Report on exports of military goods from Canada - 2016

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1. Introduction

On June 30, 2016 the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of International Trade announced that the annual Report on the Export of Military Goods would be updated to increase transparency and strengthen Canadian export controls.

Further to helpful input from interested Canadian stakeholders from industry, non-governmental and civil society organizations, the following changes have been made to the 2016 report. New information in this report includes:

• a “Developments in 2016” section - which shows changes to the Export Control List and developments affecting the Export and Import Permits Act, including work that is underway that will allow Canada to accede to the Arms Trade Treaty;
• information on permit denials – such as the destination and the reason(s) for the denial of a permit;
• in the “Military export statistics” section, data is now also reported by region and by country;
• data on exports of military goods to the United States, that require an export permit;
• a new section that gives information on “Service standard targets” for permit applications;
• an “Annexes” section – which includes information on Canada’s international cooperation on military trade, and our restrictions on the export of military goods and technology, new data on actual exports of conventional arms and small arms and light weapons and international transfers by the Government of Canada;
• and data reported to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms that is based on actual exports (instead of authorized exports).

Global Affairs Canada welcomes suggestions on how to improve future editions of this report. Please contact the Export Controls Division at Global Affairs Canada at: tie.reception@international.gc.ca.

2. Report Summary

The 2016 Report on the Export of Military Goods from Canada is a voluntary report tabled in the Parliament of Canada to increase the transparency of Canadian arms exports. This report has been produced since 1990. The last edition covered 2015 and was tabled in Parliament on June 30, 2016. 

The report only covers exports of goods and technology designed for military purposes, and does not include data on dual use or strategic items. 

Data for this report is assembled following the end of the calendar year, and verified against information received from Canadian industry. 

Data covering Canadian exports of military goods is also captured in two other key reports: the Annual Report on the Administration of the Export and Import Permits Act which is tabled in Parliament (a legal requirement of the Act); and Canada’s submission to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).  

Global Affairs Canada does not collect data on most military exports to the United States. Canada and the U.S. have had a Defence Production Sharing Agreement, in place since the 1950s, which has helped create an integrated North American technological and industrial base and supported Canada-U.S. trade. As a result, most military items shipped between Canada and the U.S. do not require permits and are therefore not included in the data presented in this report. However, permits are required for a small sub-set of goods, such as prohibited firearms. For those items that do require a permit (e.g. automatic weapons) this data is now included here for the first time.

Summary of Key Data

• For the 2016 calendar year, Canada’s total exports permitted under the Export and Import Permits Act of military goods and technology amounted to approximately $717.7 million.
• The major share ($627.1 million or 87.37%) went to member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or other countries included on Canada’s Automatic Firearms Country Control List. 
• Saudi Arabia was the largest non-U.S. export destination in 2016, receiving approximately $142.2 million in Canadian military exports (accounting for 19.81% of the total value of military exports). 
• Australia was the second largest non-U.S. destination of Canadian military exports, receiving approximately $115.8 million in military exports (accounting for 16.13% of Canadian military exports).
• Six NATO countries were in the top ten destinations for the same period: the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Norway, Netherlands and Belgium.

3. Canada’s Policy on Military Exports

Export Controls

Canada’s export controls are among the most rigorous in the world and are in line with those of our principal allies and partners in the major export controls regimes. A key priority of Canada’s foreign policy is the maintenance of peace and security. To this end, the Government of Canada strives to ensure that, among other policy goals, Canadian exports are not prejudicial to peace, security or stability in any region of the world or within any country.

This policy is implemented primarily through Canada’s system of export controls, as authorized by the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA). This law requires those who wish to export from Canada any items included on the Export Control List (ECL) to obtain, prior to shipment, an export permit issued by Global Affairs Canada.^{Footnote 4} The ECL includes military, dual-use, and strategic goods and technology, all U.S.-origin goods and technology, and a limited number of items that are controlled for economic reasons or further to Canada’s international trade agreements.

Military Goods and Technology

The military goods and technology described in this report are those included in Group 2 (Munitions List) of the ECL. Items listed in Group 2 are “specially designed or modified for military use.”

The Group 2 (Munitions List) goods and technologies include such items as ground vehicles, firearms, ammunition and imaging equipment made specifically for military use. The full list of these items is included in Table 11. Other controlled items appearing elsewhere on the ECL (such as dual-use and strategic items) are not featured in this report as they are not specially designed for military use.

Canada prohibits the export of arms and related materiel to countries that are under United Nations Security Council arms embargos via the United Nations Act, and also has autonomous sanctions in place against specific countries under the Special Economic Measures Act, ^{Footnote 5} which prohibit the export of specific goods and technology to those countries and/or to listed individuals and entities within those countries.

Canada also prohibits the sale of automatic firearms to countries that are not on Canada’s Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL) as established under the authority of the EIPA. Furthermore, the EIPA also provides for an Area Control List (ACL), which is a list of countries to which the Governor-in-Council deems it necessary to control the export or transfer of any goods or technology.  Export permits are normally issued only for those goods and technology that respond to humanitarian needs or circumstances.  In 2016, only two countries – Belarus and North Korea – are listed on the ACL. More information on the AFCCL and ACL can be found in annexes A and B.

Under export control policy guidelines approved in 1986 by Cabinet, Canada closely controls the export of military goods and technology to countries:

• that pose a threat to Canada and its allies;
• that are involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities;
• that are under United Nations Security Council sanctions; or
• whose governments have a persistent record of serious violations of the human rights of their citizens, unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population.

Additional policy goals of Canada’s overall export controls regime include:

• ensuring that exports do not contribute to the development of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction, or of their delivery systems; and
• ensuring that exports are consistent with Canada’s existing economic sanction provisions.

All applications to export goods or technology are carefully reviewed against the criteria listed above, and if any risks are identified, sent for wide-ranging consultations among geographic, human rights, international security and defence-industry experts at Global Affairs Canada (including at Canada’s overseas diplomatic missions), the Department of National Defence and, as necessary, other government departments and agencies. Through such consultations, export permit applications are assessed for their consistency with Canada’s foreign and defence policies. Regional peace and stability, including civil conflict and human rights, as well as the possibility of unauthorized transfer or diversion of the exported goods and technology, are actively considered.

A key consideration in the review of each application is the end-use and end-user of the exported article.  Careful attention is paid to end-use documentation in an effort to ensure that the export is intended for a legitimate end-user and will not be diverted to ends that could threaten the security of Canada, its allies, other countries or civilians. 

Military goods and technology listed in Group 2 (Munitions List) of the ECL generally are exported for one of the following purposes:

• sales to military and, in some cases, police forces or other government agencies;
• sales of parts and components for the production of new goods;
• following repairs of military equipment in Canada for foreign customers, and shipments of spare parts; and
• sales to private individuals (non-restricted or restricted firearms). ^{Footnote 6}

Canada’s export controls are based on our participation in the major export control multilateral regimes (explained further in annexes D and E). Canada’s export controls are not meant to hinder international trade unnecessarily, but to regulate and impose certain restrictions on exports in response to clear policy objectives. As outlined above, these objectives include ensuring that Canadian exports are consistent with Canada’s foreign and defence policies, including respect for human rights and international peace and security. Canada’s defence industry provides the Canadian Armed Forces, as well as the armed forces of our allies and partners, with the equipment, munitions and spare parts necessary to meet operational needs. It also makes a valuable contribution to the nation’s prosperity and employs tens of thousands of Canadians, develops high-technology products and is closely integrated with counterparts in allied countries.

Notes on the Export of Firearms

Most firearms exports from Canada are intended for sporting or other recreational use and are not for military use. Steps are taken to ensure that items are not diverted into the illegal arms trade or used to fuel local violence. Canadian diplomatic missions and other sources may provide information about destination countries’ firearms control laws, procedures and enforcement practices, and are often called upon to validate import permits and licenses, end-user assurances, and consignee information. Where concerns exist about a proposed export, the application may be referred to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for decision.

Certain prohibited firearms, weapons, devices, or components thereof that are included on the Export Control List may be exported only to countries listed on the Automatic Firearms Country Control List and then only to consignees that are government entities or are authorized by government entities. ^{Footnote 7}

In order for a country to be added to the AFCCL, Canada must have concluded an inter-governmental defence, research, development and production arrangement with that country.  No countries were added to the AFCCL in 2016. The full list of countries on the AFCCL may be found in annex B.

International Cooperation on Military Trade

Multilateral action is an important means of promoting international peace and security. Canada supports and participates in a range of arms control and non-proliferation activities, working closely with like-minded countries.^{Footnote 8} Information on the following can be found in:

• Annex D
  • United  Nations Register of Conventional Arms
• Annex E
  • Wassenaar Arrangement
  • Nuclear Suppliers Group
  • Missile Technology Control Regime
  • Australia Group
  • Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
  • Arms Trade Treaty

4. Developments in 2016

Arms Trade Treaty

On June 30, 2016, the Minister of Foreign Affairs issued a statement announcing that Canada would accede to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The Minister stated that Canada will become a state party to the ATT once legislation is passed, regulations are put into place and Canada’s instrument of accession is submitted to the UN Secretary-General.

For more information, see the statement.

Export Control Policy

Iran

With allies, Canada welcomed the January 16, 2016 confirmation by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran had fulfilled all necessary commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. On February 5, 2016, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and International Trade announced changes to Canada’s economic sanctions against Iran. Canada will continue to maintain tight controls on exports to Iran of goods and technologies that are considered sensitive from a national and international security perspective. Applications for export permits for all items listed on the ECL pursuant to the EIPA will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Applications will normally be denied for permits to export to Iran any goods or technologies that are considered the most sensitive from a national and international security perspective (including nuclear goods and technologies, as well as those goods and technologies which could assist the development of Iran’s ballistic missiles program).

For more information, see Notice to Exporters No. 196.

Belarus

On May 7, 2016, in response to positive developments in Belarus, Global Affairs Canada initiated the regulatory process to remove Belarus from the ACL, thereby lifting sanctions that had been in place since December 14, 2006. This is consistent with actions taken by the United States and the European Union since October 2015. It also reflects Canada’s acknowledgment that the Government of Belarus has made progress in key areas, including the release of political prisoners and conducting a presidential election in October 2015, which demonstrated greater adherence to international norms and was not marked by the levels of violence and intimidation seen in past elections. Canada also recognizes the constructive role played by Belarus in facilitating negotiations toward a ceasefire and peace agreement in Ukraine—the Minsk agreements—in September 2014 and February 2015. While the regulatory process to remove Belarus from the ACL is ongoing, Global Affairs Canada will continue to issue permits for the export to Belarus of any goods and technology not specifically listed in the ECL, until the regulatory process is completed. For those goods and technologies that are listed on the ECL, applications for export permits will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

For more information, see Notice to Exporters No.197.

Export and Import Permits Act Offences

There were no convictions for EIPA offences in Canadian courts in 2016.

Export and Import Permits Act Judicial Reviews

There was one judicial review of a Group 2 (Munitions List) decision in 2016:

Turp v Canada

On April 8, 2016, the Minister of Foreign Affairs authorized the issuance of permits to export Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs) and associated weapon systems, spare parts and technical data to Saudi Arabia. Different versions of this military equipment have been provided by Canadian companies to Saudi Arabia since 1993. An application for judicial review contested the decision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to grant these export permits. In a Judgment rendered on January 24, 2017, Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer of the Federal Court confirmed the legality of the decision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to issue the export permits for the LAVs to Saudi Arabia. An appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal is currently pending.

Permit Denials

In 2016, six applications for permits to export military goods or technology were denied.

• One permit was denied for reasons of regional conflict.
• Two permits were denied due to human rights concerns.
• Three permits were denied pursuant to the provisions of Section 7(2) of the EIPA pertaining to the AFCCL.

5. Military Export Statistics

The statistics contained in this report are obtained from utilization reports, which must be provided to Global Affairs Canada as a condition of using export permits for military goods and technology. These reports include the country of destination, a description of the goods exported, their quantity and their value in Canadian dollars.

Further details related to export transactions (for example, names of exporting companies, financial values of individual contracts and transactions, and details of the specific technologies being exported) are protected due to the commercially confidential nature of such information.

Export controls apply to all foreign destinations. However, due to Canada’s close and long-standing military cooperation with the United States, including the 1956 Defence Production Sharing Agreement which underpins the integrated nature of North America’s defence industry, Canada and the United States have reciprocal arrangements to ensure permit-free/license-free movement of most military items between our two countries.  For Canada, this has meant permit exemptions to most Group 2 (Munitions List) exports destined to the United States. Consequently, Global Affairs Canada does not collect data on most exports of military goods and technology to the United States, except for the small sub-set of goods, such as prohibited firearms, for which a permit was issued and which are reported here for the first time.

Data on Canadian military exports may be available from other sources such as Statistics Canada. These figures are derived from data collected by the Canada Border Services Agency based on the Harmonized Commodity Description Coding System (HS), and may include non-military goods such as: commercial computers; civil-certified aircraft; guns and ammunition designed exclusively for industrial uses, such as the lighting of gas flares at oil wells; or other civilian equipment. Since there is no direct correlation between the commodity codes used by Statistics Canada and the ECL numbers, and because each source uses different methods of data collection, a meaningful comparison of the information from these sources is extremely difficult.

An internationally accepted standard for statistics on worldwide military trade is UNROCA (see annex D). However, the Register limits itself to the number of exported units of complete weapon systems and does not include parts, components or the wide assortment of non-lethal support systems (such as radar equipment, simulators and software designed for military use) that make up the majority of Canada’s military exports.

Global Affairs Canada also produces an Annual Report to Parliament on the “Administration of the Export and Import Permits Act,” which is a statutory requirement in the Act. This report provides an overview of permit data and service standards, which includes Group 2 (Munitions List) permits. Following tabling in Parliament, this report is also available at Global Affairs Canada website.

Data Interpretation Notes

The following data interpretation notes apply:

1. Procurement contracts awarded by governments may have very high values and extended delivery schedules; a single contract may account for a large share of total military exports in a given year. Major changes in totals from one year to another may be explained by the beginning or end of a small number of large contracts.
2. The tables do not report exports of military goods to the United States, which are roughly estimated to account for over half of Canada’s exports of military goods and technology each year.
3. The ECL item numbers used are explained with illustrative examples. The full ECL, which consists of detailed descriptions of all goods and technology controlled under the EIPA, can be found in “A Guide to Canada’s Export Controls”, which is available at www.exportcontrols.gc.ca.
4. Table 8 reports annual values of total exports of military goods and technology by destination country.  Table 12 breaks down the value of exports to individual countries according to the ECL item number. However, the sum total of exports by ECL item number to an individual country calculated from Table 12 may not equal the total value of exports to that destination reported in Table 8. Since goods or technology included in a single export permit may be classified under multiple ECL item numbers, Tables 12 and 13 and Chart 4 contain some double-counting.
5. Table 11 indicates exports of “technology” controlled under item 2-22 of the ECL. Exports of this nature often cannot easily be quantified. For this reason, “lots” rather than unit quantities are commonly used where exports of technology may be transferred via different intangible means. For zero-value technology transactions, a nominal value (e.g., $1 to $50) is assigned.  The inclusion of such data within this report is consistent with past practice.

Chart 1: 2016 – Exports of Military Goods and Technology Categorized by Defence Relationship

Notes for Table 6:

Returned without action: A permit application is returned without action by Global Affairs Canada if it is administratively incomplete, or if there is inconsistent information. A company that wishes to pursue the export would then be required to submit a new permit application.

Withdrawn: Permit applications may be withdrawn either at the request of the exporter (e.g., if the permit is no longer required because the commercial deal falls through or if the company becomes aware of commercial, political or other types of risk that may affect their application, and decides not to pursue the commercial opportunity), or by Global Affairs Canada (e.g., if the goods or technology proposed for export are not controlled, or if a General Export Permit applies).

Cancelled: An export permit that has been issued may be cancelled for administrative reasons (e.g., at the request of applicant as the permit is no longer required, or due to an error on the permit requiring replacement by a new permit), or by direction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. An export permit that has been cancelled is no longer valid for the export of goods or technology.

Issued: Means a permit approved and issued.

Denied: Means a permit that was denied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, either directly or further to policy direction received by officials. An export permit application may be denied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This is unusual, occurring in fewer than 1% of cases annually, and is generally for reasons of Canada’s foreign and defence policy, as provided in the criteria for controlling the export of military, dual use and strategic goods  outlined above.

Chart 2: 2016 – Export Value of Military Goods and Technology - Percentage by Region

Chart 3: 2016 – Utilized Export Permits of Military Goods and Technology - Percentage by Region^{Footnote 14}

Chart 4: 2016 – Exports of Military Goods and Technology by ECL Item Number and Value^{Footnote 18}

Exports to the United States of Group 2 (Munitions List) Controlled Goods and Technology

As noted in the Report Summary on page 3, Global Affairs Canada does not collect data on most military exports to the United States, as export permits are not required for many of the goods and technology listed in the ECL if they are destined to the United States. The exception to this is that permits are required for a small sub-set of goods (listed below). In 2016, 119 export permits were issued for the export to the United States of goods controlled under Group 2 (Munitions List) of the ECL. See Table 14 for more detailed information.

This exception does not apply to shipments that transit the United States to third destinations; if exports are destined to bonded or sufferance warehouses located in the U.S., they are considered “in transit”. Exporters are advised to obtain written assurances from their U.S. consignees that U.S. export controls will apply should the goods be subsequently exported from the United States.

Within Group 2 (Munitions List) of the ECL, export permits are required to the United States in the following circumstances:

• All exports to the United States of prohibited firearms controlled under item 2-1 (e.g. automatic weapons) or 2-2 (e.g. weapons with a calibre greater than 12.7mm) of the ECL must be authorized in advance with an export permit. Details on the application process can be found in the Export Controls Handbook.
• Permits are required for the export to the United States of any ammunition controlled under item 2-3 of the ECL that is destined for end-use by police or military agencies. Permits are not required for the export of sporting ammunition.
• Permits are required for the export to the United States of goods controlled under item 2-4 (e.g. bombs) of the Export Control List.

A significant proportion of the export permits issued for the United States represent prohibited firearms of historical or cultural value (e.g. pistols brought back by veterans of the Second World War which have subsequently been classified as prohibited by the RCMP, often because their barrel is 105 mm or less in length) that are being disposed of by the executors of the estates of deceased persons who had been licensed to possess those firearms, but whose heirs are not. Such historical firearms are highly sought after by collectors in the United States and elsewhere.

Export permits are not required for replica firearms as defined in Section 84(1) of the Criminal Code (although these are also defined as prohibited devices in that same section), because by definition a replica firearm is not itself a firearm, and consequently is not controlled for export on the ECL. Firearm-based components of police or military simulation or training systems, even if no longer capable of discharging a projectile, may still be deemed a “firearm” under Canadian law, and thus may be controlled for export under ECL item 2-1 or 2-2 (depending on their calibre). Such items would require an export permit. Simulation systems controlled under item 2-14 of the ECL would not require an export permit for the United States; however, if, as noted above, the system included a simulation device produced from, for example, the receiver of a prohibited firearm (e.g., a machine gun), then that item would require a permit.

Permits are also required for the export to the United States of certain goods controlled on other ECL Groups, including all items on Group 3 (the Nuclear Non-Proliferation List), all items on Group 4 (the Nuclear-related Dual-Use List), most items on Group 5 (Miscellaneous Goods and Technology), and certain items on Group 6 (the Missile Technology Control List) and Group 7 (the Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation List).

Because most military goods and technology may be exported to the United States without obtaining an export permit, data on exports of military goods and technology to the United States have not been provided in previous editions of the Military Report. This year, the Department is publishing information on permits that were issued in 2016 for the export of military goods to the United States. In future editions of the Military Report, the Department intends to provide more data on military exports to the United States, including (for example) the actual value of military exports to the United States in categories where export permits are required and reporting conditions have been imposed.

It should be noted that reporting is not required in cases where no value is being transferred. Examples include exports where goods were sent to Canada for repair, and are being returned to the original owner; exports where goods were sent to Canada for testing, trials, or fit-ups, and are being returned; the return to foreign owners of controlled goods borrowed or leased by a Canadian company (e.g., deactivated automatic firearms used as movie props); exports of faulty or discrepant material; or exports of goods for destructive testing.

6. Service Standard Targets

Further to the information found in the Export Control Handbook, the processing time for straightforward applications that contain all required supporting documentation is 10 working days, and for more complex applications that contain all required supporting document is 40 working days. The performance target for achieving this standard is set at 90 percent. Consultations are required for more complex cases. The purpose of these intra- and inter-departmental consultations is to fully assess the risks and implications of proposed exports with respect to Canada’s foreign and defence policy considerations. Various Canadian government departments and agencies, including various divisions within Global Affairs Canada, may be involved in the consultation process.  More information on service standards can be found in the Export Controls Handbook.

7. Annexes  

New for 2016, the information in the report has been reorganized and expanded with an annexes section that has been added for ease of reference on the following topics:

1. Canada’s Area Control List (ACL)
2. Canada’s Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL)
3. Canada’s International Transfers
4. UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)
5. International Cooperation on Military Trade

Annex A: Canada’s Area Control List (ACL)

The export or transfer of any goods or technology (including technical data, technical assistance and information necessary for the development, production or use of a good) to countries on the ACL is controlled and must be authorized by an export permit issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs under the authority of the EIPA.

At the time of publication, the ACL comprised two countries: Belarus, which was added on December 14, 2006, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), added on July 14, 2010.

Guidance on exports to these countries is published in the following Notices to Exporters:

• SER-197 Export Controls to Belarus
• SER-172 Export Controls to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Annex B: Canada’s Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL)

Canada has inter-governmental defence, research, development, and production arrangements with countries on the AFCCL.  Certain prohibited firearms, weapons, devices, or components thereof that are included on the Export Control List may be exported only to destinations on the AFCCL and only to consignees that are government or authorized by government.  These must be authorized by an export permit issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs under the authority of the EIPA.

The following goods and their components and parts, as defined in Section 4.1 of the EIPA and Section 84 of the Criminal Code, are subject to the AFCCL, when these items are also included on the ECL:

• an automatic firearm, whether or not it has been altered to discharge only one projectile with one pressure of the trigger;
• any firearm that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited firearm;
• any weapon, other than a firearm, that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited weapon;
• any component or part of a weapon, or any accessory for use with a weapon, that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited device;
• a cartridge magazine that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited device.

At the time of publication, the AFCCLwas comprised of the following countries:

1. Albania
2. Australia
3. Belgium
4. Botswana
5. Bulgaria
6. Chile
7. Croatia
8. Czech Republic
9. Denmark
10. Estonia
11. Finland
12. France
13. Germany
14. Greece
15. Hungary
16. Iceland
17. Israel
18. Italy
19. Kuwait
20. Latvia
21. Lithuania
22. Luxembourg
23. Netherlands
24. New Zealand
25. Norway
26. Peru
27. Poland
28. Portugal
29. Republic of Colombia
30. Republic of Korea
31. Romania
32. Saudi Arabia
33. Slovakia
34. Slovenia
35. Spain
36. Sweden
37. Turkey
38. United Kingdom
39. United States

More information about the AFCCL.

Annex C: Canada’s International Transfers (Government to Government Transfers)

From time to time, the Government of Canada will provide surplus military equipment to foreign governments through sale or donation. When determining sales and donations to foreign governments, the Government of Canada considers a number of factors, including the nature of the goods, the country of origin, the applicable controls relating to its distribution and the applicable Government of Canada policies.

Records pertaining to these types of transfers are kept by the Department of National Defence. If applicable, this information is also publicly reported in Canada’s submission to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).

Canada’s international transfers in 2016 were:

• Sweden: 3 x 84mm Carl Gustaf rocket launchers (transferred to the Swedish military).
• United States: 1 x CF-188 Hornet aircraft with dummy missiles was donated to the United States Air Force Heritage Program for display as a demilitarized static monument at the Peterson Air Force Base Museum in Colorado Springs.
• Bahrain: 27 x Maverick missiles (government-to-government transfer). However, this is listed under commercial exports as the export of these items to Bahrain was carried out by a civil entity under an export permit issued by Global Affairs Canada. Agreement for this transfer was reached in 2014. This transaction is being reported for reasons of transparency.

More information on the sale and donation of surplus equipment.

Annex D: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)

Canada continues to actively promote greater transparency in the trade of conventional arms. In 1991, Canada was a founding contributor to UNROCA, which is an international, voluntary transparency mechanism under which Member States of the United Nations supply information to the Register on imports and exports of seven categories of conventional arms.

The Register is updated annually and makes a significant contribution to transparency, confidence-building and enhanced global security. Since the inception of the Register, more than 90 countries on average have made annual submissions to it; of these, about 70 have done so consistently, including Canada. As a result, the Register has become an important and authoritative source of information. The Register tracks data on the following seven categories of conventional arms: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers.

Canada is also one of a growing number of countries that voluntarily submit data to the Register on military holdings and on procurement through national production. In addition, Canada is one of several Member States that voluntarily supplies information on imports and exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) to the Register as part of their annual report. This information goes beyond the minimum currently required by the UN.  

Further information is available at the following links: 

• United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
• Heavy Conventional Arms
• Small Arms and Light Weapons

Actual Exports from Canada of Conventional Arms and SALW in 2016

The following table represents actual exports of conventional arms and SALW as defined by UNROCA reporting best practices, from Canada, during the 2016 calendar year, against export permits issued by Global Affairs Canada, for military, security or police end-use in the destination country.

Past editions of the Report on the Exports of Military Goods from Canada and past reports to UNROCA have listed total quantities of conventional arms and SALW that were authorized for export under permits issued in the course of the reporting year. This practice (i.e., reporting the “maximum allowable exports under issued permits”) was not optimal, as it does not allow for the tracking of actual, versus potential, transfers of conventional arms and SALW. For 2016 and subsequent years, Canada will report actual exports/transfers of reportable conventional arms and SALW that occurred during the reporting year.

Annex E: International Cooperation on Military Trade

The major multilateral export control regimes in which Canada participates are described below.  Participating governments negotiate common lists of goods and technology that are implemented by all, according to national legislation. Each participating government takes its own licensing decisions in accordance with applicable domestic law. These lists evolve in response to changing international and technological circumstances. Updates and amendments are made on a periodic basis. Changes to Canada’s Export Control List are incorporated annually through a regulatory amendment process.

Wassenaar Arrangement - Export Control List Groups 1 and 2

Most items have been included on the ECL because of Canada’s commitments to like-minded countries that participate in multilateral export control regimes or because of Canada’s obligations as a signatory to international agreements that seek to control and monitor the movement of sensitive goods and technology.

The control regime that deals with the military and dual-use goods and technology covered in Group 2 (Munitions List) of the ECL is the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, founded in 1996. The “Initial Elements” define the objectives of the Wassenaar Arrangement as, inter alia:

“to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations.”

Through national policies, the 41 Participating States seek to ensure that transfers of items covered by the common control lists do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities that have the potential to undermine regional and global security and stability. Participating States also commit to take every precaution to ensure that such goods and technologies are not diverted to illegitimate end-uses.

More information about the Wassenaar Arrangement and its Participating States.

Nuclear Suppliers Group - Export Control List Groups 3 and 4

Canada has a long-standing nuclear non-proliferation policy that is designed, among other objectives, to ensure that Canada’s nuclear exports are not used for any nuclear weapon purposes or their development.  As a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that came into force in 1970, Canada will not provide source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production, of special fissionable material, to any Non-Nuclear Weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

In the late 1970s, a group of nuclear supplier countries, including Canada, agreed on a set of guidelines for nuclear transfers to any Non-Nuclear Weapon State for peaceful purposes.  These became known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines.  In 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers Group established a list of nuclear-related dual-use goods and technology that could make a major contribution to a nuclear explosive activity or a non-safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.

ECL Group 3 includes items that are nuclear-specific.  ECL Group 4 includes nuclear-related dual-use items, i.e. items that are used in non-nuclear applications but that could also be used in a nuclear explosive activity or a non-safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.

More information about the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its membership.

Missile Technology Control Regime - Export Control List Group 6

The Missile Technology Control Regime was established in 1987 to address concerns about the proliferation of systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, namely, chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. ECL Group 6 includes items agreed upon by the Partners of the Missile Technology Control Regime that are used in, or could be used in, the proliferation of systems capable of delivering chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

More information about the Missile Technology Control Regime and its members.

Australia Group - Export Control List Group 7

The Australia Group was established in 1985 with the objective of preventing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The participants (national governments) in the Australia Group have developed common export controls on chemical substances and biological agents and related items that could be used in the production of chemical and biological weapons. 

More information about the Australia Group, including its membership.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - Export Control List Group 7

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was established in 1997 when the Chemical Weapons Convention came into force. The goal of the Member States is to achieve a world that is free of chemical weapons and of the threat of their use, and in which cooperation in chemistry for peaceful purposes for all is fostered. The ECL contains chemicals and precursors that are controlled under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Some of the Chemical Weapons Convention chemicals and precursors are also controlled by the Australia Group.

More information about the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Member States.

Arms Trade Treaty
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2013 to establish international norms for the conventional arms trade. Unregulated and irresponsible arms transfers intensify and prolong conflict, lead to regional instability, facilitate human rights abuses on a massive scale, and hinder social and economic development. The ATT promotes responsibility, transparency and accountability in the global arms trade. Canada is preparing to accede to the ATT and will also contribute to the UN Trust Fund that helps other countries accede to the ATT.

More information about the Arms Trade Treaty and its Member States.