Evaluation of Canada’s Strategy to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises — 2017-18 to 2022-23

Final report

Prepared by the Evaluation Division (PRA)
Global Affairs Canada
April 2024

Table of contents

• Acronyms and abbreviations
• Executive summary
• Background
• Evaluation scope and methodology
• Findings
• Results and delivery
• Effectiveness
• Relevance
• Conclusions
• Recommendations and considerations
• Annexes

Acronyms and abbreviations

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BRAC

Building Resources Across Communities

CFO

Chief Financial Officer

CFLI

Canada Fund for Local Initiatives

FPDS

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Services

FTE

Full-time Equivalent

GAC

Global Affairs Canada

HQ

Headquarters

ICJ

International Court of Justice

IDPs

Internally Displaced Persons

IIMM

Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar

ILO

International Labour Organization

IRG

PSOPs Programs Division

JPF

Joint Peace Fund

MHI

International Humanitarian Assistance Division

MSF

Doctors Without Borders

NGO

Non-Governmental Organization

OAK

India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal Division

OSC

Southeast Asia Division 2

PSOPs

Peace and Stabilization Operations Programming

SGBV

Sexual and gender-based violence

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

UNOPS

United Nations Office for Project Services

WFP

World Food Programme

Executive summary

This evaluation examined Canada’s Strategy to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises from 2017-18 to 2022-23. The objectives of the evaluation were to assess the effectiveness of the Strategy at achieving its intended results as well as how Canada’s engagement was able to respond to the complex and evolving needs of the crises. The report provides independent evaluation findings, recommendations and considerations to inform Canada’s ongoing and future engagement in these two evolving crises.

The evaluation found that the Strategy mostly achieved its stated objectives in responding to the two crises, but progress towards lasting outcomes for humanitarian, development, and peace and security programming was hinderedby limitations arising from the protracted crisis context.It also highlights Canada's considerable influence in international coordination and advocacy, and its contributions to the global response to the crises.

In Bangladesh, Canada helped save lives and alleviate human suffering through humanitarian assistance and provide medium-term support to vulnerable and crisis-affected populations through development programming focused on key sectors including education and livelihoods. However, contextual constraints hindered the achievement of lasting outcomes as conditions worsened and needs increased in the camps. Canada also adapted to emerging opportunities by playing a leading role in third-country resettlement. In Myanmar, Canada also provided life-saving humanitarian assistance and achieved the Strategy’s intended development assistance results, butincreased violence, instability and operational constraints hampered lasting outcomes.

Despite these contributions, the protracted Rohingya and Myanmar crises have resulted in Rohingya refugees’ continued dependence on international humanitarian assistance. Moreover, despite Canada’s push for accountability on human rights violations and increased pressure on malign actors in Myanmar, the military regime’s continued use of violence hindered progress towards creating the conditions for the return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar. The coup and subsequent military rule also resulted in major operational and access limitations for implementing partners and Canadian staff operations. Nevertheless, the evaluation noted that Canada’s administrative flexibility and strong partner engagement enabled implementing partners to better adapt to Myanmar’s post-coup political and operational context.

The evaluation underscored the importance of fostering the self-reliance of Rohingya refugees and exploring complementary solutions to repatriation in Bangladesh, while also addressing humanitarian needs to maximize the value-added of Canadian engagement in response to the Rohingya refugee crisis. It also showed that supporting sustainable solutions to the crises requires identifying ways for Canada to target the underlying causes of the conflict and political instability in Myanmar.

Background

Dual crises

The United Nations has described the Rohingya population as the most persecuted minority in the world.

Figure 1:

Canada’s Strategy to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises

The Rohingya and Myanmar crises garnered international responses across the globe. Canada was consistently among the top 10 donor countries to the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Joint Response Plans in Bangladesh and Humanitarian Response Plans in Myanmar*, from 2018 to 2023. Following a report by the Honourable Bob Rae as Special Envoy to Myanmar, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced the first phase of Canada’s Rohingya Strategy, which was later followed by a second phase.

*Canada's programming goes beyond humanitarian plans, and total ODA funding is noted in Annex V.

Figure 2: Budget breakdown**

**Annex II provides a breakdown of disbursements by phase and by program. All monetary values in this report are in CAD unless indicated otherwise.

Strategy implementation structure

Key Departmental Stakeholders

Evaluation scope and methodology

Evaluation scope and objectives

The scope and objectives of the evaluation were informed by consultations with Global Affairs Canada staff (n=23) engaged across all streams of Canada’s Rohingya and Myanmar Strategy, a preliminary review of relevant external literature, and internal planning and financial documentation.

Evaluation Questions*

*Note: See Annex VI for the evaluation findings corresponding to each evaluation question.

Methodology

The evaluation used a mixed-methods approach, collecting data from a variety of sources to ensure multiple lines of evidence when analyzing data and formulating findings. Each finding was triangulated with evidence from a mix of quantitative and qualitative data. Eight main methods were used for the evaluation:

Document review

Review of Global Affairs Canada internal documentation and-external publications related to Canada’s Strategy to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises:

• 18 internal documents on policy, planning and strategy
• 12 audits, evaluations and reviews
• 9 other publicly available reports or strategic documentation

Literature review

A systematic literature review based on a library-supported synthesis of 200 relevant sources, including:

• Academic literature
• Other government publications
• Reports, studies and evaluations from international organizations

Project review

A systematic review of documentation related to 10 sampled projects covering both phases of the Strategy and all programming streams:

• Management summary reports
• Quarterly, annual and/or final reports
• Monitoring and evaluation reports
• Other relevant reports and studies

Scan of other donor practices

A targeted scan of the strategies, approaches and engagement of a sample of 7 other donor countries and entities (Australia, Germany, Japan, South Korea, United Kingdom, United States and EU) involved in the global response to the crises. This also included 13 interviews with other donors engaged in Myanmar and Bangladesh.

Financial analysis

Review of internal Global Affairs Canada financial documents, namely statistical data on total disbursements, targeted thematic areas, gender coding and variations overtime.

Interviews

73 semi-structured individual and small group interviews:

• 31 current and past Global Affairs Canada HQ and mission staff interviews
• 28 implementing partner interviews
• 13 International donors and relevant government officials interviews
• 1 Other Government Department staff interview

Site visits

Six visits to project sites in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh to validate and assess project results, constraints and needs. The evaluation adopted a do-no-harm approach for interactions with beneficiaries during site visits, in accordance with the Murad Code.

Case study

An internal case study focused on Canadian foreign policy and diplomacy services addressing the Rohingya and Myanmar crises, building on an internal advocacy, access and influence measurement framework previously developed by the evaluation division (PRA).

Evaluation limitations and mitigation measures

Limitations

Broadly worded and output-oriented Strategy objectives

Canada's Rohingya and Myanmar Strategy objectives (except for "ensuring accountability for crimes committed“ in Phase 1) were broadly worded and output-oriented. This limited the ability to assess the Strategy's results, effectiveness and relevance beyond its outputs. The way the objectives were formulated complicated the measurement of sustainable progress.

Complex and highly politicized nature of the dual crises

The Rohingya and Myanmar crises involve complex, politicized issues having implications across the FPDS, peace and security, development and humanitarian assistance streams. The diversity of stakeholders, along with varying political implications, resulted in divergent and sometimes conflicting perspectives on the effectiveness and relevance of Canada’s response. The respective stream priorities of internal stakeholders and the political objectives of external stakeholders highlighted the challenge and importance of ensuring neutrality and limiting the subjectivity of findings through data triangulation.

Limited access to stakeholders and projects sites in Myanmar

Myanmar’s complex and unstable political environment, as well as the military regime’s strict in-country regulations around travel and field access, posed risks and constraints, including:

• Security concerns for both evaluators and stakeholders
• Limited opportunities for engagement with stakeholders limited access to field and project sites

Mitigation measures

Assess intended results and progress towards sustainable solutions

The evaluation team assessed the Strategy's results, effectiveness and relevance against its objectives and intended results, while also taking into account the sustainability of results and programming, and the progress towards the advancement of lasting solutions. This enabled a critical assessment of the Strategy’s results and progress, and Canada’s contributions to sustainable solutions.

Data triangulation and feminist principles

The evaluation team interviewed internal and external stakeholders involved in both phases of the Strategy and all program streams, and triangulated interview data with document, project and literature reviews to increase confidence in the evaluation’s findings. The team applied feminist evaluation principles of acknowledging biases and ensuring the active inclusion of diverse voices and perspectives. When collecting data in-country in Bangladesh and Myanmar, the evaluation team consulted with Global Affairs Canada mission staff for recommendations on navigating the complex environment.

In-person interviews with stakeholders in Thailand and Myanmar

The evaluation team conducted face-to-face interviews with stakeholders in Thailand and Myanmar to obtain perspectives on projects that the team was unable to visit in person due to the military regime’s restrictions on internal travel in Myanmar. The evaluation team adopted a do-no-harm approach to ensure that no stakeholders were re-victimized and that any security concerns arising from participants’ involvement in the evaluation were carefully addressed or mitigated to the extent possible, in accordance with the Murad Code.

Findings

Results and delivery

Enhancing international cooperation

Figure 3:

Image credit: Zakir Hossain, The New Humanitarian, 2020

Canada exerted considerable influence among the donor community in international coordination and advocacy for the Rohingya refugee response in Bangladesh.

As the first donor with a Special Envoy and a dedicated Strategy for the crises, Canada led collaboration, diplomatic engagement and advocacy efforts with the Government of Bangladesh, other donors and the UN to facilitate a whole-of-donor community approach and a collective response to humanitarian and development needs. This enabled Canada to advance its objective of enhancing international cooperation in the response to the crises. As Canada’s Special Envoy to Myanmar during Phase 1 of the Strategy, Bob Rae’s vocal engagement helped to raise international attention on the Rohingya crisis, mobilize the global community to respond to the crisis, and enhance Canada’s image abroad based on its strong support for human rights.

Canada’s influence in international coordination during Phase 1 included chairing an NGO and donor working group on the Rohingya response, leading an education strategy executive group, and co-creating and co-chairing a donor working group, and chairing the Joint Peace Fund, among other roles. Canada also led on coordination with like-minded countries in multilateral institutions, including by hosting a UN ministerial-level meeting in 2018 on the Rohingya crisis and launching an International Working Group (an informal grouping of 22 states) that served as a platform to facilitate cooperation among UN offices and partners. Canada continued to signal its high-level political commitment, maintain global visibility on the crises, and lead in various coordination groups, albeit the announced Special Envoy position remained vacant in Phase 2.

Canada’s advocacy and diplomatic efforts were pivotal in enabling the Government of Bangladesh successfully secure grant (as opposed to loan) funding from the World Bank to help meet the basic needs of the Rohingya refugee populations and host communities.  Canada’s advocacy efforts with the World Bank were critical in enabling the Government of Bangladesh to benefit from the International Development Association’s refugee sub-window in 2018.Canada’s influence resulted in the World Bank exceptionally waving its funding criteria to allow Canada to fund the “buy down” usually required of the host country. Through this innovative funding mechanism, every $1 contributed by Canada was matched by an additional $5 in grant funding from the World Bank, and over US $500 million in additional grant funding was unlocked. This was a significant advocacy result that demonstrated Canada's influential role in allowing for support to be channelled responsively and effectively to Rohingya refugee populations as well as impacted host communities.

By combining a strong political commitment to address the crises with important financial and human resources for the implementation of a multi-year response, Canada’s Strategy served to strengthen Canada’s credibility with the Government of Bangladesh and other donors and partners around the world. This positioned Canada to exert considerable influence in responding to the crises, notably by leading international coordination in Bangladesh, as well as advocacy and diplomatic efforts.

Alleviating humanitarian needs

Figure 4: Top 5 Humanitarian Partners in Bangladesh (both phases) *

*Disbursement to all humanitarian partners in Bangladesh totalled $120.2M over both phases of the Strategy.

Figure 5: Top 5 Humanitarian Partners in Myanmar (both phases) *

*Disbursements to all humanitarian partners in Myanmar totalled $54.2M over both phases of the Strategy.

Canada helped save lives and alleviate human suffering in Myanmar and Bangladesh, althoughits humanitarian funding decreased in Phase 2 in a context where needs increased.

Canada’s humanitarian contributions across both Phases of the strategy helped save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain the dignity of those affected by conflict and natural disasters in Myanmar and Bangladesh. In terms of the donor landscape, Canada was the 6^th largest bilateral humanitarian donor in Bangladesh for the Joint Response Plans (JRP) for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis from 2018-23, with total funding of US $102.7M. Canada was the 10^th largest bilateral humanitarian donor in Myanmar to the Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plans (or similar plans) from 2018-23, with total funding of US $29.8M*. Canada’s humanitarian contributions included life-saving food assistance, healthcare and nutrition, and other essential services.

In Bangladesh, Canada’s support to the World Food Program (WFP), helped provide life-saving food assistance to nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees through food outlets across the camps in Cox’s Bazar, using an innovative blockchain platform. It also contributed to financial inclusion and poverty alleviation through food procurement from host communities’ ultra-poor farmers. As one of only three countries providing funding to Doctors without Borders (MSF), Canada’s humanitarian contributions helped address the enormous health needs of a growing number of Rohingya refugees and host community patients through the provision of general healthcare, treatment for chronic diseases, psychosocial support and women’s healthcare.

In Myanmar, Canada’s support to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) helped meet urgent needs and to improve access to water and other essential services for hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and others affected by situations of violence. Canada’s contributions also enabled the ICRC to deliver its core protection-focused activities in favour of violence-affected communities and detainees. Support to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) in Myanmar in 2022 enabled 32 partners to implement 49 urgent and life-saving projects that reached 586,000 people.

Despite these key contributions, Canada’s humanitarian funding in response to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises also decreased considerably over the Strategy, from a total of $124M in Phase 1 to $50.5M in Phase 2. Canada shifted to providing humanitarian funding in Phase 2 through departmental reference levels rather than the Strategy, which enhanced its flexibility to direct funds to other global crises while continuing to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar humanitarian crises. However, it is worth noting that this decrease in funding occurred in a context where humanitarian needs have increased in both countries, amidst overall declining levels of international donor funding to respond to these crises.

Overall, Canada played a key role in addressing humanitarian needs of the Rohingya and Myanmar crises. However, the widening gap between the growing needs in Myanmar and Bangladesh, and Canada’s decreasing levels of humanitarian funding, has limited its ability to continue alleviating overall humanitarian needs.

*Note: These numbers may not fully reflect Canada’s or other donors’ humanitarian contributions due to differences in UN reporting systems. Canada’s disbursements under the Strategy are detailed in Annex II, and total donor humanitarian response vs ODA funding is in Annex V.

Medium-term support to vulnerable and crisis-affected populations

Before - Figure 6.1

After - Figure 6.2

Image credit: IOM, 2023. Site Development Catalogue 2.1 April 2023.

While Canada achieved the Strategy’s intended development assistance results in key sectors in Bangladesh, contextual constraints hindered the achievement of lasting outcomes.

Triangulation of evidence revealed that the Strategy’s objective of medium-term support to meet the needs of vulnerable and crisis-affected populations in Bangladesh was achieved through key development assistance contributions and a mix of projects aligned with the needs of Rohingya refugees and impacted host communities. However, the Strategy’s development assistance objective was not designed to go beyond addressing medium-term needs and sustainable outcomes were constrained by contextual limitations. These included host government constraints on Rohingya refugees’ self-reliance and the protracted nature of the crisis illustrated by worsening conditions in the camps and increasing dependence on donor assistance.

Through the course of the Strategy, Canada provided $179M in development assistance for the Rohingya refugee response in Bangladesh, delivering 16 projects across top 5 sub-action areas of education (37%), health & SRHR (17%), growth that works for everyone (15%), social services & food security (13%) and environment & climate action (11%). Canada’s key role and results in education and livelihoods were particularly relevant given the need for greater refugee self-reliance, in a context of restrictive host government policies resulting in an increased dependence on declining global donor funding.

Key Canadian development results in Bangladesh:

The Strategy enabled Canada to be a key donor in the environmental and livelihoods sectors, namely for the joint UN Safe Access to Fuel and Energy Plus (SAFE Plus) project (2019-22) and its second iteration SAFE Plus 2 (2022-25), for which Canada provided respectively 35% ($20M) and 66% ($15M) of all donor funding. Results to-date included improved environmental and economic security for vulnerable Rohingya refugee and host community households in Cox’s Bazar through the revegetation of land (52 hectares), the reduced use of firewood, the increased use of cooking fuel, as well as the development of green skills among beneficiaries.

Canada served as the leading donor in the operationalization of skills and livelihoods programming for refugees and host communities in Bangladesh as the sole donor of the largest project in this sector, namely the “Leaving No One Behind” initiative ($44M) implemented by UNHCR, BRAC and ILO (2023-25). Similarly, Canada helped improve educational access, systems and infrastructure through the Education Cannot Wait Programme ($27.5M) (2022-24). Overall, Canada's engagement in these two projects enabled refugees in the camps to become more self-reliant and resilient through skills development and stipends earned through “volunteering” services, as well as improved their access to quality, safe and inclusive learning opportunities.

Despite Canada's key development assistance contributions in meeting the needs ofvulnerable and crisis-affected populations in Bangladesh in the short and medium-term, it did not lead to sustainable outcomes due to various contextual constraints (see slides 26 & 27 for more details on contextual constraints).

Figure 7:

Image credit: Vice News, 2021

Canada’s development assistance in Myanmar achieved the Strategy's intended results, but increased violence, instability and operational constraints hampered lasting outcomes.

Canada achieved its development assistance objective of providing medium-term support to meet the needs of vulnerable and crisis-affected populations in Myanmar through programming in the areas of poverty reduction, health and nutrition, as well ascivil society, all with a strong gender lens. However, the Strategy’s development assistance objective was not designed to go beyond addressing medium-term needs. Additionally, an increase in violence, instability and operational constraints in Myanmar also hampered Canada’s ability to ensure lasting progress and outcomes for Rohingya and other crisis-affected population.

Through the course of the Strategy, Canada provided $143M in development assistance in Myanmar, delivering 20 projects across top 5 sub-action areas of health & SRHR (30%), inclusive governance (25%), growth that works for everyone (21%), gender equality & the empowerment of women and girls (14%) and environment & climate action (4%). Canada’s engagement across these areas was relevant in a context of increased socio-economic fragility and gaps in governance and social services following the coup in Myanmar, which disproportionately affected the most vulnerable including women and girls.

Key Canadian development results in Myanmar:

Canada contributed to the prevention of gender-based violence and increased awareness of sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) through $18M in funding to UNICEF’s Health, Empowerment and Rights for Vulnerable Populations in Myanmar (HER) project (2018-23). HER Myanmar made progress towards the increased realization of SRHR for women, boys and girls, including through increased promotion, scale and capacity strengthening for out-of-school Comprehensive Sexuality Education. However, the sustainability of results was uncertain, given the turbulent and unpredictable nature of the post-coup regime in Myanmar.

The Strategy enabled Canada to provide key support for poverty reduction, inclusive governance and gender equality in Myanmar, through support to the UNOPS Livelihoods and Food Security Fund (LIFT). Canada’s contributions in Phase 1 ($16M) helped increase women’s economic empowerment and gender equitable community governance, and improve Rohingya rights, as well as relationships between Rakhine and Rohingya communities. Canada’s support in Phase 2 ($15M) allowed LIFT to further its objectives, benefiting 12 million people in 88% of Myanmar’s townships. That being said, significant operating challenges in a post-coup environment impacted its capacity to measure its outcomes and report on progress during Phase 2.

Despite the medium-term support provided by Canadian development assistance to vulnerable and crisis-affected populations in Myanmar, a variety of contextual constraints hampered lasting outcomes.

Accountability and pressure on malign actors in Myanmar

Despite Canada's efforts to hold human rights violators accountable and increase pressure, the Myanmar military regime’s continued use of violence hindered success in these areas.

Canada made important progress in achieving the Strategy’s objectives of ensuring accountability for the crimes committed and increasing pressure on malign actors. The Strategy enabled Canada to support a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), impose sanctions including through FPDS advocacy and coordination among like-minded countries, and build an evidence base for accountability and the pursuit of justice. However, the regime’s de facto rule and violence have continued.

Canada has intervened in a case brought forth by The Gambia in 2019 against Myanmar at the ICJ, in which The Gambia alleges violations of the Genocide Convention. In November 2023, Canada filed a joint declaration of intervention with Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in the case against Myanmar. The declaration focused on the interpretation of the Genocide Convention. Canada had issued joint statements with the Netherlands in 2020 and 2022 announcing its intention to intervene in the case.

Canada also helped establish and fund the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar in 2018 to enable the collection, preservation and analysis of evidence of international crimes and gross human rights violations in Myanmar. The Mechanism has continued to actively monitor and investigate the deteriorating situation in Myanmar and share its reporting with relevant courts and tribunals, including the ICJ.

Canada also funded Legal Action Worldwide, which supported The Gambia’s legal team and provided witnesses and survivors an opportunity to engage with international accountability processes and receive ongoing survivor-centred support. The ICJ case is an ongoing and lengthy process.

In response to the 2021 Myanmar military coup, Canada condemned the military’s actions and has organized 9 rounds of sanctions against the regime. Often implemented through FPDS advocacy and coordination with like-minded countries, these sanctions and related public messaging aim to maximize concerted pressure on the regime to reverse course and limit its access to key resources and revenue to fuel its violence. Canada was also one of the first countries to target aviation fuel in response to the regime counter vailing international law through air strikes. These sanctions served to limit the capacity of Myanmar’s military regime to operate, but have not resulted in a significant change of course.

Canada’s considerable efforts to build an evidence base for accountability and increase pressure on malign actors in Myanmar were mitigated by ever-increasing levels of human rights violations, violence, oppression, lawlessness and poverty following the military coup of 2021. The military regime’s continued use of violence against the Rohingya (described by the UN as the most persecuted minority in the world) and Myanmar’s wider population highlights the fact that pursuing accountability remains a long-term process.

Engagement across streams

Source: Global Affairs Canada, 2023. CFO Stats Financial Data.

* Includes disbursements for FY 2022-23 up to November 2023.

** Includes $50.5M funded outside the Strategy Phase 2.

The context limited the advancement toward establishing the conditions forthe safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar.

Among their contributions to the Strategy, Peace and Stabilization Operations (PSOPs) programming and Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Service (FPDS) engagement were key drivers for Canada’s efforts to supporting the creation of the conditions for the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees. PSOPs was allocated 6% ($29.9M) of the Strategy’s funding across both phases and provided strategic contributions to peace, security and democracy in post-coup Myanmar, which was critical to meeting the Strategy’s objectives relating to advancing inclusive and sustainable peace, advancing the restoration of democratic rule, and increasing pressure on malign actors and pursuing accountability. This included projects on armed-conflict prevention, support for peace and accountability in Myanmar, support to Rohingya survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in Bangladesh, and investigations into SGBV crimes.

Canada’s largest PSOPs engagement in Myanmar ($15.3M across both phases) was its support to the multi-donor Joint Peace Fund (JPF), designed to support national efforts to achieve lasting settlement of ethnic armed conflict in Myanmar and to build broad-based participation and support for the implementation of the Nation wide Ceasefire Agreement. As a multi-donor fund focused on political and peace processes rather than on development assistance, the JPF was strategically relevant for addressing instability in Myanmar. Canada also used its positionon the JPF board to advocate for gender issues and bring together women leaders and decision-makersfrom diverse backgrounds to advance women’s roles in the peace process and integrate gender into policies and procedures in the overall process.

Canada’s FPDS stream, for its part, undertook efforts to sustain visibility on the crises and engage extensively in multilateral forums such as the UN Human Rights Council and other UN committees. Canada also led or coordinated with like-minded countries on demarches, sanctions, joint statements, interventions and resolutions, including the retention of key language such as the reference to arms flows. In addition, FPDS supported pro-democratic efforts, network building and cross-border work, and coordinated projects funded by the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI) on inclusive governance, human rights and the rule of law, democracy, independent media and security. In FY 2022-23, Canada funded 9 CFLI projects in Myanmar, including a key project to increase people’s access to credible news and information on the post-coup crisis.

However, given broader geopolitical constraints, Canada’s Strategy was unable to significantly advance inclusive and sustainable peace, the restoration of democracy orthe creation of conditions for the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees. These constraints included Myanmar’s 2021 military coup and subsequent instability, ongoing discrimination against the Rohingya population and other groups, the protracted nature of the crises and the recurrence of natural disasters. Such persistent geopolitical constraints limited progress in advancing inclusive and sustainable peace, and the restoration of democratic rule, while underlining the remaining gaps and missing conditions to establish lasting solutions.

Effectiveness

Political and operating environment

Figure 8:

Image credit: International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2023

Operational and access constraints resulting from the coup and subsequent military rule in Myanmar were key limitations for implementing partners and Canadian staff.

The increased violence and instability following the military coup created significant security and access challenges for implementing partners in Myanmar, with some partners having to relocate outside the country, namely to Thailand. While field access was already limited before the coup, it was further restricted post-coup by additional regime requirements, such as increased administrative difficulty for domestic travel authorization. This process was bureaucratically burdensome and slow, making it difficult for partners to reach target beneficiaries, particularly in Rakhine State. The regime’s 2022 Organization Registration Law (or NGO Law) was a major constraint for partners due to its complexity, prohibitive reporting requirements, lack of protection for sensitive information, and risk of criminal penalties for non-compliance. The NGO Law, while restricting access to regions in need of humanitarian assistance, also imposed substantial restrictions on partner operations and responsiveness by making operations more administratively complex.

In addition, the narrowing of democratic space and the absence of legitimate government counterparts due to the coup have limited Canada’s ability to engage in Myanmar and have had an impact on previous gains, making it more difficult to advance Canada’s objectives of sustainable peace and democratic restoration.

Canada’s administrative flexibility and strong partner engagement enabled implementing partners to better adjust to Myanmar’s post-coup political and operating environment.

In response to the unstable and challenging operating context for implementing partners in post-coup Myanmar, Canada demonstrated flexibility by adjusting its standard operating and reporting requirements for partners. For example, Canada reduced the reporting burden for partners and allowed them to pivot their programming activities or objectives in response to emerging security and operational challenges. This flexibility enabled implementing partners to continue to operate effectively in an evolving context.

Canada also consistently engaged with implementing partners and created opportunities for feedback and information sharing through site visits, partner consultations and regular communications. This was key to strengthening partners’ understanding and alignment with Canadian priorities in a rapidly changing context and enabling partners to identify opportunities for complementarity. Canadian engagement with implementing partners included a series of five consultations in June 2023, regular meetings with partners based in Canada, and project visits from mission staff to partners in the field. This facilitated the exchange of information on project development and changes in context and gave partners the opportunity to obtain feedback as well as voice their concerns and ideas.

While operational and access constraints were important limitations for implementing partners and Canadian staff in Myanmar, Canada's administrative flexibility and strong partner engagement were enabling factors to the effective implementation of the Strategy.

Relevance

Alleviating humanitarian needs

Figure 9:

Sources: (1) ISCG, 2023. 2023 Joint Response Plan: Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis. ; (2) UN OCHA, 2023. Humanitarian Needs Overview Myanmar 2023.

The Rohingya and Myanmar protracted crises resulted in a continued dependence of Rohingya refugees on international humanitarian assistance.

Following the military coup in Myanmar in 2021 and ensuing civil war, the prospects for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar have become more remote than ever. The UN noted that the Rohingya population continued to face systematic human rights violations in Myanmar and rapidly deteriorating conditions in refugee camps in Bangladesh.

In Bangladesh, an estimated 1.5 million people (538K host community and 978K Rohingya refugees)—with just over half of them women and girls—required humanitarian assistance in 2023 as part of the Rohingya humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, 95% of all Rohingya households in Cox’s Bazar in 2022 were moderately to highly vulnerable and entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance. Confined to the camps and prohibited from finding formal employment, Rohingya refugees are also almost completely dependent on food assistance, making them particularly vulnerable to food ration cuts due to declining donor funding.

In Myanmar in 2023, 600,000 Rohingya people in Rakhine State faced challenges in accessing livelihoods, urgent health care and basic services due to ongoing discriminatory restrictions on their citizenship, legal status and movement. This includes nearly 130,000 internally displaced Rohingya (IDPs), the vast majority of whom are confined to closed internally displaced people camps. This has prolonged their need for and reliance on humanitarian assistance, all in a broader context where an estimated 17.6 million people across the country were in humanitarian need due to increased conflict, instability and poverty following the coup.

Humanitarian needs were further exacerbated by natural disasters in Bangladesh and Myanmar. Myanmar is one of the world’s most disaster-prone countries, and the populations (particularly Rohingya communities in Rakhine State) affected by Cyclone Mocha in—Myanmar’s worst natural disaster in nearly a decade—remain in dire need of food, clean water, medicine, medical care and materials to build or repair shelters. In Bangladesh, a country also vulnerable to natural disasters, hundreds of thousands were affected by Cyclone Mocha, which caused considerable destruction to Rohingya and Bangladeshi homes and facilities in Cox’s Bazar.

The protracted humanitarian needs in Myanmar and Bangladesh owing to continued conflict and prolonged displacement, compounded by a vulnerability to natural disasters, mean that Rohingya refugees and IDPs will require continued international humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs and ensure their survival. For refugees in Bangladesh, humanitarian needs persist in the absence of the conditions are met for their safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable repatriation to Myanmar. This indicates that Canada’s humanitarian engagement and contributions through the Strategy, while important, cannot alone provide a sustainable solution to the growing humanitarian needs resulting from the protracted crises.

Medium-term support to vulnerable and crisis-affected populations

Figure 10: Livelihoods and Skills Development Sector Needs – Bangladesh (2023)

Source: ISCG, 2023. Livelihoods and Skills Development (Bangladesh).

Canada’s advocacy and support to livelihoods and skills development were key to meeting the needs of vulnerable and crisis-affected populations in Bangladesh.

The limited legal opportunities for Rohingya refugees to earn a livelihood in the camps in Bangladesh leave them almost entirely reliant on donor assistance, and declining donor funding levels and shifting priorities due to multiple global crises have further exacerbated the humanitarian crisis. Canada’s advocacy and support to livelihoods and skills development were particularly relevant to achieving the Strategy’s objective of meeting the needs of vulnerable and crisis-affected populations. This contributed to advancing sustainable solutions to the humanitarian crisis while seeking to reduce the related cost to donors and the Government of Bangladesh.

Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh face government restrictions on livelihoods and skills development and are officially prevented from accessing formal employment. These ongoing restrictions are related to Bangladesh Government’s concerns that providing economic opportunities to Rohingya refugees would create a “pull factor” that would lead to an influx of additional refugees and further distort local markets. They are part of a larger set of host government policies that include various degrees of restrictions on the provision of development or multi-year funding, formal education, and the use of permanent materials and structures in the camps.

Canada has maintained livelihoods as an advocacy and programming priority in Bangladesh, and donor engagement has led to incremental improvements in livelihoods and skills development opportunities for Rohingya refugees. This reflects an approach to livelihoods and skills as elements along the spectrum of education, building upon Canada’s advocacy and provision of basic education. In 2022, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) endorsed 2 related frameworks: (1) the GoB–UN Framework on Skills Development for Rohingya Refugees and Host Communities, related to refugee vocational skills development; and (2) Guidance on the Engagement of Volunteers for the Rohingya Refugee Camps, covering refugee volunteer services and incentives within the camps. A Livelihoods and Skills Development Sector was also established to build the skills and capacities of refugees, reaching over 69,000 Rohingya refugee and host community beneficiaries through 18 projects by 2023, including a Canada-funded joint UNHCR, BRAC and ILO project on vocational skills.

While incremental progress was made, limited opportunities for livelihoods and skills development and the resulting dependence on donors was of concern in a context of decreased donor funding. Indeed, the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Joint Response Plan was 50% funded in 2023, compared to 69% in 2018. Decreased funding led to food rations being cut by a third in 2023 (below minimum humanitarian standards), further eroding the health and security of a population already suffering from severe trauma and deprivation, and increased of vulnerability of Rohingya households as more than half relied on donor-funded e-vouchers as their main income.

The continued need for livelihood opportunities and related advocacy, in the context of declining global funding and a constraining policy environment, has reinforced the relevance of Canada's focus on livelihoods and skills development for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to mitigate the worsening crisis and provide longer-term solutions in a context where Rohingya refugees depend on progressively decreasing donor funding.

Resettlement efforts and dialogue

Figure 11:

Image credit: Al Jazeera, 2023.

Canada’s role as a leading donor on third-country resettlement emerged as an unexpected result from its response to the crises.

Given the rapidly deteriorating conditions for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and the lack of prospects for their repatriation to Myanmar, third-country resettlement of Rohingya refugees has become increasingly relevant as an alternative to repatriation. The UN estimated that more than 100,000 Rohingya refugees will bein need of resettlement in 2023 from host countries in Asia, including Bangladesh, and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar has called on the international community to accept Rohingya refugees, provide them with the support required under international standards, and expand opportunities for resettlement and other durable solutions.

While resettlement was not an expected result or a key Canadian objective of either phase of the Strategy, Canada played a leading role on third-country resettlement of Rohingya refugees in Phase 2. Canada actively engaged with the Government of Bangladesh and other donors on this issue, and in 2007, and again in 2022, it was the first country to welcome Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh when third-party resettlement was reopened in Bangladesh. This built on Canada’s long tradition of welcoming refugees (i.e. since 1959, Canada has welcomed more than 700,000 refugees from around the world).

Canada, along with the United States, remains one of the few donors to advocate for and engage in resettlement. In 2022, the United States announced the establishment of a resettlement program for vulnerable Rohingya refugees in collaboration with the Government of Bangladesh and the UNHCR. This followed a shift in the Government of Bangladesh’s approach to third-country resettlement after a 12-year suspension. In 2022, the UNHCR submitted 1,082 refugees for resettlement, with some cases submitted to 3 resettlement countries (United States, Canada and Sweden) as a pilot initiative.

Global Affairs Canada staff in Bangladesh and at headquarters were heavily involved in supporting third-country resettlement, notably through advocacy and diplomatic efforts. The planning and implementation of Canadian resettlement initiatives were also managed by Immigration Refugee Citizenship Canada, which oversees the screening, processing and operationalization of refugee resettlement applications, notably under the Resettlement Assistance Program.This highlighted the importance of adopting a whole-of-government of Canada approach when it comes to resettlement and ensuring clarity on how resettlement fits within Canada’s broader response to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises.

Conclusions

Canada’s Strategy to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises enabled it to play a key role and make important contributions to the global response, while largely achieving the objectives set out in the Strategy. However, the worsening situation in the region has rendered it increasingly challenging for Canada to help advance lasting solutions to the crises. In particular, with the prospects for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar more remote than ever, the refugees remain fully dependent on the Government of Bangladesh and the international donor community for their survival in the camps. The ongoing violent conflict in Myanmar, including after the 2021 coup, has led to increased humanitarian needs for internally displaced persons in Myanmar. Recurring natural disasters in both countries and a decline in donor funding globally have also further compounded the challenges.

As Canada considers its future engagement beyond the second phase of the Strategy, this evaluation provides an opportunity to reflect on Canada’s response to help prioritize areas where its impact and value can be maximized. The evaluation underscores the importance of programming in Bangladesh that focuses on fostering self-reliance among Rohingya refugees, exploring complementary repatriation solutions, as well as addressing humanitarian needs. Furthermore, the evaluation demonstrated that supporting sustainable solutions to the conflict and political instability in Myanmar requires identifying ways for Canada to target their under lying causes.

Recommendations and considerations

Recommendations

1. In Canada’s response to the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh, focus on efforts to improve Rohingya refugees’ self-reliance while still pursuing complementary solutions to repatriation, as well as addressing humanitarian needs.
2. Identify ways for Canada to target the underlying causes of the conflict and political instability in Myanmar and support lasting solutions to the Myanmar and Rohingya crises.

Note: See Annex VII for the evaluation findings corresponding to each recommendation.

Considerations for Global Affairs Canada

Whole-of-government coordination: Canada's coordinated advocacy has been an enabling factor in the effective implementation of its response to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises across a wide range of issues. This has reinforced the importance of coordination across business lines within Global Affairs Canada, as well as across the Government of Canada, including on initiatives such as third-country resettlement which requires a high level of coordination and collaboration with other departments such as Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. In light of this, the Department should consider exploring how best to integrate a whole-of-government approach to advance Canada’s objectives and mitigate risks off ragmentation through greater collaboration and coordination.

Building on Canada’s considerable influence in the global response to the crises: Through the Strategy,Canada exerted considerable influence among donors and partners, in terms of international coordination and advocacy in the global response to the Rohingya refugee crisis. Notably, as Canada’s Special Envoy to Myanmar, Bob Rae played a pivotal role in increasing international attention and urging coordinated action to address the crisis. Combined with broader diplomatic and advocacy efforts, this active engagement provided Canada with increased and enduring diplomatic influence both within Bangladesh andthe broader international community. The Department should therefore consider identifying options to further capitalize on Canada’s considerable influence to mobilize international support in advancing sustainable solutions to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises. Furthermore, it could consider how similar approaches may be leveraged in other crisis situations.

Support to regionally-driven political solutions to the crises: While Canada supported a regional response to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises by engaging with regional governments and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including on the advancement of its Five-Point Consensus to address the Myanmar political crisis, this was nota direct objective of the Strategy and progress towards a lasting regional solution remained limited. Considering the importance of regionally-driven political solutions to resolving the crises and achieving the Strategy’s objectives, the Department should consider how best to engage bilaterally in the region and with ASEAN to support peace building and sustainable solutions while also advancing Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Annexes

Annex I: Timeline of the Rohingya and Myanmar crises

Note: This timeline provides a general overview of the Rohingya and Myanmar Crises and Canada’s response and is not exhaustive. The situation is complex and continues to evolve.

Annex II: Canada’s Rohingya and Myanmar Strategy budget vs. actuals by stream and phase

Below is a comparison of budgeted amounts and actual expenditures for the 3 main Global Affairs Canada streams funded through Canada’s Rohingya and Myanmar Strategy Envelope for Phase 1 (2018-21) and Phase 2 (2021-23).

Note: Amounts are in Canadian dollars.

Figure 12: Phase 1 (2018-21), Budgeted Amounts Vs. Actuals by Streams

Figure 13: Phase 2 (2021-23), Budgeted Amounts Vs. Actuals by Streams*

*Note: Actual expenditures reflect funds disbursed to date (up to November 2023), given that Phase 2 continues until March 2024 and is therefore only 2/3 complete.

Figure 14: Complementary Humanitarian Assistance During Phase 2*

*Note: While Phase 2 did not provide dedicated funding for humanitarian assistance, it was complemented by $50.49M disbursed up to November 2023 by Global Affairs Canada’s International Humanitarian Assistance Division in Myanmar and Bangladesh, in accordance with needs.

Annex III: Donor scan: Humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh

A scan of a sample of like-minded donors to the Rohingya Crisis Joint Response Plans (JRPs)* in Bangladesh revealed an overall complementarity of donor approaches but also a trend of declining humanitarian funding over the evaluation period. Canada remained a top bilateral humanitarian donor, and one of the few countries with a dedicated Strategy. This is in addition to significant contributions from the Government of Bangladesh, including US$50.6M in funding for the 2018-23 JRPs from and its efforts in hosting refugees.

Note: These numbers retrieved in November 2023 represent contributions to the JRPs and may not fully reflect Canada’s humanitarian contributions (detailed more fully in Annex II) due to differences in UN reporting systems.

Annex IV: Donor scan: Humanitarian assistance to Myanmar and political crisis

A scan of a sample of like-minded donors to the Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plans (MHRPs)* and similar plans revealed an overall complementarity of donor approaches, often including condemnation of the military regime following the 2021 coup, and a trend of increased humanitarian funding over the evaluation period. Canada remained a major bilateral humanitarian donor and one of the few countries with a dedicated strategy.

*Note: These numbers retrieved in November 2023 represent contributions to the MHRPs and may not fully reflect Canada’s humanitarian contributions (detailed more fully in Annex II) due to differences in UN reporting systems.

Annex V: Top 10 donors in Myanmar and Bangladesh - Total ODA vs Rohingya response

Donor funding to the Rohingya Crisis Joint Response Plans (JRPs)* in Bangladesh and Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plans (MHRPs) and similar plans in Myanmar provide an important measure of international engagement in response to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises. However, contributions to these humanitarian response plans may not fully reflect the funding provided to the crises due to limitations in UN reporting systems, and their omission of (or potential overlap with) development programming. Total net official development assistance (ODA) funding provides an alternative measure of the level donor engagement, and the tables below list the top 10 donors in each country by total humanitarian response plan funding compared to total ODA funding (although this includes bilateral assistance that may not be specific to the Rohingya crisis).

^*Note: While JRP and MHRP funding data was available up to 2023, ODA data was only available until 2022 (source: OECD, 2022. Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions – total net).

Annex VI: Evaluation findings corresponding to the evaluation questions

Annex VII: Evaluation findings corresponding to the evaluation recommendations