Language selection

Government of Canada Government of Canada

Search

G7 Rapid Response Mechanism Annual Report 2023

Table of contents

Introduction

The G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RRM) was established by leaders at the 2018 G7 Summit in Charlevoix to strengthen coordination among G7 countries to identify and respond to diverse and evolving foreign threats to democracy. The definition of these threats was intentionally broad to account for the evolving threat landscape and includes hostile state activities that target democratic institutions and processes, the media and information environment, and the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Since its inception, the G7 RRM has focused on threats that manifest themselves in the digital space, specifically Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). FIMI is an umbrella term for foreign efforts aimed at covertly manipulating the information environment to achieve strategic objectives. This manipulation can undermine public trust in democratic institutions, increase societal polarization, and disrupt the implementation of government mandates and commitments. The focus of FIMI reflected the importance of information integrity as an existential pillar of democracy and filled a gap in the multilateral system. Over the past 2 years, the G7 RRM has broadened its scope to include other threat vectors, including subnational interference and transnational repression, both of which have important digital dimensions.

The G7 RRM consists of representatives—“Focal Points”—from the G7 community. Australia, New Zealand, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Netherlands and Sweden are observers. Focal Points leverage their respective institutional structures and processes to support whole-of-government engagement in the work of the G7 RRM. Canada provides ongoing leadership and strategic and logistical support to the G7 RRM on an ongoing basis in its capacity as the G7 RRM Secretariat.

At the request of G7RRM foreign ministers, the G7 RRM has produced annual reports since 2022. The reports highlight elements of the evolving threat landscape that have animated the G7 RRM’s efforts and outline the responses of members and observers. The reports aim to help build societal resilience and deter malign activities. The first report, for 2021, focused on the threats posed by FIMI, while the second report, for 2022, included a reflection on subnational interference. The 2023 report:

Foreign threats to the democratic landscape in 2023

Foreign threats, also known as foreign interference, are largely driven by geopolitics and technology. In 2023, foreign actors took every opportunity to exploit notable global events—from armed conflicts to natural disasters to elections—and turn them into geopolitical flashpoints. 2023 was also the year that generative artificial intelligence (AI) went mainstream, adding a new tool to the foreign interference toolbox.

The first few months of the year were marked by the first anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the last were marked by the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war. In the meantime, tensions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan continued to simmer. From the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant water release to the Hawaiian wildfires, foreign actors instrumentalized highly publicized disasters to achieve their strategic objectives.

2023 saw adversaries leveraging leaps in AI development. AI facilitated FIMI during elections and helped adversaries track and surveil their opponents globally as part of what has been labelled “transnational repression” (TNR) – an increasingly disconcerting subset of foreign interference that will likely only intensify along with growing migration trends and exponential improvements in connectivity technologies.

FIMI and armed conflict

For the second year in a row, the global information space reflected and shaped armed conflict. Russian information operations—a term that includes both overt and covert information manipulation as well as propaganda—sought to weaken support for Ukraine abroad and demoralize Ukrainian citizens and soldiers. In some cases, information operations led to delays in vital military assistance and raised the spectre of a nuclear incident.

Russian information operations targeted audiences with meta-narratives that sought to undermine trust in the Ukrainian government and falsely portrayed Ukrainians as Nazis. They continued to spread anti-NATO rhetoric, claiming that NATO was acting as an aggressor.Footnote 1 They also spread potentially dangerous disinformation that the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant was developing “dirty bombs,” even though independent observer missions by the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that these claims were false (IAEA).Footnote 2

FIMI thrived from the outset of the Israel-Gaza war, and came from a variety of state and non-state entities invested in the outcome of the war. Russia, PRC, and Iran sought to use the conflict to support their own foreign policy priorities. Russian state media blamed Western countries for “escalating” the conflict and falsely accused Ukraine of supplying weapons to Hamas. Russia also revived its “Doppelgänger” operation, using fake websites masquerading as real media outlets to sow chaos in the information environment around the war.Footnote 3 Iranian state-affiliated media circulated anti-Israel content and sought to portray the conflict as part of a “pan-Islamic resistance” against “neo-colonial” Western countries. Chinese state media reports took the opportunity to denounce the United States, Western countries and the mainstream media for ignoring the victims in Gaza.Footnote 4

FIMI and elections

Election periods offer opportunities for FIMI actors. Countries with underdeveloped national and local media environments are particularly vulnerable. Throughout 2023, elections were fertile ground for FIMI, with AI being used to generate false audio, video and images. Malign actors have used generative AI to target key political and media figures during elections. This was a crucial development to watch going into 2024—a historic year for electoral democracy, with more than half the world’s population eligible to vote. As these technologies evolve and become more accessible, FIMI will become increasingly sophisticated, widespread and impactful.

FIMI and Natural Calamities

In 2023, adversaries took every opportunity to perpetuate false narratives around natural calamities. Following Japan’s decision to discharge water treated through the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station into the sea, malign actors used a range of disinformation tactics, such as the dissemination of online cartoons designed to incite fear, forged documents to discredit the authenticity of the IAEA report, inauthentic online activity, such as the use of bots, and the creation of fake accounts to spread and amplify disinformation.Footnote 5 Similarly, when wildfires raged in Hawaii, PRC was found to be using AI-driven FIMI to claim that the fires were caused by the United States government.Footnote 6

Transnational repression

Transnational repression (TNR) continued to be a key issue for the G7 RRM community in 2023, both online and offline. The online version of TNR is often referred to as “digital transnational repression” (DTNR).

Online, adversarial states use mobility controls, spyware and FIMI to extend their long arm into our societies. They use these technologies to track movement, enforce compliance, crack down on dissent and intimidate diaspora communities, human rights defenders and other voices.Footnote 7 The physical manifestations of TNR are manifold and include assault, intimidation (including through family members), unlawful deportation and detention, abduction and assassination.Footnote 8

The consequences of TNR are dire for the individuals and communities it affects and for the integrity of our democratic systems and processes. By undermining the rights and freedoms of targeted individuals and threatening their safety and security, our democracies suffer.

G7 RRM activities

With Japan presiding, the G7 RRM shifted its focus to the Indo-Pacific region. Japan’s priorities included the need to strengthen the international rules-based system and improve engagement with the global majority.

The G7 Hiroshima Summit 2023 reflected the evolution of the threats facing the G7 and the importance of a unified response. As part of the G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué, leaders publicly condemned FIMI and reaffirmed the G7 RRM’s leadership in responding to threats to democracy. Following the Hiroshima Summit, the G7 RRM established a working group, led by the European External Action Service (EEAS), to develop a framework for a collective G7 response.

With TNR taking centre stage, the focus of the RRM expanded beyond countering FIMI. Statements by the G7 leaders and G7 foreign ministers invoked the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) as a tool to counter TNR. The G7 RRM also agreed to develop a statement on TNR, reflecting the growing concern about adversaries threatening and intimidating citizens within our borders.

Acknowledging the existential threat posed by weapons and materials of mass destruction (WMD) and the potential risk of WMD-related FIMI, the G7 RRM provided expertise and support to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction by establishing an 18-month pilot project aimed at countering WMD-related disinformation.

The year ended with a tabletop exercise hosted by NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division and the EEAS in Brussels, Belgium (December 2023). The exercise focused on challenges, opportunities and methods to tackle FIMI and informed considerations to strengthen collective response capabilities. The in-person meeting concluded with the G7 RRM members and observers acknowledging that 2024 would be the year in which generative AI would continue to go mainstream.

2023 G7 RRM working groups

Collective response

Transnational repression

Sub-national interference

Open-source analytics (established in 2022)

Capacity building

Evolution of FIMI

FIMI perpetrators were able to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations using AI. Adversaries also took advantage of more permissive online environments by outsourcing operations to companies selling disinformation-for-hire services or leveraging changes to social media platforms. Finally, adversaries continued to operate and build on previous campaigns by using identity-based disinformation narratives, leveraging health-based misinformation and influencing traditional media outlets.

Artificial intelligence

2023 was a landmark year for AI as it became an accessible technology for everyday users. Generative AI tools such as Chat GPT and DALL-E use advanced algorithmic models that can “learn” and generate a variety of realistic content, including text, audio and video. These new models have lowered the barrier to entry by providing more sophisticated ways to generate, distribute and manage profiles and content across social media platforms.Footnote 9 For example, deepfakes and other forms of falsified and manipulated media have been used to develop fake content used to incite controversies. Advanced AI language models can be used to easily translate disinformation into native-speaker-like fluency.Footnote 10 Strategically mixing AI-generated or AI-altered content with real images and video can serve to bolster authenticity and believability. As AI models are fed new information, updated and debugged, these advanced models of generative AI tools present significant challenges to maintaining transparency within the information environment.

Identity-based disinformation

Foreign actors continued to use identity-based disinformation in 2023. Identity-based disinformation narratives use stereotypes and falsehoods associated with social identities to exploit societal divisions, project traditional and patriarchal values and suppress the voices of marginalized communities.Footnote 11 Perpetrators strategically targeted marginalized groups including women, people of colour, and LGBTQ2+ individuals with false narratives aimed at silencing and discrediting them.Footnote 12 A significant portion of these disinformation efforts were found to have been spread by Russian actors aiming to provoke public outrage and undermine trust in Western institutions and values.Footnote 13 It is likely that authoritarian actors will continue to use identity-based disinformation to attract new audiences who already hold prejudices against marginalized communities into their disinformation ecosystems.

Increasing use of commercial manipulators

2023 saw private companies selling influence and disinformation-for-hire services. Some organizations, such as Reporters Without Borders, are sounding the alarm that this fake content is threatening journalism around the world.Footnote 14 Unfortunately, many social media platforms remain vulnerable to exploitation by savvy commercial operators, and few platforms have improved their ability to shut down this malign activity in 2023.Footnote 15 As the industry grows, it faces greater public scrutiny from both the mediaFootnote 16 and authorities, who are beginning to clearly outline the threats that these companies, and their use by foreign adversaries, pose to democratic processes.Footnote 17

Continued prevalence of health-related disinformation

Despite the desire of many in the world to return to pre-pandemic “normalcy,” the circulation and dissemination of COVID-19-related disinformation and misinformation continued into 2023 and will likely continue for years to come. While health-related disinformation is not new (purveyors of “snake oil” go back centuries), spreaders of health-related disinformation take advantage of the changing information environment and the fast-paced spread of information.Footnote 18 In 2023, disinformation and misinformation about COVID continued, ranging from disinformation about the impact of vaccines to disinformation about the impact of pandemic control mechanisms to conspiracy theories about 5G technology.Footnote 19 Researchers studying the impact of COVID-related disinformation found that it was directly linked to deaths, further underlining the importance of a trustworthy information environment.Footnote 20

Changes in social media platforms

X, formerly known as Twitter, saw a significant spike in engagement around Russian, Chinese and Iranian disinformation when the “state-run media” labels were removed following Twitter’s change in ownership.Footnote 21 With such a spike in state-aligned content, there are concerns about whether the company can effectively combat such information manipulation with policies such as subscription fees and paid verification.Footnote 22 The situation at X has been exacerbated by the company’s decision to restrict open and academic research on the platform, with more than 100 studies being cancelled or suspended over the course of the year due to changes to the platform.Footnote 23 If X retains the important role that Twitter has played as a global town square, governments will need to grapple with how best to navigate the ever-evolving platform, and the company will need to ensure that state-backed actors do not overrun the conversations of real people with disinformation and manipulated content.

Media influence

Both Russia and PRC use the combination of covert FIMI operations, in conjunction with overt influence campaigns such as state-run media, to disrupt, undermine and influence. Beyond the blatant promulgation of outright lies and disinformation, adversaries continued to employ and perfect more subtle forms of media influence, harkening back to the beginnings of information manipulation tactics during the Cold War. While these tactics are often strengthened by other information manipulation techniques, they are also remarkably “low tech.”

The G7 RRM 2022 Annual Report recounted efforts by Kremlin-backed outlets to rebrand and circumvent EU sanctions, a trend that continued in 2023.Footnote 24 Despite public reporting by independent experts and civil society organizations, shoddily rebranded Russian propaganda continues to garner millions of views on popular platforms like TikTok, Facebook and Instagram.Footnote 25 While Russian media campaigns have historically been focused on Western audiences, operations have also been uncovered in Latin America, Southeast Asia and Africa, focused on portraying Russia as an anti-colonial champion and spreading misinformation about its war on Ukraine.Footnote 26 The propaganda machine is not perfect, however; the confused response to the mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin echoed the early days of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, when Russia’s disinformation industry was also caught off-guard. As domestic systems struggled to adapt to new Kremlin narratives surrounding Prigozhin, a once-lauded hero, government censorship agencies wavered on what to restrict and how to react.Footnote 27

In recent years, the Chinese government has dramatically expanded its efforts to influence media around the world. In autumn 2022, Freedom House released a report highlighting the extent of the PRC government’s global media footprint.Footnote 28 Chinese efforts in this area have been guided by President Xi’s edict to “tell China’s story well,” which has led to a wide variety of actions, including paying local newspapers to publish propaganda stories and collaborating on co-productions with credible foreign media outlets.Footnote 29 However, these campaigns have been met with mixed results – while the PRC remains one of the largest investors in foreign information operations, its control of the media has been criticized by some countries in the Global South. Footnote 30

Government efforts to safeguard national elections in 2023

In October 2023, Australia held its first referendum in 24 years, voting on whether to amend the Australian Constitution. The Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce (EIAT) was in place to provide advice to the Electoral Commissioner on matters that risked compromising the integrity of the referendum. The EIAT is an inter-agency mechanism responsible for assessing, understanding and mitigating threats to electoral integrity and, if required, advising the Electoral Commissioner on how to manage these threats. Following the referendum, Australian Electoral Commissioner Tom Rogers stated that the EIAT agencies had not identified any foreign interference, or any other interference, that compromised the delivery of the 2023 referendum or would undermine the confidence of the Australian people in the results of the referendum. Upon request, the EIAT also provides assistance to the Australian state and territory electoral commissions to help ensure the integrity of their elections. In 2023, this included support for the New South Wales state election.

In-focus features

The purpose of the in-focus feature is to provide a brief snapshot of how members of the G7 RRM countered threats to democracy by shining light on FIMI, launching strategies and initiatives, introducing legislation and enforcing laws.

Canada

In 2023, the Government of Canada issued 2 public statements condemning PRC interference and shining light on the PRC campaign targeting Canada. The first campaign detected by Rapid Response Mechanism Canada (RRM Canada) was an information operation targeting a Member of Parliament. It took place on the social media platform WeChat, where a coordinated network of news accounts shared and amplified false or misleading narratives about their identity, political stances and family heritage.Footnote 31

The second probable PRC interference operation discovered by RRM Canada was the “Spamouflage” campaign, which targeted dozens of members of Parliament (MPs) from across the political spectrum, including the senior Canadian political leaders. The campaign used a bot network to post thousands of comments in English and French on the MPs’ Facebook and X/Twitter accounts, claiming that a critic of the Chinese Communist Party in Canada had accused MPs of criminal and ethical violations.Footnote 32 Canada responded by notifying the parliamentarians involved, contacting the platforms involved and raising concerns with the PRC.

European Union

In 2023, the EEAS put in place tangible measures and structures to systematically detect and expose FIMI. The EU FIMI Toolbox was further developed through the establishment of the FIMI Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (FIMI-ISAC)Footnote 33—a significant step toward building a community-based approach and a network of FIMI defenders with civil society and other stakeholders. The EEAS also published its first report on FIMI threats,Footnote 34 introducing a proposal for a common analytical framework and methodology for governmental and international partners.

Through the EUvsDisinfo campaign, the EEAS continued to denounce Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, reinforce the EU’s support for Ukraine, and provide evidence for additional sanctions against Russian instruments of FIMI and war propaganda. The EUvsDisinfo project reached more than 20 million people. It also contributed to building resilience in partner countries, cooperating with both governments and civil society actors who play a central role in tackling FIMI, including Ukraine and Moldova. To facilitate outreach to the African continent, a dedicated Sub-Saharan Africa StratCom Task Force was created within the EEAS StratCom Directorate. The EEAS also continued its work on countering Chinese information manipulation and interference.

France

In 2023, France’s first public exposure of a pro-Russian information manipulation campaign, “RRN,” also known as “Doppelgänger.” Drawing on a technical report by VIGINUM, the country’s agency for monitoring and protecting against foreign digital interference, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs exposed Russian information operations to undermine support for Ukraine abroad. Public exposure of the ongoing campaign served to strengthen civil society resilience to new campaigns, including efforts to generate fake engagement and stir up controversy over photographs of Stars of David graffiti in Paris. Public exposure also contributed to the implementation of the first EU sanctions against Russian disinformation operators.

In July 2023, VIGINUM organized its first public conference to further strengthen partnerships by bringing together key civil society actors, media and academics to discuss information manipulation and share best practices.

Germany

Foreign interference continues to be one of Germany’s main security and sociopolitical challenges. In 2023, the German federal government reacted to high levels of information manipulation campaigns by establishing a new interagency unit, the Central Office for the Detection of Foreign Information Manipulation. The task of the Central Office is to identify and quantify foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns at an early stage using open-source intelligence. This includes the identification of narratives that are explicitly disseminated in the German information space by social media accounts of foreign actors.

The inter-ministerial task force against disinformation will link the activities of the Central Office with other government units. Under the leadership of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the task force will continue to foster close cooperation in responding to hybrid threats, especially disinformation.

Germany has further intensified its work at the subnational level and continues to share best practices in this field with international partners. The Joint Federal and State Open Working Group on Hybrid Threats focuses on the issue at the municipal and federal state level, while developing a joint action plan for dealing with disinformation.

As part of Germany’s whole-of-society approach, cooperation with civil society to counter foreign interference, including disinformation, was successfully strengthened in 2023. For example, the Federal Ministry of the Interior provided funding to a media literacy project for youth and supported a civic participation project in which citizens developed proposals on how to combat harmful and manipulated content, protect freedom of expression and strengthen the democratic debate.

Italy

In 2023, Italy saw an increase in Russian disinformation narratives about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while also experiencing attacks on democratic principles, institutions, government representatives and media. One such attack was through “typosquatting” domains, also known as URL hijacking, of mainstream Italian newspapers with articles targeting the Italian Prime Minister’s support for Ukraine. In response, and in line with its 2022-2026 National Cybersecurity Strategy, Italy strengthened cooperation and collaboration across ministries to tackle FIMI. In 2023, the Department for Information and Publishing of the Prime Minister’s Office also introduced specific measures to reinforce the fight against disinformation, including provisions for large news agencies providing services to the public administration to establish independent advisers for countering fake news. Italy also increased public awareness and resilience. For example, Italy’s national public broadcaster, RAI, and the Italian Digital Media Observatory promoted an extensive digital education campaign (called “United Against Disinformation”) on television and online to raise public awareness, reaching over 800 million people.

Japan

In July 2023, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, and the associated activities are consistent with international safety standards and that the discharge would have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment. In the period preceding and following the submission of the IAEA report and the commencement of the discharge, misinformation and disinformation emerged in various media outlets and social media. Malign actors used a range of tactics, including: the dissemination of online cartoons designed to incite fear; forged documents to discredit the authenticity of the IAEA report; inauthentic online activities, such as the deployment of bots; and the creation of fake accounts to disseminate and amplify disinformation.

In response, the Government of Japan (GOJ) proactively disseminated information about ALPS-treated water in a transparent manner based on scientific evidence. The GOJ conducted briefings for foreign governments and media outlets, disseminated scientific information online in multiple languages, including through social media posts and short videos, and published rebuttal articles and issued press releases in response to inaccurate media reports or forgeries. By sharing information through videos, infographics and other formats, the GOJ received a considerable amount of positive feedback and encouragement.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom recognizes the threat that FIMI poses to democratic resilience. It has been working to increase its efforts to disrupt state-sponsored FIMI and to ensure the strongest alignment among its closest partners. This has included joint action to expose malign foreign information operations and actors seeking to spread lies and discord to undermine free and open societies, and a special focus to assist Ukraine counter Kremlin disinformation and propaganda seeking to justify an unjustifiable invasion. The U.K. is building global defences against FIMI and promoting societal resilience through enhancing partner governments’ ability to detect and counter FIMI threats across Europe, Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

United States

In 2023, the United States developed and launched the Framework to Counter Foreign State Information Manipulation. The framework seeks to create a shared understanding of the threat of foreign information manipulation and establish a common operating picture from which the U.S., together with its allies and partners, can develop coordinated responses to foreign information manipulation and protect free and open societies. The framework also aims to deepen cooperation among like-minded partners and support the development of resilient, fact-based information ecosystems.

The framework is based on 5 key action areas:

By committing to these 5 key action areas the U.S., with its partners and allies, is working to build societal resiliency to foreign information manipulation.

In addition, the United States has expanded its use of exposure reports to disrupt disinformation campaigns and inform the public about the tactics, techniques and procedures used by countries like Russia and the PRC use to conduct information manipulation. In August 2023, the U.S. State Department’s Global Engagement Center released the landmark report “How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment.” Other exposure reports included analyses of Russian disinformation around the invasion of Ukraine, the Black Sea Grain Initiative, and Russia’s ties to the neo-fascist Nova Resistência group in Brazil.

Australia

In November 2022, the Australian Senate established a Select Committee on Foreign Interference Through Social Media to investigate and report on the risks posed to Australian democracy by foreign interference through social media. The committee’s final report was tabled in August 2023 and included 17 recommendations to mitigate the risks. The report noted that, “Whether we like it or not, social media platforms today are not just the dominant communications channels in modern economies, they constitute the public square for democracies… Foreign authoritarian states know this. They do not permit open and free debates on their own social media platforms. They use ours as a vector for their information operations to shape our decision-making in their national interest—contrary to ours.” Effectively countering foreign interference through social media is therefore one of Australia’s most pressing security challenges.

On December 19, 2023, Chinese-Australian businessman Di Sanh, also known as Sunny Duong, was found guilty of 1 charge of preparing to commit a foreign interference offence contrary to section 92.4 of the Criminal Code Act 1995. This is the first time a person has been found guilty of a foreign interference offence in Australia. Mr. Duong was found guilty of attempting to secretly influence former federal minister Alan Tudge by using a hospital donation to further the aims of the Chinese Communist Party. On February 29, 2024, Mr. Duong was sentenced to 2 years and 9 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 1 year.

New Zealand

In August 2023, New Zealand released a series of national security documents providing an overview of its national security, defence and foreign policy outlook. This included its first unclassified security threat environment report on foreign interference and espionage. New Zealand also released its first National Security Strategy, which highlights core issues for the country’s national security interests, including foreign interference, espionage and disinformation. The documents aim to enhance public understanding of threats to national security and outline plans to address the changing environment. New Zealand is particularly concerned about the effects of foreign interference on its ethnic communities, which are often the most directly affected by these threats. To address this, last year New Zealand launched a 4-year program of engagement with its ethnic communities. New Zealand has also worked to build civil society’s understanding of and resilience to the harms of disinformation.

Sweden

The first half of 2023 was largely shaped by Sweden’s presidency of the Council of the European Union, which involved work across the whole spectrum of foreign malign influence activities and hybrid threats. The EEAS StratCom Task Force Africa was a key result delivered during Sweden’s presidency.

As a result of foreign malign information influence campaigns targeting Sweden, the Swedish government gave new assignments to government agencies in 2023. The tasks aimed to increase resilience abroad to false and misleading narratives and disinformation about Sweden, to actively promote the dissemination of facts in relevant languages, and to make a broad and long-term investment in Sweden to strengthen the media and information literacy of the domestic public. In the long term, the assignments focused on increasing society’s resilience to disinformation and foreign malign information influence activities.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

In 2023, NATO intensified its efforts to counter information threats through increased “pre-bunking” of Russian narratives, including those about Russia’s war against Ukraine, and operationalized its approach through the creation of a new, internal Counter Disinformation Task Force. Analysts from across the organization leverage big data and AI-enabled tools to flag cases of hostile information to the task force, contributing to a comprehensive situational awareness picture for the Alliance. Task force members, in turn, coordinate the most appropriate response options based on synthesized inputs from the information environment assessment, media and intelligence areas.

To build societal resilience, NATO takes a whole-of-society approach. NATO works with journalists, civil society, academics, key opinion leaders, content creators, open-source-intelligence organizations and others. In addition to supporting international efforts, NATO supports local projects. In this way, NATO enhances the resilience of citizens in the long term and bolsters support for both Ukraine and NATO. A key part of NATO’s work in countering disinformation is delivered in Russian. Despite restrictions on the media and on civil society and opposition voices inside Russia, NATO reaches out to selected Russian-speaking audiences both digitally and face-to-face, with a focus on countering information threats about NATO in Russian, and debunking some of the most repeated myths.

The Netherlands

In the Netherlands, 2023 was marked by the rollout and implementation of a government-wide strategy to counter disinformation, which was presented in December 2022. The strategy sets out several lines of action along 2 tracks: 1) strengthening public debate and 2) reducing the impact of disinformation. The Netherlands held parliamentary elections in November 2022. No relevant disinformation campaigns were identified during the elections. The Ministry of the Interior did use X’s Urgent Escalation Channel once due to false reports that risked confusing voters by causing them to cast invalid votes. In November 2023, the Netherlands officially adopted the Response Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats after testing the mechanism in a pilot phase. The framework aims to establish an inter-agency structure to facilitate a whole-of-government approach to countering hybrid threats.

Date modified: