployment projections were produced annually and published within the Program’s Annual Plans from 2011/12 to 2014/15. Financial forecasts aligned with planned missions per fiscal year. A review of the Program’s forecasting resulted in four notable observations.

First, the IPP Program followed the model outlined in the CPA MOU in both A-Base and incremental costs only in 2011/12. The costs were broken down for each mission per deployed officer. The subsequent years, the majority of the elements within the costing model were presented, but in a modified format. Starting in 2012/13, the breakdown of anticipated cost per FTE, by A-Base and incremental costs, were separately identified in another table under the Deployment Projections section of the report rather than the Budget Forecast section. Anecdotal information indicated these changes were made to enhance the CPA Working Groups’ understanding of finances and to generate more realistic forecasts.

Second, a detailed projection of EBP started in 2013/14. The planned EBP amount is an approved level while the actual EBP is based on 20 percent of actual salary costs for deployed officers, HQ Support staff, and Internal Services. Third, projection for rapid deployment capacity was only made for fiscal year 2011/12. Finally, only in fiscal year 2011/12 was the number of FTEs at RCMP headquarters reported.

Through the evaluation’s review of documents and interviews conducted, it found that the financial information, including financial forecasts, were regularly discussed and presented at both the Working Group and Steering Committee meetings. There was also regular accounting for the IPP Program’s incremental costs including invoices to GAC routinely. Relevant interviews noted that financial reporting was satisfactory, more transparent, useful and that it had improved.

Variance between forecasted and actual expenditures of selected items

In reporting actual costs against planned (forecasted) costs, analysis of financial data revealed that there was a variance percentage of two to nine percent over a four year period. This low percentage of variance suggests appropriate allocations were made to support intended total program costs. Total deployment forecasts underestimated actual expenditures in 2011/12 (excluding Haiti reconstruction) and in 2012/13. In 2013/14 and in 2014/15, forecasts were better aligned to actual expenditures.

A closer review of the variances was undertaken for the missions of focus. Table 9 shows that Afghanistan and West Bank missions had the most significant variances.

In 2011/12, the Afghanistan missions had a variance of -20.06 percent, which resulted from actual expenditures exceeding forecasted figures by $1,809,777. Monies spent outside of both its A-Base and incremental forecasts were exceeded. However, in 2012/13 and 2013/14 forecasts were better aligned to actual costs. As the Afghanistan missions concluded in 2013/14, no forecast was provided in 2014/15. Still, actual expenditures in the amount of $64,628 were allocated to the Afghanistan mission in 2014/15 as a result of costs incurred in 2013/14. Monies were recovered from the 2014/15 budget.

For a few fiscal years, there were significant variances observed for the small missions to the West Bank, as indicated in Table 9. Between 2011/12 and 2014/15 the variance percentage between forecast and actual expenditures for EUPOL COPPS mission ranged from -43.90 percent to 13.66 percent. In 2011/12 and 2012/13, monies remained within both its A-Base and incremental costs which resulted in the mission having excess funds at the end of the fiscal years. Remaining funds totaled $68,984 in 2011/12 and $36,661 in 2012/13. In contrast, in 2013/14 and 2014/15, monies spent exceeded the A-Base and incremental forecast. This resulted in a variance of -1.53 percent in 2013/14 and -43.90 percent in 2014/15. The large variance in 2014/15 was as a result of overspending both of its A-Base by $70,169 (by 23 percent) and its incremental forecast by $167,039 (by 69 percent).

In the second West Bank mission, Op PROTEUS, the variance between forecasted and actual expenditures for 2013/14 was -50.23 percent. This is largely attributed to overspending of its A-Base forecast by $69,785. Incremental costs were forecasted more accurately with $2,249 remaining in the budget. Regrettably, neither documents reviewed nor interviews conducted were able to elaborate on the reasons for these significant variances of the missions of focus.

RCMP HQ support staff and rapid deployment capacity

As seen in the Table 10, forecasts exceeded actual expenditures associated with HQ staff from 2011/12 to 2013/14. This may be attributed to the fact that the RCMP never staffed or classified all 54 FTE positions and the number of those staffed per fiscal year fluctuated. Conversely, in 2014/15, the Program underestimated actual costs as there was a -12.80 percentage variance in what was forecast versus actual expenditures. GAC expressed an interest in having more details in the RCMP HQ FTE financial and staffing information as it is limited in the annual reports, including the mix of IPP and non-IPP positions and tasks within ILDC and whether International Assistance Envelope funding is used to cover the costs of FTEs engaged in non-IPP tasks.

As part of RCMP reference levels, there is a budget of $500,000 annually to administer rapid deployment capacity. These funds are to be reported to the CPA WG separately. Further, using these funds to support mission visits and reconnaissance missions (in support of assessment missions) is in accordance with the CPA MOU.

In 2011/12, spending supported mission visits while 2014/15 unplanned spending primarily went to support Recce. Overall, the actual expenditures did not fund deployments of police officers from the RDT roster to international police peacekeeping mission during the reference period. GAC valued seeing the additional details of regarding financial data of the Rapid Deployment Capacity as the information is limited in the financial component of the annual report.

Other items

While financial information has become more transparent, a few interviews expressed room to improve the sharing of budgetary details in RCMP HQ staff, Rapid Deployment Capacity, including its use for visits.Separately, financial review noted that annual financial audits, as per the CPA MOU commitment, never occurred in any fiscal year. The evaluation found one accounting error when one assessment mission was mistakenly accounted as part of incremental costs in the amount of $30,591 instead of the A-based funds. The cost of this assessment could have supported the funds lapsed by the IPP Program.

Finding 19: The Official Development Assistance (ODA) portion of the IPP Program is reported accurately.

The reporting of the Program’s funds that qualify for Official Development Assistance (ODA) follows specific codes as per the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC)^Footnote 21 and the Official Development Assistance Accountability Act (ODAAA).^Footnote 22Funds that can qualify under ODA are determined at the activity-level which are the responsibility of programs to provide, and require detailed review and discussion with the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) at GAC. The evaluation found that the GAC CFO regularly received financial numbers (two times annually) from the RCMP. The CFO in GAC was able to clarify expenditure details at the activity-level with the RCMP.

As mentioned in Section 2.2, the Incremental portion of IPP Program spending is sourced under START’s Vote 1 budget for O&M. GAC CFO noted that Vote 1 spending is harder to attribute to the ODA portion in its financial reviews. In the past, GAC had not always provided numbers that clearly distinguished the START (civilian deployments) from the IPP Program Incremental portion. However, due to departmental amalgamation,^Footnote 23 the Vote 1 and Vote 10 portions are now more accessible at the activity-level for GAC’s CFO and it is possible to account for the IPP Program-specific, ODA contributions that were sourced from this Incremental portion. GAC’s CFO noted that this includes access to activity-level accounting in 2011/12 and 2012/13. As the Incremental portion was paid by RCMP instead of GAC in 2014/15, there are no funds from GAC’s portion of the IPP Program that qualified for ODA.

Finding 20: Lessons learned were captured inconsistently in IPP Program documents and there was limited evidence that these were routinely incorporated into on-going and future missions.

Analysis found that the IPP Program made some effort to capture lessons learned. Several products that were used to inform lessons learned included IMRs/IQRs, End of Mission Contingent Commander reports and Closure of Mission reports.Areas for improvement captured in Program documents as well as evaluation interviews, addressed the need for standardized reporting at the individual level; the need for a formal feedback mechanism or debrief of officers; and, the need for increased or better logistical support for officers. The delay in capturing lessons learned from Closure of Mission reports affects the ability of the Program to capitalize on areas for improvement for on-going and future missions.

The IPP Program also made efforts to capture lessons learned via the PS-led CPA Research Group that was created to perform strategic research and compile lessons learned. CPA Partners conducted an extensive lessons learned exercise in 2012 for the Haiti mission which highlighted the accomplishments of the Program and identified areas for improvement. In particular, it focused on the challenges associated with MINUSTAH, including areas of duplicative effort.It also noted that MINUSTAH funding for Quick Impact Projects, which provide equipment to the HNP, were often delayed which directly impacted the activities that Canadian police officers could undertake.The review found that the Program experienced challenges at times in securing positions that drew upon Canadian police expertise, due largely to the UN national balance policy.^Footnote 24The Program was able to respond to this challenge by deploying officers to specialized teams which allowed the Program to capitalize on Canadian police expertise and fill a niche role in the mission.

By 2013, the CPA Research Group ceased to exist for a number of reasons including resource constraints and acknowledgement that the work could be assumed under the broader CPA Working Group. Capturing lessons became more decentralized and research activities were undertaken by individual partners.

In 2015, the RCMP conducted a lessons learned exercise through a comparative analysis of the Norwegian and Swedish international policing models in relation to the IPP Program. The analysis was to identify best practices and identify potential areas that could improve the Program. The report made several recommendations for the Program related to training, domestic return and data collection. As stated in Finding 13, a few of these recommendations were implemented.

Analysis found several challenges in collecting lessons learned. First, there is a lack of guidance on lessons learned exercises. CPA SOPs stipulate that GAC “will, as appropriate, convene a lessons learned meeting to engage all relevant contact persons involved in a particular mission, country or file, to determine what steps various actors must take to improve Canadian effective police participation in peace operations”. Aside from the 2012 lessons learned exercise from Haiti, there is no evidence that another exercise took place.

Overall, the delay and absence of capturing lessons learned may have had an impact on the ability of the Program to capitalize on areas for improvement and incorporate relevant lessons into subsequent missions. In addition, the termination of the CPA Research Group may have contributed to the limited analysis and synthesis of lessons learned.

Alternative delivery models of like-minded countries

Part of the scope of the evaluation included analysis and interviews with external stakeholders in order to address evaluation question 5.3 (see Appendix 3) regarding lessons learned, best practices, alternative design and/or delivery models for international-policing operations. The evaluation found that both the U.K and Australia have international policing models that share similarities to the Program but also contain unique features.

The U.K has a Joint International Policing Hub (JIPH) that coordinates stakeholders from across the UK and provides a single gateway into and out of police services across the country for international partners. The JIPH works closely with the Stabilisation Unit, a cross-government unit that supports efforts to tackle instability overseas and maintains a pool of officers who can be deployed to international peacekeeping missions, Reintegration arrangements currently vary depending upon the route through which an officer has deployed. Work is currently underway in the UK to refresh existing guidelines in order to incorporate developments and bring some standardisation to terms and conditions of deployment. Debriefs were helpful with all returning officers to capture learning for the future.

In Australia, police deployed to international peace missions are required to complete a four week training program that focusses on cultural awareness, teamwork, remote first aid, mission specific scenario activities and technical skill development such as land navigation and bush craft. The Australian international policing model is also unique in the way it formalizes its commitment to gender equality and support for women in the countries where police officers are deployed. Australia has a comprehensive gender strategy for its international policing that specifically outlines the ways it will operationalize its commitment to gender equality through: 1) increasing the representation of women in policing (in both Australia and the host country) and 2) requires missions to consider the ways that policing activities will impact women in the affected communities i.e. gender mainstreaming in all police policies and activities.

5.0 Conclusions of the evaluation

Conclusion #1: Relevance

The IPP Program continues to be a relevant and important tool for the GC to respond to requests for international police peacekeeping. The Program has demonstrated some ability to adapt by exploring more strategic, non-traditional deployment opportunities. The Program demonstrated consideration of the needs of missions and responded to these to the extent possible. At times, the Program limited the degree to which mission needs could be met by deployed Canadian police officers. For instance, the inability to deploy civilian subject matter experts, the lack of flexibility in deployment duration and the limit on bilateral deployments were referenced as challenges for meeting mission needs. Police peace operations continue to be a key tool in the maintenance of international peace and security, including in areas that relate to Canada’s national security. While there were ongoing efforts among CPA partners to ensure coherence with other GC programming, better coordination with Canadian missions would enhance synergies in broader areas of SSR.

Conclusion #2: Performance- Achievement of Expected Outcomes (Effectiveness)

While there are performance measurement tools to track and report on mission results, the extent to which expected outcomes, as defined in the CPA Logic Model, were achieved could not be fully measured due to inconsistent reporting, as well as the confusion of activities with outcomes. Performance reporting was found to be lacking in the areas of strengthened judicial systems, domestic benefits and gender related outcomes. There was also a lack of detail on expected results under these thematic areas in the CPA Logic Model, with missing and/or incomplete indicators from which to measure performance. In addition, performance measurement tools did not consistently align to the outcomes as defined in the CPA Logic Model which impacted the ability of the IPP Program to capture and demonstrate results.

There were reporting weaknesses across a number of documents required by the Program. This included inconsistent numbers in tracking deployed officers, lack of comprehensive tracking of requests and rejections of deployments of Canadian police officers, reporting on results, mission-level selection, and annual planning and reporting documents.

Conclusion #3: Performance- Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy

The Program did not staff and/or classify all 54 FTE positions partly due to a steady decline in missions. Total IPP Program spending was made in accordance with planned deployments per fiscal year. However, some notable variances between planning and actual expenditures could not be explained in the missions of focus. There were also some areas of efficiency and economy that could not be reviewed given the absence of corporate and mission-level documentation.

6.0 Recommendations

Recommendation #1: The IPP Program should strengthen and streamline its performance measurement and reporting tools to consistently capture outcomes and lessons learned at both the mission and program level. In particular, the CPA performance information should be revised to reflect and further define expected results under the thematic areas of gender, judicial reform and domestic benefits.

Associated Findings 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15 and 20.

Recommendation #2: CPA Partners should update and implement operational and guidance documents (MOU and SOPs) in order to:

• increase flexibility of deployments (e.g. civilian deployments, bilateral missions) and develop guidance that strengthens the IPP Program’s ability to address the needs of the police force in the fragile or conflict affected states;
• consistently reflect all considerations and apply the tools that support the mission selection process (e.g. use of the 13 points of assessment, needs assessment missions; Memos to Ministers)
• satisfy and streamline the reporting requirements at all levels (individual, mission and corporate);
• increase communication regarding IPP deployments with GC representatives in Canada and at missions;
• clarify and refine ministerial roles and responsibilities that reflect an amalgamated GAC; and,
• provide clear expectations for supporting exercises such as tracking of requests and lessons learned.

Associated Findings 2, 5, 11, 14, 15, and 20.

Recommendation #3: The RCMP is encouraged to continue to document the roles and staffing levels of the 54 FTEs in order to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the resourcing model.

Associated Findings 16 and 17.

7.0 Management Response and Action Plan

Recommendation 1

The IPP Program should strengthen and streamline its performance measurement and reporting tools to consistently capture outcomes and lessons learned at both the mission and program level. In particular, the CPA performance information should be revised to reflect and further define expected results under the thematic areas of gender, judicial reform and domestic benefits.

Management Update: As part of the Government of Canada's renewal of its National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security in 2017, the RCMP will report annually on its performance on a wide variety of gender-related activities. This reporting will occur separate from and in addition to the MRAP, and will clearly define expected results related to gender.

Appendix 1: List of Findings

Finding 1:

The IPP Program addressed a continued need for international police peacekeeping and peace operations missions, despite a steady decline in authorized missions and deployment numbers. While needs varied depending on the particular mission, the Program demonstrated strengths including access to diverse and professional police officers from across Canada.

Finding 2:

The IPP Program considered the needs and priorities of missions. Notwithstanding the political and security sensitivities, there are examples where the Program was limited in its ability to meet the needs of mission.

Finding 3:

Anecdotally, the Program referenced domestic benefits to Canada as a result of its participation to CPA missions. The most frequently identified domestic benefit to Canada was the skills that Canadian police officers either acquired and/or enhanced.

Finding 4:

The IPP Program aligned with the GC priorities. The Program was an important tool for advancing foreign policy objectives.

Finding 5:

The IPP Program complemented the GC’s and the international community’s approach to fragile and conflict affected states. However, there is still room to improve coherence by enhancing synergies and increasing coordination in similar thematic areas.

Finding 6:

The IPP Program is aligned with its three partners’ respective strategic outcomes and priorities.

Finding 7:

The IPP Program has developed performance measurement tools to track, monitor and report on deployment activities and outputs. However, the tools were not consistently used to report on performance nor were they directly aligned with the outcomes in the CPA logic model.

Finding 8:

While the IPP Program has contributed to the achievement of results under its immediate and intermediate outcomes, the extent to which they were met could not be measured as there was a lack of performance information. In particular, this was evident in the outcomes of strengthened judicial systems and domestic benefits.

Finding 9:

The evaluation could not assess whether the Program achieved its ultimate outcome due to a lack of consistent performance reporting and factors beyond the reach of the Program.

Finding 10:

Deployments resulted in both unintended positive and negative outcomes internationally and domestically in Canada.

Finding 11:

Deployed Canadian police officers contributed to gender initiatives to promote the participation and protection of women in the affected areas. However, there was limited evidence to suggest that gender is strategically taken into consideration in mission selection criteria, planning and implementation.

Finding 12:

There has been an increase of female Canadian police officers participating in the IPP Program, through targeted initiatives, such as the use of communications tools and specific language in job posters to encourage women to apply.

Finding 13:

The IPP Program has a formalized selection process and has made enhancements to respond to mission-specific needs. Improvements have also been made to the pre-deployment training and duty of care.

Finding 14:

CPA governance (e.g. committees, MOU, and SOP) provides a clear operational structure. However, there are some challenges in its design and implementation.

Finding 15:

The IPP Program has numerous reporting requirements. The reports generated are not consistently produced nor do they indicate planned results and overall impact.

Finding 16:

The number of IPP Program support positions classified and staffed at RCMP headquarters has fluctuated below the authorized 54 FTEs. Based on the ratio of 3:1 between operational personnel in mission to headquarters support staff, the Program was understaffed in relation to the number of deployments in 2011/12 and 2012/13, and overstaffed in 2013/14 and 2014/15.

Finding 17:

Inclusive of monies carried forward, the IPP Program funds in 2011/12 and 2012/13 satisfied the delivery of the Program. In 2013/14 and 2014/15, there was a 17 percent decline in the percentage of funds spent. The Program lapsed funds each fiscal year due primarily to the reduction of deployments. Unspent funds were not fully carried over each fiscal year.

Finding 18:

Improvements to financial data have enhanced the transparency and level of detail shared among the CPA Partners. Financial forecasts were generated annually and aligned with planned missions. Forecasts contained the majority of the elements of the IPP Costing Model. Total Program expenditures were made in accordance with planned deployments per fiscal year.

Finding 19:

The Official Development Assistance (ODA) portion of the IPP Program is reported accurately.

Finding 20:

Lessons learned were captured inconsistently in IPP Program documents and there was limited evidence that these were routinely incorporated into on-going and future missions.

Appendix 2: CPA Logic Model

Appendix 3: Evaluation Objectives and Questions

Evaluation objectives

1. To determine the on-going need of the CPA-IPP to strategically support the GoC’s international peace and security outcomes;

2. To determine the extent to which the CPA-IPP Program has been effective and efficient in achieving its outcomes;

3. To determine whether CPA-IPP’s governance and planning structure supports an efficient and economic allocation of resources; and,

4. To determine the extent to which progress has been made on the implementation of recommendations from the 2012 evaluation.

Evaluations Questions

Relevance Issue 1: Continued need for the initiative

• 1.1 To what extent have CPA-IPP deployments addressed a need for international police peacekeeping and peace operations in affected and fragile states?
• 1.2 To what extent does the CPA-IPP address GC’s relevant foreign policy, international security and development objectives?
• 1.3 To what extent have CPA-IPP deployments maximized the benefits of domestic security needs?
• 1.4 To what extent have CPA-IPP deployments met the needs of the missions?

Relevance Issue 2: Alignment with government priorities

• 2.1 To what extent does the CPA-IPP support the priorities of the GC?
• 2.2 To what extent does the CPA-IPP align with the priorities and strategic outcomes of partner Departments?
• 2.3 To what extent are CPA-IPP deployments part of a coherent GC approach to international peace and security issues, including those of the affected/fragile states as well as other thematic priorities?

Relevance Issue 3: Consistency with federal roles and responsibilities

• 3.1 To what extent are the roles of the CPA partner departments aligned to mandates of their respective departments?

Performance Issue 4: Achievement of expected outcomes

• 4.1 To what extent is the CPA-IPP achieving outcomes as defined in the CPA logic model?
• 4.2 To what extent are there any unintended positive or negative results from the CPA-IPP program?
• 4.3 To what extent has the CPA-IPP Program supported the participation of female police in peace operations and/or improved its ability to address gender-related issues within its operations?
• 4.4 To what extent have the partner departments made progress towards the implementation of their respective recommendations as outlined in the 2012 evaluation?

Performance Issue 5: Demonstration of efficiency and economy

• 5.1 Has the CPA model effectively and efficiently deployed officers?
• 5.2 Has the CPA model economically delivered the IPP Program?
• 5.3 To what extent can efficiencies and effectiveness for the CPA-IPP model be identified through lessons learned, best practices, alternative design and/or delivery models for international-policing operations?

APPENDIX 4: Missions of Focus

AFGHANISTAN

Overview

Deployment Missions	NATO Training Mission- Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Timeframe: Feb.2007- Mar.2014 Partners: NATO, United States Embassy of Canada (Kabul) Timeframe: May 2007- Mar.2014 European Union Police (EUPOL) in Afghanistan Mission Timeframe: Sep.2007- Mar.2014 Partners: EUPOL
	International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) Timeframe: May 2011- Mar.2014 Partners: IPCB Member Nations, Ministry of the Interior of Afghanistan, EU, EUPOL, German Police Project Team (GPPT), International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), NATO, United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), United Nations Development Program/ Law and Order Trust-Fund Afghanistan (UNDP/LOFTA) Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) Timeframe: 2011-2014 Partners: United States, United Kingdom
Total Budget 2011/2012-2014/2015	Total Budget 11/12-14/15: $28,728,766 2011-2012: $10,833,717 2012-2013: $9,984,497 2013-2014: $7,910,552 2014-2015: $64,628
Total of IPP Program Police Officers Authorized 2011/2012-2014/2015	Ministerial authorization of up to 45 police officers until March 31st, 2014 2011-2012: Average of 44 police officers deployed per month 2012-2013: Average of 40 police officers deployed per month 2013-2014: Average of 32.5 police officers deployed per month 2014-2015: No deployments

Context

Afghanistan remains a fragile state after more than 30 years of conflict and insurgency which has devastated Afghan development, hardened society and created instability that continues to pose a threat to global peace and security. The Government of Afghanistan has made significant progress in its transition towards democracy in recent years but grave concerns persist in terms of the government’s commitment to fight corruption and protect human rights. In particular, Afghan women and girls continue to be marginalized within Afghan society and face significant obstacles in accessing judicial institutions within the state.

The Afghan National Unity Government also faces numerous obstacles in its ability to provide security to the Afghan people with the existence of a resilient insurgency that has weakened state control over the territory, an underground economy of illicit drug production, and the withdrawal of international security forces in 2014. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), comprised of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), gradually assumed responsibility for Afghan security beginning in June 2013 but the ANSF’s effectiveness is limited by weak institutional and human capacity. The insurgency continues attacks in Kabul and the northwestern ethnic Tajik and Uzbek regions, which resulted in the deaths of more than 4,600 members of the ANSF in 2014 alone.

From 2003 to 2014, Canadian police officers deployed to Afghanistan through the IPP Program to support the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security Awareness Force (ISAF) and the broader international effort to make Afghanistan a more stable and self-sufficient state. The IPP Program in Afghanistan flowed from Canada’s broader engagement in rebuilding fragile states through the re-establishment of effective public institutions. Canada’s support for Afghanistan sought to help build a stable, secure and democratic country which respects human rights, ROL and freedom of religion. Canada also sought to build a state which would empower Afghan citizens, including encouraging economic empowerment of women and girls and ensuring their security from sexual violence and child early and forced marriage.

In December 2011, Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan shifted from a combat to non-combat role and moved from a Kandahar-centric mission to a Kabul-centric mission. The IPP Program was also present in other regions in Afghanistan including Bamyan, Kunduz, Feyzabad and Herat. Canada’s non-combat role in Afghanistan focused on four target areas, one of which included advancing security, ROL and human rights, through the deployment of up to 950 Canadian Forces personnel to train the ANSF. Canada’s engagement in police reform in Afghanistan focused on four niche areas:

- Leadership and management training and mentoring;

- Specialized policing – advanced investigational and anti-corruption policing;

- Ministry of Interior reform and capacity building; and,

- Community policing.

Canada’s mission in Afghanistan came to a close as of March 2014. As stated in Section 3.1 of the evaluation report, the reference period for the evaluation is from 2011-2014 which covers Canada’s non-combat engagement in Afghanistan. During this time period, there were five active IPP Program missions in Afghanistan which presents a unique opportunity to compare and contrast Canada’s engagement in the country.

Deployment Mission Descriptions

NATO Training Mission- Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan (CSTC-A)

The NATO Training Mission- Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan (CSTC-A) assisted the Afghan Government in establishing the institutional structures required to recruit, train, and field the Afghan National Army (ANA). The mission provided a higher-level training for the ANP, including at defence colleges and academies, and was also charged with doctrine development, training and advising the ANP. The expected outcome of the mission was to defeat the insurgency, provide internal security and enforce the ROL in Afghanistan.

International Police Coordination Board (IPCB)

The IPCB is the primary organizational body mandated to coordinate, prioritize, and direct international police reform efforts in Afghanistan. In the wider ROL context, it provides support for the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MoI) in the development of policies, strategies, and plans in the areas of police reform and police-justice cooperation. Canadian police were an integral part of this board and the development of the ANP 10-year vision plan as well as the two year action plans. In support of the IPCB Secretariat (IPCB-S), in May 2013, a female Canadian Member undertook the role of Chief of Staff to the IPCB-S, and was later appointed Deputy Head of the Secretariat. Another Member acted as a Senior Coordinator for ANP development starting in November 2013.

European Union Police (EUPOL) in Afghanistan Mission

The EUPOL Afghanistan mission worked to contribute to the establishment of a sustainable, effective and ethnically balanced policing service under Afghan ownership that encompassed appropriate linkages with the wider criminal justice system and was responsive to the needs of Afghan citizens. Canada supported EUPOL through police deployments to strategic positions under the “City Police and Justice Projects” and development of the Anti-Crime Police and Uniform Police. The mission’s expected outcomes included:

• - Improving the cohesion and coordination amongst international partners;
• - Supporting the development of an MoI capable of effectively managing the ANP;
• - Advising on police-related criminal justice matters;
• - Contributing to legislative development and overall strategy;
• - Assisting the Attorney General’s Office’s criminal investigations department and criminal investigations police in order to create effective cooperation mechanisms;
• - Aid the ANP in developing and implementing a national training strategy; and,
• - Assisting the ANP in establishing an effective border management system.

Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF)

The MCTF was composed of Afghan law enforcement personnel from the MoI and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) who conducted criminal investigations to address allegations of senior level corruption and investigate organised criminal networks and high profile kidnappings committed by persons against the GoA. Canadian police personnel assisted in training and mentoring MCTF units through the provision of specialized investigative expertise to conduct counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and other special operations. Contributing to the development of investigative units of this nature served to advance Afghan law enforcement personnel beyond basic policing towards an independent, skilled and specialized organisation, while addressing institutional corruption.

Embassy of Canada (Kabul)

The Canadian Police Commander (CPC), Deputy Police Commander (DPC) and an Administrative Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) were located at the Canadian Embassy. Collectively, they advised the Ambassador and the General Relations section on matters concerning ANP and Ministry of the Interior (MoI) reform. They also advised the RCMP regarding placements of Canadian police in various missions within Afghanistan. The CPC represented Canada on the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) Senior Police Group, which promoted the coordination of efforts and funds, as well as the Government of Canada’s policies and priorities. The DPC coordinated the day-to-day operations of all Canadian police in mission on behalf of the CPC. The expected outcome of the mission was to assist in the transition of the ANP to a sustainable, modern law enforcement institution.

HAITI

Overview

Deployment Mission	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) Timeframe: 2004-Present Partners: MINUSTAH
Total Budget 2011/2012-2014/2015	Total Budget 11/12-14/15: (missing 2014/2015 budget) 2011-2012: $16,993,100 (regular mission) + $10, 816, 043 (Haiti reconstruction) 2012-2013: $18,696,136 2013-2014: $17,595,995 2014-2015: $16,322,902
Total of IPP Program Police Officers Authorized 2011/2012-2014/2015	Ministerial authorization of up to 100 police officers until February 2013 50-person surge deployment approved from FY 2010-2011 to FY 2011-2012 Ministerial authorization of up to 90 officers post February 2011-2012: Average of 132 police officers deployed per month 2012-2013: Average of 90 police officers deployed per month 2013-2014: Average of 86 police officers deployed per month 2014-2015: 2014-2015 CPA Annual Report not available at time of evaluation.

Context

Haiti has struggled in its transition to a stable democracy since the end of military rule in 1988, plagued by political instability and rampant corruption. Government infrastructure remains weak and resources are limited which directly impacts the ability of the state to provide security. Haiti is the poorest country in the Americas, ranking 168 out of 187 on the UNDP’s 2014 Human Development Index. The country is also recovering from a devastating earthquake in 2010 that left over 300,000 dead, decimated the country’s infrastructure and impeded progress on institutional reforms.

The Haitian National Police (HNP) is the only security force in Haiti and is composed of the police, coast guard, correctional service agents, fire fighters, border, air, port and airport police. The international community and Haitian government worked together to develop the 2012-2016 Haitian National Police Development Plan which aims to increase the capacity of the police force. Despite significant progress in implementing reforms, the HNP is still ranked the most corrupt police force in the world.

Canada has been deploying police to Haiti since 1993 and has been involved with MINUSTAH since its inception in 2004. The IPP Program contributes to MINUSTAH through the support, strengthening, professionalization, and reform of the HNP. Canadian police officers in Haiti are embedded in the UN Police (UNPOL) and engage in mentorship, training, and capacity building of the HNP. Since 2014, the IPP Program has been deploying specialized teams to Haiti under the thematic areas of community policing, management advisory and serious crime.

Deployment Mission Description

MINUSTAH was authorized by the Security Council (SC) in 2004 following the deployment of the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) earlier that year to respond to escalating violence within the country. MINUSTAH has both a police and military component which are mandated to support the Transitional Government in restoring stability and security to Haiti through Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programmes, reforming the Haitian National Police (HNP) and assisting in the maintenance of law and order and respect for human rights. The police component of MINUSTAH is divided into two pillars: Operational (Pillar I) and Developmental (Pillar II). Each section of the HNP has an equivalent section in MINUSTAH to provide mentoring and expertise. The mandate of MINUSTAH has adapted and evolved since its inception and now encompasses additional responsibilities, such as supporting the political process in Haiti, promoting reconciliation and providing logistical and security assistance during elections.

Following the deadly earthquake in 2010, which claimed the lives of 102 UN personnel, the SC authorized an overall increase in deployment levels by 2,000 troops and 1,500 police and shifted its focus to immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability in Haiti. Later that same year, the SC authorized the temporary deployment of an additional 680 police to assist in building the capacity of the HNP. MINUSTAH’s surge capacity was reduced over subsequent years to reflect the improved security environment. In 2015, the SC determined that force levels would consist of up to 2,370 troops and up to 2,601 police. The SC has currently extended the mandate of MINUSTAH until October 2016.

West Bank

Overview

Deployment Missions	EUPOL COPPS Timeframe: 2008- Present (Authorized until March 31, 2016) Partners: The European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) Op PROTEUS Timeframe: 2013- Present (Authorized until March 31, 2016 Partners: Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Department of National Defence (DND), United States Security Coordinator (USSC)
Total Budget 2011/2012-2014/2015	Total Budget 11/12-14/15: 2011-2012: $435,968 (EUPOL COPPS) 2012-2013: $387, 972 (EUPOL COPPS) 2013-2014: $472,575 (EUPOL COPPS) $202, 002 (Op PROTEUS) 2014-2015: $775,558 (EUPOL COPPS) $257,220 (Op PROTEUS)
Total of IPP Program Police Officers Authorized 2011/2012-2014/2015	Ministerial authorization of up to 2 police officers for EUPOL COPPS and 1 police officer for Op PROTEUS until March 31, 2016 2011-2012: Average of 2 police officers deployed to EUPOL COPPS per month 2012-2013: Average of 1.5 police officers deployed to EUPOL COPPS per month 2013-2014: Average of 1.67 police officers deployed to EUPOL COPPS per month Average of 0.67 police officer deployed to Op PROTEUS per month 2014-2015: 2014-2015 CPA Annual Report not available at time of evaluation.

Context

The Palestinian Authority (PA) has struggled to maintain stability and security in the West Bank. The protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict has led to weak institutions, underdeveloped infrastructure and widespread criminality and unrest in the region. The economic situation in the West Bank, characterized by high unemployment and widespread poverty, is a major contributing factor to social unrest in the region. Violent clashes between Palestinians and Israeli Security Forces are common place. Tensions between the PA and Hamas have also contributed to the unstable security environment.

The Palestinian Civil Police Force (PCP), governed by the Palestinian Security Services under the PA, was founded in 1994 as part of the Oslo Accords process. Prior to the establishment of the PCP, the West Bank did not have a functioning police force and was largely controlled by clans and criminal organizations. The international community has been engaged in training the PCP since 2005 to professionalize the force and build capacity. Nonetheless, the PCP faces numerous challenges in providing security in the West Bank. One of the most significant impediments is the political situation and lack of progress in the Middle East Peace Process. The PCP exercise limited control over the territory and borders of the West Bank since nearly 60 percent of the region is administered by Israel.

Deployment Mission Description

European Union Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)

EUPOL COPPS was established in 2005 under the European Union (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). EUPOL COPPS provides support to the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) at the strategic and operational levels. The aim of the mission is to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership and in accordance with best international standards. An average of two Canadian police officers deployed to EUPOL COPPS, working within the PCP in areas such as accountability and oversight, traffic and criminal investigations.

Op PROTEUS (Canadian Forces (CF) Contribution to the United States Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC))

Op PROTEUS is a Canadian Forces (CF) led mission that contributes to the Office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) in Jerusalem. The mandate of the USSC is to encourage coordination on security matters between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) and to build the security capacity of the PA in the West Bank. Op PROTEUS consists of 20 CF personnel and one Canadian police advisor. The Canadian police officer provides technical policing expertise to the CF mission and the USSC, in addition to liaising with EUPOL COPPS, to ensure coordination on police reform and bridge the gap between military and police actors in the region. The police officer also acts as a liaison with the Canadian Embassy in Tel Aviv, the Representative Office of Canada in Ramallah and other stakeholders as required to ensure coordination and coherence on police reform.