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Minister of Foreign Affairs appearance before the Committee of the Whole – Briefing material

2020-06-17

Table of contents

  1. Africa relations
  2. Arctic sovereignty
  3. BREXIT
  4. CARICOM relations
  5. China
    1. China Consular Cases
    2. Canada’s Approach to China, including Canada’s One China Policy
    3. Hong Kong
    4. Human Rights and Freedom of Religion in China
    5. Meng Wanzhou Arrest and U.S. Extradition Request
    6. Canada-China Agriculture Trade
    7. Regional Maritime Tensions
    8. China’s Belt and Road Initiative
  6. Consular cases
  7. CUSMA
  8. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
  9. Export permits and LAVs
  10. Feminist foreign policy
  11. Incidents in Cuba affecting Canadian diplomats
  12. India-bilateral relations
  13. International security, democracy and human rights
    1. Canada’s Contribution to Peace Operations
    2. Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security and the WPS Ambassador
    3. Bill to Amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act
  14. Iran
    1. Iran-U.S. Tensions
    2. Human Rights
    3. Flight PS752
  15. Israeli-Palestinian conflict
    1. Potential Israeli Annexation of Parts of the West Bank
    2. Jerusalem
    3. Violence in Gaza
    4. U.S. Middle East Peace Plan
    5. International Criminal Court Investigation into the “Situation in Palestine”
    6. Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS)
    7. Palestinian Self-Determination
  16. NATO
  17. Official development assistance levels
  18. Physical security at missions abroad
  19. Rohingya – Canada’s response
  20. Russia / Ukraine
  21. Sanctions
  22. Saudi Arabia
    1. Human Rights
    2. Bilateral Dispute
    3. G20 2020 Presidency
  23. Syria
    1. Crisis and Peace Talks
    2. Syria Consular Cases
  24. United Nations Security Council campaign
    1. Overview
    2. UNSC Positive Vote
    3. UNSC Subsequent Rounds
    4. UNSC Negative Vote
  25. United States
    1. Bilateral Relations
    2. Protests / Anti-Black Racism
  26. Venezuela
  27. Yemen
  28. 5G review
  29. Supplementary estimates (A)

Canada-Africa relations

Supplementary messages

Update

In 2020, Canada allocated $159.5 million to support international efforts to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, and $306 million to respond to annual humanitarian appeals to continue to address the needs of the most vulnerable. In the six months leading up to the outset of the global pandemic, the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Parliamentary Secretary Oliphant, the Minister of International Development, the Minister of Small Business, Export Promotion and International Trade as well as the Minister of Families, Children and Social Development have visited 11 countries in Africa. The Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of International Development have also had a series of bilateral calls with their African counterparts in May and June to discuss the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and other common objectives.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada’s Arctic sovereignty

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Background

No one disputes Canada’s sovereignty over the lands and islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. The only exception is tiny Hans Island between Ellesmere Island and Greenland, which is claimed by Denmark.

The waters of the archipelago, including the waters of the “Northwest Passage,” are internal waters of Canada by virtue of historic title, and thus Canada has full sovereignty over them. For greater clarity, in 1986 Canada drew straight baselines around the archipelago. According to the Oceans Act, all waters landward of baselines are internal waters and form part of Canada.

Under International Law, no right of transit passage by foreign vessels exists through internal waters. The U.S., however, disputes Canada’s characterization of the Northwest Passage as internal waters and considers the passage to be a strait used for internal navigation, in which a right of transit passage exists. This dispute is well managed, including through the Arctic Cooperation Agreement, under which the U.S. has committed to seek, and expects Canada to grant, consent to voyages by U.S. icebreakers through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.

Under international law, Canada has exclusive sovereign rights over resources of the seabed and subsoil of its continental shelf, including as it extends beyond 200 nautical miles. Filing a continental shelf submission is the first step in the process that will clarify the outer limits of where these rights can be exercised.

Canada is working to resolve the Lincoln Sea maritime boundary dispute and the dispute over the sovereignty of Hans Island through the Canada-Denmark Joint Task Force on Boundary Issues, established in May 2018. The Beaufort Sea dispute with the U.S. continues to be well managed and will be resolved in due course, in accordance with international law.

BREXIT

Supplementary messages

Update

The U.K. ceased to be a Member State of the EU as of February 1, 2020, and is no longer represented in the EU institutions. However, during the Brexit transition period which currently is scheduled to end on December 31, 2020, the U.K. remains bound by the entire body of EU law and continues to access the benefits of EU membership. To date, the U.K. has refused to contemplate an extension of the transition period, and while it is facing pressure from stakeholders to reconsider, particularly given the economic impacts of COVID-19, it is unlikely to change its position.

Canada has agreed to continue treating the U.K. as an EU Member during the transition period in terms of its agreements with the EU. Key agreements such as the CETA, the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and the Air Transport Agreement will continue to cover our relationship with the U.K. in those areas until the end of the transition period. Following the transition period, however, Canada-EU agreements will cease to apply to the U.K. New instruments between Canada and the U.K. will replace certain key Canada-EU agreements. Since 2017, line departments and agencies of the Government of Canada have been discussing such instruments with their U.K. counterparts in the event of a no-deal Brexit and, for the most part, have new instruments ready to enter into force at the end of the transition period.

U.K. Global Tariff (UKGT) and Possible Implication for Canadian Exporters

On May 19, 2020, the U.K. published its Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) applied tariff schedule (UKGT) that it intends to apply when the Brexit transition period ends and the U.K. leaves the EU single market, as soon as January 1, 2021. As published, and in the absence of an extension of the Brexit transition period or a bilateral preferential trade agreement, Canadian exporters would be subject to the UKGT. Compared to EU MFN applied tariff rates (i.e. “pre-CETA” rates), which the U.K. currently applies, the UKGT is more liberal. Under the UKGT, 94.6% of average Canadian exports from 2017-2019 would enter the U.K. MFN duty-free. However, gold exports (duty-free) account for 64% (or $12.4 billion of $19.2 billion) of average Canadian exports. Removing gold from trade totals, the percentage of Canadian exports that would enter the UK duty-free decreases to approximately 84%. During the Brexit transition period, the CETA continues to apply to the U.K. Beyond transition, discussion on any potential Canada-U.K. agreement should reflect our bilateral relationship and take into account the future EU-U.K. trade relationship, as well as any unilateral U.K. approaches.

Canada-CARICOM relations

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

China

China consular cases

Supplementary messages

Consular cases in China - Mr. Huseyincan Celil

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Canada’s approach to China

Supplementary messages

Update

GAC officials, in consultation with other departments, are preparing advice on re-framing Canada’s approach to relations with China. The work of various Parliamentary committees, alongside other sources and stakeholders, continues to inform this work.

Supporting facts and figures

Erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy

Supplementary messages

Update

China has announced that it will impose national security legislation in a process that circumvents the legislative channels of Hong Kong. The legislation would likely criminalize a wider range of politically-related activities and greatly shrink the range of freedoms Hong Kong citizens have traditionally enjoyed, notably those related to freedom of association and expression. The decision by Beijing to proceed unilaterally and without the consent of the Hong Kong people comes in response to months of civil unrest in 2019 and comes at a time when Covid-19 is keeping Hong Kong citizens off the streets. Canada will be undertaking a review of its existing relationship with Hong Kong, to determine whether it merits continuation or adjustments for the future.

Supporting facts and figures

Human rights and religious freedom in China

Supplementary messages

Update

Canada continues to raise human rights concerns as a priority in its engagement with China. Some key issues are the human rights situations in Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet.

Supporting facts and figures

Meng Wanzhou arrest and U.S. extradition request

Supplementary messages

Update

On May 27, 2020, the BC Supreme Court dismissed Ms. Meng’s argument that dual criminality (for Canada to extradite an individual, the foreign charges must amount to a criminal offence in Canada) does not apply in her extradition case. The extradition process will therefore proceed. This will include a hearing on a defence motion regarding abuse of process, and a committal hearing. Both are expected to take place later this year. From the day of her arrest, Ms. Meng has had full access to Chinese consular assistance as well as her lawyers.

Canada-China agriculture trade

Supplementary messages

Canola
COVID-19 and Impact on Agriculture Trade
Responsive – if asked about the impact of the U.S.-China Phase One deal on Canadian agriculture exports

Background

Canada-China Trade: China is Canada’s third-largest trading partner, after the U.S. and the EU (in 2019, 75.4% of Canada’s total exports went to the U.S., 8.1% to the EU, and 3.9% to China). In 2019, two-way merchandise trade between Canada and China fell slightly to $98.2 billion ($23.3 billion in Canadian exports and $75 billion in imports). Top exports were wood pulp, motor cars and vehicles for transporting persons, iron ores and concentrates, and copper ores and concentrates. Top imports from China included electronic machinery and equipment, data processing machinery, furniture, and toys. Canadian merchandise trade deficit with China increased by 8.1 percent from $47.9 billion in 2018 to $51.7 billion in 2019. From January to April 2020, Canada-China bilateral trade declined 15.1% from $31.8 billion to $27 billion YTD. In the same period, Canada’s exports declined 10.5% ($7.8 billion to $6.9 billion), imports declined 16.4% ($24 billion to $20.1 billion), and the trade deficit narrowed to $13.1 billion (a decline of $3.1 billion).

Canola: In March 2019, China suspended canola seed shipments from two major Canadian exporters, Richardson and Viterra, and increased inspection of all Canadian canola seed exports to China, citing alleged discovery of pests. Canada’s canola seed exports to China have fallen approximately 70%, with exports decreasing from $2.8 billion in 2018 to $859.2 million in 2019. As of April 1, 2020, Customs China indicated that it will permit the continued trade in Canadian canola seed for shipments with a dockage level of less than 1%, however Customs China has not reinstated the two suspended Canadian canola companies. Technical engagement is ongoing related to both the suspended companies and the new dockage requirements.

China-U.S. “Phase One” Trade Deal: The “Phase One” agreement entered into force on February 14, 2020 with a requirement that China purchase an additional $200 billion of U.S. goods and services in 2020/2021 compared to 2017 levels. COVID19 has lowered consumer demand in China and disrupted trade flows, leading to concern in the U.S. that China will not be able to buy the additional $200 billion in U.S. goods and services. The purchases so far have been behind the pace needed to reach the target of the first year’s $76.7 billion increase. On May 8, 2020, China’s Vice-Premier Liu He met by phone with U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer to discuss the ‘Phase One’ agreement. After the call, USTR made a statement that “both sides agreed that good progress is being made on creating the governmental infrastructures necessary to make the agreement a success” and further that “both countries fully expect to meet their obligations under the agreement in a timely manner”.

COVID-19 Economic Impacts: It is difficult to estimate the overall commercial impact of the outbreak on Canadian agriculture exports to China. Impacted agriculture sectors include live lobster; other seafood, including crabs; and meat, due to continued restrictions and limitations of port operating capacity and consumer demand in China.

Regional maritime tensions

Supplementary messages

Update

In recent months China has established new administrative districts to cover two disputed island chains in the SCS, shadowed a Malaysian vessel undertaking natural resource exploration in waters that are claimed by Malaysia, Vietnam and China, and reportedly sank a Vietnamese fishing boat. Regional tensions have heightened as several ASEAN countries as well as Australia and the U.S. have publically criticized recent Chinese actions.

In recent years, Beijing has pursued a more assertive policy to defend its claims in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS) through persistent incursions by Chinese coast guard and militia fishing vessels in disputed waters, including off the coasts of Indonesia, Japan and Vietnam. Tensions between the U.S. and China have escalated concurrently, as the U.S. has increased the frequency of its “Freedom of Navigation Operations” (FONOPs) to challenge China’s claims. Canada does not have a FONOPs program and has never participated in a U.S. FONOP. However, Canadian navy ships regularly traverse the SCS and ECS when deployed in the Asia-Pacific and operate in areas where the freedom of navigation regime applies.

Supporting facts and figures

Belt and Road Initiative

Supplementary messages

Update

According to Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, despite the disruption caused by COVID-19, China’s investment in BRI countries increased by 11.7% and trade increased by 3.2% in Q1 2020. China is now also proposing a “Health Silk Road” to deal with global health issues.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

In 2013, President Xi Jinping announced a pair of new development and trade initiatives for China and the surrounding regions later known as BRI. The reaction to the BRI has been mixed. While recipient countries generally welcome funding from China for much needed infrastructure build-out, there are questions about China’s geopolitical motives, concerns over whether BRI projects are economically and financially sound, whether China is practicing “debt trap diplomacy”, and whether BRI projects conform to global standards on environmental protection and labour.

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Consular cases

Supplementary messages

Case of Paul Whelan (Russia)

Case of Yasser Ahmed (Egypt)

Clemency - Canadians facing the death penalty abroad

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CUSMA / Softwood lumber / Aluminum

Supplementary messages

CUSMA Entry into Force

Supply Management

Softwood Lumber

Aluminum Import Monitoring

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Supplementary messages

Update

Despite extensive international efforts to isolate North Korea, constrain its economy, and counter its WMD proliferation, Pyongyang has markedly improved its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities in recent years and is continuing to do so. The last missile launches took place on April 14th, but March 2020 saw the largest number of missiles launched by North Korea in a single month. Reports from UN agencies in 2019 have highlighted the worsening humanitarian situation in North Korea, including significant food shortages due in part to droughts, which have resulted in the lowest levels of food production in more than a decade. While North Korea officially claims to have no cases of COVID-19, there are indications the country is battling infections. Experts are concerned that that an outbreak of the virus in North Korea could quickly deteriorate into a humanitarian emergency.

Supporting facts and figures

Export permits and LAVs

Export Development Canada loan

Responsives

Supplementary messages

Update

The review of all arms exports to Saudi Arabia, including LAVs, has concluded and export permits for Saudi Arabia are being reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

Supporting facts and figures

Feminist foreign policy

Supplementary messages

Update

On 7 May, Ministers Champagne and Gould held a Virtual Roundtable with 14 Canadian civil society organizations (CSOs) to discuss Canada’s feminist response to the pandemic. Participants encouraged Canada to maintain its global feminist leadership as part of an integrated and comprehensive approach to COVID-19. There was convergence in messaging among CSOs, especially on the following themes: support for civil society and women’s rights organizations; economic impacts, human rights, sexual and reproductive health and rights, sexual and gender based violence, LGBTQI, and women peace and security. The Ministers reiterated their commitment to strengthening the foundations of Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy by working with civil society to develop and launch a White Paper in this regard. This targeted dialogue process will, at least initially, take place on a digital platform due to the pandemic.

Supporting facts and figures

Incidents in Cuba affecting Canadian diplomats

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Canada-India bilateral relations

Supplementary messages

Update

In response to the COVID-19 crisis, Canada and India have worked together in ensuring the global supply of critical medical supplies and pharmaceuticals; supporting one anothers’ repatriation efforts; and advancing multilateral cooperation through the UN, WHO, G20, and other fora. The visit of Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar to Ottawa on December 19-20, 2019, was an opportunity to deepen the bilateral relationship across trade and investment, gender equality, environment and climate change, and peace and security.

Supporting facts and figures

International security, democracy and human rights

Canada’s contribution to UN peace operations

Supplementary messages

Update

COVID-19 is now present in all countries hosting UN peace operations. Its impact is far-reaching, straining limited resources and placing new demands on the UN to support response efforts. To date no deployed Canadian personnel are known to have contracted COVID-19. The UN Department of Peace Operations continues to request mission-critical enablers, like helicopters and mobile forces, that advanced militaries can provide.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada’s National Action Plan and Ambassador for women, peace and security

Supplementary messages

Update

The first annual report for Canada’s National Action Plan on WPS was tabled in Parliament in September 2018. The second was tabled in Parliament on June 10, 2020. It outlines in detail the progress made to advance WPS in the last fiscal year (2018-19). The tabling of the report was delayed due to the election and COVID-19.

Supporting facts and figures

Bill to amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act

Supplementary messages

Update

The Minister of Foreign Affairs introduced C-9, An Act to amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act on March 10, 2020.  This legislation helps to align Canada’s domestic implementing legislation with our international commitments. Canada’s adoption of these amendments would be an expected response to international calls for these dangerous chemicals to be controlled under the CWC. As the chemicals to be added have no use except as chemical weapons, there will be no impact on Canadian industry.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) seeks to completely eliminate and prohibit an entire category of weapon of mass destruction in a verifiable manner. The CWC's Annex on Chemicals includes three lists of chemicals (the "Schedules") that are subject to declaration and verification by the OPCW - these are the lists of possible chemical weapons and their precursors.

At the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC, in November 2019, two binding decisions were adopted to add new toxic chemicals to Schedule 1. Among these chemicals are the family of "Novichok" type agents used in the attempted assassination of former British spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia Skripal in the UK in March 2018.

Iran

Iran-U.S. tensions

Supplementary messages

Update

A January 17, 2020 Friday Prayers speech by the Supreme Leader indicates that he expects the Quds force to carry on exerting regional influence and has provided them with religious justification for their actions. In that same speech, the Supreme Leader called the Quds Force “combatants without borders” who sacrifice their lives to assist the oppressed in the region.

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Iran – Human rights

Supplementary messages

Update

The general trends suggest that grievances in Iran continue to multiply, along social economic, ethnic, and political lines. While occasional protests are a regular occurrence in Iran, it is likely that a higher frequency of protests will become the norm in the near term. At the outset, the Iranian regime is likely to opt for technical measures over excessive force to repress protests, though will escalate to excessive force if the protests threaten Iran’s domestic stability. The Iranian regime often demonizes marginalized groups in the face of domestic instability, including targeting ethnic and religious minorities, women and sexual minorities, and other minority groups. There have been no significant improvements in the situation of human rights in Iran during President Rouhani’s two terms (2013-present). If the recent February 2020 elections are an indication, with an overwhelming hardline majority elected, the trends will continue to worsen.

Flight PS752

Supplementary messages

Background

Canada and the Coordination Group countries are finalizing the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation concerning the negotiations on reparations with Iran. This MOU sets out the terms of reference for Ukraine’s prominent role as the Negotiating Spokesperson and creates an Advisory Committee consisting of all members of the Coordination Group who will be present during the negotiations and will support the work of the Spokesperson.

Before negotiations can begin, another MOU will have to be negotiated among the Coordination Group members to set out the group’s common negotiating position, which will be a guide for the Spokesperson and the Advisory Committee during the negotiations with Iran. Iran has expressed an interest in compensating victims equally without regard to nationality. In preparations for this MOU, Canada will have to conduct an analysis and evaluation of the claims linked to Canada.

Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Potential Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank

Supplementary messages

Background

The probability that annexation will occur in the coming months has increased following the inauguration of the Netanyahu-Gantz coalition government on May 17.  The coalition agreement identifies July 1, 2020 as the earliest date that legislation on annexation may move forward. This agreement builds on the U.S. Vision for Peace, which proposes permanent Israeli control of up to 30 percent of the West Bank. Should Israel opt to unilaterally annex parts of the West Bank, this action would be considered by most countries to be prohibited under international law, and therefore directly challenge the rules-based international order. It would also seriously imperil the prospect of a viable two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is a longstanding policy objective for Canada and the international community.

Canada’s policy on annexation is clear: Canada does not recognize permanent Israeli control over territories occupied in 1967, including the West Bank. Canada has, and will continue to engage with Israel, the Palestinian Authority and other leaders in the region to ensure that Canada’s position is understood clearly and expressed effectively to a broad set of stakeholders.

PM Trudeau notably relayed Canada’s concern publicly on June 3, and directly to Israeli PM Netanyahu and Alternate PM Gantz on May 18 and 19 respectively. Minister Champagne also expressed Canada’s concern to Israel Foreign Minister Ashkenazi on June 2.

Jerusalem

Supplementary messages

Update

The Palestinians have long sought their future capital to be in East Jerusalem, however the recently-released US peace plan proposes a future Palestinian capital in eastern Jerusalem, falling well short of Palestinian aspirations. During Israel’s recent election campaign, PM Netanyahu pledged to push forward with the expansion of several settlement projects in and around Jerusalem, which would further diminish the Palestinian presence in, and connection to, Jerusalem. Several states have issued public statements criticizing the Israeli plans.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

As the international consensus on Jerusalem begins to weaken, Israel is continuing the expansion of settlements and challenging the status quo at the Old City’s holy sites, raising tensions between the city’s Jewish and Arab residents. While the US peace plan did not propose any change to the status quo at the holy sites (including the Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif complex), the plan’s proposal for overall Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem would, if implemented, further erode the Palestinians’ claims to East Jerusalem, risking increased tensions and further violence.

Violence in Gaza

Supplementary messages

Update

On February 23, 2020, Israeli forces attacked a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) team that was placing a bomb along the border fence between Gaza and Israel, killing one. Video of the body of the deceased being moved by an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) bulldozer circulated on social media, causing considerable anger. Multiple exchanges of rocket fire by PIJ and airstrikes by Israel followed. Hamas did not engage in this round of violence. A fragile ceasefire between PIJ and Israel was struck on February 24, 2020.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

The population of Gaza faces high levels of acute vulnerability. Recurrent violence, severe restrictions on the movement of people and goods, limited economic growth, poor governance, and poverty have eroded Gazans’ resilience. Approximately 82 percent of the population require some form of humanitarian assistance. Unemployment rates are among the highest in the world, the majority of the population is food insecure and 96 percent of the groundwater in Gaza is unfit for human consumption. Against this backdrop, protests began in March 2018 as part of the “Great March of Return”. The resulting clashes have led to more than 250 Palestinians being killed and over 23,600 injured.

While the protests have since diminished in intensity, violence between groups in Gaza and Israel continues. An escalation of violence occurred in November 2019 following an Israeli airstrike that killed a senior PIJ commander and his wife. In response, approximately 500 rockets were launched into Israel by PIJ. Israel’s counterstrikes on targets in Gaza resulted in 34 deaths in Gaza and in 111 injuries.

Canada exercises enhanced due diligence for all humanitarian and development assistance for Palestinians. Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, is a listed terrorist organization. The Government of Canada has no contact with Hamas.

U.S. Middle East peace plan

Supplementary messages

Update

The US Vision for Peace was released in its entirety on January 28, 2020. The plan addresses the key final status issues (Jerusalem, refugees, borders, security, recognition), however the plan strongly favours Israel, and crosses several Palestinian red-lines, with the result that the Palestinian Authority rejected it the same day it was released.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

In engagements with likemindeds and others since the plan’s release, Canadian officials have been clear that Canada remains committed to supporting peace between the parties, but ultimately it is up to Israelis and Palestinians to reach an agreement through direct negotiations. International reactions to the plan were at first cautiously supportive of US efforts, however more recently several states and groups such as the EU, Arab League, and others have reiterated their support to the longstanding international consensus of a two-state solution based on 1967 lines, rather than the vision laid out in the US plan. Many observers have also indicated that the US plan may have the effect of shifting the baseline negotiating positions on the conflict in Israel’s favour, which could affect future negotiations between the parties.

International Criminal Court investigation into the “situation in Palestine”

Supplementary messages

Background

On December 20, 2019, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) decided to formally advance the investigation on the “Situation in Palestine” after finding that in her view, war crimes had been or are being committed in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza. However, due the contested legal issues surrounding territorial definitions in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, the prosecutor requested from the Pre-Trial Chamber, a ruling confirming whether the ICC has the jurisdiction to investigate in those territories.

Canada has expressed its position to the treaty depositary in January 2015 that it does not recognize a “State of Palestine” and it does not consider “Palestine” to be a party to the Rome Statute or to have any treaty relationship to Canada as a State Party. In the absence of a Palestinian State, it is Canada’s view that the Court does not have jurisdiction under international law. Canada further reaffirmed this position in 2018 and on February 14, 2020, Canada once again reiterated this position in a letter submitted to the ICC.

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Boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS)

Supplementary messages

Update

On February 12, 2020, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published a list of 112 companies operating in Israeli settlements (no Canadian companies were listed). Canada had previously expressed concerns to the High Commissioner in writing.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

The BDS movement is a campaign founded in 2005 by Palestinian NGOs. The BDS movement "urges nonviolent pressure on Israel until it complies with international law by meeting three demands”: (i) Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the barrier between the West Bank and Israel; (ii) Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and (iii) Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 194. Much of the movement is focused on university campuses in Europe and North America and includes academic and cultural boycotts.

Critics of the campaign argue that the BDS movement is antisemitic and promotes the de-legitimization of Israel. There are also more targeted calls for boycotts of products produced in Israeli settlements in the West Bank or the Palestinian boycott of Israeli goods sold in the West Bank.

Canada’s vote on Palestinian self-determination

Supplementary messages

Background

On November 19, 2019, Canada changed its vote from “No” to “Yes” on a resolution titled “The Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination” at the UN General Assembly. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 165Y-5N-9A. The only states to vote “No” were the US, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Vanuatu. The resolution was co-sponsored by 129 countries including likeminded (EU, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Norway).

The resolution reaffirms the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right to an independent Palestinian state. As such, Canada voted in support of this resolution as it addresses the core issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, namely the right of both peoples to determine their own future. Canada strongly supports the international consensus on a two-state solution, so that both sides can have a secure and prosperous future.

Although we voted “Yes” on this single resolution, Canada maintains its position at the UN that there are too many resolutions related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a situation which unfairly singles out Israel for criticism. We have thus maintained voting record on all other resolutions, voting overwhelmingly “No” on these Israel-related ones.

United Nations Resolutions on the Middle East

Every year, resolutions addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict are tabled at the UN. Canada assesses each resolution on its merits and consistency with our principles. We support resolutions that are consistent with Canadian policy on the Middle East, are rooted in international law, reflect current dynamics, contribute to the goal of a negotiated two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and address fairly and constructively the obligations and responsibilities of all parties to the conflict. Canada advocates for a fair-minded approach and rejects one-sided resolutions and any politicization of the issues. Canada believes that the United Nations and its member states have a responsibility to contribute constructively to efforts to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict. Canada will continue to examine carefully each of these resolutions as they come forward.

NATO

Supplementary messages

Update

NATO has been implementing robust measures to limit the spread of COVID-19, to reduce risks to Allied soldiers, civilians and communities, and to ensure that the Alliance’s essential work - to maintain deterrence and defence for Allied nations - continues. NATO’s ability to conduct operations is unimpaired. NATO is also working to combat the spread of COVID-19, including through joint-strategic airlift capabilities, capacity-building for managing the pandemic in-country, military hospital capabilities and medical support for Allies in-need.

Supporting facts and figures

Official development assistance levels

Supplementary messages

Update

Since February 11, 2020, the Government of Canada has committed $166.5M from the International Assistance Envelope to support the global response to COVID-19. This funding builds on Canadian leadership in supporting essential health services around the world such as: $600M from 2021 to 2025 pledged to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; $650M from 2017 to 2020 for sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR); and, $6.35B from 2010 to 2020 for maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH). Prior to the pandemic, Canada announced a scaling-up of global health investments, including SRHR, to $1.4B per year by 2023.

Supporting facts and figures

Physical security at missions abroad

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Rohingya – Canada’s response

Supplementary messages

Update

Repatriation of Rohingya remains highly unlikely in the short or medium term due to a sharp escalation in violence in Rakhine State, displacing over 160,000 since January 2019. National elections in Myanmar in 2020 are expected to spark further ethno-nationalism and hate speech. Rohingya in both Myanmar internally displaced persons’ (IDP) camps and the Cox’s Bazar refugee camps in Bangladesh are highly vulnerable to the spread of COVID-19 given congested living conditions.

Supporting facts and figures

Russia / Ukraine

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Canada’s sanctions regime

Supplementary messages

Background

Through the use of targeted sanctions measures, the Government of Canada strives to minimize adverse consequences for civilian populations and for legitimate business, humanitarian, or other activities. The Government of Canada also mitigates unintended humanitarian consequences of sanctions through legislated exceptions for certain activities, and through the permit and certificate processes, enabling the Minister of Foreign Affairs to authorize activities which would otherwise be prohibited, including implementing any related UN Security Council exemptions or decisions, as required.

The Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (JVCFOA) allows Canada to target foreign nationals responsible for, or complicit in, gross violations of internationally-recognized human rights or acts of significant corruption. There are 70 individuals listed under the JVCFOA, including nationals from Venezuela, South Sudan, Myanmar, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Canadians are prohibited from dealing with listed individuals, effectively freezing their Canadian assets. These individuals are also inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) allows Canada to impose sanctions against a foreign state, individuals and entities related to that foreign state. Canada may impose sanctions under SEMA, either, when there has been a grave breach of international peace and security resulting in a serious international crisis, when an international organization calls on its members to impose sanctions, in cases of gross and systematic violations of human rights, or cases of significant corruption.

SEMA sanctions may include a dealings ban for a list of targeted individuals and/or entities, restrictions on trade, financial transactions or other economic activity. Canada uses humanitarian exemptions to mitigate unintended consequences and potentially adverse effects on vulnerable groups, such as women and girls. To maximize sanctions effectiveness, Canada seeks to coordinate sanctions with other countries (ex. U.S., EU). There are SEMA sanctions on 11 countries: Iran, Libya, Myanmar, Nicaragua, DPRK, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.

Canada is legally required to implement sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. These sanctions are implemented in Canadian law by adopting regulations under the United Nations Act. There are 13 countries subject to UN sanctions (Central African Republic, Mali, DRC, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, DPRK, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Yemen).

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia – Human rights

Supplementary messages

Update

Saudi Arabia’s ongoing human rights violations remain a predominant concern for Canada. Despite some recent announcements in April, which Saudi Arabia is framing as improvements on human rights, including changes to laws related to flogging and the death penalty for minors, Saudi Arabia continues to perpetuate grave human rights violations.   

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Background

Despite improvements in some areas, Saudi Arabia continues to perpetuate grave human rights violations. These include a high number of executions, the repression of political opposition, the application of corporal punishment, the suppression of freedom of expression, arbitrary arrests, torture and ill-treatment of detainees, limitations on freedom of religion, ongoing discrimination against women and religious minorities, and the mistreatment of migrant workers. A number of civil society and human rights activists have been arrested since mid-2018; it is unclear how many remain in detention. Some of them are facing trials. These arrests provide further evidence that, despite modernization efforts, dissent is not tolerated in Saudi Arabia. Little is known about the trials as diplomats and international groups are barred from attending.

Raif Badawi, a Saudi blogger/activist, was arrested in 2012, on a charge of insulting Islam and brought to court on several charges, including apostasy. He remains in detention. Canada, along with several other likeminded countries and civil society, has advocated for Mr. Badawi, but our ability to discuss the case with Saudi officials is limited given the bilateral dispute. The Saudi government continues to reiterate that the situation is a "private rights" case, as it is a dispute between father and son.

Saudi Arabia – Bilateral dispute

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Update

The bilateral relationship has been fractured since August 2018 and many Saudi punitive measures against Canada remain in place. Saudi Arabia’s ongoing human rights violations remain a predominant concern for Canada. Saudi Arabia assumed the Chair of the G20 in December 2019; the Leaders’ Summit is scheduled for November 2020.

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Background

No progress has yet been achieved in normalizing bilateral relations despite early ministerial-level discussions in 2018. Prime Minister Trudeau had a brief interaction with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the G20 Osaka Summit in June 2019. Minister Champagne briefly met his Saudi counterpart at the G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in November 2019. Meetings in February 2020 between Canadian and Saudi officials (ambassadorial level) in Riyadh and in New York were positive and cordial.

At the core of Canada’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is a range of objectives: respect for human rights; international and regional security; and trade diversification and investment. Saudi Arabia’s poor record on human rights domestically and abroad, and the humanitarian impact of its actions in Yemen continue to be problematic. However, KSA remains an integral and valued security partner, as well as the key regional bulwark against Iran’s expansionist ambitions and the threat these pose to global and regional security.

For information pertaining to the export controls review, see separate note provided on that topic.

G20 2020 Presidency

Supplementary messages

Responsive – Attending G20 meetings under KSA Presidency

Update

In response to the COVID-19 crisis, the Saudi Presidency has convened a series of special meetings, including an Extraordinary G20 Leaders’ Summit on 26 March. Since March, KSA has also convened: three meetings of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors; two meetings of G20 trade and investment ministers; and meetings of G20 health, energy, agriculture, employment and labour, tourism, and digital economy ministers. At their April 15 meeting, G20 finance ministers and central bank governors released a G20 action plan detailing the group’s efforts to mitigate the impacts of the crisis.

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Syria

Syria crisis and peace talks

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Update

In early March, Turkey and Russia agreed to a ceasefire in Idlib. While initially expected to be brief, the ceasefire has been sustained at least partly due to COVID-19 concerns, although it is expected that the regime will eventually resume attacks on Idlib. In the meantime, at least 140,000 civilians have returned as the ceasefire continues to hold.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Despite an early January 2020 ceasefire agreement, the Syrian regime, with Russian air support, relaunched its ground offensive to capture opposition-held territory in the Idlib governorate in northwestern Syria. Turkish military forces have dispatched additional troops and equipment to Idlib in an attempt to push back the offensive and curb refugee flows towards its border, resulting in a direct confrontation with the Syrian regime and 55 Turkish deaths. This offensive has resulted in nearly 960,000 displaced persons since December 2019.

The humanitarian crisis has been exacerbated by the closing of two of four cross-border humanitarian passages after Russian and Chinese pressure prevented the technical rollover of UNSCR 2504. The UNSC is set to vote on the renewal of UNSCR 2504 in early July 2020, where Russia is expected to try to further reduce the scope of access. The Geneva talks remain stalled after the regime walked out in November 2019 over a disagreement on the agenda, and the Astana process lacks the ability to produce a lasting political solution. However, the regime has agreed to return to the constitutional committee negotiations once the pandemic subsides.

Syria consular cases

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Consular case of orphan child

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United Nations Security Council campaign

Canada’s United Nations Security Council campaign (UNSC)

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UNSC Vote – Positive result – First round

Supplementary messages

Background

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will hold elections for non-permanent members on June 17, 2020. Canada is campaigning for a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a non-permanent member for the 2021-2022 term.

Voting will take place between 9am and 1:30pm (EST) on June 17.  While the voting process is taking place, there will be no media engagement, and the communications approach will be subdued. Further communications/media engagement will take place only after the election concludes.

It is expected that the results will be announced by the President of the General Assembly (PGA) from the podium at 4pm. Three other elections are taking place at the UN on this day, so this may delay the announcement of results.

Canada wins a seat by successfully meeting two conditions: 1) comes first or second in the overall number of votes cast, and 2) obtains support of at least two-thirds of those UN member states present and voting (129 votes if all 193 members are present).

UNSC vote – Positive result – Subsequent rounds

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UNSC vote – Negative result

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United States

Canada-United states relations

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Supporting facts and figures (Statistics in Canadian Dollars)

Background

Economic recovery: Smooth and effective implementation of CUSMA is key to our economic recovery as is ensuring that North American supply chains remain strong. Efforts by the United States government towards reshoring manufacturing and supply chains present both risks and opportunities for Canadian companies.

Trade: Canada’s efforts are now focused on preparations for CUSMA’s entry into force on July 1, 2020. The United States continues to initiate Section 232 investigations on whether certain imports threaten United States national security, which may impact bilateral trade.

North American Energy Security: Energy will be a major component of economic recovery post-COVID-19. Key to this is an ongoing high-level dialogue with the United States on a North American approach to market stability and price recovery to ensure support for our respective industries.

Border Management: Canada is assessing how the temporary border restrictions on all non-essential travel may be adjusted as we approach the June 21 expiry date(see separate Border Issues note).

Anti-black racism and U.S. protests

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Supporting facts and figures

Background

Death of George Floyd: On May 25, 2020, George Floyd, a 46-year-old African American, was killed in Minneapolis, Minnesota, during an arrest. Derek Chauvin, a white police officer, knelt on Floyd's neck for almost nine minutes while Floyd was handcuffed and lying face down in the street. Chauvin was charged with second-degree murder and the three other officers on the scene were charged with aiding and abetting second-degree murder.

Protests: Floyd’s death set off protests in Minneapolis that swiftly spread to cities across the U.S. and around the globe, including Canada. Democratic Minnesota Governor Walz contextualized the protests as frustration with long-standing social, civil rights and economic grievances facing the African-American community. There have been instances of journalists harmed by police while covering the protests, including CBC journalist Susan Ormiston. Over 10,000 people in the U.S. have been arrested. Minneapolis officials announced their intent to defund and disband the city's police force, which has sparked similar debates in other cities on defunding the police and investing more in marginalized communities where much of the policing occurs.

Federal and State Responses: President Trump has taken a law-and-order approach, including proposing to invoke the 1807 Insurrection Act (which was opposed by Secretary of Defense Esper) to deploy active-duty U.S. troops to respond to the civil unrest. Multiple U.S. states have activated their National Guards to support law enforcement. Joe Biden has condemned President Trump’s response to protestors. House Democrats are expected to pass their Justice in Policing Act, which includes a series of police reforms in response to the killing of George Floyd. How it will be received by the GOP-controlled Senate is unclear.

Canadian Responses: On June 2, the PM made a statement in the House of Commons commenting on the “horrific reports of police violence against black men and women south of the border”. On June 5, the PM took a knee during an anti-racism rally held in honour of George Floyd on Parliament Hill. Canada’s Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) delivered on June 4 a well-received statement on racism and the protests in the U.S., following consultations with and a statement by the U.S. delegation. Canada will address racism at the Human Rights Council on June 16/17 (date TBC).

Venezuela

Supplementary messages

Update

We continue our outreach to key international partners to discuss a way forward towards a united call for change.On May 26, 2020, Canada participated as a co-convener in a virtual donor’s conference hosted by Spain and the EU to mobilize funds for the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and the region. Canada contributed $27M in assistance. On June 1, an internal agreement was signed between the regime, the opposition and PAHO to coordinate a response to COVID-19.

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Yemen

Supplementary messages

Update

Since the UN Secretary-General’s call for a general ceasefire globally, followed by a unilateral ceasefire announced by Saudi Arabia, efforts for a nationwide ceasefire in Yemen have not materialized. The security situation remains extremely concerning following a renewed escalation in violence since early 2020. The overall humanitarian situation is deteriorating further due to the spread of COVID-19. UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths continues engaging in negotiations with the parties, identifying and building on points of convergence, and proposing compromises where differences remain. The Southern Transitional Council’s declaration of self-administration on April 25 is of concern as military tensions are now rising among the disparate factions in the south.

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5G review

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Update

The security of 5G wireless systems has been at the forefront of domestic and international media stories. Canada’s Five Eyes partners have all made public announcements on how they plan to protect 5G wireless telecommunications networks. The United States has been the most vocal on this issue, strongly encouraging countries to carefully weigh the security considerations of 5G technology. On 28 January 2020, the United Kingdom (UK) announced that high risk vendors would be excluded from the sensitive elements of their networks, and limited to a minority presence in the less sensitive elements of its networks.

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