Evaluation of Canada-Haiti Cooperation
2006-2013 - Synthesis Report

January 2015

Acknowledgments

The Development Evaluation Division would like to thank all those who contributed to this evaluation. The Haiti Program team provided invaluable support throughout the process. Many partners in Canada and Haiti contributed, and we would specially thank those that hosted the field missions and facilitated data gathering.

We would like to acknowledge the work of the team of consultants from the firm Goss Gilroy Inc.: Louise Mailloux (who headed the evaluation team), Bruce Goodman, Dean Pallen, Dr. Yuri Zelenski and his assistant Dr. Réginald Réjouis, Dr. Julio Inostroza, Ali Anwer, and Lindsay Renaud, and in Haiti, Jean-Marie Chéry, Jacques Dieudonné, Jean-Luc Adrien, and Dr. Myriam Béliard for her help with logistics.

Thank you to Dr. Stephen Baranyi, Associate Professor from the University of Ottawa, for his expert peer review of the evaluation.

From the Development Evaluation Division, Sandra Gagnon managed the evaluation and supported the drafting process, Tricia Vanderkooy worked on scoping and planning, and Andres Velez-Guerra supervised the evaluation.

James Melanson
Head of Development Evaluation

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Executive Summary

This report^{Footnote 1} presents the findings, conclusions, lessons and recommendations stemming from the evaluation of Canada-Haiti development cooperation for the 2006–2013 period^{Footnote 2}. The evaluation, conducted from May 2013 to March 2014, assessed a sample of 47 out of the 170 projects implemented during the review period, 17 of which were visited in the field.

Context

Haiti is the poorest country in Latin America and the Caribbean, with high levels of inequality. Efforts have been made by donors to promote, among other things, poverty reduction and democratic governance. Development progress, however, has been hindered by a lack of national capacity and leadership, and vulnerability to natural disasters.

The country’s small public sector is, according to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), one of the causes of the deep social inequalities. It is too small, weak and ineffective to provide basic services to the population. Public sector employment in Haiti represents 2.8% of total employment, as opposed to 6.5% to 9% in most developing countries and 17% in OECD countries. Despite low salaries, these jobs account for 40% of public expenditures.

Canada has implemented a whole-of-government strategy in Haiti over the last 10 years. This strategy required close coordination, primarily through the UN, of diplomatic efforts for a comprehensive approach to security, stabilisation, and development. In 2006, Canada committed to investing C$555 million over five years (2006-2011). This commitment focused on four main priorities: fostering sound governance; establishing an open, responsible government; fighting corruption; and strengthening the rule of law.

Between 2006 and 2013, a total of C$1,037,890,229 was disbursed through Canadian cooperation (ex-CIDA) in Haiti, including humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural disasters such as the 2010 earthquake. Since 2009 programming has been focused on four main sectors: sustainable economic growth, health, governance, and basic education.

Conclusions

Based on the sample, the evaluation concludes that, overall, the initiatives Canada supported were relevant and effective.

In the health sector, Canadian cooperation helped Haiti establish a national health policy, reduce maternal and child mortality, and improve coordination between national and international actors. Canada also played a role in sharing knowledge and training national leaders and

decision makers who adopted principles of the Canadian health care system such as universal coverage.

In the education sector, Canadian cooperation helped improve school attendance and student retention rates among both boys and girls, although it could not be determined whether this contribution had an impact on passing and graduation rates. Initiatives to improve management of the education sector should have a positive effect in the long term. However, the evaluation found that there is still much to be done to involve parents and community organizations in school management. Better links between youth vocational training and local labour markets were created. However, while the placement rates for graduates appear satisfactory in the capital, rural economic development efforts must continue in order to generate more jobs for graduates there.

In sustainable economic development, Canada helped build infrastructure in Haiti, which should generate future economic benefits. The program introduced innovations, particularly as part of the municipal integrated planning approach and sustainable agriculture in target areas. A key achievement was implementation of an agricultural insurance and credit system. However, the evaluation found a need for greater focus on agricultural reform, marketing, and support for value chains.

In the food security sector, Canadian cooperation helped introduce micro-credit to encourage small-scale food production with potential for replication on a wider scale. The program also fostered innovative practices (for example, mill engines, used tires for gardening) that have led to a broader range of local agricultural products. Several civil society organizations were supported in improving management of rural agriculture.

In the governance sector, Canadian cooperation made a tangible contribution to increasing universal suffrage and creating a space for exercising civic and fundamental rights. Better access to national identification cards and support for civil society organizations contributed to this. There was some strengthening of the public sector by getting central agencies and the justice system to adopt and use internationally recognized management methods. Effective management practices were established in four municipalities, with potential for replication more widely.

Canadian support helped Haiti to produce its first reports on the human rights situation, in accordance with UN conventions. Strengthening the national police force and supporting MINUSTAH contributed to public safety. These initiatives, combined with support for elections, have led to greater political stability. However, transition to the rule of law remains a challenge. Despite investments, and some progress, it is clear that more work has to be done to reinforce the justice system, and strengthen civil society’s capacity to promote basic human rights and hold government accountable.

Several of the initiatives supported by Canadian cooperation were considered at risk for not sustaining results, particularly in health and education. This is largely due to insufficient funding from the Haitian government to maintain long-term results. Insufficient planning, the absence of a local partner, or its lack of commitment, as well as the lack of a proper strategy for transferring knowledge and skills to national partners are the other main factors that diminished prospects for sustainability.

The evaluation found that Canada-Haiti cooperation has been contributing to progress in the area of gender equality (GE), including the decrease in maternal and child mortality since 2006, and improvement of the attendance and retention rates of both boys and girls at the elementary school level.

Canadian cooperation also helped strengthen women’s roles in rural organizations in the targeted areas. The most successful projects were implemented by large Canadian NGOs. In a number of cases, partnerships between Canadian and Haitian NGOs have bolstered the GE work already under way in local organizations and empowered these organizations to take charge of GE issues.

Some governance sector interventions have given women and young people greater access to the democratic process by raising awareness of human rights and giving Haitians access to the national identity card required to vote and obtain public services. However, the evaluation found that, despite support, little progress was made in increasing GE in state institutions, including Parliament. As well, several projects did not have adequate strategies and/or performance measurement frameworks to measure GE results, including initiatives implemented by the UN. Additional work is needed in these areas.

In the area of environmental sustainability, the evaluation found that in most cases Canadian cooperation followed required environmental assessment standards. The agriculture and food security sectors contributed to some modest results in environmental rehabilitation by raising environmental awareness and introducing green technologies. However major electricity infrastructure and road construction projects, such as the Cayes-Jérémie road project, risk contributing to longer-term negative environmental effects, such as deforestation, if mitigation measures are not followed.

The evaluation revealed performance management deficiencies in all sectors, particularly with respect to baseline data collection and monitoring frameworks. Projects should provide funding for baseline data collection activities, and encourage robust performance management, monitoring and evaluation systems. Financial resources should also be allocated to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation skills of partners in key sectors.

Although there was no overarching strategy for integration of relief, reconstruction and development efforts, there were specific initiatives that took this approach.

In terms of respecting the principles for engagement in fragile states (see Annex K), the evaluation concluded that Canadian cooperation exhibited mixed performance. On the one hand, a number of initiatives helped to strengthen government institutions. On the other, the almost exclusive reliance on executing agencies (the United Nations, the private sector, universities, NGOs and so on), meant the opportunity to strengthen government systems was missed. As well, executing agencies offered salaries and conditions that the Government of Haiti could not match. The Fragile States Principles Monitoring Surveys in Haiti noted that significant differences in salary between local and international staff contributed to movement of qualified staff away from the public sector.

With regard to the principle of acting fast but staying engaged long enough to give success a chance, the evaluation noted that Canada had maintained and increased its involvement in Haiti between 2006 and 2013. Canada demonstrated its ability to act quickly by supporting the holding

of democratic elections on two occasions, providing humanitarian assistance after the January 2010 earthquake, and getting involved in the reconstruction process.

Recommendations

With the current review of Canada’s cooperation in Haiti, and the creation of the amalgamated Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Department, there is an opportunity for renewed direction on the program.

1. DFATD should develop a new country framework taking into account Haitian priorities, and update its sector strategies where future cooperation is anticipated, potentially in sustainable economic growth, education, health and governance.

   Future donor efforts will have to address the weakness of government institutions, their challenges in coordinating large foreign assistance programs, and the need to increase domestic funding flows. The principles for engagement in fragile states that pertain to developing and using country systems should also be taken into consideration.

2. Canadian cooperation should place a particular emphasis on governance and strengthening Haitian institutions. It should also continue to play a role in donor coordination, and building the Haitian Government’s capacity in aid coordination and management.
3. Over time, DFATD (along with other donors) should consider increased use of government systems for their financial assistance. This will depend on the Government of Haiti’s ability to demonstrate that it can transparently and accountably manage such funds. With the aim of making the Haitian State more accountable to its Parliament, its media and its citizens, and to encourage sound management of the State, DFATD should continue to engage in transparency discussions with the Haitian government.

   Sustainability of the benefits of donor investments has been found to be a challenge, by this and other evaluations.

4. In planning its future program, DFATD should ensure that local capacity to absorb and sustain investments is fully considered. Among others, it should, with Haitian and international partners, explore sustainable funding strategies for the recurrent cost of infrastructure and programs.

   The Haitian population and economy remain vulnerable to environmental degradation and recurrent natural disasters. The economic impact of these trends is large, often undermining previous investments.

5. DFATD’s future programming should include emphasis on supporting Haitian efforts to reduce risks from environmental degradation and natural disasters and increase the resilience of populations.

   While there have been some successes, there have also been challenges in addressing gender equality and environmental sustainability in past Canadian assistance.

6. DFATD should focus more on achieving and demonstrating gender equality (GE) and environmental sustainability results. All DFATD programs and projects should take GE and environmental issues into account at the planning and implementation stages, and ensure that results are measured and documented. DFATD and its partners should ensure that projects/programs have sufficient financial and human resources to do so.

   Fragile state principles also suggest that engagement by donors should be long term, incrementally improving local capacities.

7. DFATD should identify from among initiatives that have achieved meaningful results in the past, those that could be put on a more sustainable footing with further modest but strategic support, including technical assistance.
8. Also to consolidate past investments, DFATD should target a portion of its development assistance to specific geographic areas in which it has experience (e.g., Les Cayes–Jérémie corridor and Artibonite) to consolidate local institutions and to pursue reform and decentralization in order to better meet basic needs.

   There is a need for more effective performance management of Canadian assistance in an environment where local capacities are limited. Clarity on results and targets, and monitoring of their achievement, can also support agreed mutual accountability arrangements.

9. DFATD should ensure that all projects, including those implemented by multilateral agencies, have sufficient and functional monitoring and evaluation systems in place. These should allow baseline data to be collected and targets set; regular monitoring to be undertaken, and improvements to be made as needed to ongoing projects

1.0 Introduction

This report presents the findings, conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations stemming from the evaluation of Canada-Haiti cooperation for the 2006–2013 period. Although the Canada-Haiti cooperation includes programs implemented by the former Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), particularly by the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START),^{Footnote 3} and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), this evaluation focuses solely on CIDA programs,^{Footnote 4} as START initiatives were the subject of a separate evaluation.

1.1 Evaluation Rationale, Purpose and Objectives

This section briefly describes the key aspects of the evaluation. For a more detailed description of the approach, refer to Annex A.

1.1.1 Evaluation rationale

The Cooperation between Canada and Haiti was last evaluated in 2002, and an evaluation that had been planned for 2009–2010 was postponed as a result of the earthquake that devastated Haiti in January 2010. It was therefore timely to conduct the present summative evaluation of Canada’s program in Haiti.

1.1.2 Evaluation objectives

Table 1 outlines the evaluation objectives:

• To provide an evidence-based, neutral assessment of the results achieved by the development assistance administered by CIDA in Haiti from 2006–2007 to 2012–2013, based on the established criteria of relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, cross-cutting issues, aid coordination, efficiency/economy, and performance management.
• To support policy and program improvements by helping to identify lessons learned and best practices.
• To assess the extent to which the design, delivery and management of the Haiti program aligns with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations^{Footnote 5}.

1.2 Evaluation Approach and Data Collection Methods

The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the principles, standards and practices outlined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It gathered primary data (mostly qualitative) and secondary data (qualitative and quantitative). Four data collection methods were used: interviews with key stakeholders; a literature and document review; visits to projects in Haiti; and focus groups with beneficiaries (see Annex B for more details on methodology).

The evaluation team conducted a total of 184 interviews with key informants from Canadian government departments involved in cooperation with Haiti, particularly CIDA and DFAIT, Canadian NGOs, and national and international partners including donor countries and the United Nations. Interviews were also conducted with project advisers and monitoring officers. In addition, 32 focus groups, in which nearly 300 people participated, were held with representatives from local partners and target populations (see Annex E).

Structured approaches were put in place to document and synthesize the information gathered. Indicators were developed for each evaluation question, with definitions and a rating scale.

1.2.1 Sampling

The evaluation assessed a sample of 47 of the 170 projects implemented between 2006–2007 and 2012–2013. This sample represented 48% of the total investment, not including humanitarian assistance which was evaluated in 2011–2012. The sampling approach was purposive, not random, as it was based on a number of criteria to ensure that it adequately covered investment and project representativeness, and key programming sectors (health, governance, sustainable economic development, food security, education and the transition from humanitarian assistance to development).

An extensive document review was conducted for all projects in the sample, and the evaluation team visited 17 of them (36% of the sample) in the field. The list of projects that made up the sample is presented in Annex C.

1.3 Evaluation Limitations

1.3.1 Contribution of Canadian assistance

It is always a challenge to attribute results to specific initiatives given the high number of partners involved. As well, in assessing levels of contribution, the financial data required to compare investments from Haiti’s various technical and financial partners (TFPs) was not available. Nonetheless, where results in sectors of Canadian engagement can be observed, relative contribution would be informed by the fact that Canada was the second largest bilateral donor of financial assistance to Haiti between 2006 and 2013 (see Figure 1).

Baseline data had not been collected for the majority of the projects reviewed (especially the older ones) nor had targets been established (e.g., capacity level and average revenue before and after the initiative). In these circumstances, it was difficult to measure with precision the impact on populations, target areas and sectors.

1.3.2 Limited number of projects evaluated

To obtain evidence, the evaluation strategy included a review of project evaluations conducted between 2006 and 2013. Visits to projects were prioritised for those that had not previously been evaluated. This made it possible to gather evidence for 75.5% of the projects in the sample. For the 13 projects in the sample that were not previously evaluated or that were not visited, the evaluation team analyzed the most relevant documents, such as project performance frameworks, follow-up reports and final reports in order to collect the best data possible.

Some of the evaluation criteria (including efficiency, gender equality, and environmental sustainability) and indicators used for this evaluation were not included in the project- evaluations conducted by third parties, or in the reports from implementing agencies. However, overall, the evaluation was able to draw on enough data to draw relevant conclusions.

2.0 Country Context and Information on the Cooperation Program

2.1 Haitian Context

Haiti is the poorest country in Latin America and the Caribbean, with high levels of inequality. Social indicators have declined steadily for more than two decades and, as a result of poor economic performance between 1990 and 2009, the gap between Haiti and the rest of the region has widened. According to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the gross domestic product per capita in 2009 was US$646, about 11% of the average for the region. More than 70% of the population lives on less than US$2 a day, which is three times higher than the regional average of 21%. In terms of human development, the index^{Footnote 6} for Haiti was 0.432 in 2006 and 0.532 in 2009, which is a slight improvement. It dropped following the earthquake, standing at 0.456 in 2012.

Efforts have been made by donors to promote democratic governance; however, there have been challenges with national leadership and sometimes misinformed action by the international community. Strengthening the rule of law also remains problematic. According to the IDB, one of the causes of social inequality is the fact that the public sector in Haiti is too small, weak and ineffective to meet the basic needs of the population, a theme which was echoed in CIDA’s 2011-2012 annual report on the country.

Haiti’s Public Sector

Public sector employment in Haiti represents 2.8% of total employment, as opposed to 6.5% to 9% in developing countries and 17% in OECD countries. Despite low salaries, these jobs account for 40% of Haiti’s public expenditure. Moreover, the large discrepancy in salaries and benefits compared with UN bilateral agencies and NGOs is contributing to the loss of qualified staff from the public sector.

The majority of basic health and education services in Haiti are delivered privately – through both the charitable and private sectors – rather than by the Government of Haiti. Despite efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Haitian public sector in the past two decades, procedures for public financial management and internal rules on the accountability of public funds remain weak. Consequently, many donors have not used the Haitian government’s financial systems in their interventions. Prior to the earthquake, only 23% of funding to strengthen Haiti’s public sector was channelled through government financial systems, while the remaining 77% was channelled via multilateral organizations, NGOs, project implementation units or as technical advisors.^{Footnote 7}

Haitian Diaspora Contribution to Development

According to estimates, the Haitian diaspora accounts for approximately four million Haitians scattered throughout the world (about 40% of the current population of Haiti, with 2.5 million located in North America). Three quarters of them come from the Haitian intelligentsia that left Haiti during the dictatorship from 1964 to 1986 and in the years of political instability that followed. According to estimates, the contribution of the diaspora amounts to 31% of Haiti’s GDP. In fact, the restoration of remittances services to Haiti was seen for the first time as a critical part of disaster relief and response^{Footnote 8}.

Natural Disasters

Fragile infrastructure, environmental degradation, and weak government institutions combined with serious fiscal problems led to increased population vulnerability to natural disasters. This was demonstrated during the 2004 hurricane season, when tropical storm Jeanne killed 3,000 people, and in 2008, when tropical storm Fay and hurricanes Gustav, Hanna and Ike caused damage totalling approximately $900 million, which is equivalent to about 15% of Haiti’s GDP.

On January 12, 2010, an earthquake devastated Haiti. It struck Port-au-Prince, the country’s capital, destroying much of the infrastructure, including several government buildings. The earthquake killed 217,300 people, injured 300,000 and displaced a further 1.5 million. The death toll included many Haitian government and UN representatives, killing approximately 20% of public servants in Haiti. The country’s main port became unusable, and the presidential palace, Parliament and courts were destroyed, along with administrative, governmental and public buildings. As well, 105,000 homes were completely destroyed and more than 208,000 were damaged.

The earthquake also destroyed the equivalent of 120% of GDP and helped wipe out a decade of efforts to reduce poverty. The earthquake brought the entire economy to a standstill and has exacerbated poverty and vulnerability of the entire population of Haiti. The private sector has been particularly hard hit, suffering damage and loss of about $ 5.7 billion, estimated at 70 percent of the total. As a result, economic output declined by 5.4 percent during fiscal year 2010.^{Footnote 9}

Moreover, insecurity became a major concern following the earthquake. Infrastructure and police equipment were damaged or destroyed, and the police saw many of their officers killed or injured by the earthquake. Increased insecurity coupled with weakened judicial institutions led Haitian citizens to mistrust the national justice system and to approve authorities acting at the margin of the law to address the increasing criminality in municipalities affected by the earthquake^{Footnote 10}.

International Dialogue and Aid Coordination

There have been intense efforts over a number of years to coordinate the engagement of the international community with Haiti in both political dialogue and development assistance.  Among others, Canada has played an active role in major conferences in Washington (2004 and 2005), New York (2010) and Montreal (2010). In 2013, Minister Fantino chaired a meeting in Washington, bringing together major donors and representatives of the Government of Haiti, to discuss how to better coordinate efforts and increase transparency and development results in Haiti. High level bilateral missions, and efforts to influence and engage multilateral institutions and their investments in Haiti, have also featured in Canada’s overall engagement with Haiti.

The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was established in the months following the earthquake to help strengthen coordination of the recovery efforts. The IHRC was co-presided by the Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive and the Special Envoy from the United Nations, Bill Clinton. Upon expiration of the IHRC’s mandate in October 2011, responsibility of coordinating donors was taken over by the Government of Haiti. In 2013, the Haitian Government created the Cadre de coordination de l’aide externe au développement (CAED), which is now in charge of coordinating international assistance based on the government’s Strategic Plan for the Development of Haiti (PSDH).

International Assistance

In the 20 years preceding the earthquake, international assistance in Haiti fluctuated. However, between 2006 and 2010, a progressive increase in international cooperation can be observed (see Figure 1). During this period, Canada was the second largest bilateral donor of financial assistance after the United States.

The pre-earthquake funding over the 2004-2009 period also saw a shift in international financing from loans to grants, the application of debt relief and the introduction of budget support averaging $60.5 million USD per year.  

Of the humanitarian financing committed by the international community response to the earthquake, 40% was provided as in-kind donation of goods and services, while only 1% was provided directly to the Government of Haiti. The majority of funding was allocated to national civil and military disaster response units, the UN and its executing partners, as well as international NGOs and private contractors^{Footnote 11}.

After the earthquake, an estimated $13.34 billion was allocated by multilateral and bilateral donors for relief and recovery efforts in Haiti. By 2012, 48% of this amount had been disbursed, the majority of recipients being NGOs. In 2010, international assistance was 4 times higher than the Haitian government’s internal revenue.

Role of NGOs

Non-governmental organisations played a major role in donor efforts in Haiti over the 2006–2013 period. For Canada, they were important for the humanitarian response to natural disasters, and large NGOs such as CECI, Oxfam-Québec and Development and Peace were active in sustainable economic development, agriculture and food security, entrepreneurship development, and management capacity building for community organizations and local governance bodies.

2.2 Canadian Cooperation in Haiti

Canada’s commitment of $555M over five years (2006-2011) focused on four main priorities: fostering sound governance; establishing an open, responsible government; fighting corruption; and strengthening rule of law. This investment represented a 600% increase from 2000, with the amount of assistance rising from $20M in 2002-2003 to approximately $100M annually starting in 2005–2006. An additional commitment of $400M over two years (2010-2012) was made for supporting the reconstruction efforts after the earthquake in January 2010.

Canada has implemented a whole-of-government strategy in Haiti. This has required close coordination and a comprehensive approach, including through the UN, of diplomatic efforts for security, development and stabilization in Haiti. In order to address security and justice issues, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) dedicated over $80M to stabilization projects in Haiti. Other participating departments included the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

For CIDA, bilateral cooperation was the most frequently used funding mechanism, except after the January 2010 earthquake, when multilateral agencies played a lead role in responding to the humanitarian crisis. Following the earthquake, the Minister of International Cooperation announced that Canada would match individual donations to registered Canadian charitable organizations to support humanitarian and early recovery assistance to Haiti. In total, $238 million in donations were matched by the Canadian Government through the CIDA-managed Haiti Earthquake Relief Fund. As of March 31, 2013, CIDA had allocated all these funds to 40 different Canadian and international humanitarian and development organizations working in Haiti to increase the resources for their programming. ^{Footnote 12}

Figure 3 below shows total disbursements between 2006-2007 and 2012-2013 by area of intervention, including humanitarian assistance, which represents 21% of the total Canadian cooperation during the period.

3.0 Key Findings

This section presents key findings for program effectiveness in health, education, economic growth, food security and governance. Reconstruction issues came under various sectors (e.g., school construction and rehabilitation falls under education).

3.1 Canadian Cooperation Strategies in Haiti 2006 to 2013

In 2006, the Canadian assistance program set its priorities based on the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) of the Haitian government. This interim strategy was based on three pillars: (1) governance and state-building (governance and democracy); (2) access to basic services (health, education and basic infrastructure); (3) social peace and critical needs (infrastructure, delivery of services and nutrition).

In 2009, the program began to develop a new programming framework, with the objective of contributing to Haiti’s prosperity, resilience and stability. A country strategy was approved in December 2009, focusing on securing the future of children and youth, and promoting sustainable economic growth. Democratic governance, gender equality, and environmental sustainability were integrated as crosscutting themes. However, implementation of the strategy was interrupted by the earthquake of 2010.

Following the earthquake, Canada reviewed its programming to ensure that it reflected the priorities of the country's early recovery, reconstruction and development. To help the country get back on its feet, Canada supported numerous humanitarian assistance, rapid recovery and reconstruction projects between 2010 and 2013. Programming was also aimed at strengthening public institutions, democratic participation, and consolidation of security and stability, based on a Canadian whole-of-government approach.

In January 2013, the Minister of International Cooperation announced that Canada would continue to support the initiatives underway in Haiti, but that no new ones would be approved before a review of Canada’s strategy was completed.

3.2 Health

3.2.1 Main challenges in the health sector

Disparities in access to health care between Haiti’s departments and between rural and urban populations are striking. For example, the population outside of Port-au-Prince (63%) is served by just 33% of the country’s health professionals. Health facilities are generally underfunded (lack of equipment, medication, etc.) and are under-used^{Footnote 13}.

Given the low level of national health spending (8% of the national budget), over 90% of the funding for the Haitian health care system comes from donor countries. Moreover, the lack of reliable national statistical data is a persistent barrier to strategic planning, health program monitoring and decision making.

With respect to the already fragile health care system, the effect on infrastructure was particularly acute: 60% of hospitals (more than 50 hospitals) were damaged or destroyed and the main building of the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP) collapsed. In addition, the displacement of people greatly increased the pressure on health institutions in departments outside the areas directly affected. The cholera epidemic that followed the earthquake further burdened a health care system already operating at full capacity. One of the responses of CIDA following the earthquake was to give 85% of the affected population access to treatment against cholera or to cholera treatment centers (2010-2011).

3.2.2 Strategies in the health sector

Canada’s main investments in the health care sector in Haiti were directed towards maternal and child health care ($33M),^{Footnote 14} the improvement of the national and departmental management of the health care system ($30M), the rebuilding of the La Providence Hospital in Gonaïves ($29.25M), the fight against HIV/AIDS ($20M), and immunization ($15M).

Since 2006, Canada has provided direct support for the reform of the health care sector by prioritizing the central and departmental level through projects focused on governance, collaboration on the development of strategic plans, strengthening the health system, and capacity building to better address the health care needs of target populations in the Artibonite, Nippes, Sud-Est and Nord-Est departments.

The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) and the MSPP developed an interim plan for the health care sector to address the situation after the earthquake, which Canada supported. The provision for damaged or destroyed infrastructure was added to the priorities identified above.

3.2.3 Effectiveness

Finding: Canada contributed to strengthening the health care system and reducing maternal and child mortality and morbidity through its support for health access and quality. This allowed Haiti to make progress on reducing maternal and child mortality and increasing immunization coverage between 2006 and 2013.

Finding: Canada played an active role in knowledge sharing and the training of a new generation of national leaders and decision-makers who adopted principles of the Canadian health care system, such as universal coverage.

Finding: Canadian cooperation contributed modestly to treating and providing access to drinking water in target areas by rehabilitating the water supply, educating the public and improving sanitation.

According to the data available at the time of the evaluation, maternal and child mortality rates continued to decline between 2006 and 2013, a result to which Canada contributed (see Table 2). For example, maternal mortality fell from 410 to 350 per 100,000 births from 2005 to 2010,^{Footnote 15} while child mortality decreased from 90.5 to 75.6 per 1,000 births from 2005 to 2012.^{Footnote 16} These results are due in part to the efforts of many partners to improve access to quality care, particularly maternal and child health care.

Source: Maternal Mortality Estimation Inter-agency Group, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank

Source: UNICEF 2013

Access to health services and care

According to multiple lines of evidence, at least 2.2 million additional women, men and children had access to better care in the four target departments, particularly for maternal and child health care. This increase in the rate of use of maternal and child health services can be attributed to factors such as the removal of financial obstacles (e.g., provision of free obstetrical and gynaecological care), proximity of care (e.g., more maternal health centres in rural areas) and an increased supply of specialized care.

Most of the initiatives supported by Canada saw increases of between 30% and 59% in user rates for maternal and child health services at the targeted health establishments. Furthermore, 22 new institutions providing free obstetrical care were created, boosting the number of institutions from 41 in 2006 to 72 in 2011. A total of approximately 330,000 additional women in the Nippes and Sud-Est departments had access to deliveries attended by qualified personnel, representing 4% of the population. However, the evaluation revealed that the obstetrical services usage rate in the target areas varied between establishments depending on the local literacy rate and socio-economic profile, and the availability and quality of personnel in the health establishments.

The evaluation found that the Support Project to Combat Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs) and HIV/AIDS in Haiti (PALIH II) contributed to educating nearly one million people about various aspects of STI and HIV/AIDS prevention in the department of Artibonite. Nevertheless, the project did not demonstrate that it had an impact on reducing STI/HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the department of Artibonite. On the other hand, the PALIH II project allowed local Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP) structures to rapidly detect the cholera epidemic that followed the earthquake and to quickly alert Haitian authorities.

As for immunization, the Expanded Vaccination Program Support Initiative (PAPEV) forecasted a coverage rate of over 80% for the Bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG), Polio, Varicella (VAR) and Diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis (DTPer) antigens. In spite of the earthquake and the cholera epidemic, which weighed heavily on the health care system, the fifth survey of mortality, morbidity, and use of services (EMMUS V),^{Footnote 17} which was conducted in 2012, showed an improvement in immunization coverage nationally since the 2006 survey. The EMMUS V data indicates that the immunization rate went from 75% to 83% for BCG, from 52% to 59% for Polio, and from 53% to 63% for DTPer. The proportion of children with no immunization fell from 10% to 7% between 2006 and 2012.^{Footnote 18}

Access to drinking water and sanitation

Access to drinking water, sanitation and hygiene education was a priority identified in the 2006 Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) and the CIDA strategy until 2009. CIDA investments did contribute modestly to improving access to drinking water and sanitation, especially through the construction of latrines and public education about hygiene practices in certain target areas.

For example, in Léogâne, the Save the Children project equipped every affiliated health centre with toilets, sanitation, waste disposal and water treatment systems and provided health education for health professionals. Collaboration between local and international partners has provided 80% of the population in three rural communities of Léogâne with access to drinking water and basic sanitation since 2012.

Another project (Viva Rio project) has provided sixty thousand people in the Bel-Air community, a poor neighbourhood in Port-au-Prince, with nearby access to drinking water since 2011 at nine locations (water points) in the community. Modern sewage and sanitation systems with latrines, drainage and waste disposal were installed in the new La Providence Hospital in Gonaïves. Also, because of the cholera epidemic in Artibonite, health workers and the surrounding population received health education in order to decrease the possibility of future epidemics.

Quality of health services

Canadian cooperation also helped the Haitian government introduce management tools at the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP), set up a health training program, and improve the skills of medical personnel and health managers.

For example, the Health System Development Project (PADESS) assisted the MSPP to formulate a new national health policy. The contribution of PADESS to strategic discussions about the health care system was pivotal in developing this shared vision for the health sector among stakeholders, while at the same time strengthening the regulatory role of the MSPP.

The Health Management Capacity Building Support Project (PARC) allowed 117 health managers (59 women and 58 men) to undergo three years of training at the University of Montreal and receive a specialized graduate degree (DESS). In addition, Canadian cooperation allowed more than 150 health managers (45% women) to obtain a master’s degree in health management. Eighty-four (84) percent are still in their positions. The DESS program was actually taken over by the Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy (FMP) at the State University of Haiti (UEH) thanks to substantial support from PARC and the faculty of the University of Montréal.

Support from PALIH II has resulted in improved management methods in the Artibonite Health Department (DSA), and the establishment of a referral system for clients. In turn, this has allowed community organizations to acquire new skills and practices in the provision of services. For example, a referral system was set up linking community organizations to providers of health care or other relevant social services, particularly in the case of abused women. In 2009, 17 preventive programs were implemented for individuals at high risk of contracting sexually transmitted infections and HIV/AIDS.

This progress went beyond the STI/HIV/AIDS framework to encompass management of the entire Artibonite health care system. When the project ended, Artibonite was the only department covered by a partially functional network of public health units (PHUs) equipped with an integrated health development plan meeting national standards and guidelines.

In reproductive health, the joint UNFPA-UNICEF-PAHO^{Footnote 19} project contributed to improving the quality of targeted obstetrical services through the training of health professionals and the building, refurbishment and equipping of health establishments. The project also covered the salaries of key local personnel so free care could be provided.

Through the Health and Education Fund, 56 health institutions now provide all five care components^{Footnote 20} of the essential care package (ECP)^{Footnote 21} for the target populations in 28 communes. However, the evaluation found that, because of limitations such as lack of qualified human resources, absence of standard procedures, weaknesses in governance, and lack of financial support, the MSPP has not been able to control quality and compliance with national standards and regulations.

3.3 Education

3.3.1 Main challenges in the education sector

The education system has long been grappling with problems of access, quality and governance. According to the latest school census (2011)^{Footnote 22}, only 20% of the supply comes from the public education sector. The rest is in the hands of the private sector. A 2010 Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training (MENFP) report estimated the illiteracy rate in Haiti at over 30% of the population (3 million), of whom 52% were women. In 2012, over 500,000 children between the ages of 6 and 12 were still waiting to attend school. The percentage of Haiti’s national budget allocated to education dropped from 17% to 10% between 2001 and 2010, with 20% of education-related expenditures reaching the rural areas that have 70% of the country’s population.

In the education sector, 80% of school infrastructure (over 1,300 educational institutions) was destroyed or became unusable in Port-au-Prince and the headquarters of the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training (MENFP) was demolished^{Footnote 23}. Casualties amounted to approximately 40.000 students and 1,350 teachers. Similar to the health sector, the displacement of people significantly increased the pressure on the education system in the departments outside the areas directly affected.

3.3.2 Strategies in the education sector

Between 2006 and 2013, Canada supported a number of education initiatives aimed at improving school access and retention by providing food ($66.6M), supporting for the Ministry of Education to ensure school resumption ($26.2M), and providing loans and subsidies through the United Nations Education for All initiative ($15M). Other support was directed to strengthening school system management capacity and teacher training ($26M), including nearly $10M for the vocational training system, $6.6M for school and classroom reconstruction/rehabilitation, $3.7M to support the family credit program, and $6M for other activities.

3.3.3 Effectiveness

Finding: Canadian cooperation contributed to improving the school attendance and retention rate for girls and boys in the target areas, although the extent of this contribution in terms of increased passing and graduation rates could not be determined. According to the preliminary findings of the Demographic and Health Survey in Haiti (2013), 77% of children aged between 6 and 11 years attended primary school in 2012, compared with a little less than 50% in 2005–2006.

Finding: Canadian cooperation helped lay some important groundwork for potential improved basic education outcomes. This included improving infrastructure, and introducing and implementing internationally recognized pedagogical and management methods in teacher and manager training programs at various levels.

However, it remains to be seen whether these reforms will be systemic and sustained. Moreover, the evaluation found little evidence that the community involvement and engagement strategies used by the education projects helped improve the management of educational establishments. Rather than actually being incorporated into education management practices, these were sometimes observed as a formality.

Primary education: Access, retention and graduation

The evaluation found that the Program contributed to increasing school access and retention rates for girls and boys in the target areas, particularly girls. This result was achieved through the provision of credits, scholarships, school supplies and meals, and the construction and rehabilitation of school facilities. For example, between 2006 and 2012, the Credit for School Fees, Batilavi and Education for All projects granted nearly 176,000 loans or scholarships. One meal a day was provided for at least 300,000 children each year under the School Feeding Program.

However, it is not possible to ascertain whether the Canada-Haiti Program directly impacted passing and graduation rates. Only one of the projects reviewed gathered reliable data about passing rates. The Credit for School Fees project allowed 9,944 children to attend school after its inception in 2008 [57.6% girls (5,728) and 42.4% boys (4,216)]. According to CIDA’s Management Summary Report, after the first four years of the project, the data showed that more than 98% of children whose parents obtained education loans stayed in school and their passing rate was 83%, compared with the national average of 60%.

Better pedagogical and management practices

Most of the projects involved training, and aimed to improve pedagogical practices and education management in target regions. The Health and Education Fund II project, for example, strengthened the pedagogical skills of 4,650 teachers based on in the detailed MENFP curriculum. The Haiti Vocational Training Centre (CFPH CANADO) project enabled a technical and vocational training institute for teachers to adopt a skills-based approach (SBA) to improve the match between training and labour market requirements.

The evaluation nevertheless found that, for some projects, there was not enough time to implement the new processes and management tools, and for others (e.g., CFPH CANADO), it will take a few years for these practices to be incorporated into day-to-day operations.

Community involvement/engagement in managing educational establishments

Involvement by parents and community organizations in the local school system was an anticipated outcome to improve accountability with respect to financial management and quality of education in schools. Most of the projects reviewed for this evaluation did not make much progress in this regard. The evaluation found that collaboration varied in depth and consistency and did not entail actual participation in management. For example, the evaluation of the Education for All project revealed that though subsidies were provided for more than 85,700 children in order to involve parents in eight departments, those parents knew almost nothing about the subsidy mechanism and did not feel it was their place to examine school budgets and expenditures.

Ties between youth training and the labour market

Some projects were designed to create or strengthen ties between youth training and the local labour market in order to foster economic development. Despite a promising placement rate in Port-au-Prince, finding employment for graduates in rural areas once they have been trained continues to present a major challenge without greater regional development.

3.4 Economic Growth and Food Security

3.4.1 Main challenges in the economic growth and food security sector

In spite of the Haitian government’s goal to produce 60% of the staple food crops required to meet national food requirements, Haiti relies heavily on food imports. This dependence is due to a number of factors including inadequate regulation, weakness of infrastructure and the lack of markets for local products. It is difficult for consumers in Haiti to obtain good-quality basic foodstuffs.

Since the world food crisis in 2008, there has been a more concerted effort to combat the underlying causes that created Haiti’s dependence on food imports. Stimulating increased agricultural output, both for consumption and as a driver of economic growth, has become a priority for donor countries and the Haitian government.

3.4.2 Strategies in the economic growth and food security sector

Since 2006, the main initiatives supported by Canada have included the building of roads, including the one from Jérémie to Les Cayes in the country’s south and southwest ($75 million) and other infrastructure such as municipal buildings and health centres ($29.5 million), along with various socio-economic development initiatives ($32 million). On food security, Canada has provided approximately $21.5 million for World Bank loans to Haiti, $12.8 million for agricultural projects, and $19 million for agriculture insurance and credit.

3.4.3 Effectiveness

In the area of economic growth:

Finding: The program supported the construction of major economic infrastructure in Haiti, which should facilitate economic growth in the future. However in some cases project implementation and monitoring arrangements should have been stronger. The program also contributed to introducing innovations in economic development in target zones and to improving agricultural production practices through technological innovations.

In the area of food security:

Finding: Canadian cooperation contributed to the introduction of micro-credit to encourage small-scale food production, with potential for wider replication; and to better access and more diverse agricultural products and management practices in rural organizations. The program introduced innovations and targeted training in sustainable food production with long-term potential to increase output. However, better measurement of change in production and household income that result from interventions is needed.

A more productive, more sustainable agricultural sector

According to the available data, rural community support and agricultural projects increased agricultural output through the introduction of new agricultural inputs, new transformation technologies^{Footnote 24}, new agricultural techniques and access to agricultural credit. The management of several local NGOs and civil society organizations was strengthened. Unfortunately, very few projects directly measured the increase in agricultural output, let alone the number of families whose economic status was improved by producing more and selling surpluses, except anecdotally (for example in focus groups with farmers).

The credits granted by the Agricultural Financing and Insurance Systems in Haiti (SYFAAH-DID) project, which is recognized as having potential for national replication, allowed approximately 25,000 women to carry on income-generating production or commercial activities and has had direct impacts on the quality of life of children and families. However, the networks’ impact on poverty is not being maximized because a large share of savings remains unproductive and because the networks engage few outside resources to generate more credit, which is critical to increasing economic activity.

Based on interviews and focus groups, the development of better business practices and networks of entrepreneurs should be encouraged. Production technology and processes also need to be improved, in terms of both cost-effectiveness and environmental sustainability. The expansion of value chains should be fostered. In addition, agricultural reform is needed and the government of Haiti should assume its role in improving regulation for small Haitian producers and the private sector.

Food security

All of the projects in the agricultural sector and most of the micro-credit projects and family gardens that were examined contributed to improving access to food and local consumption. For example, some projects such as Food Security Support had exceeded the objectives by 54% in terms of the number of vegetable gardens established. According to the data gathered for the Pro-Huerta project in several departments, the gardens’ implementation success rates were as follows: Nord, 70%; Artibonite, 60%; Centre, 70%; Ouest, 60% and Nord-Est, 65%. Once again, the lack of baseline data and adequate monitoring systems limited the ability to determine the extent of the changes to food security in the target zones.

Infrastructure development

The evaluation concluded that the three projects that had key infrastructure components (Les Cayes-Jérémie Road, Jacmel Technical Assistance Project-Phase III, Local Development Program), should lead to broader development. For example, a number of informants had positive opinions about the impact of the Les Cayes-Jérémie Road on economic development in the region. At the time of the evaluation, local businesses were beginning to replace transportation of goods via river boat, which is less reliable, with more practical vehicle transport.

However, infrastructure projects carry implementation risks, and require capacity on the part of a funding agency to intervene if necessary. It is not clear that CIDA had this capacity during the period under review. For example, Les Cayes-Jérémie Road, for which CIDA provided a $75 million grant to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB),^{Footnote 25}encountered a series of coordination and communication problems between the project partners. Moreover, the contracting process lacked a clear mandate for selecting the executing agency, which had a negative impact on implementation. The Brazilian construction company that won the contract worked without any appropriate performance indicators and with a lack of supervision by the IDB. Because of these problems, CIDA staff had to intervene and pay closer attention than usually required for a grant to a multilateral organization in order to help rectify the situation. It is too early to determine if the corrective actions rectified these issues.

The implementation of these projects has shown that good monitoring and reinforcement of local capacity is needed to avoid negative unintended results such as deforestation and soil degradation.

3.5 Governance

3.5.1 Main challenges in the governance sector

The weak capacity of government institutions to provide essential services reinforces the structural obstacles to development (poor infrastructure, inadequate access to basic services, unemployment, poverty, social inequality), all factors that kept Haiti stuck in a vicious circle of anarchy and violence for many years. This led to the establishment in 2004 of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which is still in place in 2013.

Elite interests have at times impeded efforts to strengthen the rule of law and promote inclusive economic growth. There is an excessive concentration of political, economic and even socio-cultural activities in the metropolitan area around the capital. Corruption also hampers the effectiveness of the Haitian government and casts doubt on its legitimacy.

Two presidential elections took place since 2006. These electoral processes were problematic and required the international community to intervene in order to resolve disputes. The decentralization announced in the 1987 Constitution remains at the embryonic stage, without any real national coordination or dialogue. Local elections had still not been held at the time of the evaluation and mayors were being appointed by the central government.

3.5.2 Strategies in the governance sector

Canadian cooperation invested roughly $120 million in the governance sector in Haiti between 2006 and 2013, approximately 14% of total disbursement for this period. Support for elections accounted for approximately $33 million; public administration and Parliament totalled $50 million; civil society $20 million; municipal development $13 million; and the justice sector $4 million.

The priorities for Canadian cooperation in the governance sector between 2006 and 2013 were: (1) strengthening the government’s central institutions including the public finance management system; (2) consolidating democratic structures to support electoral processes and strengthen civil society as a key player in Haiti’s democratic system; and (3) reinforcing the rule of law, specifically the modernization and implementation of a legal framework and implementation of legislation dealing with the judiciary. There were also efforts aimed at strengthening the regulatory, planning and coordination role of the Ministry of Justice and Public Safety, and at creating a professional and accountable policing structure able to adequately respond to the security and civic order needs of the Haitian population.

3.5.3 Effectiveness

Finding: The program helped improve governance structures through administrative reforms of central and municipal institutions, and encouraged citizen participation in national elections. However, sustainability of central and municipal reforms results is not assured.

Finding: Despite investments, and some progress, it is clear that more work has to be done to reinforce the justice system, and strengthen civil society’s capacity to promote basic human rights and hold the government accountable.

Strengthening the government’s central institutions

Canadian support has led to major reforms of Haiti’s Parliamentary procedures. Although the sustainability of the Parliament’s Secretariat and the Chamber of Deputies’ Secretariat was not assured following Canadian involvement, the Support to the Haitian Parliamentproject nevertheless helped the executive and legislative branches produce the first legislative agenda in Haiti’s history. It also led to the development of a guide to parliamentary and legislative procedures. The project provided technical support for the drafting and analysis of essential legislation for the Haitian legislature and government, including a draft customs code. It also contributed to the adoption of amended electoral legislation, the 2009–2010 Budget Act, the Responsible Paternity Act, and an act that imposed a 30% quota for women in the public service.

Canada has supported the reform of human resources management in the public sector through the promulgation of a series of orders and by strengthening collaboration between ministries. The Modernization of Haiti’s Civil Registry project enabled the civil registry to automate procedures, issue national identification cards (NICs) and maintain birth registries. These changes constitute a major step forward for Haiti’s public administration.

The Public Sector Management Support Project (PARGEP) resulted in strengthening the organization and operation of the Office of Management and Human Resources (OMRH), specifically the procedures and terms and conditions for organizing recruiting competitions leading to jobs in the public service.

There was also identifiable success in municipal development, where the Municipal Cooperation Project (PCM) implemented new administrative procedures in four targeted municipalities in Les Palmes region (Gressier, Léogâne, Petit-Goâve, and Grand-Goâve) and Port-au-Prince. Summary urban development plans and record management systems were developed by municipal employees. The project was particularly effective in the creation of the Les Palmes Intermunicipal Administrative and Technical Directorate. The four municipalities of Les Palmes successfully adopted and introduced the inter-municipal model, which enabled them to jointly implement services for citizens that they could not have delivered individually.

The model of the Les Palmes Intermunicipal Administrative and Technical Directorate was being studied by the Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Communities in order to improve legislation on decentralization in Haiti at the time of the evaluation. However, another project of the Nord-Est Department Local Governance Support (AGLNE), implemented by a UN agency, was disappointing in terms of the fostering decentralization processes in Haiti. The production of local development plans (LDPs) became an end in itself, without any link to the participatory planning process and the essential budgeting exercise.

Consolidation of democratic structures

Almost all of the governance projects that Canada has supported have helped to strengthen either universal suffrage or the principles of democratic participation.

The Support in Implementing the Interim Cooperation Framework (AMOCCI) project contributed to the success of the presidential and legislative elections held in 2006. More than 560,000 people were added to the voters’ list, accounting for 92% of the adult population (18 years and over). The training documents, information sessions and framework document for Permanent Electoral Council members and the political parties resulted in fewer contested results during the municipal elections.

The National Identification Office (ONI) became a key player in the Haitian elections because of the Modernization of Haiti’s Civil Registryproject. Its 141 offices issued 5,083,581 national identification cards (NICs) to Haitian citizens of voting age, 90% of the eligible population. Since the 2006 presidential election, the ONI has provided the Electoral Council with the required statistical information to support the development of a voters’ list for five separate electoral processes. One of the most important achievements of this project is that an increased number of women understand their rights and want to obtain their national identification card.

In addition, the Joint OAS-CARICOM Electoral Observation Mission, which took place during the Haitian elections from August 2010 to May 2011, helped hold relatively credible, impartial and transparent presidential and legislative elections, despite the country’s numerous economic problems.

The work of Rights and Democracy (R&D)^{Footnote 26} contributed to raising the profile of human rights in Haiti. It improved capacity among civil society organizations in the area of gender rights and gender equality. As a result, several civil society organizations improved their advocacy and management techniques (e.g., strategic plans, project monitoring, and investigation of human rights violation cases). Organizations such as Rights and Democracy also obtained significant results in terms of increased knowledge of human rights, specifically for women and children, and increased participation of populations in the democratic process.

Strengthening the rule of law

Among the program’s positive results was the fact that it raised the profile of human rights by moving this responsibility for this issue from the Committee of Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister’s Office. Training in advocacy techniques and support from Canada’s Rights and Democracy experts helped the Ombudsman’s Office (OPC), which continues to be supported by the Deployment for Democratic Development mechanism, to produce its first report on the human rights situation in accordance with the UN conventions that the country has ratified. The report is available each year on the UN website.^{Footnote 27}

Canada also supported the training and mentoring of police officers during the evaluation period. A project to build a national police academy for the training of inspectors and commissioners is currently being planned. This project will replace the temporary police school project, which has trained hundreds of Haitian policeman. However, support to the Ministry of Justice did not achieve the expected results. Despite the implementation of an intervention plan, supported by Canadian cooperation, the Ministry of Justice had difficulty assuming its sector coordination role, which impeded progress.

In addition, support from the Intergovernmental Agency of La Francophonie for the penal system, which was expected to have led to a significant drop in preventive detentions, did not achieve the expected results and few changes were recorded in this area.

3.6 Contribution of NGOs and the Private Sector to Achieving Results

NGOs received about $145M from CIDA, or about 17% of the development assistance budget between 2006 and 2013. This amount does not include humanitarian assistance and the consortia of private and public institutions receiving funding (e.g. city, universities, credit union, etc.). It should be noted that two community initiatives were implemented by Latin American NGOs for about $10M. In addition, local NGO community development initiatives were supported through Local Funds ($49M), approximately 6% of the development assistance budget.

However, according to various sources, when initiatives were aimed at reforming central government institutions or public administration or were very large-scale, other actors were more likely to respond to particular needs: for example, the University of Montréal in health care sector reform, the WFP for School Feeding, the World Bank for Education for All and debt management, the IDB for building the Les Cayes-Jérémie Road, UNOPS for building La Providence aux Gonaïves Hospital.

Private companies, including Développement international Desjardins (DID) and Canadian consulting firms received approximately $50M, or 6% of the development assistance budget. A substantial portion of that funding was used to develop a savings, insurance and credit system to support agricultural production and local entrepreneurship and enable some families to send their children to school (Credit for School Fees).

3.7 Flexibility of funding mechanisms

Following the earthquake, CIDA demonstrated considerable flexibility in redirecting funding and developing mechanisms to respond to the situation. The Local Funds were redirected to meet the immediate needs of the people in the areas affected by the earthquake. In addition, the Bilateral Program and PWCB implemented reconstruction projects that initially were not part of country programming (see Annex I).

Local funds were often implemented by Haitian NGOs and supported by Canadian NGOs to meet specific local needs. These initiatives did not require large financial amounts. This helped build the governance and management capacities of Haitian NGOs. Ultimately, although these projects were aligned with Haiti’s priorities and there appeared to be no doubt as to their value for the targeted communities, CIDA determined that they were too small and scattered to have a significant aggregated impact.

4.0 Development results

4.1 Relevance

Finding: Canada’s programming was aligned with the priorities identified in the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2007-2010), the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti (March 2010) and statements by the Martelly government (2011) for each sector supported. The program was also aligned with the development priorities of the Government of Canada.

Finding: Very few donors opted to provide government institutions with on-budget support. In terms of the Fragile States Principle of focusing on state-building as the central objective, this meant missing an opportunity to strengthen the Haitian government system.

The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review of Canada noted in 2007 that “Canada’s strategic orientations in Haiti are in line with the priority concerns of the new government and with Canada’s foreign policy objectives in an environment that is considered both insecure and fragile from a political, economic and social point of view.”

All of the projects reviewed were relevant or very relevant to the needs of the Haitian population and the direction of the Haitian government. Document review, interviews, and focus group discussions confirmed that Canada’s priorities and initiatives were aligned with both Haiti’s national priorities and those of the Canadian government.

For example, large-scale projects such as PADESS,^{Footnote 28} PARC,^{Footnote 29} PAPEV^{Footnote 30}, PALIH and PALIH II^{Footnote 31} were aimed at strengthening national policies and health system institutions at the central and departmental levels. The rebuilding of the La Providence aux Gonaïves Hospital was also a national priority with the goal of decentralizing healthcare to better serve the population of the Artibonite area. Projects carried out by Canadian NGOs were also aligned with national and Canadian priorities, especially on maternal and child health.

Canada’s interventions in education were consistent with Haiti’s guidance documents concerning governance, access and better-quality education. They also met the Canadian government’s priorities, in particular, “securing the future of children and youth” and, over the long term, “stimulating sustainable economic growth.” Some projects such as School Feeding were aimed at both improving access to primary education and reducing hunger, in line with CIDA’s priority to improve food security and to improve child health.

The cooperation initiatives in sustainable economic growth and food security also largely met the needs of communities, civil society and municipal governments. Similarly, interventions in the sustainable economic development and food security sectors were in line with CIDA’s major priorities in 2006-2009, namely, to fight poverty by supporting the thematic priority of improving food security, which was an integral part of its Aid Effectiveness Action Plan. Since 2010, Canadian programming in Haiti has been clearly aligned with two out of three thematic priorities of CIDA, namely, to stimulate sustainable economic growth (job creation, technical and vocational training, higher income) and to improve food security (access to and availability of food).

In addition, projects in governance met the strategic direction identified in the Government Reform Framework Program (PCRE–2007-2012). The focus of the PCRE, which many of Canada’s interventions fit into, included: (i) putting in place a new civil service system; (ii) accelerating modernization of the national government management system; (iii) reforming the decentralization of public services; and (iv) technological modernization of the state. The initiatives also met the strategic direction of the Interim Cooperation Framework and the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP) in terms of democratic development and strengthening the rule of law. Governance projects also followed Canadian foreign policy priorities; in particular, DFAIT’s Americas Strategy, adopted in 2006, and CIDA’s bilateral program interim strategy in Haiti (2006–2009).

The Canadian government priorities also included security and the reform and strengthening of the justice system. However, few technical and financial partners dealt sufficiently with justice issues, according to various sources. For example, the Fragile States Principles Monitoring Surveys^{Footnote 32} note that this aspect is lacking for all donor countries (see Annex J for a summary of the main findings of the 2010 and 2011 Surveys). Although Canadian cooperation supported a number of relevant initiatives (e.g. support for the Haitian National Police and correctional services, elections support and the treatment of victims of gender-based violence), key informants noted that greater support from Canada for the justice sector would have been worthwhile given its significant deficiencies. The document review and project evaluations confirmed that conclusion.

The evaluation found that, owing to persistent government weaknesses, very few technical and financial partners (TFPs) opted to provide central government institutions with on-budget support. According to the data collected, in 2013, only the European Union and the World Bank had agreed to provide the Haitian government with budget support for reconstruction and debt management. Some key informants noted that most Canadian interventions were implemented by NGOs, the United Nations or the private sector. They criticized the fact that, in terms of operations, the Haitian government was bypassed; this was also a finding of the Monitoring Survey on Engagement in Fragile States.

4.2 Sustainability of Results

The evaluation examined the sustainability of the initiatives supported by Canadian cooperation from the standpoint of the national partners’ institutional capacity to take ownership of the activities once the projects have ended. It also examined the factors that did or did not contribute to local ownership.

Finding: Canadian initiatives get mixed reviews on sustainability. Several of the initiatives supported by Canada are at risk without further donor support.

The evaluation revealed several obstacles to the sustainability of results obtained during the period in question. In most of the projects reviewed, the national partners’ did not take sufficient ownership of the activities. Gains made in several initiatives may be lost without further support from Canadian cooperation. It should be noted that the earthquake had a negative impact on the achievement of results and their institutionalization.

Health sector

The sustainability of results in the health sector is not a given. In fact, in most of the projects reviewed, the national partners’ ownership of the activities was deemed generally unsatisfactory. In addition to the earthquake and the cholera epidemic, the factors causing the fragility of results in the health sector are numerous and varied. Some stem from project design, others are contextual in nature, yet others are systemic and derive from the weakness of public institutions (lack of leadership and technical capacity) as well as inadequate human and financial resources in the core directorates at the national and departmental government levels.

Although health initiatives generally led to increased knowledge and changed behaviours among the system’s actors and beneficiaries, the capacity to provide increased and improved services did not reach the self-sustaining threshold. The absence of multi-year strategic plans and inadequate follow-up mechanisms are factors that affect the sustainability of results. It would also be prudent to base funding on performance and objectives achievement, by mutual agreement, with national and international partners.

Furthermore, post-election changes at the head of some ministries led to some changes in MSPP administration. The periodic change in senior management has a domino effect that contributes to staff movement. Despite the presence of qualified and motivated personnel, working conditions that are below government-set standards are affecting the MSPP’s performance, causing staff movement and difficulties in recruitment. Moreover, the large discrepancy in salaries and benefits compared with bilateral agencies, UN and NGOs is contributing to the loss of qualified staff from the public sector. This has resulted in high attrition levels and affected the MSPP’s ability to meet technical requirements and quality standards.

One of the underlying causes of these shortcomings is the lack of sufficient financial resources that would allow the MSPP to properly manage its portfolio. The health budget, which accounts for 8% of the national budget, is wholly inadequate, considering African countries with similar levels of development target at least 15%^{Footnote 33}. Overall, healthcare facilities in Haiti are reportedly underfunded by 30% to 50%. Nearly all of the MSPP’s budget is used to pay salaries. As a result, the sustainability of national health programs depends almost entirely on external funding.

Haiti’s health needs are clearly enormous, and Canada responded by trying to align with the national government’s plans and priorities and to include the national government in decision-making and implementation mechanisms for the support to sector reform and capacity building at all levels. However, these often exceeded the country’s technical, human and financial capacities, and were not designed to handle the structural obstacles in leadership and governance. Because of these obstacles, many results are at high risk of being lost without ongoing, long-term support.

The MSPP lacks both the resources (funding, staff, medication, equipment, etc.) and the management capacity to support existing programs, even in the capital region. Recent studies indicate that the Haitian government cannot both support the existing health infrastructure and deliver the additional programs offered by the international community, which often push health facilities to show immediate results with a limited positive impact on health services overall. For these reasons, Canada should carefully consider whether to contribute to the further expansion of infrastructure and health programs, and what the capacity constraints of doing so might be.

Education sector

The evaluation identified several barriers to the sustainability of the results obtained during the period in question. In most of the projects, the national partners did not take sufficient ownership of the activities. One change that is promising for the sustainability of school retention and completion efforts took place in 2011, when a free, mandatory, universal education program was introduced. However, sustainably funding such a program is a real challenge. Despite the fact that local partners have taken over their operation, even the activities of the Credit for School Fees project have little chance of continuing without external financial support or reforms to how the Haitian government funds the education system.

The partnership framework signed in 2012 between the technical and financial partners (TFPs) and the Ministry of Education will undoubtedly help identify and implement sustainable interventions, using an integrated and consultative approach. Given systemic weaknesses in the education sector, aggravated by the earthquake, more than one phase of funding will no doubt be needed, along with ongoing attention to ensure the sustainability of the initiatives. The Haitian government will also need to make a commitment to continue the reforms that will professionalize and improve the efficiency of the public service, and to continue the fiscal reforms that will generate internal revenues enabling the government to gradually assume recurring costs. Similar to the health sector, it would also be wise to base education funding on performance and on the achievement of targets jointly agreed with national and international partners.

Economic growth and food security sector

The sustainability of Canadian investments in economic development, and food security is mixed and was deemed problematic in many cases.

In the most promising projects, examples of skills transfer were seen mostly at the local level among community groups/organizations and the local government. For example, with the support of Boosting Agricultural Production Project, the knowledge of agricultural officers in the Communal Agricultural Bureau (BAC) and the professional agricultural organization (OPA) was strengthened through training sessions on best practices in farming and livestock production, environmental protection and grain stock management. A total of 854 trainers actively transferred their knowledge to 20,000 farmers in their respective organizations.

The Peasant Movement of Papaye(MPP), which Development and Peace supported, was motivated, empowered and strengthened so much that it was able to undertake and successfully manage a large-scale project that was considered a major success. The Agricultural Financing and Insurance Systems in Haiti (SYFAAH) supported by Développement international Desjardins (DID) also succeeded in building local partners’ capacities and demonstrated that local organizations have significant ownership potential.

However, roughly half of the projects examined were unsatisfactory or moderately satisfactory in their ability to transfer the necessary knowledge and skills to local institutions, partner organizations or the beneficiaries. Several factors explain this inability to transfer project responsibilities to local entities. Some projects addressed an urgent need to provide services, whereas a longer-term implementation strategy would have been more appropriate. Other projects were implemented without the commitment of local partners.

Large, complex projects were in sectors that the Haitian government had trouble managing (e.g., roads, electricity). In other cases, implementing partners had doubts about the ability of local organizations to manage the investments, or they perceived a weak capacity or lack of interest on the part of the government.

Another example of uncertain sustainability comes from the Pro Huerta project, which successfully trained local technical agents (LTAs), and staff from the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR), who in turn were able to train individual families in soil preparation and vegetable production. However, those activities apparently could not continue since the MARNDR did not take charge of the agents at the end of the project as planned. According to the evaluation that was done, the MARNDR was supposed to take over the model and replicate it throughout Haiti, but it reportedly expressed doubts about the potential of the Pro Huerta model compared with traditional agriculture support models.

Governance sector

Governance project results were not always sustainable. Half of the projects examined received a satisfactory score for the local organizations’ capacity to take over project activities, while the other half received an unsatisfactory score.

Among the initiatives that have gone well in terms of sustainability, the evaluation found that civil society organizations supported by Rights and Democracy (R&D) were in turn able to strengthen the advocacy abilities of grassroots human rights NGOs in the areas of rule of law, justice and women’s rights, and they continue to operate after R&D’s closure.

The Municipal Cooperation Program was also successful in terms of ownership. Despite the absence of legislation governing decentralization, the target municipalities were able to take on greater local development responsibilities.

After the end of assistance from Canada and the OAS, the National Identification Office (ONI) and the Haitian government took over a number of components of the Modernization of Haiti’s Civil Registry project, which suggests that the achievements will be sustainable: ONI is responsible for digitizing registries, and has assumed responsibility for the salaries of 300 employees to digitize civil registries (12 million documents). The field visit showed that the civic registry system exists and continues to produce NICs, despite some logistical, administrative and organizational problems. However, ONI did not take over the birth registry.

Some projects did not identify or work with local counterparts that could have taken over project responsibilities once the project had ended. In other cases, the local institution itself was an obstacle to the sustainability of the results pertaining to institutional strengthening, as there was a lack of interest, willingness or simply capacity. In other instances, including the two projects above mentioned, results had to be achieved very quickly, such as preparing the country for free and fair elections. This made it impossible to sufficiently build local capacities to take on longer term responsibilities.

Despite significant support for developing Parliamentary and legislative procedures, the Parliament’s Secretariat was not operational at the time of the evaluation and was having trouble performing its work related to administrative techniques, communication, records and file management, and archiving. The skill transfer that took place within the framework of the Support to the Haitian Parliament project had little impact on the Chamber of Deputies’ Secretariat. Several stakeholders attributed the Haitian government’s lack of capacity and ownership to the continuous weakening of the government apparatus in recent years, in part because of the earthquake and staff rotation. In a context like Haiti, where these problems are well known, continuing the initiative over a longer period of time (e.g., a second phase) would no doubt have improved its sustainability potential.

4.3 Cross-Cutting Themes: Gender Equality and Environmental Sustainability

4.3.1 Gender equality

Finding: Canadian cooperation helped strengthen the role of women in rural agriculture. In some cases, that led to their being given a central role in agricultural activities. A larger number of women in target areas are benefiting from better access and a greater diversity of agricultural and management practices and increased agricultural yields, and they are taking on a more important role in households and in organizational decision making.

Finding: It is difficult to be precise about the magnitude of gender equality (GE) results due to the lack of effective performance measurement systems. Though CIDA has a well-established policy for ensuring that gender equality issues are incorporated into all initiatives that it supports and for identifying the results to be achieved, the evaluation found that GE issues were not systematically incorporated, implemented or monitored.

The Canada-Haiti cooperation Program achieved gender equality results in the areas of increased human rights awareness and enhanced analysis of gender equality. Progress was also made in exercising human rights, including increased participation in democratic life and women’s involvement in decision-making bodies. Women had greater access to the benefits of development initiatives (e.g., better access to health services, reduced maternal and infant mortality, and higher school retention for girls).

Health sector

The health sector had not identified any specific GE results to be achieved. However, a large portion of investments were aimed at reducing the maternal and infant mortality rates, and improving maternal and child health, important GE issues. In addition, Canada helped increase the number of women trained in the health sector.

Some projects did not have strategies for promoting gender equality or did not make a sufficient effort to do so (e.g., endeavouring to disaggregate the participation of women and men in training courses). In other cases, results were not measured.

Education sector

The education sector had a significant GE component. One of the goals of the cooperation Program was to increase school retention and completion rates for boys and girls while narrowing the gaps between them. Based on the activities carried out, approximately half of the projects examined had a positive GE record (moderately satisfactory).

The program allowed for some progress toward an education system that respects the principles of gender equality. This progress was achieved by developing learning modules, implementing training, raising awareness, implementing positive discrimination toward women and girls, developing GE policies, and gathering data disaggregated by sex. However, it was unclear whether GE principles were systematically incorporated into school curricula, given the lack of available data on this subject. Furthermore, in several projects that were reviewed, the tracking data was not disaggregated by sex, which made it difficult to determine concrete results for girls as compared to boys or women as compared to men.

Economic growth and food security sector

The cooperation Program did not set out any specific GE results in the economic growth and food security sector, and there was a lack of data on concrete GE results. However tangible efforts had clearly been made to incorporate the basic and strategic needs of women into the projects. The initiatives of major Canadian NGOs stood out in the area of GE compared with the United Nations agencies, which could have done better.

The biggest strides were made by Oxfam-Québec, Development and Peace, and the consortium made up of CECI/CRC Sogema Inc./ENAP/SOCODEVI. Most of these organizations’ projects had significant GE-related budgets/components and provided large-scale training and awareness campaigns. They were working in partnership with women’s groups to prioritize the strategic interests of women. Several Canadian NGOs supported GE discussions and processes in their partner organizations. Some incorporated the GE theme into their training and awareness programs and made women the focus of their agricultural activities.

Projects that did not successfully incorporate the GE theme were primarily focused on achieving quantitative results and participation quotas with no GE programming. For example, the GE component of the IDB executed Les Cayes–Jérémie Road project focused on having a 30% inclusion quota for women. However, the documentation provided no evidence as to whether this quota was achieved or the number of women who obtained road maintenance work following the training. The Bank should have provided a GE specialist to develop a strategy and an implementation plan. A GE evaluation was planned at the time of this evaluation.

Governance sector

Based on the sample, most governance initiatives saw positive results regarding GE. In the area of civil, political and socio-economic rights, Canadian cooperation helped women begin to take part in associations and defend their individual and collective rights. At the same time, modest but promising opportunities for women were created in politics and employment.

The Support for the Rights of Children and Youth project financed a women’s fund that supported studies on problems specific to women (migration of women, domestic violence, incarceration of women, etc.). Training specifically for women enabled them to be more present and active on consultation committees and to take their place in the community. It was also thanks to civil society that the law requiring a 30% quota of women in government activities was adopted.

Since 2011, the Public Sector Management Support Project (PARGEP) has provided the Ministry for the Status of Women and Women’s Rights (MCFDF) with support for developing the national equality policy and action plan, and for incorporating comparative gender analysis and the gender-based budget into government practices. According to those in charge of the program, the funded activities helped build the MCFDF’s capacities so it could assume its cross-cutting and strategic responsibilities.

The Support to the Haitian Parliament project supported female candidates in the 2009 elections so that women would be better represented in Parliament and in the constituencies, however success was limited. The project helped female candidates to benefit from the experience of female Latin American Parliamentarians. The latter shared their personal experiences and most of them became mentors for the 45 female candidates for the Chamber of Deputies and the 8 candidates for the Senate in the 2011 elections^{Footnote 34}. Despite this innovative strategy, the number of women elected was still very small: 5 out of 99 deputies (5.05%) and 1 out of 30 senators (3.33%). An amendment to the Constitution was proposed for the next election to establish a quota of 30%.

4.3.2 Environmental sustainability

Finding: The program used the environmental assessment standards set out in Canadian legislation and contributed to the adoption of the Canadian environmental assessment model in certain ministries, including the Ministry of Public Health and Population. It contributed to some modest results in terms of environmental rehabilitation.

However, the major electrical power and road construction projects had weak environmental components, or guidelines were ignored by the executing agencies. As a result, these projects may generate long-term negative impacts. For example, the construction of the Les Cayes-Jérémie Road, in which Canada invested $75 million, risks having a negative impact on the environment if no action is taken. The Canadian cooperation program also invested little in environmental risk mitigation, a priority in a country vulnerable to natural disasters.

Under Canadian legislation, all projects funded by Canada that involve building new or developing existing infrastructure must undergo a systematic environmental assessment that includes consideration of such elements as drainage, waste disposal and vulnerability to natural disasters.

Projects that do not have a construction component must still take environmental sustainability into consideration as a cross-cutting theme.

Though the evaluation identified several examples of initiatives that had a positive effect on the environment (e.g. reforestation, protection of watersheds, prevention of erosion), it found that, overall, cooperation efforts were limited to avoiding adverse environmental effects.

Health sector

The La Providence Hospital in Gonaïves project underwent an environmental assessment, which resulted in the selected site of the future hospital being moved to reduce the risk of flooding during a hurricane. The project was innovative because it used natural energy sources to reduce operating costs. It also had a leveraging effect and attracted other international partners. For example, France provided support for the installation of a water purification system, and Mexico invested in solar energy and green technologies.

Hiring local and regional companies encouraged market growth for green construction technology in tropical climates, with the potential of stimulating economic development in the region.

Among positive environmental results, the rehabilitation work to improve the handling of wastewater and garbage increased the quality of life in some underprivileged neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince. Other projects helped transfer and institutionalize Canadian environmental assessment standards at the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP) and other ministries, even though that was not their goal. However, the evaluation was unable to confirm whether this unexpected result was actually incorporated into practices.

The evaluation identified a few cases in which environmental strategies were not developed when there was reason to do so, or were not followed. The treatment of biomedical waste is an issue for which technical and financial partners (TFPs), including the Canadian cooperation and Haitian authorities, must develop long-term funding strategies at the department-level to avoid additional environmental and health problems.

Education sector

Environmental activities were generally incorporated into Canada-supported education programming in Haiti. The most common were the addition of climate change adaptation components to projects, earthquake-resistant construction, environmental education, introduction of recycling policies, introduction of improved ovens, and use of recycled paper briquettes at school canteens to reduce the use of coal.

Economic growth and food security sector

Some examples of positive environmental activities include installation of biodigesters (an innovative activity for Haiti that offers many possibilities in the areas of hygiene, alternative energy and climate change), planting of trees on streets, and introduction of “green roofs”^{Footnote 35}. Several projects by NGOs had sustainable forestry components, including fruit tree production, which aside from reducing watershed erosion has economic potential. The projects of the Mennonite Central Committee Canada (MCC), for instance, introduced some fast-growing, self-regenerating species, helped plant thousands of trees and enabled some local nurseries to set up shop so they could supply the local market.

Several projects worked to reduce pesticide use. The use of natural insecticides and biological traps, the preparation of compost, and crop rotation, were incorporated into local practices in targeted areas. According to the available data, these initiatives helped change behaviour so that resources in an area were better managed. However, data on the impacts of these initiatives were not available.

The major electrical power and road construction projects had weak environmental components or often ignored guidelines. As a result, these projects risk contributing to adverse effects. For example, the Les Cayes–Jérémie Road project carried out by the IDB using a grant from Canada should have a resource management and sustainable development plan prepared for the area. Though an environmental plan was developed in 2010, it was not fully followed. According to key informants, the road has introduced deforestation, exposing previously isolated areas to exploitation, particularly by charcoal producers. Without appropriate management, this may have an adverse effect on rivers and watersheds.

Governance sector

Very few Canadian governance activities addressed environmental matters, probably because the projects’ impact on the environment was deemed minimal. However, urban planning and solid waste treatment projects were among the concerns of the Municipal Cooperation Program, helping targeted municipalities set up solid waste recycling programs with small private operators. This helped clean up certain arteries, especially of plastic waste. The Champ de Mars project, underway at the time of the evaluation, created the public building and housing construction unit (UCLBP), which adopted and actively promoted earthquake-resistant construction principles.

Finally, as the corporate evaluation of CIDA humanitarian assistance noted, Canada could have invested more in building the Haitian government’s capacity to reduce environmental risks in relation to natural disasters.

5.0 Management Principles

5.1 Aid Coordination

Finding: Canadian cooperation played a strong role in supporting the Haitian government take ownership of coordinating international cooperation, particularly through the development of the Haitian government’s strategic framework for guiding international efforts. However, these Canadian initiatives did not produce a substantial and lasting improvement in cooperation between the Haitian government and international partners.

The evaluation examined whether Canadian cooperation helped the Haitian government in coordinating international cooperation, aligning its initiatives and harmonizing its procedures with those of other donors. It found that Canada played an active role in helping the country coordinate international cooperation throughout the period in question. Similarly, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review, conducted in 2007, noted Canada’s efforts to build the government’s capacities and mechanisms to coordinate donor countries.

According to the data collected, Canada supported the development of the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), launched in 2004. The ICF was a forum in which international and Haitian representatives could discuss progress made and problems encountered. Canada also supported the Haitian government’s efforts to develop the National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (DSNCRP) in 2006-2007, which was presented to technical and financial partners in the fall of 2007. This document was used as a guide for aligning sector priorities.

Canada actively participated in international donor conferences in support of Haiti in Washington (2004 and 2009), and New York (2010) and has contributed to international conferences in Montreal (2005 and 2010). Canada also chaired a meeting in 2013 in Washington, bringing together major donors and representatives of the Government of Haiti, to discuss how to better coordinate efforts and increase transparency and development results in Haiti.

Canada was heavily involved in the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC), created to better coordinate resources granted to Haiti following the earthquake of 2010. It is also involved in the Aid Effectiveness Committee established by the government of Haiti. Canada’s participation in the G12 helped influence Haiti’s security and stabilization policies and the role of the United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH).

In terms of diplomacy and reconstruction after the earthquake, Canada was an active member of the group of Haiti’s key partners, which, apart from large multilateral organizations (UN, World Bank, IDB, EU, OAS), includes the United States, France, Brazil and Spain.

However, there are some challenges. Despite support to the Haiti Prime Minister’s Office that should have enabled it to play its role in strategically coordinating the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), the evaluation found that the sector tables and the strategic planning units (SPUs), which made up the ICF’s coordination strategy, did not function very well and were rarely used. Moreover, several international partners did not agree to support the development of Haiti’s national Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in 2007.

Fragile States Principles Monitoring Surveys from 2010 and 2011 confirmed that there is still a long way to go in terms of coordination between the Haitian government and the international community. Even ignoring the coordination of humanitarian assistance where, according to various data sources, the Haitian government was lagging behind the technical and financial partners, the government was having difficulty performing its coordination role.

Health sector

At the sector level, Canadian cooperation put most effort into health and was successful in strengthening the Haitian government’s ability to manage cooperation between actors at various service delivery levels (central, departmental, community, etc.). These efforts paid off to a certain extent. Departmental health directorates (DDSs) are more involved than before, but there has not been any real devolution of power or budgets to them.

The evaluation found that Canadian cooperation stood out in its efforts to coordinate with national bodies and other technical and financial partners in the health sector. Several international and national partners emphasized the lead role that Canada played in establishing the health sector table^{Footnote 36} in 2008. This coordination mechanism evolved over the years and helped align the technical and financial partners’ strategic plans with the Haitian government.

The Health System Development Project (PADESS) served as a foundation to improve coordination among health sector partners. Its priorities were developed in a participative and inclusive manner as a result of consultations in Haiti and Canada. These consultations involved the governments of both countries, donors and civil society, as well as health experts.

The Support Project to Combat STIs and HIV/AIDS in Haiti (PALIH II) promoted the creation of a platform for operational dialogue among health officials, civil society, and technical and financial partners in the department of Artibonite. According to the partners, PALIH II contributed a great deal to the development of a new culture of collaboration among health stakeholders in the department.

The coordination mechanisms, such as the sectoral groups, that Canada implemented in the project to rebuild La Providence Hospital in Gonaïves, were ongoing at the time of the evaluation, and were deemed effective by most of the key informants. In their opinion, the project is an example of effective coordination between the various partners and governments, characterized by consultations with the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP), technical groups and the Embassy of Canada. In fact, some key national informants stated that Canada is represented on all the technical committees to ensure program coherence.

According to key national and international stakeholders, despite these advances, and in spite of the efforts and resources invested, Canadian cooperation did not manage to make significant progress in improving local coordination. The main obstacles that were identified include weak local governments, bureaucracy, a long decision-making process, the frequency of coordination meetings, and the rotation of qualified management staff from the government and local representatives. Competition for limited resources and the lack of information sharing proved to be additional problems.

Education sector

Overall, projects in the education sector were implemented in cooperation with a variety of partners, including the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training (MENFP) and the National Institute of Vocational Training (INFP), as well as non-governmental organizations, United Nations agencies and private sector companies. These collaborative efforts made it possible to implement projects that were more relevant and effective. The Haiti Vocational Training Centre (CFPH CANADO) and Credit for School Fees projects are excellent examples of cooperation among a number of partners from different sectors.

Key informants provided some examples of coordination between the ministries and sector specialists from the technical and financial partners such as the World Bank, the World Food Programme (WFP), IDB and USAID during crisis periods (e.g., earthquake, cholera epidemic), but observed that they were not consistent in their application. MENFP’s coordination of stakeholders has to date been minimal, which has made it difficult to improve consistency and structuring the sector. However, the MENFP has drafted an operational plan for comprehensive reform of the education sector, and signed a cooperation framework with technical and financial partners in September 2012 to support effective, coordinated and transparent implementation of education initiatives.

Sustainable economic growth and food security sector

Overall, coordination of Canada’s involvement in the sustainable economic growth and food security sectors was deemed satisfactory. The coordination mechanisms were used to avoid overlap, build effective teams that could draw on the strengths of individual members, harmonize approaches, exchange information, and establish critical working relationships.

That said, there were a few challenges in relation to coordination among partner organizations, such as the Les Cayes–Jérémie Road project. Coordination was virtually nonexistent for a long time, though at the time of the evaluation, this situation had improved. According to key informants, Canada relied on the IDB to provide effective project management although in the end these responsibilities fell to the Haitian government as the implementing agency. Coordination, supervision and accountability were problematic.

Coordinating land expropriation was also problematic at the community level, as the central government did not work well with the municipalities. Construction began before fair compensation for expropriated land had been finalized.

Governance sector

The various data sources revealed that several governance initiatives failed to establish the necessary connections between the various players, jeopardizing their long-term sustainability. In some cases, coordination was temporary (during the elections), and in other cases it involved only informal information exchanges.

In some cases, the evaluation revealed a lack of interest in shared approaches. For example, it was not always easy to arrange coordination mechanisms among international stakeholders in projects such as Support for the Modernization of Haiti’s Civil Registry. Though there were some coordination meetings between CIDA, the OAS and other technical and financial partners (the United States, the European Union, etc.), they were limited to the election period, which was deemed a priority by the international community. Another project for which there was very little coordination was Support to the Haitian Parliament, which ran at the same time as a similar project funded by USAID, resulting in several cases of duplication according to the various data sources.

At the same time, coordination was exemplary in some initiatives in the governance sector. For instance, at the time of the evaluation cooperation between the Municipal Cooperation Program (MCP) and international partners was still in place in Les Palmes, and Port-au-Prince, as well as at the level of the three national associations of municipal elected officials^{Footnote 37}. This resulted in gains in effectiveness that the MCP could not have achieved on its own. A political coordination platform was implemented by United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) to promote information exchange and coordination among all cities and municipal organizations operating in Haiti.

5.2 Efficiency

Finding: Three quarters of the projects in the sample were deemed satisfactory with respect to efficiency, and one quarter were not (Table 22 in Annex H). Key areas for improvement include ensuring that projects have a framework for monitoring results, and that planned budgets and project objectives are realistic and take into consideration the current capacity of national partners.

Finding: The call for proposals for the recovery and reconstruction of Haiti launched in the fall of 2010 with Canadian partners targeted humanitarian assistance but did not adequately reflect the complexity of the environmental, legal and political issues of Haiti. The vast majority of projects funded by this call were not completed on schedule.

Finding: In order to rapidly demonstrate results, some project proposals under the call for proposals for recovery and reconstruction in Haiti were accepted with outcomes that were too ambitious, logic models that were flawed, and without sufficient consultation with the local people and authorities.

Natural disasters aside, the presidential elections caused delays in the implementation of several projects. For example, following the inauguration of President Martelly in May 2011, conflicts between the executive and legislative branches and the delayed ratification of a prime minister hindered the implementation of numerous projects that required support from government authorities. Senate and local elections scheduled before the end of 2011 that did not take place, and delays in the review and approval of essential legislation also hindered the results of certain projects.

Besides the delays caused by political upheaval, the evaluation found that factors affecting efficiency included planning weaknesses, lack of a framework to monitor results, and overly ambitious budgets and objectives, particularly as a result of the shortcomings of national partners.

Call for proposals for Recovery and Reconstruction in Haiti

One year after the earthquake, a call for proposals for Recovery and Reconstruction in Haiti of nearly $30M to be administered by the Partnerships with Canadians Branch (PWCB) was announced. This funding was to last 12 months and help Canadian entities, whether civil society or the private sector, to contribute to the efforts of recovery and reconstruction following the earthquake. The call for proposals was launched in October 2010 and 15 projects were funded.

However, in its haste and with emergency assistance as its focus, CIDA expected that Canadian organizations would deliver projects in 12 months. This was challenging, especially in a situation of post-emergency where local organizations, government authorities, and project partners were still recovering from the aftermath of the earthquake. In addition, several approved projects included a component of building construction, a domain outside the usual area of competence of partners and PWCB. Construction in a country such as Haiti poses significant challenges on the technical, environmental, legal and political fronts, and requires close supervision and monitoring - areas in which most organizations had no expertise.

Only 2 of the 15 projects approved were completed within the prescribed time frames, and 3 had not yet been completed at the time of the evaluation. Fortunately, CIDA has demonstrated flexibility by granting extensions and supporting the Canadian organizations through a PWCB monitoring officer, decentralised at the embassy in Port-au-Prince. Specialists from the Haiti-Canada Cooperation Centre (CCHC) also provided technical support. Both the monitor and CCHC specialists helped resolve bottlenecks and provided information to staff at headquarters, which facilitated the implementation of these projects.

Among the changes that have occurred during the period, the calls for proposals system resulted in a loss of flexibility in PWCB programming. Key informants claimed that the new approach adopted to increase transparency of the competitive process had the negative effect of not permitting the same level of involvement by program officers during the development of projects proposals. In particular, it prevented iterative discussions on project proposals leading to better project design.

Lessons should be drawn from this experience. In the rush to demonstrate results, proposals were accepted for which the expected outcomes were far too ambitious, logic models were flawed, and there were doubts about the consultation processes with the local people and authorities. As one of the key informants remarked, several factors were ignored so that projects could be implemented as quickly as possible. Moreover, contrary to its usual practice, CIDA approved the projects before an environmental assessment could be done. This meant that most of the organizations took up to six months to complete the environmental assessments, leaving them, in theory, only six months to finish their construction project.

Owing to the challenges associated with such programming and the amounts involved in the special call, it would have been appropriate and more efficient to hire an engineering firm to support CIDA in analyzing files, carrying out environmental assessments and monitoring projects. In addition, adapting the duration of projects to the reality on the ground as well as taking into consideration the long-term nature of the commitment of local organizations in reconstruction efforts would have been appropriate.

5.3 Performance Management

Finding: Overall, the cooperation Program adequately monitored the initiatives that Canada supported; however, a number of initiatives had no baseline data or targets, which limited the ability to report on progress and results. In addition, more project-level evaluations should have been carried out to measure and validate results. Major projects should also have had monitors, as Embassy staff were unable to meet demand owing to their other responsibilities.

The evaluation found that the Program used performance management frameworks to report on progress and results. CIDA produced annual reports indicating progress made in each sector. The Program documented project risks and bottlenecks, following up with national authorities to maintain timelines. Ratings of performance management by sector are provided in Appendix G.

A number of bilateral initiatives were monitored in the field by program officers based at the Canadian Embassy, sector specialists at the Canada-Haiti Cooperation Centre (CCHC) and, in some cases, independent monitors assigned to specific initiatives. However, according to various data sources, this strategy had its limitations. Independent monitor budgets should have been allocated for all major or at-risk initiatives, and this was not always the case. According to interviews with key informants, workloads sometimes made it difficult for program officers and CCHC specialists to monitor projects on a regular basis, as was observed in about one third of projects sampled.

A good practice was observed for the Special Call for Proposals on recovery and reconstruction, where a dedicated monitor was put in place. Key informants suggested that this helped address bottlenecks, support implementing agencies, and keep HQ informed of progress.

The program could have benefitted from conducting more evaluations. Only about thirty project evaluations could be identified. Projects often lacked baselines and targets, limiting ability to assess outcomes.

6.0 Conclusions

Based on the sample, the evaluation concludes that, overall, the initiatives Canada supported were relevant and effective.

In the health sector, Canadian cooperation helped Haiti establish a national health policy and improve coordination between national and international actors. It helped reduce maternal and child mortality. Canada also played a vital role in sharing knowledge and training national leaders and decision makers who adopted principles of the Canadian health care system such as universal health coverage.

In the education sector, the evaluation found that although Canadian cooperation helped improve school attendance and student retention rates among both boys and girls, it could not be determined whether this contribution had an impact on passing and graduation rates. Results achieved in managing the education sector should have a positive effect in the long term. However, community involvement in managing educational establishments has achieved limited progress, and there is still much to be done to involve parents and community organizations in school management. Better links between youth vocational training and local labour markets were created. However, while the placement rates for graduates appear satisfactory in the capital, rural economic development efforts must continue in order to generate more jobs for graduates.

In sustainable economic development, the evaluation found that Canada helped build infrastructure in Haiti, which should generate future economic benefits. But environmental risk needs to be more carefully managed. The program introduced innovations, particularly as part of the municipal integrated planning approach and sustainable agriculture in target areas. A key achievement was implementation of an agricultural insurance and credit system. However, the evaluation found a need for greater focus on agricultural reform, marketing and support for value chains.

In the food security sector, Canadian cooperation helped introduce micro-credit to encourage small-scale food production with potential for large-scale reproduction. The program also fostered innovative practices (for example, mill engines, used tires for gardening) that have led to a broader range of local agricultural products. Several civil society organizations were supported in improving management of rural agriculture.

In the governance sector, Canadian cooperation made a tangible contribution to increasing universal suffrage and creating a space for exercising civic and fundamental rights. Better access to national identification cards and support for civil society organizations contributed to this. There was some strengthening of the public sector by getting central agencies and the justice system to adopt and use internationally recognized management methods. Effective management practices were established in four municipalities, with potential for replication more widely.

Canadian support helped Haiti to produce its first report on the human rights situation, in accordance with UN conventions. Strengthening the national police force and supporting MINUSTAH contributed to public safety. These initiatives, combined with support for elections, have led to greater political stability. However, transition to the rule of law remains a challenge. Despite investments, and some progress, it is clear that more work has to be done to reinforce the justice system, and strengthen civil society’s capacity to promote basic human rights and hold government accountable.

Several of the initiatives supported by Canadian cooperation were considered at risk for not sustaining results, particularly in health and education. This is largely due to insufficient funding from the Haitian government to maintain long-term results. Insufficient planning, the absence of a local partner, or its lack of commitment, as well as the lack of a proper strategy for transferring knowledge and skills to national partners are the other main factors that diminished prospects for sustainability.

The evaluation found that Canada-Haiti cooperation has been contributing to progress in the area of gender equality (GE), including the decrease in the maternal and child mortality rate since 2006, and improvement of the attendance and retention rates of both boys and girls at the elementary school level.

Canadian cooperation also helped strengthen women’s roles in rural organizations in the targeted areas. The most successful GE initiatives were implemented by large Canadian NGOs. In a number of cases, partnerships between Canadian and Haitian NGOs have bolstered the GE work already under way in local organizations and empowered these organizations to take charge of GE issues. Some governance sector interventions have given women and young people greater access to the democratic process by raising awareness of human rights and giving Haitians access to the national identity card required to vote and obtain public services.

However, the evaluation found that, despite support, little progress was made in increasing GE in state institutions, including Parliament. Similarly, several projects did not have adequate strategies and/or performance measurement frameworks to measure GE results, including initiatives implemented by the UN. Additional work is needed in both of these areas.

In the area of environmental sustainability, the evaluation found that in most instances Canadian cooperation followed required environmental assessment standards. The agriculture and food security sectors contributed to some modest results in terms of environmental rehabilitation by raising environmental awareness and introducing green technologies. However, major electricity and road construction projects, such as Les Cayes-Jérémie Road project, risk contributing to long-term negative environmental effects, such as deforestation, if mitigation measures are not followed.

The evaluation revealed performance management deficiencies in all sectors, particularly with respect to baseline data collection and monitoring frameworks. Projects should provide funding for baseline data collection activities, and encourage robust performance management, monitoring and evaluation systems. Financial resources should also be allocated to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation skills of partners in key sectors.

Although there was no overarching strategy for integration of relief into reconstruction and development efforts, there were specific initiatives that took this approach.

In terms of respecting the principles for engagement in fragile states (see Annex K), the evaluation concluded that Canadian cooperation exhibited mixed performance. On the one hand, a number of initiatives helped to strengthen government institutions. On the other, the almost exclusive reliance on executing agencies (the United Nations, the private sector, universities, NGOs and so on), meant the opportunity to strengthen government systems was missed. As well, executing agencies can offer salaries and conditions that the Government of Haiti cannot match. The Fragile States Principles Monitoring Surveys in Haiti noted that significant differences in salary between local and international staff contributed to movement of qualified staff away from the public sector.

With regard to the principle of acting fast but staying engaged long enough to give success a chance, the evaluation noted that Canada had maintained and increased its involvement in Haiti between 2006 and 2013. Canada demonstrated its ability to act quickly by supporting the holding of democratic elections on two occasions, providing humanitarian assistance after the January 2010 earthquake, and getting involved in the reconstruction process.

7.0 Lessons

7.1 Health Sector

The implementation of large-scale bilateral projects in the health sector enabled Canada to cement its relations with the Haitian government. Programs such as the Health System Development Project (PADESS) can have a real impact on the cohesiveness of the Haitian government’s health programs and policies, and is a model to be refined and made sustainable.

This initiative made it possible to support national and departmental authorities in decision- making and implementation. The project also provided an opening for policy dialogue on access to, and quality of, health services. It can serve as a model for coordinating national and international partners, a practice that should continue. A regular review of coordination strengths and weaknesses could help improve or simplify the process. However, national partners should be provided with the human, financial and technical resources they need to fully participate in coordination at the departmental and community levels.

Canada must obtain meaningful and measurable results in terms of the quality and quantity of health services provided to the Haitian population. It should consider transition to funding based on the performance of the public health network (PHUs, health centres, hospitals). One example of this approach is the $20M Manman ak timoun an santé (MATS)^{Footnote 38} project, which was supported by Canada and implemented by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). In this project, 17 participating departmental hospitals signed performance-based contracts, and provided obstetric and pediatric services. The project also sought to standardize health services nation-wide.

This option would provide a better basis for negotiation on the progress to be made in the sector as a whole. It would be appropriate to upgrade the health sector’s strategic framework, including the operational plan. This framework should identify concrete deliverables, clear and coordinated strategies, the contribution expected from partners, and a robust monitoring and evaluation plan.

Given how difficult it is for the Haitian government to support existing health care infrastructure, a proliferation of new health programs and infrastructure should be avoided. With the help of the Haitian government, strategies should be identified to support and strengthen existing infrastructure with long-term funding. This must be achieved through among other things fiscal reforms so that Haiti can generate more internal revenues and take on more of the health system funding.

The practice of contracting UN agencies—because of the Haitian government’s limited absorptive capacity and in order to mitigate the financial risks of investments—tends to create parallel management units, inflate salaries on the local market, lead to loss of qualified staff from the public sector, and create dependence. There are no easy solutions to these problems, but Canada needs to find alternatives with the Haitian government and its international partners.

7.2 Education Sector

The skills-based training approach used by the Haiti Vocational Training Centre (CFPH CANADO) is exemplary, as it emphasizes co-development with Haitian partners, and development of methodologies, processes, techniques and tools necessary for this training.

The lack of systematic or ongoing monitoring in certain education projects limited the opportunities to introduce necessary corrective action during their implementation, and to report on their results. The approach used to encourage community involvement, especially the participation of parents, in the management of educational institutions should also be revisited, as it did not work out as hoped during the period evaluated. Other countries’ experiences could provide possible solutions.

The absence or lack of clarity of educational administrative standards and directives, as well as political factors, made it more difficult to achieve results and promote progressive takeover by the Haitian government. This was the case, for example, for the National School Feeding Program (PNCS), where greater government ownership is required.

7.3 Economic Growth Sector

Supplying credit and agricultural insurance is a practice that has begun to bear fruit with a potential for scaling up. Other practices, such as the transfer of environmentally friendly techniques, also merit a larger-scale application in a country like Haiti, as does integrated municipal planning.

The lack of reform in the agricultural sector is limiting the sector’s economic potential. The government must assume its role in improving regulations for small farmers and the private sector, and the development of adequate business practices and entrepreneur networks must be encouraged. Efforts must also be continued to improve production-related technologies and processes, both in terms of cost-effectiveness and environmental sustainability. Finally, concepts such as the development of businesses through the expansion of value chains must be fostered.

Major infrastructure projects require rigorous environmental screening and gender analysis, and clarity of implementation arrangements. While there will likely be ongoing economic benefit from the Les Cayes–Jérémie Road investment, there may also be unplanned negative environmental consequences, and the project suffered from unclear management roles, responsibilities and coordination during implementation.

7.4 Governance Sector

Interventions in governance and government capacity building require time. A long-term commitment is required to build institutional capacity so that the government can take over from international assistance. It would be appropriate for DFATD to ensure coordination with local and international partners, and commit to projects or programs over a longer time frame in order to achieve sustainable results.

Though the majority of governance projects had a performance measurement framework and regularly reported on progress to DFATD staff, most did not have a monitor, which had a negative impact on results in certain cases. It would have been advisable to consistently ensure adequate monitoring to ensure that the activities were being carried out and results achieved, bearing in mind that the CCHC had very few staff to conduct monitoring.

While Canadian cooperation activities have led to results in terms of democratic participation and strengthening civilian human rights organisations, it would be appropriate to engage a whole-of-government strategy to help the Haitian government make greater progress in all areas of governance.

Fragile States Principles

The Monitoring Surveys are useful tools for provoking thought and discussion, both between Canadian government actors and with Canada’s international and Haitian partners. It is important to continue discussions with national authorities to make progress towards a Haitian State that is better able to manage responsibly and be accountable to the public.

8.0 Recommendations

With the current review of Canada’s cooperation in Haiti, and the creation of the amalgamated Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Department, there is an opportunity for renewed direction on the program.

1. DFATD should develop a new country framework taking into account Haitian priorities, and update its sector strategies where future cooperation is anticipated, potentially in sustainable economic growth, education, health and governance.

   Future donor efforts will have to address the weakness of government institutions, their challenges in coordinating large foreign assistance programs, and the need to increase domestic funding flows. The principles for engagement in fragile states that pertain to developing and using country systems should also be taken into consideration.

2. Canadian cooperation should place a particular emphasis on governance and strengthening Haitian institutions. It should also continue to play a role in donor coordination, and building the Haitian Government’s capacity in aid coordination and management.
3. Over time, DFATD (along with other donors) should consider increased use of government systems for their financial assistance. This will depend on the Government of Haiti’s ability to demonstrate that it can transparently and accountably manage such funds. With the aim of making the Haitian State more accountable to its Parliament, its media and its citizens, and to encourage sound management of the State, DFATD should continue to engage in transparency discussions with the Haitian government.

   Sustainability of the future benefits of donor investments has been found to be a challenge, by this and other evaluations.

4. In planning its future program, DFATD should ensure that local capacity to absorb and sustain investments is fully considered. Among others, it should, with Haitian and international partners, explore sustainable funding strategies for the recurrent cost of infrastructure and programs.

   The Haitian population and the economy remain vulnerable to environmental degradation and recurrent natural disasters. The economic impact of these trends is large, often undermining previous investments.

5. DFATD’s future programming should include emphasis on supporting Haitian efforts to reduce risks from environmental degradation and natural disasters and increase the resilience of populations.

   While there have been some successes, there have also been challenges in addressing gender equality and environmental sustainability in past Canadian assistance.

6. DFATD should focus more on achieving and demonstrating gender equality (GE) and environmental sustainability results. All DFATD programs and projects should take GE and environmental issues into account at the planning and implementation stages, and ensure that results are measured and documented. DFATD and its partners should ensure that projects/programs have sufficient financial and human resources to do so.

   Fragile state principles also suggest that engagement by donors should be long term, incrementally improving local capacities.

7. DFATD should identify from among initiatives that have achieved meaningful results in the past those that could be put on a more sustainable footing with further modest but strategic support, including technical assistance.
8. Also to consolidate past investments, DFATD should target a portion of its development assistance to specific geographic areas in which it has experience (e.g., Les Cayes–Jérémie corridor and Artibonite) to consolidate local institutions and to pursue reform and decentralization in order to better meet basic needs.

   There is a need for more effective performance management of Canadian assistance in an environment where local capacities are limited. Clarity on results and targets, and monitoring of their achievement, can also support agreed mutual accountability arrangements.

9. DFATD should ensure that all projects, including those implemented by multilateral agencies, have sufficient and functional monitoring and evaluation systems in place. These should allow baseline data to be collected and targets set; regular monitoring to be undertaken, and improvements to be made as needed to ongoing projects.

Annex A: Summary of the Terms of Reference

1. Objectives of the Evaluation
   • Provide a neutral and evidence-based evaluation of CIDA’s development assistance to Haiti from 2006-2007 to 2012-2013.
   • Contribute, through the evaluation report, to learning and informed decision-making with regard to programming in Haiti, and promote improvements to policies and programs, by identifying best practices and lessons learned.
   • Evaluate results achieved in Haiti in relation to program strategies and plans, based on established development assistance criteria (relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, cross-cutting themes, aid coordination, efficiency/economy, and performance management).
   • Evaluate the extent to which program design, delivery and management are in line with the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.
   • Identify best practices, areas for improvement and lessons learned, and then recommend improvements with regard to organization and programming.
2. Scope of the Evaluation

   CIDA’s last Haiti program evaluation dates back to 2002. CIDA began an evaluation in 2009, but it was postponed after the earthquake that occurred in January 2010. The current evaluation will thus focus on CIDA programs implemented in Haiti between 2006-2007 and 2012-2013.

   The evaluation will target CIDA’s key areas of development programming in Haiti. The evaluation will not directly address the results of humanitarian assistance, since these activities were evaluated in a separate exercise. However, the evaluation will address the following two aspects:

   • linkages between humanitarian assistance and development in the context of the program; and
   • the working relationship between bilateral programs and the International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) Directorate, both at CIDA Headquarters and in the field.
3. Evaluation Criteria and Questions

   Relevance: To what extent do the objectives of the development intervention meet the needs of direct beneficiaries’ and the people of Haiti?

   Effectiveness: To what extent has CIDA achieved expected outcomes in Haiti?

   Sustainability: To what extent are the benefits and results achieved likely to be maintained over the years?

   Cross-cutting themes: Has the Haiti program been able to integrate cross-cutting themes, such as gender equality and environmental sustainability?

   Aid Coordination: To what extent were activities in Haiti coordinated with the programming efforts of other departments, other donors and CIDA’s various delivery mechanisms?

   Efficiency/economy: To what extend have resources efficiently been converted into results?

4. Important Considerations for the Evaluation

   A number of important considerations were identified during the Haiti evaluation planning mission in June 2012. The Development Evaluation Division consulted CIDA’s Haiti program team and partners in the field to incorporate their perspectives in the terms of reference. The following considerations were taken into account:

   • Whole-of-government environment: The Consultant’s analysis will consider the larger whole-of-government environment in which CIDA’s activities were carried out.
   • International environment: The Consultant’s evaluation report will consider the environment of other donor countries in Haiti. A distinction will be made between traditional and new donors.
   • Flexibility in a fragile state: The Consultant’s evaluation report will also consider the degree of flexibility of the tools available to program managers (at Headquarters and in the field), and whether they were appropriate to programming in the context of a fragile state.
   • Absence of a country strategy and programming framework: During most of the evaluation period, the bilateral program operated without a country strategy or a programming framework. In the absence of such formal documents, a sector-based approach seems to have been adopted instead. The Consultant’s evaluation report will consider how the lack of these tools affected the conduct of the bilateral program.
   • Aid delivery mechanisms: The Consultant’s evaluation report will examine how the various aid delivery mechanisms operated, with special emphasis on local funds, and the evaluation report will include their results.
   • The role of NGOs in CIDA’s program: The Consultant’s evaluation report will consider the role of NGOs in CIDA’s program, and will identify and include strategic results.
   • Humanitarian activities: The evaluation will not focus directly on the results of humanitarian projects. However, the Consultant’s evaluation report will address (1) linkages between humanitarian assistance and development in the context of the program; and (2) the working relationship between bilateral programs and the International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) Directorate, both at CIDA Headquarters and in the field. These issues will be considered in a chapter of the evaluation report.
   • The challenging situation created by the earthquake of 2010, and its impact on program content and delivery.

Annex B: Methodology

1. Data collection method

The evaluation used a combination of data collection methods, and gathered both primary (especially qualitative) and secondary (qualitative and quantitative) data. These data were obtained from people, documents, and direct observation during project visits. The figure below describes the four data collection methods and their respective data sources:

Figure 3: Data collection methods

Interviews with key stakeholders/respondents
Total: 184

• Structured and semi-structured interviews with:
• Staff at the Canadian embassy in Haiti and at DFATD Headquarters
• Haiti-Canada Cooperation Centre
• Other donor countries
• Multilateral agencies
• Other departments of the Government of Canada
• Implementation partners, inluding Canadian NGOs and the United Nations
• National governments partners (Haiti)
• National (Haitian) partners from civil society and the private sector
• Monitoring officers and consultants
• Key Haitians independent contacts

Focus groups
Total: 32 groups/ 293 persons

• National governments' partners  (Haiti)
• National (Haitian) partners from civil society and the private sector

Literature review
Total: 47 projects

• Evaluations, final reports (in particular) and other relevant documents from sample projects were systematically reviewed using templates.
• Annual reports and other relevant documents from CIDA
• Academic research on Haiti
• Peer evaluations by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)

Visits to communities
Total: 17 projects

• A combination of methods was used during visits to projects in Haitian communities benefiting from CIDA investments, including:
  • Observation of facilities and other selected achievements – Checklist
  • Individual interviews
  • Discussion groups 

2. Sample

Since Canadian cooperation supported 170 projects between FY 2006-2007 and FY 2012-2013, the evaluation was based on a systematic review of a sample of 47 projects implemented during this period. The sample was purposive, to ensure adequate coverage in terms of project investment and representativeness in relation to programming. The sample considered the following criteria:

• significance of project investment;
• area of intervention;
• variety of funding mechanisms (such as multilateral, bilateral, and partnership);
• representativeness in terms of geographic sector coverage of Canadian cooperation; and
• projects already evaluated.

The table below provides an overview of the sample coverage by sector. The sample represented 48% of the total investment, excluding humanitarian assistance, which was evaluated in 2011-2012. All sample projects were the focus of an extensive literature review, and the evaluation team conducted a field visit for 17 projects (36%).

Since the evaluation emphasized initiatives evaluated during the period, the health and economic growth sectors are substantially overrepresented in the sample, compared to other sectors. The list of sample projects is found in Annex C. Note that the humanitarian assistance-development continuum is not a sector of Canadian cooperation, but rather an approach that CIDA adopted following the earthquake. Initiatives under this heading are thus coded as “Other”. The sample included three reconstruction initiatives. Two were in the education sector, and were included in the analysis of this sector.

Annex C: List of Projects Reviewed

Annex D: List of Documents Reviewed

Annis, R. (n.d.). Failed Reconstruction in Haiti Debated in Canada.

Atlantis Global Vision. (2013). Suivi des recommandations de l’évaluation du projet PDM-II: Rapport final. [follow-up to PDM-II project evaluation recommendations: final report]

Audette, R., Clérismé, C., Laguerre, V. B., & Liburd, M. (2009). Appui à la gouvernance locale dans le département du nord-est (AGLNE): Rapport final. [support for local governance in the Northeast Department (AGLNE): final report]

Baio, A. (2013). Office des Nations Unies pour les Services aux Projets (UNOPS) - Hôpital départemental La Providence des Gonaïves: Rapport d’Activités Annuel. [United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) – La Providence Departmental Hospital in Gonaïves:  annual activity report]

Baranyi, S. (2010a). Canada and the Travail of Partnership in Haiti. In Thompson & Heine (Eds.), Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and Beyond.

Baranyi, S. (2010b). Canada and the Travail of Partnership in Haiti. Retrieved from Canada and the Travail of Partnership in Haiti

Baranyi, S. (2013, February 21). Lessons from Canada’s Development Engagement in Fragile States. Retrieved from http://cips.uottawa.ca/lessons-from-canadas-development-engagement-in-fragile-states/

Baranyi, S., & Paducel, A. (2012). Canada’s Approach to Fragile States. In S. Brown (ed.), Struggling for Effectiveness, CIDA and Foreign Aid (p. 119). McGill-Queen University Press.

Beaulieu, R. (2012). Evaluation Report of the Joint Electoral Observation Mission to Haiti.

Bergeron, I., & Pinard, J. M. (2009). Évaluation de fin de projet- Projet assistance technique Jacmel Phase III (A-032087): Rapport. [end-of-project evaluation – Jacmel technical assistance project, Phase III (A-032087): report]

Bernyck, W. (2013). Rapport de fin de projet: Rentrée scolaire 08-09. [end-of-project report: Back to School 08-09]

Boisvert, R., Lorda, M. A., & Racine, G. (2011). Évaluation mi-parcours du projet-  Projet de coopération trilatérale d’autoproduction d’aliments frais Pro-Huerta Haïti: Rapport final d’évaluation. [project mid-term evaluation – Pro Huerta trilateral cooperation project to produce its own fresh food: final evaluation report]

Bouya, A., & Morrissette, L. (2011). RE:FW: Cantines scolaires Haïti 2010-12. [Re: Fw: Haiti school feeding, 2010-12]

Brenes, G. (2007). Rapport narratif annuel: Appui à la mise en œuvre du cadre de coopération intérimaire. [annual narrative report: support in implementing the interim cooperation framework]

Byron, G. (2009). Mid Term Evaluation Report - Save The Children Canada - CIDA - Canadian Partnership Branch Program 2006-2011: Realizing the Rights of the Socially Excluded Children Worldwide.

Cadet, C. L., & Vaillancourt, P. (2010). Projet d’appui au renforcement de la gestion publique en Haïti (PARGEP # A-033068) – Évaluation mi-parcours: Rapport version finale. [project to help strengthen public administration in Haiti (PARGEP #A-033068) – mid-term evaluation: final report]

Canada’s Haiti partners “saddened” by Ottawa’s aid review. (2013).

CECI-CRC-SOGEMA-ÉNAP-SOCODEVI Consortium. (2013). Rapport narratif de fin de projet - Période du 10 juillet 2006 au 31 mars 2013: Programme de Développement Local en Haïti (PDLH). [end-of-project narrative report – period from July 10, 2006, to March 31, 2013: Local Development Program in Haiti]

Charles, H., & Coimin, Y.-M. (2013). Haïti Canada Centre de Coopération Haïti-Canada. Suivi du projet Pro-Huerta. [Haiti-Canada Cooperation Centre, Pro Huerta project follow-up]

CIDA. (n.d.a). Credit for School Fees: Annex C: Logical Framework.

CIDA. (n.d.b). Memorandum for the Minister: Construction of the Artibonite Provincial Hospital in Gonaives.

CIDA. (n.d.c). Modernization of Haiti’s Civil Registry: Performance Measurement Framework (PMF).

CIDA. (n.d.d). Modernization of Haiti’s Civil Registry: Logic Model (LM).

CIDA. (n.d.e). PWCB development partners: Application Form for Haiti.

CIDA. (n.d.f). Performance Management Framework: Reporting Template.

CIDA. (n.d.g). Haiti-Canada Municipal Cooperation Program: Project Approval Document.

CIDA. (n.d.h). Project to strengthen democratic governance and promote human rights in Haiti: Project Approval Document.

CIDA. (n.d.i). Annex A: Project Description.

CIDA. (2003). Gender Equality Assessment.

CIDA. (2008). Memorandum for the Minister.

CIDA, (2009). Haiti Country Strategy 2.0. (2009).

CIDA. (2010a). Haiti Program, 2009-2010 Annual Country Program Report.

CIDA. (2010b). Annual Haiti Program Performance Report.

CIDA. (2011a). Joint evaluation of the Viva Rio activity in Haiti’s Bel Air neighbourhood – Supported by CIDA, DFAIT/START and NCA: Final report.

CIDA. (2011b). Memorandum for the Minister (GPB).

CIDA. (2011c). Haiti country strategy update – Health sector variance analysis.

CIDA. (2011d). Haiti-Canada Municipal Cooperation Program (MCP): 2011-13 Implementation Plan and 2011-12 Annual Work Plan – Draft for approval by MCP steering committee.

CIDA. (2011e). Haiti Program, 2011-12 Annual Country Program Report.

CIDA. (2011f). Haiti Program, 2010-11 Annual Country Program Report.

CIDA. (2011g). Project proposal - Rehabilitation of the Champ de Mars.

CIDA. (2011h). Rapport sommaire de gestion / Management Summary Report.

CIDA. (2011i), October 4). Haiti country strategy update: Education sector variance analysis.

CIDA. (2011j). Haiti Program Annual Country Program Report 2010-2011.

CIDA. (2011k). Programme Haïti - Rapport annuel programme-pays 2010-2011.

CIDA. (2012a). School feeding 2010-2012: Annex A.

CIDA. (2012b). Corporate Evaluation of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance 2005-2011.

CIDA. (2012c, August). Corporate Evaluation of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance 2005-2011 – Summary Report.

CIDA. (2012d). Evaluation of CIDA’s International Humanitarian Assistance – 2005-2011.

CIDA. (2012e). Investment Performance Report.

CIDA. (2012f). Haiti Program, 2011-12 Annual Country Program Report.

CIDA. (2012g). Support to Combat STIs and HIV/AIDS in Haiti 2 (PALIH 2): Annual Report, Year 6, April 2011-January 2012.

CIDA. (2012h). 2012 Activity Report – Joint RH Project: Improving Reproductive Health in Haiti.

CIDA. (2012i). Management Summary Report - Investment.

CIDA. (2012j). SGDE-EDRMS: Support to School Feeding.

CIDA. (2012k). Geographic Programs Branch, Haiti Program, 2011-2012 Annual Country Program Report.

CIDA. (2012l). Haiti Program Annual Country Program Report 2011-2012.

CIDA. (2012m). Evaluation Background Profile: CIDA’s Programs in Haiti (FY 2002-03 to 2011-12). Evaluation Directorate, Strategic Policy and Performance Branch.

CIDA, (2012n). Evaluation Background Profile: CIDA’s Programs in Haiti (FY 2002-03 to 2011-12). CIDA.

CIDA. (2013a). Management Summary Report - Investment.

CIDA. (2013b). Project to support food security and agricultural production in the arrondissement of Léogâne, Haiti: Final report.

CIDA, Annex 1: Update of Part II of the Performance Measurement Framework regarding aid effectiveness, 2009-2010. (n.d.).

CIDA, Annex 2: Stories from the Field. (n.d.).

CIDA, Annex 2 Gender Equality Action Plan – Progress report – Country: Haiti. (n.d.).

CIDA & Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic Regional Division (BMH). (2007). Summary of results in the context of the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) (April 2006 – March 2007) Final Report.

CIDA, Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic Division. (2002). Health Policy Framework (HPF) for Haiti.

CIDA, Interim Strategy for CIDA’s Bilateral Program in Haiti. (n.d.).

CIDA, PMF Section 2 – Country/Region: Haiti Aid Effectiveness Action Plan Commitments. (n.d.).

CIDA, Strategic Plan for the Remainder of the IHRC’s Mandate. (2010).

CIDA, Summary of Results, CIDA’s Contribution to Development in Haiti (2004-2007). (n.d.).

CIDA, Thematic Focus: The Haiti program focuses on CIDA’s priority themes: sustainable economic growth, food security, and children and youth. (n.d.).

Consortium for International Development in Education. (n.d.). Projet Appui à l’implantation de l’approche par compétences au centre de formation professionnelle d’Haïti: Rapport d’évaluation environnementale. [skills-based approach implementation support project at Haiti’s professional training centre: environmental assessment report]

Consortium for International Development in Education - Commission scolaire des Grandes-Seigneuries. (2010). Appui à l’implantation de l’approche par compétences au Centre de formation professionnelle d’Haïti: Plan de mise en œuvre. [skills-based approach implementation support at Haiti’s professional training centre: implementation plan]

Cruz, L. (2012). Rapport final de prestations de Directeur de projet: Travaux pour la réhabilitation et la construction de la route Les Cayes - Jérémie. [project manager’s final activity report: work to build and rehabilitate the Les Cayes-Jérémie Road]

DAC. (2007). Évaluation de la coopération canadienne par les pairs Annexe D. Visite sur le terrain en Haïti. [peer evaluation of Canadian cooperation, Annex D, field visit to Haiti] Revue de l’OCDE sur le développement, No. 8(4), 417–422.

Delorme G, Durand-Drouhin J-L, Vargas V, Barry A, Vandenplas B, Day G, Des Rosiers S. (2010). Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP). Organizational audit - draft.

Delorme, G., Marier, F., & Henrice, E. (2009). Évaluation de mi-parcours du Programme de développement local en Haïti (PDLH) (Version finale). [mid-term evaluation of the Local Development Program in Haiti (PDLH) (final version)]

Désilets, J. (2011). Appui à l’implantation de l’approche par compétences (ACP) au Centre de formation professionnelle d’Haïti: Rapport annuel an 1. [skills-based approach (SBA) implementation support at Haiti’s professional training centre: annual report, Year 1]

Désilets, J. (2012). Appui à l’implantation de l’approche par compétences (APC) au Centre de formation professionnelle d’Haïti: Rapport annuel an II. [skills-based approach (SBA) implementation support at Haiti’s professional training centre: annual report, Year 2]

Désilets, J. (2013). Appui à l’implantation de l’approche par compétences (APC) au Centre de formation professionnelle d’Haïti: Rapport semestriel an IV. [skills-based approach (SBA) implementation support at Haiti’s professional training centre: annual report, Year 4]

Development and Peace and Mouvman Peyizan Papay [Papaye rural movement]. (2013). Rapport final: Renforcement de la sécurité alimentaire en Haïti. [final report: strengthening food security in Haiti]

Développement international Desjardins. (2010). Rapport final Évaluation à mi-parcours du programme Bâtir l’avenir: la réduction de la pauvreté par un meilleur accès aux ressources financières mis en œuvre de 2007 à 2011. [final report, mid-term program evaluation, Building the future: reducing poverty via better access to financial resources, implemented from 2007 to 2011]

Développement international Desjardins. (2012a). Programme crédit écolage à Haïti: Rapport annuel du 1er avril 2011 au 31 mars 2012. [Credit for School Fees project in Haiti: annual report from April 1, 2011, to March 31, 2012]

Développement International Desjardins. (2012b). Rapport annuel - Appui aux coopératives d’épargne et de crédit haïtiennes (ACOOPECH) Phase III - Le Levier. [annual report – support for haitian savings and credit co-operatives (ACOOPECH), Phase III – Le Levier]

Dupuis, L.-A. (2008). Projet ACCOOPECH III - Évaluation à mi-parcours de la composante GALATA Rapport final. [ACOOPECH III – mid-term evaluation of the GALATA component, final report]

Econotec inc. (2012). Évaluation sommative du projet Peace Dividend Marketplace - Haïti  (PDM-H) A-034346: Rapport d’Évaluation. [summative evaluation of the Peace Divided Marketplace – Haiti (PMDH-H) project, A-034346: evaluation report]

Embassy of the United States of America. (2012). Partnership Framework to Support Haiti’s Health Strategy 2012-2017.

Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation Division. (2008). Five-year Review of Rights and Democracy (Programs and Activities): Final Report.

Goss Gilroy Inc. (2009a). End of Project Evaluation of Integrated Community Health Care Project in Haiti and Operational Project Evaluation of Maternal Health Care Project - International Child Care: Final Report.

Goss Gilroy Inc. (2009b). Organizational Assessment of Rayjon Share Care (Sarnia and Haiti) and Project Evaluation of “Integrated Rural Community Development” (S062053) and “Agribusiness Development, Environmental Sustainability and Organizational Skills Training” (S064095).

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Greindl, I. & Noirhomme, M. (2012). Évaluation des SOG. [Evaluation of free obstetric care]

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Groupe-Conseil Interalia. (2013b). Évaluation sommative de fin de projet du Projet d’appui au développement du système de santé (PADESS) en Haïti: Rapport final. [end-of-project summative evaluation, Health System Development support project (PADESS) in Haiti: final report]

Groupe-Conseil Interalia. (2013c). Évaluation sommative de fin de projet du Projet d’appui au renforcement des capacités de gestion de la santé en Haïti (PARC): Rapport final. [end-of-project summative evaluation, Health Management Capacity Building support project in Haiti (PARC): final report]

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Hill, M. M. (2012). Multi-Country Study: Providing Health Care in Severely Disrupted Environments: An assessment of the health system in Haiti.

Hogue, M. (2006). Appui aux médias en Haïti: Rapport d’évaluation à mi-parcours. [support for the media in Haiti: mid-term evaluation report]

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Inter-American Development Bank. (2013). Les Cayes - Jeremie: Intermediate Report.

International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. (2012). Projet Haïti Appui aux droits des enfants et des jeunes et à la participation des populations vulnérables dans la reconstruction d’Haïti: Rapport narratif Année 4, semestre 2. [Haiti project, support for the rights of children and youth and participation of vulnerable communities in rebuilding Haiti, narrative report, Year 4, 2nd half]

Jeanty, J. H. (2012). Fonds Bati lavi: Rapport de fermeture. [Bati Lavi Fund: final report]

Kim, Shibchurn, Patenaude, Josué. (2009, July). Economic Development Team.

L’Anglais, C., & Massé, J.-P. (2013). Projet de reconstruction /réhabilitation en éducation, en santé et en eau potable en Haïti. [education, health and water reconstruction/rehabilitation project in Haiti]

Laberge, S. (2010). Rapport de suivi Projet État de droit (PNUD). [Rule of Law project monitoring report (UNDP)]

Lebrun, C. N., Dorval, O., & Vénor, A. P. (2012). Fonds Santé-Éducation - Volet santé et éducation: Rapport de fermeture. [Health and Education Fund, health and education component: final report]

Levasseur, S. (2008). Memorandum for the Minister.

Local Fund Management Centre, Canadian Cooperation in Haiti. (2008). Health and Education Fund, Health Component: Mid-year Report, April-September 2008.

Local Fund Management Centre, Canadian Cooperation in Haiti. (2009). Health and Education Fund, Phase II: Annual Report, 2008-2009.

Lofalanga, J. R. E. (2011). Amélioration de l’état de santé de la reproduction en Haïti - Projet conjoint MSPP/UNFPA/UNICEF/OPS-OMS 2008-2014: Évaluation de mi-parcours 2008-2011 Rapport final. [improving reproductive health in Haiti: MSPP/UNFPA/UNICEF/OPS-OMS 2008-2014 joint project: mid-term evaluation 2008-2011, final report]

Louis-Jean, J. R. (2013). Projet de formation professionnelle et du renouveau économique: Rapport de fin de projet (partie technique). [vocational training and economic renewal project: end-of-project report (technical part)]

Marier, F., Paul, É., Plante, J., & Venort, A. (2007). Évaluation du projet Appui à l’école Nouvelle dans l’Artibonite - Phase II: Rapport d’évaluation (version finale). [New School Support – Artibonite II project evaluation: final evaluation report]

Marier, F., Paul, É., Plante, J., & Venort, A. (2007). Évaluation du projet éducation intégrée en Artibonite: Rapport d’évaluation version finale. [Integrated Education in Artibonite project evaluation: final evaluation report]

Marier, F., & Rochon, C. (2007). Évaluation de fin de projet - Appui à la mise en œuvre du cadre de coopération intérimaire (AMOCCI) en République d’Haïti, Rapport d’évaluation (version finale). [end-of-project evaluation – support in implementing the interim cooperation framework (AMOCCI) in the Republic of Haiti, final evaluation report]

Mazin, D. (2011). UNOPS Hôpital Départemental La Providence aux Gonaïves: Rapport d’activités semestriel. [UNOPS. La Providence Departmental Hospital in Gonaïves: Mid-year activity report]

McGill, H. (2010). Haiti Earthquake 2010: After Action Review of The Government of Canada’s Response.

Ménard, I., Laberge, S., & Guerrier, F. (2008). Rapport final: Revue opérationnelle du projet État de droit Appui au secteur Justice. [final report: project operational review, Rule of Law – Support for the Justice Sector]

Mennonite Central Committee Canada. (2013). Désarmes Vocational Education and Economic Renewal Project: Completion Report.

Morin, L., Renaud, P., & Éléazard, O. (2009a). Évaluation à mi-parcours du projet PADESS/COS-Haïti: Rapport - Version finale. [PADESS/COS-Haiti mid-term project evaluation: final report]

Morin, L., Renaud, P., & Éléazard, O. (2009b). Évaluation à mi-parcours du projet PALIH 2 en HAÏTI  A-032673: Rapport version finale. [PALIH 2 project in Haiti, A-032673, mid-term evaluation, final report]

Morin, L., Renaud, P., & Éléazard, O. (2009c). Évaluation à mi-parcours du projet PARC en Haïti: Rapport version finale. [PARC project in Haiti, mid-term evaluation, final report]

Nancy Thede, Université du Québec à Montréal. (n.d.). Human Security, Democracy, and Development in the Americas: The Washington Consensus Redux?

OECD. (2007). Principes pour l’engagement international dans les États fragiles et les situations précaires (PDF 622.73 KB) (French only). [Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations]

OECD. (2007, December). Ensuring Fragile States Are Not Left Behind – Fact Sheet (PDF 943.73 KB).

OECD. (2010). Enquête de suivi des Principes d’engagement dans les États fragiles et les situations précaires (PDF 953.18 KB) (French only). [Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations]

OECD. (2011). International Engagement in Fragile States: Can’t we do better?

Organization of American States. (2012). Modernization and integration of Haiti’s civil registry project: Final Report.

Oxfam-Québec. (2011a). Prolongation du Projet «Appui à la relance de la production agricole nationale et à l’accroissement de la sécurité alimentaire en Haïti» PARPANASA: Rapport final. [extension of Boosting Agricultural Production and Food Security in Haiti project, PARPANASA, final report]

Oxfam-Québec. (2011b). Coordination nationale de la sécurité alimentaire (CNSA): Rapport d’évaluation finale du PARPARNASA, Régions Plateau Central/Artibonite. [national food security coordination (CNSA): PARPANASA final evaluation report, Central Plateau/Artibonite regions]

Oxfam-Québec. (2011c). Projet d’appui à la relance de la production agricole et à l’accroissement de la sécurité alimentaire: Rapport final Octobre 2008-mars 2011. [Boosting Agricultural Production and Food Security project: final report, October 2008-March 2011]

Parliamentary Centre. (2006). Haiti-Canada Parliamentary Support Project (HCPSP): Project Implementation Plan.

Parliamentary Centre. (2010). Projet d’appui au parlement haïtien (2006-2010). [Support to the Haitian Parliament project (2006-2010)]

Peters, D. (2010). PWCB Partners for Development: Haiti Application Form.

Performance Report – Haiti Program – 2004-2005 (health sector). (n.d.).

Performance Report – Haiti Program – 2004-2005. (2005).

Performance Report – Haiti Program – 2005-2006. (2006).

Performance Report – 2003-2004 - Haiti. (2004).

Poulin, A., & Sicotte, A. (2008). Évaluation de fin de projet - Médias et développement démocratique en Haïti (MDDH): Rapport d’évaluation Version préliminaire. [end-of-project evaluation – Media and democratic development in Haiti (MDDH): draft evaluation report]

Proulx, S., & Luccéus, E. (2006). Fonds Kore Fanm (FKK) - Revue opérationnelle de la Phase II: Rapport (version finale). [operational review of Phase II: final report]

Ramachandran, V., & Walz, J. (2012a). Haiti: Where Has All the Money Gone?

Ramachandran, V., & Walz, J. (2012b). Haiti: Where Has All the Money Gone? (No. 004). Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development.

Republic of Haiti. (November 2007). Document de stratégie nationale pour la croissance et pour la réduction de la pauvreté (DSNCRP) (2008-2010). [national growth and poverty reduction strategy paper (GPRSP) (2008-2010)]

Robert, F. (2009). Rapport sur l’évaluation à mi-parcours du projet Éducation pour tous en Haïti - Mission du 27 avril au 11 mai 2009. [mid-term evaluation report, Education for All project in Haiti – Mission from April 24 to May 11, 2009]

Sanders, Richard. (2008, July 11). Giving a Helping Hand to Haiti’s Elite: How CIDA’s “Agents of Regime Change” Supported the G184. Retrieved from: http://mostlywater.org/giving_a_helping_hand_haiti%E2%80%99s_elite_how_cidas_agents_regime_change_supported_g184

Sanders, R. (n.d.). Agents of Regime Change. Retrieved from http://coat.ncf.ca/our_magazine/links/62/ARC.htm

Save the Children Canada. (n.d.). Semi Annual Progress Report, January-March 2012 “Providing Maternal and Child Health Services in Leogane.”

Save the Children Canada. (2012a). Memorandum of Understanding.

Save the Children Canada. (2012b). Providing Maternal and Child Health Services in Leogane, Haiti: Final Narrative Report.

Shamsie, Yasmine .Canadian Foreign Policy. (2008). Canada’s Approach to Democratization in Haiti: Some Reflections for the Coming Years.

Simpson, E. (2005, May). The Post 9-11 Security Agenda and Canadian Foreign Policy: Implications for the Global South? Key Entry Points for Action: A CCIC Policy Background Paper.

UNCDF. (2012). Évaluation finale: Appui à la gouvernance locale dans le département du Nord-Est (AGL-NE) Haïti. [final evaluation: support for local governance in the Northeast Department (AGL-NE) Haiti]

UNDP. (2013). Human Development Indicators, Country Profile: Haiti.

UNICEF. (2013, January 10). Nearly three years after Haiti earthquake, national survey shows progress for children in Haiti.

United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti. (2011). Has Aid Changed? Channelling assistance to Haiti before and after the earthquake.

Zebich, M. (2008). The Honest Broker? Canada’s Role in Haitian Development. (2009, December). Retrieved from http://mspp.gouv.ht/newsite/documentation.php

Annex E: List of People Interviewed