Report on exports of military goods from Canada - 2020

Table of contents

• 1. Introduction
  • Summary of Key Data
• 2. Canada’s Policy on the Export and Brokering of Military Items
  • Military Goods and Technology – “Groups 2 and 9”
  • Export and Brokering Permit Assessment Process
  • Brokering Controls
  • Notes on the Export of Firearms
  • International Cooperation on Military Trade
• 3. Developments in 2020
  • Implementation of a More Robust Risk Assessment Framework
  • COVID-19
  • Policy Reviews - Controlled Exports to Saudi Arabia and Turkey
  • Changes in Export Control Policies for Certain Destinations
  • The Arms Trade Treaty and Civil Society Engagement
  • Announcement of an Advisory Panel of Experts
  • Export Control List Updates
  • Amendment to the Regulations Prescribing Certain Firearms as Prohibited
  • Amendments to the Automatic Firearms Country Control List
  • Export and Import Permits Act Offenses
  • Export and Import Permits Act Judicial Reviews
  • Permit Denials
• 4. Military Export and Brokering Statistics
  • Data Interpretation Notes
  • Exports to the United States of Certain Group 2 (Munitions List) Controlled Items
  • Brokering Data
• 5. Service Standard Target
• 6. Annexes
  • Annex A: Canada’s Area Control List (ACL)
  • Annex B: Canada’s Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL)
  • Annex C: Canada’s International Transfers (Government to Government Transfers)
  • Annex D: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)
  • Annex E: International Cooperation on Military Trade
  • Annex F: Index of Destinations Considered Lower-Risk in 2020
  • Annex G: 2020 Exports of Military Goods and Technology by Destination and ECL Item

List of Tables and Charts

• Table 1: 2020 - Total Value ($CAD) of Exports for Military Goods and Technology by NATO and AFCCL Destinations
• Table 2: 2020 - Export Permits Utilized and Value of Exports by Region
• Table 3: 2020 - Canada’s Top Twelve Non-U.S. Destinations for Military Goods and Technology
• Table 4: 2020 - Export Permit Denials of Military, Dual-Use and Strategic Goods and Technology
• Table 5: 2020 - Summary of Export Permits by all ECL Groups
• Table 6: 2020 - Export Value of Military Goods and Technology to all non-U.S. Destinations
• Table 7: 2020 - Top Twelve Non-U.S. Destinations: Utilized Export Permits for Military Goods & Technology
• Table 8: 2020 - Number of Utilized Export Permits for Military Goods & Technology by Destination
• Table 9: 2020 - Number of Issued Export Permits for Military Goods & Technology by Destination
• Table 10: 2020 - Group 2 (Munitions List) of Canada’s ECL
• Table 11: 2020 - Exports of Military Goods and Technology by ECL Item Number
• Table 12: 2020 - Number of Permits Utilized and Value Exported for certain Group 2 (Munitions List) Controlled Goods and Technology to the United States
• Table 13: 2020 - Group 9 Commercial Exports to the United States
• Table 14: 2020 - Transactions Reported under GBP-1 by Destination
• Table 15: The Brokering Control List
• Table 16: 2020 - Summary of Brokering Permits Applications Received in 2020
• Table 17: 2020 - Brokering Permits Issued by Destination and ECL Items
• Table 18: Export Permit Applications Processed (2020-2018)
• Table 19: 2020 - Global Affairs Canada Service Standards for all Military, Dual-use and Strategic Export Permit Applications
• Table 20: 2020 – UNROCA: Actual Exports from Canada of Conventional Arms and SALW
• Chart 1: 2020 - Exports of Military Goods and Technology by NATO and AFCCL Destinations
• Chart 2: 2020 - Export Value of (non-U.S. destined) Military Goods and Technology – Percentage by Region
• Chart 3: 2020 - Utilized Export Permits for Military Goods and Technology to non-U.S. Destinations - Percentage by Region
• Chart 4: 2020 - Exports of Military Goods and Technology by ECL Item Number and Value

1. Introduction

The Report on the Export of Military Goods is tabled annually in the Parliament of Canada to promote transparency around Canadian exports of military items. The report provides information on the export of military goods and technology from Canada in a given calendar year. Further to amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA) in 2019, there is now a legal requirement that the annual report be tabled in Parliament prior to May 31 of the subsequent calendar year. Prior to this, the report had been produced voluntarily since 1990. The last edition of this report covered 2019 and was tabled in Parliament on May 27, 2020.

This was the first full year in which the Government implemented the robust risk assessment framework that was put in place in preparation for Canada’s accession to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), in September 2019. The Government of Canada has taken action to strengthen Canada’s export controls, which are among the most rigorous in the world and are in line with those of our principal allies and partners in the main export control regimes. A key priority of Canada’s foreign policy is the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end, the Government of Canada strives to ensure that, among other policy goals, such as supporting Canadian foreign and defence policies and legitimate trade, Canadian goods and technology are not used in a manner that is prejudicial to human rights, peace, security or stability.

The data in this report covers exports and brokering of goods and technology included in the Export Control List (ECL) that are designed for military purposes. Data for this report is assembled and verified against information received from Canadian industry. Information on how military items are defined for the purposes of export controls is provided in section 2 of this report. Information about brokering transactions authorized in 2020 is included in this report for the first time.

Global Affairs Canada collects data on military exports to the United States for all ECL Group 9 goods and for ECL Group 2 items only if they require a permit to be exported to the United States. As of September 1, 2019, regulatory amendments enabled the collection of information on exports to the United States of full-system conventional arms, as defined in Article 2(1) of the ATT.

Information on Canadian exports of military goods is also captured in three other key reports: the Annual Report on the Administration of the Export and Import Permits Act, which is tabled in Parliament, and Canada’s submission to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and to the Arms Trade Treaty.

Global Affairs Canada welcomes suggestions on how to improve future editions of this report. To submit any suggestions, please contact the Export Controls Policy Division at Global Affairs Canada: expctrlpol@international.gc.ca.

Summary of Key Data

• For the 2020 calendar year, the value of Canadian exports of controlled military goods and technology amounted to approximately $1.966 billion, compared to a value of $3.757 billion in 2019. This year-on-year decrease in export value is largely attributable to the lower value of military exports to Saudi Arabia in 2020, which diminished by $1.553 billion compared to 2019.
• Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the processing of export and brokering permit applications has been deemed a priority service and the department has reallocated resources to ensure the continuity of the permit application and assessment process.
• Timelines for processing permits slightly improved in 2020. There was a year-on-year 5% increase in the number of applications processed within the published service standard (72% in 2019 to 77% in 2020).
• The major share of exports by value ($1.473 billion or 75%) went to non-NATO countries included on Canada’s Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL) (see Annex B for the list of AFCCL countries).
• Saudi Arabia was the largest non-U.S. export destination, receiving approximately $1.311 billion in Canadian military exports (accounting for approximately 67% of the total value of non-U.S. military exports).
• The United Kingdom was the second largest non-U.S. destination of Canadian military exports, receiving approximately $122.88 million in military exports (accounting for approximately 6% of the total value of all non-U.S. military exports).
• Most of Canada’s military exports consisted of ground vehicles and their components which accounted for 63.22% of all controlled military exports in 2020 ($1.312 billion).

Table 1: 2020 – Total Value of Exports for Military Goods and Technology by NATO and AFCCL Destinations^{Footnote 1}

Chart 1: 2020 – Exports of Military Goods and Technology by NATO and AFCCL Destinations

Text version

• NATO Destinations – 17%
• Non-NATO AFCCL Destinations – 75%
• Other Destinations – 8%

Table 2: 2020 – Export Permits Utilized and Value of Exports by Region^{Footnote 2}

Table 3: 2020 – Canada’s Top Twelve Non-U.S. Destinations for Military Goods and Technology

Chart 2: 2020 – Export Value of (non-U.S. destined) Military Goods and Technology – Percentage by Region

Text version

• Africa – 1%
• Americas – 1%
• Asia-Pacific – 10%
• Europe – 19%
• Middle East – 69%

2. Canada’s Policy on the Export and Brokering of Military Items

As of September 2019, under the EIPA, the Minister of Foreign Affairs must deny exports and brokering permit applications for military goods and technology if there is a substantial risk that the items would underminepeace and security, or could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws, acts constituting an offence under international conventions relating to terrorism or organized crime, or serious acts of gender-based violence.

This objective is pursued primarily through Canada’s system of export and brokering controls, as governed by the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA). The EIPA requires Canadian individuals and companies that wish to export any items included on the Export Control List (ECL), or to broker any items included on the Brokering Control List (BCL), to obtain a permit issued by Global Affairs Canada^{Footnote 4} . The ECL includes military, dual-use, and strategic goods and technology, U.S.-origin goods and technology, and a limited number of items that are controlled for economic reasons, in accordance with Canada’s international trade agreements and obligations. More information on brokering controls and on the types of items controlled on the BCL is provided below.

Canada prohibits the export, sale, supply, or shipment of arms and related materiel to countries that are under United Nations Security Council arms embargos, through regulations under the United Nations Act. These embargoes also prohibit the provision of technical assistance, including by transferring technical data, in relation to the sale, supply, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of arms and related material. Canada also has autonomous sanctions in place in relation to certain countries through regulations under the Special Economic Measures Act, which prohibit certain activities, including the export of specific goods and technology to those countries, or to any person in those countries, and/or to listed individuals and entities subject to a full dealings ban. More information on Canada’s sanctions is available on the Canadian Sanctions website.

Furthermore, the EIPA also provides authority for an Area Control List (ACL), a list of countries to which the Governor-in-Council deems it necessary to control the export or transfer of any goods or technology, regardless of whether or not the items are included in the ECL. Currently, only North Korea is listed on the ACL. More information on the ACL can be found in Annex A.

The ECL is based principally on our participation in the major multilateral export control and non-proliferation regimes. Canada’s export and brokering controls are not meant to hinder international trade unnecessarily, but to regulate and impose restrictions in response to clear legislative and policy objectives. As outlined above, these objectives include ensuring that Canadian exports and brokering activities abroad are consistent with Canada’s foreign and defence policies, including respect for human rights and international peace and security.

Military Goods and Technology – “Groups 2 and 9”

The military goods and technology described in this report are those included in Group 2 (Munitions List), and in its subset Group 9 (Arms Trade Treaty Items), of the ECL.

Goods and technology listed in Group 2 are “specially designed or modified for military use.” These items include, among others, ground vehicles, firearms, ammunition and imaging equipment made specifically for military use. A full list of the categories of Group 2 items is included in Table 10.

Group 9 is a subset of Group 2 and includes the full-system conventional arms that are listed in Article 2(1) of the ATT, namely: battle tanks; armoured combat vehicles; large-calibre artillery systems; military aircraft; military helicopters; military vessels and submarines; missiles and missile launchers; and small arms and light weapons when destined for police and/or military end-use. Group 9 items require a permit prior to export to all destinations, including the United States.

Other controlled items appearing elsewhere on the ECL (such as dual-use and nuclear items) are not featured in this report as they are not specially designed for military use.

Military goods and technology listed in Groups 2 and/or 9 of the ECL are typically exported for one or more of the following purposes:

• sales to military and, in some cases, police forces or other government agencies;
• sales of parts and components for the production of new goods;
• inter-company transfers to affiliates in foreign countries;
• return of military equipment for foreign customers following repair in Canada, and shipments of spare parts;
• sales to private individuals (particularly for firearms)^{Footnote 5} .

Export and Brokering Permit Assessment Process

Under the Export and Import Permits Act, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is legally required to take into account the assessment criteria referred to in Article 7 of the ATT in deciding whether to issue or deny export and brokering permit applications for “arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war” (i.e., military goods and technology controlled under Group 2 of the ECL). Specifically, the Minister is required to consider whether the goods or technology specified in the application:

• would contribute to peace and security or undermine it; and
• could be used to commit or facilitate
  • a serious violation of international humanitarian law,
  • a serious violation of international human rights law,
  • an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism to which Canada is a party,
  • an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to transnational organized crime to which Canada is a party, or
  • serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.

The legislation stipulates that the Minister cannot issue an export or brokering permit for “arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war” if, after taking into account available mitigating measures, he or she determines that there is a substantial risk that the proposed transaction would result in any of the negative consequences referred to in the ATT assessment criteria. For there to be a substantial risk, there should be a direct and foreseeable risk, based on compelling evidence, that the specific good or technology proposed for export or brokering would result in a negative consequence listed in the EIPA.

Additional objectives of Canada’s overall export and brokering controls regime include:

• ensuring that exports or brokering transactions do not pose a threat to Canada and its allies;
• preventing exports or brokering transactions that would be in violation of Canadian sanctions;
• ensuring that exports or brokering transactions do not contribute to the development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons of mass destruction, or of their delivery systems; and
• mitigating the possibility of unauthorized transfer or diversion of the exported or brokered goods and technology.

All applications to export or broker goods or technology are carefully reviewed against the criteria listed above through wide-ranging consultations with geographic, human rights, international security and defence industry experts at Global Affairs Canada (including at Canada’s overseas diplomatic missions), the Department of National Defence, and, as necessary, other government departments and agencies. Every export and brokering permit application are also closely scrutinized to ensure they align with Canada’s foreign and defence policies and security interests.

To guide this consultation process, Global Affairs Canada developed an enhanced risk assessment framework for the review of permit applications, laying out the different elements to be considered, the relevant government experts to be consulted, and parameters for the identification of risks. Any concerns raised through this process are then closely evaluated, including whether a substantial risk exists with respect to any of the ATT criteria.

A key consideration in the review of each application is the end-use and end-user of the item. Careful attention is paid to end-use documentation in an effort to ensure that the export or brokering transaction is intended for a legitimate end-user and will not be diverted to ends that would threaten the security of Canada or its allies or would result in a negative consequence referred to in the ATT assessment criteria. Where a substantial risk is identified with respect to any of the ATT criteria, mitigating measures, such as additional end-use assurances, post-shipment controls, or transparency provisions between Canada and the government of the destination country, must be sought. A permit can only be issued if the mitigating measure reduces the risk to less than “substantial”.

Brokering Controls

Article 10 of the ATT requires State Parties to take measures to regulate the brokering of arms taking place under their jurisdiction. Canada’s brokering controls have been in effect since September 1, 2019, and apply to persons and organizations in Canada, as well as to Canadians abroad (Canadian citizens, permanent residents, and organizations).

Brokering is defined in the EIPA as “arranging or negotiating a transaction that relates to the movement of goods or technology included in a Brokering Control List from a foreign country to another foreign country.” The Brokering Control List, which comprises all items for which a permit is required prior to engaging in a brokering transaction, includes full-system conventional arms (as defined in Group 9 of the ECL), all items listed in Group 2 of the ECL, as well as any ECL item – including dual-use items – that are likely destined to a weapons of mass destruction end-use.

Throughout 2020, Global Affairs Canada provided on-demand support to businesses that requested assistance in understanding Canada’s brokering controls. The department also availed itself of opportunities to proactively share information about Canada’s brokering controls with industry and to meet with civil society organizations that expressed an interest in the issue.

For more information about these controls, please consult the brokering regulations online. Global Affairs Canada welcomes feedback from stakeholders and is open to considering additional measures to further streamline and improve the ongoing implementation of Canada’s brokering controls.

Notes on the Export of Firearms

In terms of the quantity of permits issued, most firearms exports from Canada are intended for sporting or other recreational use and not for military purposes. In addition to the assessment criteria mentioned previously, permit applications for firearms are carefully assessed for the risk that items may be diverted to the illegal arms trade or used to fuel local or regional violence. Canadian diplomatic missions and other sources may provide information about the destination country’s firearms control laws, procedures and enforcement practices, and are often called upon to validate import permits and licences, end-user assurances, and consignee information prior to the issuance of a permit.

Prohibited firearms and components thereof may only be exported to countries listed on the Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL) and then only to consignees that are government entities or are authorized by government entities^{Footnote 6} . The full list of countries on the AFCCL is found in Annex B. On May 1, 2020, the Government of Canada reclassified 1,500 models of firearms and their variants as prohibited, thereby barring their export to non-AFCCL destinations.

International Cooperation on Military Trade

Multilateral action is an important means of promoting international peace and security. Canada supports and participates in a range of arms control, export control, and non-proliferation activities, working closely with partners who share our objectives^{Footnote 7} . Canada participates in the following export control bodies and initiatives: the Arms Trade Treaty, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Further information on these multilateral forums can be found in Annexes D and E.

3. Developments in 2020

Implementation of a More Robust Risk Assessment Framework

On September 1, 2019, a more robust risk assessment framework was put in place in preparation for Canada’s accession to the ATT. This was the first full year in which the Government implemented this framework for the review of export and brokering permit applications. The introduction of this rigorous assessment framework has led to delays in the processing of applications. These delays have been noticed by industry, which has been vocal in expressing its desire for a more transparent, timely, and predicable system. The department is working on solutions to streamline its assessment process, while maintaining the level of rigour that is both legally required and that Canadians expect.

COVID-19

Global cooperation on pandemics is critical to ensuring the health and safety of people around the world. Global Affairs Canada has not implemented any new export restrictions under the Export and Import Permits Act in response to COVID-19 at this time.

Throughout the pandemic, the processing of export and brokering permit applications has been deemed a priority service and the department has reallocated resources to ensure the continuity of the permit application and assessment process.

COVID-19 has had a significant negative impact on the overall health of the Canadian economy. At this time, it is difficult to measure the exact impact the pandemic will have on the long-term health of the Canadian defence industry. The information currently available shows that most countries have not significantly reduced defence budgets. However, industry feedback suggests that global travel restrictions have led to a decrease in the effectiveness of international business development efforts, which could potentially lead to a decline in new contracts. In 2020, 1,521 fewer export permit applications for military, dual-use, and strategic goods or technology were received when compared to 2019.

The department is looking to improve its service delivery to support the economic recovery of the defence industry, which prior to the pandemic contributed over 60,000 high-skill, high-wage jobs to the Canadian economy and provides the Canadian Armed Forces with the equipment necessary to meet its operational needs.

Policy Reviews - Controlled Exports to Saudi Arabia and Turkey

In April 2020, the Government concluded a review of export permits to Saudi Arabia and the final report was published online.

On October 5, 2020, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs directed the department to investigate reports that Turkish-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – most likely equipped with Canadian sensors – may have been used in combat operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya and linked to alleged violations of international humanitarian law in Syria. Accordingly, from October to December 2020, the department, in consultation with the Department of National Defence, conducted a review of all suspended and valid export permits, and pending export permit applications for military goods and technology destined to Turkey. Following the findings of the review, which was published online on April 12, 2021, 29 export permits to Turkey that were suspended in the fall were cancelled.

Changes in Export Control Policies for Certain Destinations

Saudi Arabia

No new export permits were issued during the Government’s review of export permits to Saudi Arabia between October 2018 and April 2020. On April 9, 2020, upon completion of the review, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that the department would resume the assessment of new export permits applications on a case-by-case basis to ensure that they comply with the legal requirements under Canadian law and the ATT.

Turkey

In October 2019, following Turkey’s military incursion into northeastern Syria, the issuance of all new export permits destined to Turkey was temporarily suspended. The suspension did not affect valid export permits, and Canadian companies holding valid permits were able to continue exporting to Turkey.

On April 16, 2020, the department announced a change in policy regarding the issuance of export permits to Turkey as a result of an assessment of the situation in Syria, regional security and the overall bilateral relationship with Turkey. For Group 2 items, permit applications are presumptively denied. However, the department reviews these applications on a case-by-case basis to determine whether exceptional circumstances, including NATO cooperation programs, exist to justify issuing the export permit. For all other groups on the Export Control List, permit applications destined to Turkey continue to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis under Canada’s robust risk assessment framework.

Belarus

On November 9, 2020, Canada temporarily suspended the issuance of all new permits for the export and brokering of controlled goods and technology to Belarus. The department will continue to monitor the evolving situation and may reassess this decision in light of changes on the ground.

Hong Kong

On July 3, 2020, Canada revised its policy with regards to the export of controlled items to Hong Kong.  Canada will treat export permit applications destined to Hong Kong in the same way as those destined to mainland China. The Government will closely scrutinize all export permit applications destined to Hong Kong, and will deny permits that are not in line with Canada’s domestic and international legal obligations, foreign policy or security interests.

The Arms Trade Treaty and Civil Society Engagement

In its first full year as a State Party, Canada has been vigorously engaged in the ATT despite the COVID-19 pandemic. Throughout the year, Canada supported the work of the ATT’s Working Groups, in particular the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation. Canada actively participated in the Sixth Conference of States Parties (CSP6), where it announced a financial contribution of approximately $100,000 to the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) and Sponsorship Program. The Sponsorship Program is a mechanism by which States Parties with modest capacity can request financial support from the ATT Secretariat so that delegates based in the capital can attend the Treaty’s meetings in person. The VTF is a basket fund that supports the national implementation of the Treaty by other States Parties. Through a decision at CSP6, Canada became a member of the VTF Selection Committee (for a two-year mandate) and looks forward to supporting projects that will strengthen Treaty compliance by States Parties.

In addition, Canada launched discussions with key international partners within the ATT with a view to strengthen international compliance with the Treaty, with a long-term goal towards garnering support for the establishment of an international inspection regime. These efforts will continue in 2021.

Outside the context of the ATT, Global Affairs Canada also engaged regularly with international partners and civil society stakeholders to share information, benchmark best practices and discuss ways to increase the rigour and transparency of Canada’s export controls.

Announcement of an Advisory Panel of Experts

To ensure that the Government upholds the highest standards with respect to human rights, on April 9, 2020, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs announced the creation of an arms-length advisory panel of experts that would review best practices regarding arms exports by State Parties to the ATT and ensure that Canada’s export controls are as robust as possible. The advisory panel would not be responsible for evaluating permit applications.

Export Control List Updates

On March 13, 2020, the Government of Canada finalized the regulatory process to amend the Export Control List to incorporate commitments made at various multilateral export control regimes. This amendment served to add, clarify and remove controls over specific items as agreed upon in the various regimes. The “December 2018” edition of the Guide to Canada’s Export Control List came into effect on May 1, 2020, incorporating the regime commitments made up until December 31, 2018.

Amendment to the Regulations Prescribing Certain Firearms as Prohibited

On May 1, 2020, the Government amended the Regulations Prescribing Certain Firearms and Other Weapons, Components and Parts of Weapons, Accessories, Cartridge Magazines, Ammunition and Projectiles as Prohibited, Restricted or Non-Restricted to reclassify as prohibited approximately 1,500 models of firearms and their variants. These newly prohibited firearms may now only be exported to destinations that are listed on the Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL).

Amendments to the Automatic Firearms Country Control List

On October 14, 2020, amendments were made to the AFCCL to add Austria, Ireland, Japan, and Switzerland. This amendment allows Canadians to now apply for permits to export prohibited firearms, weapons and devices to these destinations. It also provides Canadians who own one of the 1,500 models of firearms that were reclassified as prohibited on May 1, 2020, with additional options to dispose of them through export to the country of manufacture.

Export and Import Permits Act Offenses

There were no convictions for offences under the EIPA during the 2020 calendar year, although there was one case involving a 2015 conviction that was later set aside.

R. c. Guimont, 2020 QCCA 1759

In 2015, two individuals were found guilty by jury of 4 counts of possession of controlled items contrary to section 37 of the Defence Production Act and 4 counts of exporting goods on the Export Control List without a valid export permit, contrary to article 13 of the EIPA (R. c. Guimont, 2015 QCCS 4030). However, in 2017, the Quebec Court of Appeal found that, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, the individuals’ right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms had been breached. Accordingly, the Court set aside the convictions and ordered a stay of proceedings (R. c. Guimont, 2017 QCCA 1754). In 2020, the Quebec Court of Appeal had to decide whether to order the return of the controlled goods (components for night vision goggles) that had been seized by the Crown in the context of the earlier criminal prosecution. The Court held that the controlled goods should not be returned to the accused and should instead be forfeited to Her Majesty (Guimont c. R., 2020 QCCA 1759).

Export and Import Permits Act Judicial Reviews

There was one ongoing judicial review in relation to Group 2 export permits during the 2020 calendar year.

Daniel Turp v. Minister of Foreign Affairs (3^rd Judicial Review)

On October 10, 2019, Mr. Turp commenced a third application for judicial review against the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ purported failure to cancel all existing permits for the export of Light Armoured Vehicles to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Permit Denials

In 2020, 58 applications for permits to export military, dual-use, and strategic goods or technology were denied. This represents a significant increase in the number of permits denied compared to previous years. Since 2016, when the report began to include information on permit applications denied, there have been less than 10 denials per year.

40 applications to export dual-use items to China (28) or Hong Kong (12) were denied for reasons pertaining to Canada’s foreign and defence policy. 9 applications to export prohibited firearms and their corresponding parts and components were denied as the destination country was not listed on the AFCCL at the time the application was submitted. 5 applications were denied because there was a substantial risk that the proposed Group 2 export would have resulted in one of the negative consequences of the ATT assessment criteria as outlined in section 7.4 of the EIPA.

Table 4 includes information on applications that were denied in 2020, including those that were submitted prior to January 1, 2020.

It is important to note that each year, a number of permit applications are withdrawn at the request of the exporter if the company becomes aware, or is otherwise informed, of commercial, political or other types of risk that may affect their application and decides not to pursue the commercial opportunity. For the number of export permit applications withdrawn in 2020 please see Table 5.

Table 4: 2020 - Export Permit Denials of Military, Dual-Use and Strategic Goods and Technology^{Footnote 8}

4. Military Export and Brokering Statistics

The statistics contained in this report are obtained from permit utilization reporting, which exporters must provide to Global Affairs Canada consistent with the conditions listed on export permits for military goods and technology. The data displayed below includes the country of destination, the ECL item under which the export is controlled, and the value in Canadian dollars.

Further details related to export transactions (for example, names of exporting companies, values of individual contracts and transactions, and details of the specific technologies being exported) are protected due to the commercially confidential nature of such information.

Export controls apply to all foreign destinations. However, due to Canada’s close and long-standing military cooperation with the United States, including the 1956 Defence Production Sharing Agreement that underpins the integrated nature of North America’s defence industry, Canada and the United States have reciprocal arrangements to ensure permit-free/licence-free movement of most military items between our two countries. For Canada, this has meant permit exemptions for most Group 2 exports destined to the United States. Consequently, Global Affairs Canada collects data for exports of Group 9 goods and a small sub-set of goods for which individual permits are required, such as prohibited firearms, related parts and ammunition, and select items controlled under ECL number 2-4 (see Tables 12 and 13).

Data on Canadian military exports may be available from other sources such as Statistics Canada. These figures are derived from data collected by the Canada Border Services Agency based on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems (HS), and may include non-military goods such as: commercial computers; civil-certified aircraft; guns and ammunition designed exclusively for industrial uses, such as the lighting of gas flares at oil wells; or other civilian equipment. Since there is no direct correlation between the commodity codes used by Statistics Canada and the ECL numbers, and because each source uses different methods of data collection, a meaningful comparison of the information from these sources is not possible.

An internationally accepted standard for statistics on worldwide military trade is the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) (see Annex D). The Register quantifies the number of complete weapon systems permanently exported and does not include parts, components or the wide assortment of non-lethal support systems (such as radar equipment, simulators and software designed for military use) that make up a significant component of Canada’s military exports. Since 1991, Canada has consistently submitted annual voluntary reports to UNROCA. In 2021, Canada will submit to the ATT Secretariat the same public report on the export and import of full-system conventional arms recently listed under Group 9 in order to meet its reporting obligations under the ATT.

Global Affairs Canada also produces an Annual Report to Parliament on the Administration of the Export and Import Permits Act, which is also a statutory requirement under the EIPA. This report provides an overview of permit data and service standards, which includes Group 2 permits and is also available at: https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/controls-controles/eipa-2020-llei.aspx?lang=eng.

Data Interpretation Notes

The following data interpretation notes apply:

1. Procurement contracts awarded by governments may have very high values and extended delivery schedules; a single contract may account for a large share of total military exports in a given year or over multiple years. Major changes in totals from one year to another may be explained by the beginning or end of a small number of high-value contracts.
2. Other than Table 9 and Tables 12, 13, and 20, the data presented does not include information on exports of military goods and technology to the United States. Data on permit applications for exports to the United States is included in Tables 5, 18, and 19.
3. The ECL item numbers used are explained with illustrative examples. Detailed descriptions of all strategic goods and technology controlled under the EIPA, can be found in “A Guide to Canada’s Export Control List”, which is available at www.exportcontrols.gc.ca.
4. Readers will notice that some of the totals vary between tables. For instance, Table 6 reports annual values of total exports of military goods and technology by destination country, whereas Annex G breaks down the value of exports to individual countries according to the ECL item number. However, the total of exports by ECL item number to an individual country calculated from Annex G may be greater than the total value of exports to that destination reported in Table 6. This is because goods or technology included in a single export permit may be classified under multiple ECL item numbers. Table 11, Chart 4, and Annex G therefore, contain some double-counting, which inflates the value of total exports.
5. Table 10 references transfers of “technology” controlled under item 2-22 of the ECL. Transfers of this nature often cannot be easily quantified. For this reason, “lots” rather than unit quantities are commonly used where technology may be transferred via intangible means (such as through meetings or emails). The “value” assigned to such technology transfers is determined by exporter in their reporting and may explain some low-value exports to certain destinations. The inclusion of such data within this report is consistent with past practice.
6. A multi-destination permit (or MDP) allows exports to multiple countries under a single permit. Group 2 MDPs only allow exports to like-minded countries that are members of the export control regimes to which Canada is party, and that have an effective system of export controls. MDPs are offered to exporters who have an exporting history with Global Affairs Canada. These exporters have implemented defined due diligence processes and procedures when planning, marketing and shipping ECL items to foreign clients to ensure a reasonable level of assurance that goods or technology will not be exported to unauthorized or illegitimate end-uses or end-users. The values exported under MDPs are included in all the tables reporting the total value of military exports. However, Tables 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12, along with Chart 3, do not include the number of MDPs utilized per destination as a single permit can cover exports to multiple destinations.
7. The number of Group 2 permits issued in 2020 (reported in Table 5 as 2237) does not equal the number of Group 2 permits utilized in 2020 (reported in Table 8 as 2295) because a single permit issued in any given year can be valid for up to a period up to five years and be exported against during any of the years in which it is valid.
8. Exporters are not required to submit permit utilization reports to Global Affairs Canada for Group 2 exports where no value is being transferred. Examples include exports where goods were sent to Canada for warranty repair, and are being returned to the original owner; exports where goods were sent to Canada for testing, demonstration or trials, and are being returned; the return to foreign owners of controlled goods borrowed or leased by a Canadian company (e.g., deactivated automatic firearms used as movie props); exports of faulty or discrepant material; or exports of goods for destructive testing. Exports of such nature are omitted from this report.

Table 5: 2020 – Summary of Export Permits by all ECL Groups^{Footnote 11}

Notes for Table 5

Submitted Applications: Table 5 includes data on all export permit application submitted between January 1 and December 31, 2020. It does not include information on applications that were submitted prior to 2020 (or those that were submitted on December 31, 2020 and not received on January 1, 2021) nor does it include information on export permit amendment requests. Items in an export permit application may be assessed under more than one ECL Group. To avoid counting the same application twice, applications containing more than one ECL assessment have been assigned to a single Group based on the following order of precedence: 9, 2, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 5. Therefore, an application containing both a Group 9 assessment and a Group 2 assessment will appear once in the Group 9 row and an application containing both a Group 6 and a Group 5 assessment will only appear in the Group 6 row. The status of all export permit applications reflected in the table is accurate as of December 31, 2020.

Issued: Means a permit has been approved and issued in 2020. If a permit was issued in 2020 and is subsequently cancelled, it is only counted once in the cancelled or suspended column.

Denied: Means a permit that was denied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, either directly by the Minister or by departmental officials further to policy direction received from the Minister. This occurs in fewer than 1% of cases annually and is generally for reasons related to Canada’s obligations under the ATT or Canada’s foreign and defence policies, as provided in the criteria for controlling the export of military, dual use and strategic goods outlined above. Information on denials is also reported in Table 5. Please note that Table 4 includes information on applications that were denied in 2020, including those that were submitted prior to January 1, 2020. Table 5 includes information on applications that were submitted in 2020 that had been denied up to December 31, 2020. The variance between Tables 4 and 5 is due to the fact that Table 4 includes applications that were submitted prior to 2020.

Returned without action: A permit application is returned without action by Global Affairs Canada if it is administratively incomplete, or if there is inconsistent information. A company that still wishes to pursue the export would be required to submit a new permit application.

Withdrawn: Permit applications may be withdrawn either at the request of the exporter or if the exporter is advised by Global Affairs Canada that a permit is not required. An exporter may decide to withdraw their application if the permit is no longer required because the commercial contract has fallen through, if a change to the contract requires them to resubmit the information under a separate application, or if the exporter becomes aware of political, commercial, or other types of risk that may affect their application and decides not to pursue the opportunity. An application may also be withdrawn if the goods or technology proposed for export are not controlled, if the items are controlled but a permit is not required for their export to the United States, or if a General Export Permit applies. All of these situations are captured in the category of withdrawn permits. In 2020, a total of 245 applications were withdrawn because an individual export permit was not required. The remaining 111 withdrawals were at the request of the company.

Cancelled or Suspended: An export permit that has been issued may be cancelled for administrative reasons (e.g., at the request of the applicant as the permit is no longer required, or due to an error on the permit requiring replacement by a new permit), or for policy reasons at the direction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. An export permit that has been cancelled is no longer valid for the export of goods or technology. An issued export permit can be suspended for policy reasons and reinstated later.

Under Review: Includes applications submitted in 2020 that as of December 31, 2020 were not completely processed or were otherwise under review.

Table 6: 2020 - Export Value of Military Goods and Technology to all non-U.S. Destinations

Chart 3: 2020 – Number of Utilized Export Permits for Military Goods and Technology to non-U.S. Destinations - Percentage by Region^{Footnote 13}

Text version

• Africa – 2%
• Americas – 3%
• Asia-Pacific – 17%
• Europe – 58%
• Middle East – 20%

Table 7: 2020 - Top Twelve Non-U.S. Destinations: Utilized Export Permits for Military Goods & Technology

Table 8: 2020 - Number of Utilized Export Permits for Military Goods & Technology by Destination^{Footnote 14}

Table 10: 2020 – Group 2 (Munitions List) of Canada’s ECL

Table 11: 2020 - Exports of Military Goods and Technology by ECL Item Number^{Footnote 17}

Chart 4: 2020 – 2020 - Exports of Military Goods and Technology by ECL Item Number and Value^{Footnote 18}
(Without ECL Item 2-6: “Ground vehicles and components”)

Text version

EN/FR

Exports of Military Goods and Technology by ECL Item Number and Value for Chart 4

ECL Number	Total Value	Percent of Permits Utilized
2-1	$40,151,052.40	5.26%
2-2	$61,883,989.16	8.11%
2-3	$18,998,576.97	2.49%
2-4	$12,299,515.39	1.61%
2-5	$56,077,744.93	7.35%
2-7	$6,860,381.10	0.90%
2-8	$3,604,589.08	0.47%
2-9	$36,840,649.07	4.83%
2-10	$140,120,816.94	18.36%
2-11	$76,192,024.06	9.98%
2-13	$26,600,078.74	3.48%
2-14	$47,797,120.70	6.26%
2-15	$99,073,815.61	12.98%
2-16	$5,639,922.94	0.74%
2-17	$9,391,162.49	1.23%
2-18	$15,883,983.23	2.08%
2-21	$32,450,344.17	4.25%
2-22	$73,525,437.60	9.63%

Exports to the United States of Certain Group 2 (Munitions List) Controlled Items

Global Affairs Canada collects data on military exports to the United States for all Group 9 goods and for Group 2 items only if they require a permit to be exported to the United States.

Within Group 2 of the ECL, export permits are required to the United States in the following circumstances:

• All exports of prohibited firearms controlled under item 2-1 (e.g. automatic weapons) or 2-2 (e.g. weapons with a calibre greater than 12.7mm) of the ECL must be authorized in advance with an export permit. Details on the application process can be found in the Export and Brokering Controls Handbook at https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/controls-controles/reports-rapports/ebc_handbook-cce_manuel.aspx?lang=eng
• Any ammunition controlled under item 2-3 of the ECL that is destined for end-use by police or military agencies. Permits are not required for the export of sporting ammunition.
• Goods controlled under item 2-4.a (e.g. bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles etc.) of the ECL.

In 2020, 113 export permits were utilized for the export to the United States of goods controlled under Group 2 (Munitions List) of the ECL. See Table 12 for more detailed information.

Goods exported from Canada to the United States are thereafter subject to the United States export controls regardless of whether a Canadian export permit was required. Goods exported from Canada through the United States to a third country (i.e. transit/transshipment) require a Canadian export permit for the third country when they leave Canada.

Permits are also required for the export to the United States of certain goods controlled on other ECL Groups, including all items in Group 3 (the Nuclear Non-Proliferation List), all items in Group 4 (the Nuclear-related Dual-Use List), most items in Group 5 (Miscellaneous Goods and Technology), and certain items in Group 6 (the Missile Technology Control Regime List) and Group 7 (the Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation List).

Table 12: 2020 – Number of Permits Utilized and Value Exported for certain Group 2 (Munitions List) Controlled Goods and Technology to the United States

Table 13: 2020 – Group 9 Commercial Exports to the United States

Brokering Data

In 2020, Global Affairs Canada received 49 brokering permit applications and 7 pre-notifications to use the General Brokering Permit No. 1 (GBP-1). As expected, based on benchmarking with allies and the size and nature of the Canadian defence industry, the number of brokering permit applications and of pre-notifications for the use of GBP-1 have proved low (1% of all applications received for military, dual-use and strategic items). The modest number of applications may have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Table 14: 2020 - Transactions Reported under GBP-1 by Destination

Table 15: The Brokering Control List

Table 16: 2020 - Summary of Brokering Permits Applications Received in 2020

Table 16 contains data on the status of brokering permit applications submitted between January 1 and December 31, 2020. Their status is accurate as of February 24, 2021. A total of three brokering permits were issued in 2020 and a further three were submitted in 2020 but issued in 2021.

Table 17: 2020 - Brokering Permits Issued by Destination and ECL Items

5. Service Standard Target

As stated in the Export and Brokering Controls Handbook, the processing time for applications for export permits to low-risk destinations that contain all required supporting documentation is 10 working days, and for complete applications for export permits to other destinations the processing time is 40 working days. The performance target for achieving this standard is set at 90 percent. For a list of destinations considered low-risk please refer to Annex F.

All export permit applications for military items, regardless of the country of destination, are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the ATT assessment criteria. However, applications for export permits to non-low-risk countries are subject to a more comprehensive assessment process, based on a risk assessment of the items being exported, the consignee country, and the intended end-use and end-user. These assessments are conducted through intra- and inter-departmental consultations to evaluate the risks and implications of the proposed exports with respect to the mandatory ATT assessment criteria, as well as considerations related to Canada’s foreign and defence policy and national security. Various Canadian government departments and agencies, including multiple divisions within Global Affairs Canada and Canada’s network of missions abroad, are involved in the consultation process.

When determining if an application has been processed within the allotted service standard, the department takes into consideration whether the application has been submitted with all of the required documentation. The processing time calculation only begins the moment a complete application has been received and no further clarification or supporting documents are required from the exporter. Applications that are withdrawn, returned without action, or denied are also counted towards the service standard. The data below, which is accurate as of December 31, 2020, captures export permit applications that were submitted in 2020. However, it does not include those applications that were submitted in 2020, but that had not been fully processed as of December 31, 2020.

More information on service standards can be found in the Export and Brokering Controls Handbook. Please note that service standards are not legal requirements. Rather, service standards are a public commitment to a measurable level of performance that permit applicants can expect under normal circumstances.

Table 18: Export Permit Applications Processed (2020-2018)^{Footnote 21}

Table 19: 2020 - Global Affairs Canada Service Standards for all Military, Dual-use and Strategic Export Permit Applications

6. Annexes

Annex A: Canada’s Area Control List (ACL)

The export or transfer of any goods or technology (including technical data, technical assistance and information necessary for the development, production or use of a good) to countries on the ACL is controlled and must be authorized by an export permit issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs under the authority of the EIPA. Export permits are normally issued only for those goods and technology that respond to humanitarian needs or circumstances, or for the personal belongings of an individual relocating to a country listed on the ACL.

As of December 31, 2020, the ACL was comprised of one country: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), which was added on July 13, 2010.

Guidance on exports to North Korea is published in Notice to Exporters No. 172, which is available at:
http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/systems-systemes/excol-ceed/notices-avis/172.aspx?lang=eng

Annex B: Canada’s Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL)

Further to sections 4.1 and 7(2) of the EIPA, certain prohibited firearms, weapons, or devices, and components and parts thereof, that are included on the Export Control List, may be exported only to destinations on the AFCCL and only to consignees that are government or authorized by government. These must be approved by an export permit issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs under the authority of the EIPA.

The following goods and their components and parts, as defined in section 4.1 of the EIPA and subsection 84(1) of the Criminal Code, are subject to the AFCCL, when these items are also included on the Export Control List:

• an automatic firearm, whether or not it has been altered to discharge only one projectile with one pressure of the trigger;
• any firearm that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited firearm;
• any weapon, other than a firearm, that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited weapon;
• any component or part of a weapon, or any accessory for use with a weapon, that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited device;
• a cartridge magazine that is prescribed by regulation to be a prohibited device.

At the time of publication, the AFCCL was comprised of the following countries:

1. Albania
2. Australia
3. Austria
4. Belgium
5. Botswana
6. Bulgaria
7. Chile
8. Colombia
9. Croatia
10. Czech Republic
11. Denmark
12. Estonia
13. Finland
14. France
15. Germany
16. Greece
17. Hungary
18. Iceland
19. Ireland
20. Israel
21. Italy
22. Japan
23. Korea, Republic of
24. Kuwait
25. Latvia
26. Lithuania
27. Luxembourg
28. Netherlands
29. New Zealand
30. Norway
31. Peru
32. Poland
33. Portugal
34. Romania
35. Saudi Arabia
36. Slovakia
37. Slovenia
38. Spain
39. Sweden
40. Switzerland
41. Turkey
42. United Kingdom
43. United States
44. Ukraine

The AFCCL can be found at: http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-91-575/FullText.html

Annex C: Canada’s International Transfers (Government to Government Transfers)

From time to time, the Government of Canada, normally via the Department of National Defence, will provide surplus military equipment to foreign governments through sale or donation. When determining sales and donations to foreign governments, the Government of Canada considers a number of factors, including the nature of the goods, the country of origin, the ATT export assessment criteria, the applicable controls relating to its distribution, and applicable Government of Canada policies. Records pertaining to these types of transfers are kept by the Department of National Defence. As the Department of National Defence is not subject to the EIPA, no permits are required for these exports.

Information on government-to-government transfers of full-system conventional arms is also publicly reported in Canada’s submission to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and will also be included in Canada’s reports to the ATT Secretariat.

Canada’s international government-to-government transfers in 2020 were:

• USA: 44 RIM-66 Standard Missile 2 were donated to the United States Navy

More information on the sale and donation of surplus equipment is available at:
www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-acquire-surplus-equipment/index.page

Annex D: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)

Canada continues to actively promote greater transparency in the trade of conventional arms. In 1991, Canada was a founding contributor to UNROCA, which is an international, voluntary transparency mechanism under which Member States of the United Nations supply information to the Register on imports and exports of seven categories of conventional arms.

The Register is updated annually and makes a significant contribution to transparency, confidence-building and enhanced global security. Since the inception of the Register, more than 90 countries on average have made annual submissions to it; of these, about 70 have done so consistently, including Canada. As a result, the Register has become an important and authoritative source of information. The Register tracks data on the following seven categories of conventional arms: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers. These same categories have been incorporated into the ECL through the creation of Group 9, which will facilitate reporting on exports of these items to both UNROCA and the ATT Secretariat.

Canada is also one of a growing number of countries that voluntarily submit data to the Register on military holdings and on procurement through national production. In addition, Canada is one of several Member States that voluntarily supplies information on imports and exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) to the Register as part of their annual report. This information goes beyond the voluntary minimum currently recommended by the UN.

Further information on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is available online at:
www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/register/

Actual Exports from Canada of Conventional Arms and SALW in 2020

The following table represents actual exports of conventional arms and SALW as defined by UNROCA reporting best practices, from Canada, during the 2020 calendar year, against export permits issued by Global Affairs Canada, for military, security or police end-use in the destination country.

Editions of this report and reports to UNROCA prior to 2016 listed total quantities of conventional arms and SALW that were authorized for export under permits issued in the course of the reporting year. This practice (i.e., reporting the “maximum allowable exports under issued permits”) was not optimal, as it does not allow for the tracking of actual, versus potential, transfers of conventional arms and SALW. Since 2016, Canada reports actual exports/transfers of reportable conventional arms and SALW that occurred during the reporting year.

Table 20: 2020 – UNROCA: Actual Exports from Canada of Conventional Arms and SALW

ACV: Armoured Combat Vehicle (full systems only)

UCAV: Combat aircraft and unmanned combat aerial vehicles

MML: Missiles and missile launchers

LCAs: Large-Calibre Artillery Systems (guns, howitzers, and artillery pieces with a calibre of 75 mm and above).

LMG: Light Machine Gun (full automatic firearm up to 12.7 mm / .50 calibre)

HMG: Heavy Machine Gun (full automatic firearm over 12.7 mm / .50 calibre)

HH/UB GL: Hand-Held/Under-Barrel Grenade Launcher

NOTES:

1. All bolt-action and semi-automatic rifles are reported under “Rifles & Carbines”. Full-automatic firearms that are not submachine guns and that do not fall into the Light Machine Gun or Heavy Machine Gun category are reported under “Assault Rifles”.

2. For illustrative examples of ECL items listed under Group 2 (Munitions List) see Table 10. Please note that as only full systems are reported to UNROCA, the values presented in Annex G (which reports all exports, including parts and components) may not correspond to the unit items exported, as reported in this chart.

Annex E: International Cooperation on Military Trade

The major multilateral export control and non-proliferation regimes in which Canada participates are described below. Participating governments negotiate common control lists of goods and technology that are implemented by all, in accordance with national legislation. Each participating government makes its own licensing decisions in accordance with applicable domestic law. These lists evolve in response to changing international and technological circumstances. Updates and amendments are made on a periodic basis.

Wassenaar Arrangement - Export Control List Groups 1 and 2

Most items have been included on the ECL because of Canada’s commitments to international partners that participate in multilateral export control regimes or because of Canada’s obligations as a signatory to international agreements that seek to control and monitor the movement of sensitive goods and technology.

The control regime that deals with the military and dual-use goods and technology covered in Group 1 (Dual-Use List) and Group 2 (Munitions List) of the ECL is the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, founded in 1996. The Wassenaar Arrangement defines its objectives as:

“to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations.”

Through national policies, the Participating States seek to ensure that transfers of items covered by the common control lists do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities that have the potential to undermine regional and global security and stability. Participating States also commit to take every precaution to ensure that such goods and technology are not diverted to illegitimate end-uses.

More information about the Wassenaar Arrangement and its 42 Participating States is available at www.wassenaar.org

Nuclear Suppliers Group - Export Control List Groups 3 and 4

Canada has a long-standing nuclear non-proliferation policy that is designed, among other objectives, to ensure that Canada’s nuclear exports are not used for any nuclear weapon purposes or their development. As a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that came into force in 1970, Canada will not provide source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production, of special fissionable material, to any Non-Nuclear Weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

In the late 1970s, a group of nuclear supplier countries, including Canada, agreed on a set of guidelines for nuclear transfers to any Non-Nuclear Weapon State for peaceful purposes. These became known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines. In 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers Group established a list of nuclear-related dual-use goods and technology that could make a major contribution to a nuclear explosive activity or a non-safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.

ECL Group 3 includes items that are nuclear-specific. ECL Group 4 includes nuclear-related dual-use items, i.e. items that are used in non-nuclear applications but that could also be used in a nuclear explosive activity or a non-safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.

More information about the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its 48 Members is available at www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org

Missile Technology Control Regime - Export Control List Group 6

The Missile Technology Control Regime was established in 1987 to address concerns about the proliferation of systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, namely, chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. ECL Group 6 includes items agreed upon by the Partners of the Missile Technology Control Regime that are used in, or could be used in, the proliferation of systems capable of delivering chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

More information about the Missile Technology Control Regime and its 35 Members is available at www.mtcr.info

Australia Group - Export Control List Group 7

The Australia Group was established in 1985 with the objective of preventing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The participants (national governments) in the Australia Group have developed common export controls on chemical substances and biological agents and related items that could be used in the production of chemical and biological weapons.

More information about the Australia Group, including its 43 Members, is available at https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/theaustraliagroupnet/site/en/index.html

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - Export Control List Group 7

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was established in 1997 when the Chemical Weapons Convention came into force. The goal of the Member States is to achieve a world that is free of chemical weapons and of the threat of their use, and in which cooperation in chemistry for peaceful purposes for all is fostered. The ECL contains chemicals and precursors that are controlled under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Some of the Chemical Weapons Convention chemicals and precursors are also controlled by the Australia Group.

More information about the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its 193 Member States is available at www.opcw.org

Arms Trade Treaty - Export Control List Group 9

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2013 to establish international norms for the conventional arms trade. Unregulated and irresponsible arms transfers intensify and prolong conflict, lead to regional instability, facilitate human rights abuses on a massive scale, and hinder social and economic development. The ATT promotes responsibility, transparency and accountability in the global arms trade. Canada acceded to the ATT on September 17, 2019.

More information about the Arms Trade Treaty and its 110 States Parties is available at
www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/att/

Annex F: Index of Destinations Considered Lower-Risk in 2020

Most export permit applications to the following destinations are considered low-risk and are thus subject to an expedited assessment processes. As previously mentioned, the service standard for applications to these destinations is typically 10 working days, as opposed to 40 working days for all other destinations. All export permit applications for military items, regardless of their country of destination, are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the previously mentioned assessment criteria, including the ATT criteria. The countries listed below are also considered low-risk within the context of Canada’s brokering controls. Controlled transactions brokered to any of these destinations are covered under General Brokering Permit No. 1.

Annex G: 2020 Exports of Military Goods and Technology by Destination and ECL Item